


The First Dynasty of Islam

The Umayyad Caliphate
AD 661–750

2nd Edition

G.R. Hawting



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MUSLIMS, MONGOLS *AND* CRUSADERS

EDITED BY G. R. HAWTING



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MUSLIMS, MONGOLS AND CRUSADERS

The period from about 1100 to 1350 in the Middle East was marked by continued interaction between the local Muslim rulers and two groups of non-Muslim invaders: the Frankish crusaders from Western Europe and the Mongols from Northeastern Asia. In deflecting the threat those invaders presented, a major role was played by the Mamluk state which arose in Egypt and Syria in 1250. The *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* has, from 1917 onwards, published a variety of articles pertaining to the history of this period by leading historians of the region, and this volume reprints some of the more important and interesting of them for the convenience of students and scholars. In making the selection the interests of those who are not specialists in the history of the Middle East and may not know the languages of the region have been taken into account. This volume will be of interest to historians of medieval Europe who are concerned with the Crusades as well to those interested in the Middle East and the Mongols. The papers here reprinted include discussion on Arabic and other sources for the period (including the controversial *Marco Polo and his 'Travels'*), innovative studies of military, diplomatic, administrative and other issues, and wider treatments of such things as the image of Saladin and historiography on the Mongol Empire. An introduction by the editor puts the papers in the historical and scholarly context.

G.R.Hawting is Head of the History Department and Professor in the History of the Near and Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His special interest and most of his publications relate to the early development of Islam in the Middle East.

MUSLIMS, MONGOLS AND CRUSADERS

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Compiled and Introduced by

G.R.Hawting

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INTRODUCTION¹

The period and its historiography

One notable feature of the period in the history of the Middle East with which the articles collected in this volume are concerned is the migration into the region, or its invasion, by peoples—Turks, Franks and Mongols—originating outside it. These groups ruled over and settled among an already existing population which was diverse but by this time probably predominantly Muslim, and Arabic or Persian speaking. It may be useful to begin with a summary account before proceeding to reflect on the way in which academic scholarship on the period has developed.²

During the ninth and tenth centuries, Turks became the most important element in the armies of the eastern Islamic world. Some achieved positions of power to the extent that they were able to establish and maintain dynastic states independent of the authority of the caliphs in Baghdad. Frequently, the Baghdad caliphs were little more than figureheads, with real power in the hands of Turkish generals and commanders.

The Turks had first come into the Islamic world as individual slaves, selected for training as soldiers and conversion to Islam, to be followed by manumission and service in the armies of the caliph or other powerful figures. Islam had not yet spread among the Turkish tribes of Central Asia and they were still legitimate targets for Muslim raiders and slave traders, their reputation as fighters high. The institution of the slave soldier (*ghulām*, *mamlūk*) was to remain a characteristic feature of Muslim armies in pre-modern times, and so long as there were still non-Muslim Turkish populations they were to remain a favoured source of military manpower.

During the second half of the tenth century, however, Islam began to spread among some groups of Turkish tribes in and beyond what were then the eastern border regions of the Islamic world. The reasons for, and the nature of this process of Islamization, are to some extent obscure but, given the earlier willingness of groups of Turks to adopt religions associated with the settled cultures with which they were in contact, not too difficult to envisage. One of the groups which became Muslim at this time was that of the Oghuz tribes, and in the first half of the eleventh century they began to migrate west under the leadership of the Seljuk family.

By 1055, they had won control over most of Persia and Iraq,

including Baghdad, the residence of the caliphs who were the nominal leaders of Sunni Islam. Subsequently, groups of Turks continued to move west into Syria, over most of which they established control in the 1070s, and northwest into Asia Minor. There, their victory at Manzikert near Lake Van in 1071 over the Byzantine army led by the emperor Romanus Diogenes opened up Asia Minor for the first time to Islamization and Turkification. That region, before Manzikert largely Christian and Greek speaking, is now the heart of the country known as Turkey.

These free Turkish migrants into the Islamic Middle East came as Muslims, and their progress from Central Asia to Baghdad and beyond was relatively slow. This enabled them, or at least their leaders, to adapt and assimilate to the predominantly Perso-Islamic culture of the eastern regions of the Muslim world but without losing their own Turkish identity. The Christian Franks who came as crusaders from western Europe and who arrived in Syria at the end of the eleventh century, in contrast, had no interest in assimilation, although inevitably during the nearly 200 years of their presence in the region they had to adapt to many of the features of the local way of life.

Coming from the north in 1099, the Franks quickly established four Latin Christian polities in the region of Syria: the kingdom of Jerusalem, the principality of Antioch, and the two counties of Edessa and Tripoli. To a large extent this initial success must be explained by the disunity and disharmony of the several Muslim powers who, between them, struggled for hegemony in Syria and more widely in the Middle East.

The Ismāʿīlī ^{Fāṭimid} caliphate, ruling in Cairo since 969, partly as a result of the coming of the Turks, had been forced to abandon its aim of establishing its authority throughout the Muslim world. The Seljuks proclaimed themselves champions of the Sunni form of Islam, and their arrival in Syria ended ^{Fāṭimid} expansion there. Nevertheless, the ^{Fāṭimids} still had supporters in the area and an interest in maintaining a presence at least in Palestine and Ghaza in order to protect Egypt, the heart of their Shiite state.

In central and northern Syria, geographical fragmentation and the divisions inside the Seljuk empire following the death of the sultan Malik Shah in 1092 allowed the development of a political and religious patchwork and a shifting pattern of alliances and hostilities, sometimes involving also the Frankish states. One other notable element here was that of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, known to the Franks and to the west as the Assassins. In the 1090s, they had separated from those Ismāʿīlīs who continued to recognize the leadership of the ^{Fāṭimid} caliphs in Cairo, and they had established politically active groups in various parts of Persia and Syria.

Slowly during the twelfth century these divisions among the Muslims were diminished, although never completely overcome. The process culminated in the rule of Saladin (1169–93), who was able to make himself master of Egypt and of extensive territories in Syria. Saladin's most famous achievement was the wresting back of Jerusalem from the Franks following the battle of Ḥaṭṭīn in 1187; earlier (1171) he had ended the line of Fāṭimid caliphs in Cairo. His seizure of Jerusalem did not, however, bring the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem to an end, and at the time of Saladin's death it still hung on in Acre and Tyre. It was to remain a significant player in the region for another century. Two of the originally three crusading states to the north, those in Tripoli and Antioch, also still survived, but the county of Edessa had been eliminated as early as 1144.

Saladin was succeeded in his Egyptian and Syrian territories by various members of the family to which he belonged, forming a loose, often mutually antagonistic, dynasty—the Ayyūbids whose name is derived from that of Saladin's father (see the dynastic table in Peter Jackson's article in this volume on the crusades of 1239–41). These successors of Saladin were faced with the incursions of several more crusading expeditions from Europe and with the continuing presence of the crusading states in Syria. By this time, however, the crusading movement itself had become more liable to rivalries and competing aims between the various participants, and the crusaders in Syria did not pose the threat to the Muslims that they had before Saladin's time.

During the first half of the thirteenth century, a more immediate and greater danger to the Muslim rulers came from the rise of the power of the Mongols and the disturbances that it triggered in east and Central Asia. Between 1218 and 1221, some of the great Muslim towns of Central Asia were devastated by the raids of Genghis Khan's followers, but the Middle East itself was spared for some years as the Mongols consolidated their conquests in China and expanded in the southern Russian steppe. Genghis himself died in 1227. In the 1240s, renewed Mongol raids led to the submission of a number of Muslim territories, including the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm which had developed in Asia Minor after Manzikert, and to the influx into Syria and Palestine of significant numbers of refugees from Khwarazm, a Muslim state to the southwest of the Aral Sea. This new ingredient in the situation in Syria was to be an important element in the relationship between Ayyūbids and Franks in the region.

In the 1250s, the Mongol invasion of Persia began and by 1258, after the destruction of the strongholds in Persia of the Nizārī Ismā'īlīs (the Assassins), Baghdad was taken. Whereas the Muslim Seljuk Turks, two centuries earlier, had posed as champions of the Baghdad

caliphs and saw the advantages of maintaining the caliphate and exercising control over it, the non-Muslim Mongols had no use for it. They killed the reigning caliph, al-Mustaʿsim and effectively ended an institution that dated back to the earliest Islamic times.

By this time the caliphate had lost its importance in the life of Islam. From the middle of the ninth century its religious authority had been usurped by the religious scholars (the ulema), and the caliph in Baghdad had become little more than a symbol of the unity of Sunni Islam, even though some of the later caliphs were able to take advantage of temporarily favourable conditions to revive their political authority and, to some extent, the prestige of their office. At the level of theory, the writings of several Sunni Muslim scholars reflect the diminished status of the caliphate and it may be argued that by 1258 the institution was no longer of fundamental importance for Muslim religious and political life. Although the idea of the caliphate survived, and although later individuals claimed to be, and to some extent received recognition as, caliphs, the institution henceforth had only an attenuated existence. (See the article in this volume by P.M.Holt on the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo.)

Mongol ambitions in the Middle East were not limited to Persia and Iraq and by 1260 they had entered northern Syria and were pushing south into Palestine. But there they experienced their first significant defeat—at the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt in that year. That proved to be a decisive reverse. Excluded now from lands west of Iraq, the Mongol ruler Hülegü (d. 1265) established his capital in Azerbaijan and he and his Mongol descendants as rulers of Iraq and Persia became known as the dynasty of Il-Khans (1256–1335).³

The Mongols had been defeated at ‘Ayn Jālūt by the recently installed Mamluk sultanate of Cairo. Like earlier Muslim rulers, the Ayyūbid successors of Saladin, especially al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ, sultan of Egypt 1240–49, had built up their armies by the extensive use of slave soldiers. At this time the majority were slaves acquired from among the Turks of the Kipchak steppe of southern Russia.

Al-Ṣāliḥ died during the crusade to Egypt led by Louis IX in 1249 and shortly afterwards his son and successor was killed by some of the Turkish soldiers. By 1257, following a period of puppet rulers and violent intrigues in which one of al-Ṣāliḥ’s concubines, Shajar al-Durr, played a leading part, power in Egypt was seized by the soldier Quṭuz, a Khwarazmian. Quṭuz at first claimed to act on behalf of the son and successor of a previous sultan but soon felt secure enough to send the nominal ruler into early retirement. This was a pattern of succession that became frequent during the following more than two and half centuries when Egypt and Syria were ruled by a series of

sultans who had originally been recruited as slave soldiers.

It was **Qutuz** who commanded the army that defeated the Mongols at 'Ayn Jālūt but soon afterwards he was killed by Baybars, a Turkish Mamluk who had played an important part in the battle and had been involved earlier in the murder of al-Ṣālih's successor. Baybars (1260–77) was the first important sultan in the line of Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria (1250–1517).

Baybars' immediate priority was to secure his territories against further attacks from the Il-Khanid Mongols in Persia. To this end he began to extend his control over Syria by moving against those elements there—Franks, Armenians, Nizārīs and survivors of the Ayyūbid dynasty—who had been or were potentially allies of the Mongols, and to forge links with another Mongol power in the region, the Golden Horde.

The Horde controlled the Russian steppe and exercised suzerainty over the Russian princes to the north. Its rulers were enemies of the Mongol Il-Khans of Iran. Its Khan Berke (1257–67) had accepted Islam although generally the Islamization of the Horde proceeded at a slower pace than that of the Il-Khanid Mongols. From the point of view of Baybars, probably the most important factor was that the Horde controlled the region which was the source of the supply of slaves for the Mamluk territories.

Following the killing of the caliph in Baghdad a member of the 'Abbāsīd family escaped and made his way to Cairo where, in 1261, he was installed as caliph by Baybars. This successor caliphate in Cairo continued until the Ottoman occupation of Egypt in 1517. At a later date the Ottoman sultans in Istanbul claimed that the last caliph of Cairo (who had been taken to Istanbul in 1517) had transferred the office into their hands. The caliphate was proclaimed formally abolished by Kemal Atatürk when he established the state of Turkey in 1922.

After the death of Baybars in 1277, the Mamluk sultanate eventually passed to a figure of similar stature, Qalāwūn (1279–90), who continued the policies of his predecessor. Largely as a by-product of the need for security against the Mongols in Iran, Qalāwūn was concerned to bring Syria more firmly under his control. His great achievement was the taking of the county of Tripoli in 1289. He died shortly afterwards while preparing for an attack upon Acre. That prize finally fell to Qalāwūn's son and successor, al-Malik al-Ashraf Khalīl b. Qalāwūn (1290–93).

A convenient conclusion to the period we are concerned with in this volume is signalled by the destruction of the last remaining Frankish possessions in Syria during the 1290s and by the conversion to Sunnī Islam of the Mongol Il-Khanid ruler of Persia, Ghazān Khan (1295–

1304). The conversion of the Il-Khans to Islam symbolizes the gradual acculturation of the Mongol conquerors of Iran and was a significant stage in the disappearance of the Mongols as a distinct ethnic group in the Middle East. Thirty years or so after the death of Ghazān, the Il-Khanate itself had disappeared, and when—some twenty years later—a claimant to the Il-Khanid throne appeared, he bore the traditional Persian name of Anushirwan.

Nevertheless, the acceptance of Islam by Ghazān Khan did not end the hostility between the Mongols in Iran and the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria. Ghazān was even able to take possession of Damascus for a short time in 1299–1300. A second attempted invasion in 1303 was less successful and Syria thenceforth remained under Mamluk control until the coming of the Turko-Mongol Timur (Tamerlane) a century or so later.

Clearly, a selection of articles concerned with aspects of Mamluk, Mongol and Crusading history, taken from the volumes of the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* published in the latter two-thirds of the twentieth century, will not be completely representative of the development of studies in these fields. There are scholars—Bertold Spuler, Claude Cahen and Ulrich Haarmann are just three who come to mind—who made major contributions but did not publish (at least on these subjects) in the *Bulletin*.⁴ Equally there are areas, for example, artistic, intellectual and religious history in the period of this volume, which have received significant attention elsewhere but are largely unrepresented here. The majority of the contributions in this volume are concerned with political, diplomatic, administrative and institutional history, and the methods and evidence used are also predominantly traditional—that is, the critical analysis of texts, predominantly the chronicles and biographies written by contemporaries. Most of the research presented here is based on the appearance or easier availability of new textual sources, or by fresh exploitation of already known texts.

Given the tight focus of most academic articles, it is not really possible on the basis merely of those in this volume to deduce how far and in what direction views about the significance of the period as a whole may have developed. It may be of value, however, to consider some views about the period generally and to see how far the articles collected here indicate developing understandings of it.

Two of the contributors to this volume, in particular, have been concerned to view the period within the *longue durée* of the Islamic Middle East.

H.A.R. Gibb, in an influential article assaying an interpretation of medieval Islamic history, which appeared in the first issue of the

Journal of World History, characterized this period as one in which the “orthodox institution” of Islam (he was referring to the body of Sunni scholars concerned above all with the interpretation and implementation of the Law) lost its ability to integrate and provide leadership in society, a role that increasingly came to be taken over by Sufi movements. This development he associated with an urban and economic decline consequent upon the expansion of nomadism, and the coming of the Turks and Mongols was part of that phenomenon. The growing influence of Sufism, the major forms of which, according to Gibb, had grave intellectual consequences for Islam (“it drew intellectual energies off into subjective and antirational speculation”) was

hastened on by the destruction of the still vigorous centers of Islamic culture in north Persia during the Mongol invasion of 1220, and the Mongol occupation of all western Asia (except Syria) after the capture of Baghdad in 1258. The orthodox institution was eclipsed under the rule of heathen princes, and though it gradually revived in the following century its social and political foundations were too weak to allow it to recover its former influence.⁵

Gibb, therefore, tends to view the period unfavourably in comparison with the earlier one in which, following the Arab conquest of the Middle East, Islamic society and culture had formed. Gibb seems to value the Arab contribution over that of other ethnic and linguistic groups, urban society over that of agriculturalists and pastoralists, and Sunni “orthodoxy” over other forms of Islam in the religious sphere.

The view of the period, especially between the coming of the crusades and the Mongol conquests, as one of stagnation or even decline has been shared by some other scholars. Historians who focus on political developments have often emphasized the political fragmentation of the Islamic world from the ninth century onwards—the period in which the importance of the Turks first became notable. Those who focus on intellectual and religious matters sometimes point to a perceived lack of innovation in the tradition of Islamic philosophy (Averroes, d. 1197, and Maimonides, d. 1204, are often seen as the last significant scholars in that tradition); and to an alleged increasing narrowness and intolerance in the field of religion (Ibn Taymiyya, d. 1328, is sometimes seen as the key figure here; al-Ghazālī, d. 1111, although generally admired for the sophistication of his theology, is sometimes regarded less favourably for the impact of his attack on the philosophical tradition).

Bernard Lewis shares the view that it was the already apparent

internal weaknesses of Islamic state and society in the Middle East that made it susceptible to attack from outside. Those weaknesses were political, economic and cultural. Internally, the chief threat was posed by Ismāʿīlī Shiism, externally it came from the invaders from the east—the Turks and subsequently the Mongols.

However, for Lewis, the Turks were not simply one aspect of the spread of nomadism at the expense of urban society. He emphasizes the identification of the Turks with Islam and the role they played in defending the Sunni form of the religion against the Ismāʿīlīs and the Crusaders, which allowed it to recover and develop its strength.

He sees Sufism, not in the rather negative way of Gibb, but as strengthening Sunnism by providing it with an emotional content in addition to its legal and dogmatic ingredients. The development of the Sufi tradition was not at the expense of the “religious institution” but accompanied the rise of that institution to a position of authority which was in fact greater than that it had enjoyed in early Islam. Under the Turks the religious institution came to be incorporated into the structure of political authority, a process which reached its peak in the “gunpowder empires” which emerged in the period following the withering away of the Mongol presence.

The destruction of the caliphate by the Mongols, according to this view, was no more than the laying to rest of something already moribund, and Lewis also plays down the long-term destructive effects of the Mongol devastation. Without minimizing the depredations of the Mongols in the lands that they conquered, he stresses too the potential for speedy recovery and the fact that the Mongols never reached Egypt which, by this time, had replaced Baghdad as the centre of Islamic civilization in the Middle East. He regards, however, the coming of the Mongols as deleterious for the long-term political and agricultural development of Iraq.

The chief legacy of the period other than the resurgence of Sunnism, according to Lewis, was the division of the Islamic Middle East into two cultural zones—that dominated by Persian and Turkish to the north and east and that by Arabic to the south and west—although to some extent this division was countered by the revival of Sunnism.⁶

Lewis’s presentation, therefore, seems less negative than that of Gibb. For Lewis, the period seems generally to be one of recovery and development (although not necessarily constant and consistent), preparing the way for the flourishing of Islam in the period of the “gunpowder empires” (the Ottomans, Safavids and Moghuls) before the impact of modernity on the Middle East from around the end of the eighteenth century.

Our other contributors have been less ready to paint with such broad

strokes, perhaps reflecting a feeling shared by many contemporary historians that their primary task is to understand rather than to evaluate and that the broad delineation of periods of history may be at the expense of their complexity and diversity.

It is perhaps possible to deduce, nevertheless, that few of them would share the negative views of Gibb. Assuming that scholars do not devote themselves to the study of topics that they do not consider important and attractive, the recent revival of interest in the Mongols (illustrated here especially by the contributions of Amitai, Jackson and Morgan) and in the Mamluks (Amitai, Ayalon and Holt here, Haarmann and others elsewhere) points to a more positive evaluation of these groups compared with that of some earlier writers (and of much popular writing).

At the beginning of his article on “The position and power of the Mamlūk Sultan” (chapter 8, below), Holt quotes the view of Prideaux in 1722 that “they scarce did anything worthy to be recorded in History”. His own article then goes on to illustrate the power, wealth and sophistication of the Mamluk state and to argue that it was more stable and united than the previous Ayyūbid regime. The achievement of the Mamluks in their struggles against the Mongols and Franks has long been recognized, but Holt’s assessment of them seems to go beyond that.⁷

To say that there has been a clear and marked change in the scholarly treatment of the period is perhaps to put the case too strongly, but any attempt to discuss it generally today would take account of, for example, increased awareness of the richness and diversity of the Shiite (Ismā‘īlī and Twelver) tradition of Islam, the importance of Sufism in spreading Islam in Asia and Africa, and the importance too of the Mongol conquests for the spread of Islam in central and eastern Asia. The Arab, Sunni and urban bias which characterized the interpretation of Gibb has declined in scholarship, if not necessarily in popular accounts and in the use of the Crusaders and the Mongols in political propaganda.

On two particular points modern scholarship has taken issue with views expressed in popular and politically inspired presentations.

The Crusades have naturally elicited comparisons in some circles with what is portrayed as the threat from “western” imperialism and Zionism. One result has been to magnify the importance of the Crusades as a factor in the history of the Middle East and that has been a consequence too of the modern idealization of Saladin and the wish on the part of several modern Arab leaders to be seen as inheritors of his mantle.

In contrast, modern scholarship on the Crusades has tended to diminish their importance in the development of Islamic and Middle

Eastern history generally, in contrast to their importance in European history. It has been pointed out that following the liquidation of the last Frankish states in the 1290s the historical memory of them faded in the Middle East until the nineteenth century when it revived as European historical works came to be translated into Arabic. The Arabic expression for “crusades” (*al-ḥurūb al-ṣalibiyya*) did not exist prior to the nineteenth century; until that point the common name for the crusaders in Arabic was the ethnic designation “Franks”, and no historical works on the Crusades appeared in Arabic before the late nineteenth century.⁸ The significance of the Crusades in the history of the Middle East may be debated but modern scholarship is inclined to limit it.⁹

The second point concerns the long-term consequences of the destruction caused by the Mongol raids and conquests in the first half of the thirteenth century. That the Mongols were destructive of agriculture and towns is not questioned, but there has been a reaction against the view, sometimes expressed in popular and politically motivated writings, that the Mongols are to be blamed for many of the ills which have been claimed to afflict the Middle East even into the twentieth century—agricultural and economic “backwardness”, the failure to develop representative political institutions, the dominance of society by the military, etc.¹⁰

The period treated in this volume continues to inspire research and interest, and it is hoped that the greater accessibility of these articles as a result of their republication here will contribute to that.

Notes on the authors and articles

Some of the authors of articles collected in this volume contributed to Middle Eastern and Islamic studies, and other fields, in areas unconnected with that which is of interest here. In the following notes I have focused mainly on their work associated with the Crusades, the Mamluks and the Mongols.

Joseph de Somogyi (1899–1976) is perhaps best known for his association with Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921), often regarded as the real founder of the academic study of Islam. De Somogyi seems to have been the last of Goldziher's students to survive, was one of the editors of the Goldziher Memorial Volumes, was responsible for the publication of his teacher's *Gesammelte Schriften*, and for the composition of several obituaries and tributes. He himself was Professor of Islamic Languages in the School of Oriental Commercial Studies at Budapest until after the Second World War when he moved to Harvard. His *A Short History of Oriental Trade* was published in 1968.¹¹

The text of the *qaṣīda* mourning the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols, which de Somogyi edited and translated in his article (1933) reprinted here, is taken from the *Ta'rīkh al-Islām* of Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347), a work which was only in manuscript at the time de Somogyi wrote. The full text is now available in the edition of 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (52 vols, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1987–99) and the poem is printed in the volume for the years AH 641–650, at pp. 37–39.¹² Tadmurī indicates that the poem is also given in the *Nuṣūṣ al-zāhira* of Ibn Taghrībī. A *marthiya* (in Arabic) on the same subject by the famous Persian poet al-Sa'dī (d. 691/1292) may also be noted.¹³

For discussion of the Mongol conquest of Baghdad, the precise dating of which seems to be open to question, see J.A. Boyle, "The death of the last 'Abbāsīd caliph of Baghdad: a contemporary Muslim account", *Journal of Semitic Studies* 6 (1961), and, by the same author, *The Cambridge History of Iran*, v, Cambridge 1968, 345–350.

Avraham N. Poliak (b. Kiev, 1910) was Research Professor and Head of the Department of General and Jewish History at the University of Tel Aviv and is probably best known for his work (in Hebrew) on the Jewish Khazars¹⁴ and for that pertaining to the agrarian and social history of the Middle East in the late mediaeval period. His *Feudalism*

in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon¹⁵ is the best known of his works in English. With reference to the subject of the present volume, Poliak's "La caractère colonial de l'état mamelouk dans ses rapports avec la Horde d'Or", *Revue des Études Islamiques* 9 (1935):231–245, may be noted.¹⁶

The main thesis of Poliak's "The influence of Chingiz-Khān's Yāsa upon the general organization of the Mamlūk State" (1940–42) is that the law and administration of the Mamluk sultanate, especially as they concerned the Mamlūk element of the population, were consciously derived from and modelled upon the "great yāsa" or code of law promulgated by Genghiz Khan. The article was published under wartime conditions, and appended at the end are a number of critical comments contributed by the great Iranologist, Vladimir Minorsky (d. 1966), the first of which questions the validity of Poliak's thesis.

Subsequent work, notably that of the late David Ayalon (see especially the reference at note 1 of Morgan's article on the Yāsa below), and the article of David Morgan which is included in this volume, has served to weaken much of Poliak's argument and even to question the nature and existence of the alleged yāsa of Genghiz Khan. Nevertheless, his willingness to contemplate the Mamluk sultanate in a wider comparative context is refreshing, and some of his suggestions and details seem deserving of continuing reflection.

H.A.R. (Sir Hamilton) Gibb (d. 1971) was perhaps the foremost British Arabist and historian of the Middle East of his generation.¹⁷ Professor of Arabic at the universities of London, Oxford and Harvard in succession, his writings deal with many aspects of Arabic literature, Middle Eastern history and Islam. He contributed four chapters to the first volume, and one to the second, of the monumental *A History of the Crusades*, published by the University of Wisconsin Press under the general editorship of K.M.Setton.¹⁸ The career of Saladin in particular was a theme to which he devoted several articles and a posthumous book.

In addition to the chapter "The rise of Saladin, 1169–1189" in the first volume of Setton's *History*, mention may be made here of his "The armies of Saladin", *Cahiers d'Histoire égyptienne* 3 (1951):304–320; "The achievement of Saladin", *Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library* 35 (1952): 44–60; (both were reprinted in Stanford J.Shaw and William R.Polk (eds), *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* by Hamilton A.R.Gibb, London 1962); and *The Life of Saladin from the works of 'Imād ad-Dīn and Bahā' ad-Dīn*, Oxford 1973.

Gibb's "Notes on the Arabic materials for the history of the early Crusades" (1933–35) is a pioneering analysis of the mediaeval Arabic source material for the early period of the crusades. It was occasioned by the appearance of the first of the three volumes of René Grousset's

Histoires des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem (Paris 1934–36).

Gibb argues that on a number of points the understanding of Grousset and others may be criticized because they interpret the early period of the crusades in the light of conditions and attitudes that only developed later. This anachronistic view of the early period is the result of excessive reliance on sources dating from the time of Saladin and later. To some extent that was inevitable since it was the later sources, in particular the universal history (*al-Kāmil fi'l-ta'rīkh*) of Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233), which were the first to become known to western scholars. In the second part of his article, Gibb shows that the understanding of the events of the earlier period which Ibn al-Athīr presents must be corrected by comparison with earlier material, more contemporary with the events treated. Particularly important is the *Dhayl Ta'rīkh Dimashq* (Continuation of the History of Damascus) by Ibn al-Qalānisi (d. 555/1160). Gibb himself had made some of the important passages of Ibn al-Qalānisi's work available in an English translation a few years earlier (*The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, London 1932).

Bernard Lewis was, at the time of his retirement (1986), Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, and currently holds that title as Emeritus Professor. Before his move to Princeton in 1974 he was Professor of the History of the Near and Middle East in the University of London, and he is a former editor of *BSOAS*. His many writings range widely over the pre-modern and modern history of the Middle East, but his earliest interest was in the mediaeval period and especially in the history of the Ismā'īlī branch of Shiite Islam, and its subgroup, the Nizārī Assassins.

His revised University of London PhD thesis was published as *The Origins of Ismailism: a study of the background of the Fatimid caliphate* (Cambridge 1940, reprinted New York 1975), and his *The Assassins. A radical sect in Islam*, London 1967. He also contributed the chapter on "The Ismā'īlites and the Assassins" to vol. I of Setton's *A History of the Crusades*.

Lewis's "Saladin and the Assassins" (1953) may be understood as an exercise in source criticism similar to that in Gibb's article, as much as an exploration of its avowed theme. Lewis suggests that Saladin's own presentation of himself as the champion of "orthodox" Sunni Islam against the Shiite "heretics", an image which seems to be corroborated by many of the sources, may be called into question. By examining the range of available sources, including the semi-legendary historical work of the Ismā'īlī Abū Firās, Lewis is able to present Saladin's relationship with the Assassins as more pragmatic than one would guess from the rather idealizing accounts produced by

his own officials and biographers.

David Ayalon, who is represented in this collection by three articles on the structure of the Mamluk army (1953 and 1954), devoted the majority of his work to the study of military slavery in Islam and put the study of the Mamluk state on a new footing. His academic career was associated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where, at the time of his death in 1998, he was Emeritus Professor of Islamic History.

For a useful summary of his work, see Reuven Amitai, "The rise and fall of the Mamluk institution: a summary of David Ayalon's works", in M.Sharon (ed.), *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon*, Jerusalem and Leiden 1986, 19–30; for a brief obituary and complete bibliography, see idem, "David Ayalon, 1914–1998", in *Mamlūk Studies Review* 3 (1999), 1 ff. Most of his articles are now available in four volumes of the Variorum Collected Studies Series: *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt, 1250–1517*, London 1977; *The Mamluk Military Society*, London 1979; *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs*, London 1988; and *Islam and the Abode of War*, Aldershot 1994. His best known book is *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society*, London 1956.

Ayalon's three articles here on the structure of the Mamluk army represent a major item in his scholarly work and a continuing substantial introduction to the structure and terminology of the ruling institution of the Mamluk state. As has been emphasized by Amitai, Ayalon's scholarly strength was his concern for the correct understanding of terminology, but he was also willing to stand back and present the details in a broader context.

P.M.Holt, who is represented in this volume by five articles was, at the time of his retirement in 1982, Professor of the History of the Near and Middle East in the University of London. Much of his earlier work had concerned Egypt and the Sudan in the Ottoman and modern periods, but he went on to make a number of important contributions to the history of the Middle East in the time of the crusades and the Mamluks.

He is the editor of a collection of seminar papers, *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades*, Warminster 1977; he translated from the Arabic *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince: Abu'l-Fidā'*, Sultan of Hamah (672–732/1273–1331), Wiesbaden 1983; and is the author of *The Age of the Crusades: the Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517*, London 1986; and *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290): Treaties of Baybars and Qalāwūn with Christian Rulers*, Leiden 1995. Among his articles are: "Qalāwūn's treaty with Genoa, 1290", *Der Islam* 57 (1980): 101–108; "Three

biographies of al-ẓāhir Baybars”, in D.O.Morgan (ed.), *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, London 1982; “Literary offerings: a genre of courtly literature”, in Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (eds), *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, Cambridge 1998, 3–16; and “The last Mamlūk Sultan: al-Malik al-Ashraf Tūmān Bāy”, in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 25 (2001):234–246. His translation from the French of Claude Cahen’s *The Formation of Turkey: The Seljukid Sultanate of Rūm, 11th to 14th century* also appeared in 2001 (London: Longman).

By the time of Holt’s review article, “Saladin and his admirers: a biographical reassessment” (1983), which was occasioned by the appearance of the work of Lyons and Jackson on Saladin,¹⁹ the scholarly reassessment of Saladin had developed considerably. A study by A.Ehrenkreutz (publication details in Holt’s article) had even presented him as something of a disaster and a villain. Holt underlines the place of Gibb in a tradition of idealization of Saladin that in the west goes back to Walter Scott and earlier, while its ultimate roots may be traced to the success of the propaganda that Saladin and his panegyrists Ibn Shaddād and ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī created. The author himself shares the middle of the road position of Jackson and Lyons rather than the more polemical stance of Ehrenkreutz.

The other four of Holt’s articles reprinted here are contributions to Mamluk history (and in one case to Il-Khanid history also).

His “The position and power of the Mamlūk Sultan” (1975) discusses such things as accession ceremonies, titles, symbols of office, the roles of the Sultan and his relationship with the Mamluk amirs and the representatives of Islam. Holt’s suggestion that rulers of slave origin could nevertheless adopt some of the trappings of sacral kingship is especially interesting. The article emphasizes the complexity and evolving character of the Mamluk sultanate and argues that, in spite of inherent weaknesses, for two and half centuries it not only survived but exercised political and military power more effectively than had its Ayyūbid predecessor.

Holt’s “The treaties of the early Mamluk sultans with the Frankish states” (1980) discusses aspects of seven treaties (or “truces” as they are regarded according to Islamic law) between the Mamluk rulers in Cairo and various Frankish authorities in the kingdom of Jerusalem and the county of Antioch-Tripoli in the second half of the thirteenth century. These treaties, and details about their conclusion, have been preserved in Arabic literary sources for the period. Particularly interesting is the final account of the abrogation by Qalāwūn of his treaty with the Latin kingdom in 1290, which a year later was to lead to the final extinction of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

“Some observations on the ‘Abbāsid caliphate of Cairo” (1984) discusses the circumstances and considerations, different in each case, which led Baybars to install the first two of the caliphs, and examines the largely powerless position of the caliph in the Mamluk sultanate. Holt quotes the saying of a Mamluk amīr, “For God’s sake—nobody takes any notice of the caliph!” Nevertheless, the sultans found it useful to try to legitimize their seizure of power by having the caliph play a role in their accession ceremonies, and it may be added that some of the Delhi sultans in India, too, thought it politic to emphasize their allegiance to the Cairo caliphs. Holt demonstrates the evident falsity of the claim that the last Cairo caliph transferred his position to the Ottoman sultan after the Ottomans had captured Cairo and taken the caliph to Istanbul.²⁰

Finally, Holt’s “The Īlkhān ^{Aḥmad’s} embassies to Qalāwūn: two contemporary accounts” (1986) compares two Arabic accounts of embassies, letters and gifts sent by the first of the Il-Khanid rulers to be converted to Islam, Tegüder ^{Aḥmad} (681–683/1282–1284), to the Mamluk sultan Qalāwūn (678–689/1279–1290).²¹ ^{Aḥmad’s} acceptance of Islam was a personal conversion which preceded the later “communal conversion” of the Il-Khānate under Ghazān Khān (694–704/1295–1304), aspects of which are considered in the article of Reuven Amitai-Preiss reprinted here.

Holt draws attention to some discrepancies between the accounts, which agree, however, regarding the display put on by the Mamluk ruler in attempting to impress his Mongol contemporary with his might and magnificence. Behind this, however, Holt detects the continuing fear and mistrust of the Mongols among the Mamluks.

Peter Jackson is currently Reader in History at the University of Keele, and is especially known for his work on Mongol and Persian history in the period with which this volume is concerned.

As well as being the author of several articles in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, he is the author of “The accession of Qubilai Qa’an: a re-examination”, *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society* 2 (1975):1–10; “The dissolution of the Mongol empire”, *Central Asiatic Journal* 22 (1978):186–244; “Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols, and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjāb and Sind”, *Iran* (1990):45–53; “From Ulus to Khanate: the making of the Mongol states, C.1220–C.1290”, in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David Morgan (eds), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, Leiden 1999; “The state of research: the Mongol empire, 1986–1999”, *Journal of Medieval History* 26 (2000):189–210; and “The fall of the Ghurid dynasty”, in Carole Hillenbrand (ed.), *The Sultan’s Turret*, Leiden 2000. For another contribution by him on the crusades see “The crisis in the Holy Land in 1260”, *English Historical Review* 95 (1980):481–513. Jackson also edited volume 6 of the

Cambridge History of Iran, and he is the author of a history of the Delhi Sultanate (Cambridge 1999). He translated and, together with David Morgan, provided the scholarly commentary for, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: his journey to the court of the Great Khān Möngke, 1253–55*, London 1990.

Jackson's discussion of "The Crusades of 1239–41 and their aftermath" (1987) is concerned with a relatively neglected period in the history of the Franks in Syria. He demonstrates both the substantial increase in source material, western and eastern, since the time of Gibb's paper, and what can be done by someone able to exploit the full range of sources. He is able to exploit in particular volume iv/2 of the *Arabic History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church*, the edited and translated text of which became available in 1974, and which has new information on military history in the early 1240s. That enables Jackson to present a picture which underlines the complexities in the military and political situation faced by the Franks and to counter the propaganda directed against Theobald, especially that emanating from the Emperor Frederick II who was concerned to maintain the commercial links between Sicily and Egypt.

"Marco Polo and his 'Travels'" (1998) discusses the problems surrounding the provenance and nature of the work associated with the name of the famous Venetian traveller. The article is relevant in the context of the present volume because, while the *Travels* have sometimes been regarded as a valuable source for aspects of Asian and Middle Eastern history in the last decades of the thirteenth century, recent research has tended to be more sceptical and to cast doubts on the value of the information it contains. In particular the work of Frances Wood, *Did Marco Polo go to China?*, London 1995, has suggested that the Venetian may not have gone further east than Constantinople or the Black Sea.

Jackson's conclusions are less sceptical: he argues that the book as it exists (and the manuscript history is very complex and difficult to reconstruct) should be regarded as an account of the known world rather than a relation of the journey of Marco Polo, and that, while the stature of Polo is likely to have been exaggerated, nevertheless some of the material pertaining to China and the Mongols must be the result of personal observations. Although his judgements incline towards the positive, he demonstrates the difficulties of reaching firm conclusions about the value of the *Travels* as an historical source.

David Morgan is Professor of History and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He was until 1999 Reader in the History of the Near and Middle East at SOAS, a member of the Editorial Board of *BSOAS* on various occasions, and Editor of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*.

Morgan is the author of *The Mongols*, Oxford 1986, and *Medieval Persia, 1040–1797*, London 1988. In addition to his contribution to *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (for which see under Jackson, above) and his joint editing with R.Amitai of *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, Leiden 1999, he is the editor of *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, London 1982 (which includes his article “Persian historians and the Mongols”). Among his other articles are: “The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300”, in Peter W.Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement*, Cardiff 1985, 231–235; “Mongol or Persian: the government of Il-Khan Iran”, *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 3 (1996):62–76; “Rashīd al-Dīn and Ghazān Khan”, *Bibliothèque Iranienne* 45 (1997); and “Reflections on Mongol communications in the Ilkhānate”, in Carole Hillenbrand (ed.), *The Sultan’s Turret*.

His “Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn on barbarian rule in Italy and Persia” (1977) compares and contrasts the personalities, writings, and the historical times in which they lived, of two “native” administrators who worked on behalf of the “barbarian” conquerors of societies with long traditions of culture and bureaucratic government. In spite of some striking similarities, the article draws attention to the fundamentally different relationship between the Ostrogoths and the culture of the Roman aristocratic families, on the one hand, and the Mongols and the Perso-Islamic tradition, on the other. One difficulty that Morgan recognizes in the article is the question of the authenticity of the letters attributed to Rashīd al-Dīn which he uses as a source. Elsewhere he acknowledges the strength of the arguments against their authenticity mounted by A.H.Morton.²²

Five years before the publication of his own book on the subject (*The Mongols*, referred to above), Morgan surveyed some other works of attempted synthesis and popular historical writing on the Mongols in “The Mongol Empire: a review article” (1981). This remains informative for its insights into the problems facing scholars working in the field of Mongol history.

Undoubtedly the most challenging of the three articles of Morgan in this volume is his “The ‘Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān’ and Mongol law in the Ilkhānate” (1986). The notion of the yāsā, understood as a written law code promulgated by Genghiz Khān which served as the unalterable basis of Mongol law and administration, has been widely accepted in modern scholarship. Stimulated by a series of articles in *Studia Islamica* by David Ayalon,²³ Morgan dissects the evidence on which this notion has been based, suggests possible explanations as to why and how the notion may have arisen, and calls into question—without completely rejecting—whether such an institution ever existed.

Given the prominence of the idea in the literature on Mongol history—and, as is evident from the article of Poliak included here, on related fields—Morgan’s questioning of it marks an important development. For further discussion of the topic, see I. de Rachewiltz, “Some reflections on Cinggis Qan’s *Jasay*”, *East Asian History* 6 (1993):91–104, and the remarks of Reuven Amitai at pp. 3–6 of his article “Ghazan, Islam and Mongol tradition: a view from the Mamlūk sultanate”, reprinted in the present volume. In the light of these and other recent studies, Morgan has looked again at the question in “The ‘Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’ revisited”, in R.Amitai and M.Biran (eds), *Nomads and sedentary peoples in the Middle East and East Asia* (forthcoming).

Reuven Amitai²⁴ is a Professor, and currently Head of Department, in the Department of Islamic and Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of several articles on the history of the Mongols in the Middle East and of *Mongols and Mamluks. The Mamluk-Ilkhānid War 1260–81*, Cambridge 1995. He has edited, jointly with David Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, Leiden 1999. For his appreciations of David Ayalon, see the note under Ayalon above. Among his other articles are: “Hülegü and the Ayyūbid lords of Transjordan”, *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 9 (1995–97); “Sufis and Shamans: some remarks on the Islamisation of the Mongols in the Il-Khanate”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 1999; “Northern Syria between the Mongols and the Mamluks: political boundary, military frontier and ethnic affinities”, in Daniel Powers and Naomi Standen (eds), *Frontiers in Question*, London 1999, 128–152; “Al-Nuwayrī as a historian of the Mongols”, in Hugh Kennedy (ed.), *The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800)*, Leiden 2001, 23–36; and “The conversion of Tegüdar Ilkhān to Islam”, *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 25 (2001), 15–43.

His “Ghazan, Islam and Mongol tradition: a view from the Mamlūk sultanate” (1996), uses Arabic sources, some only available in ms., to throw light on various aspects of the acceptance of Islam by the Il-Khanid Ghazan in 694/1295, and its consequences. He refers to the Islam held by Ghazan and those Mongols who followed him into it as “syncretic”, and shows that it existed together with attachment to Mongol tradition and religion, even though elements of that tradition and religion were in direct conflict with demands of the Sharia. As Amitai concludes, this is more historically convincing than to envisage that Islamization meant a decisive break with the Mongol past.

T.H.Barrett is Professor of East Asian History in the University of London, and the current Chair of the Editorial Board of *BSOAS*. He is a specialist on the history of religion in China and author of several

articles and books on pre-modern China. He has contributed “Qubilai Qa’an and the Historians: some remarks on the position of the Great Khān in pre-modern Chinese historiography”, to *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* edited by Amitai and Morgan.

The *Secret History of the Mongols*, with which his short note is concerned, is in David Morgan’s words, “the only substantial surviving Mongol work about the Mongol Empire, the only direct insight we possess into how the Mongols viewed things”.²⁵ It has survived in a transcription in Chinese characters (originally it was written in the script of the Turkish Uighurs which Genghiz Khan had adopted for the writing of Mongolian) and in an abridged Chinese translation. The circumstances in which the Chinese transcription and translation were made are obscure, and Barrett’s note draws attention to a piece of evidence which has not previously been taken into account in discussions of the genesis of the texts.

The new evidence seems to point to the existence of the Chinese translation at a date slightly earlier than that accepted previously. More generally, Barrett suggests that Ming historiography has not been sufficiently investigated regarding the information it may contain of interest to students of the Mongols.

Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Michael Brett, George Lane and David Morgan for help and advice in preparing this Introduction.
- 2 Of course, a summary account is not in any sense neutral. The following is based on the accounts of the period established by scholars (such as Gibb and Lewis), some of whose assumptions and approaches are discussed later in this Introduction. Some may feel that the emphasis on invasion, disintegration and destruction now gives a rather limited view of the period.
- 3 For some remarks on the significance of this dynastic appellation, see R.Amitai-Preiss, “Ghazan, Islam and Mongol tradition”, ch. 18 of the present volume. [7, n. 43 in original pagination]
- 4 Note, however, Ulrich Haarmann’s “Regional sentiment in medieval Islamic Egypt”, *BSOAS* 43 (1980):55–66, which is not included here because it is slightly tangential to the the theme of this volume.
- 5 H.A.R.Gibb, “An interpretation of Islamic history”, *Journal of World History* 1 (1953):39–62; cited here from the reprint in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, London 1962, 3–32—see especially 27 ff.
- 6 This summary is based on [chapter 5](#) (“The coming of the steppe peoples”) of B.Lewis, *The Middle East. Two thousand years of history from the rise of Christianity to the present day*, London 1995. Lewis has attempted similar broad treatments elsewhere: see, e.g., his *The Arabs in History*, 1st edn London 1950, which naturally interprets the period from the point of view of its importance for the Arabs and consequently emphasizes decline and decay more than mere change.
- 7 See too Holt’s “Conclusion: retrospect and prospect” at the end of his *The Age of the Crusades. The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517*, London 1986. For the positive evaluation of the military achievements of the Mamluks in the Islamic historical tradition, see U.Haarmann, “Der Segen des Sklaventums”, in U.Haarmann (ed.), *Geschichte der arabischen Welt*, Munich 1987, 217 f. Regarding the Mamluk victory at ‘Ayn Jālūt, modern scholarship now sometimes emphasizes the disadvantages of the Mongol position as much as the military prowess of the Mamluks at the battle.
- 8 This last point may now need to be modified. In 1981, Suhayl Zakkār published a short work, apparently based on a manuscript found in the Bibliothèque Nationale, devoted to the Crusades and entitled *Al-I‘lām wa’l-*

tabyīn fī khurūj al-firanj al-ma'ādīn 'alā diyār al-muslimīn ("Information and explanation regarding the attacks of the accursed Franks on the lands of the Muslims"). In his introduction Zakkār attributes this work to Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Ḥarīrī and dates it to 926/1520. Possible questions remain, however, about the provenance and dating of the work (Zakkār describes the ms. but omits to give the catalogue no.), for my knowledge of which I am indebted to P.M.Holt's review of Carole Hillenbrand's *The Crusades* (see below) in *BSOAS*.

9 One issue on which there is general agreement is the importance of the Crusades in the development of commerce between Europe and the Middle East. For discussion of the importance of the Crusades in the history of the Middle East, see the article "Crusades" by Cl.Cahen in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edn, Leiden 1954 ff. and, most recently, Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades, Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh 1999, especially ch. 9.

10 For discussion and references see Bernard Lewis, "The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim polity", in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series 18 (1968,):49–68 (reprinted in his *Islam in History*, new edition, Chicago 1993, 189–207), and D.O.Morgan, *The Mongols*, Oxford 1986, 73–83.

11 For an obituary and tribute see *Studies in Islam* 15 (1978):145–147.

12 I am very grateful to Mr Khaled al-Mufti for sending me a copy of this part of the edited text.

13 *Kulliyāt al-Sa'dī*, ed.M.'Alī Furūghī, reprint Tehran 1363/1984, 766.

14 See now Kevin Allen Brook, *The Jews of Khazaria*, Northvale NJ 1999.

15 London 1939; the text was reprinted together with appendices consisting of two of Poliak's articles on the subject dating from 1936 and 1937, Philadelphia 1972.

16 I know of no obituary of Poliak, and have only been able to ascertain his year of birth. I am grateful to Shani Allouche for help in enquiries about him.

17 Among the obituaries of Gibb those by A.K.S.Lambton (*BSOAS* 35 (1972): 338–345) and Albert Hourani (*Proceedings of the British Academy* 58 (1972): 493–523) are to be noted.

18 London, Madison and Milwaukee: vol. I, *The First Hundred Years*, Marshall W. Baldwin (ed.), 1955, 2nd edn 1969; vol. II, *The Later Crusades, 1189–1311*, Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W.Hazard (eds), 2nd edn 1969.

19 M.C.Lyons and D.E.P.Jackson, *Saladin: the politics of the Holy War*, Cambridge 1982.

20 For extensive discussion of the caliphate between the fall of Baghdad and its reinstitution in Cairo by Baybars, see now Stefan Heidemann, *Das Aleppiner Kalifat (A.D. 1261). Vom Ende des Kalifates in Bagdad über Aleppo zu den*

21 See too the article of Amitai-Preiss reprinted in this volume, ch. 18 [8, n. 48].

22 D.O.Morgan (ed.), *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, London 1982, 123, n. 43. See A.H.Morton, “The letters of Rashīd al-Dīn: Ilkhanid fact or Tīmūrīd fantasy?”, in R.Amitai-Preiss and D.O.Morgan (eds), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, 155–199.

23 D.Ayalon, “The Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān: a reexamination”, details in note 1 of Morgan’s article.

24 In many of his publications he uses the form Amitai-Preiss.

25 D.O.Morgan, *The Mongols*, 9.

A *Qaṣida* on the Destruction of Baghdād by the Mongols

By JOSEPH DE SOMOGYI

(PLATE I)

HARDLY ever has Islām survived a more disastrous and more H mournful event than the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols of H Ūiā gh Ū Khān in the middle of the month of al-Muḥarram of the year 656/January, 1258. The Mongol conqueror, after having subdued the Assassins, turned against the capital of the ‘Abbāsids and captured it without any resistance. The fall of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate was followed by a veritable reign of terror which lasted for forty days.

Baghdād was plundered during this dismal period, its entire population was massacred mercilessly with the exception of the Christians, the co-religionists of H Ūiā gh Ū Khān’s wife and father. The Caliph al-Musta’ṣim and his sons fell victims to the fury of the enraged conqueror, who put them to death. And to complete the disaster, a great conflagration destroyed many parts of the city.¹

But all the more remarkable is the fact that we possess only very scanty accounts of this veritable martyrdom of Islam in Arabic literary sources. The most reliable author on the history of the ‘Abbāsids, Ibn al-Athīr, closes his *Al-kāmil fī-ta’rīkh* as early as the year 628/1230–1. Among the later historians “neither Abul-Faraj nor Abulfidā affords much information on this subject. Indeed, of the Mongol siege in the seventh century A.H. we know far less than we do, thanks to Ṭabarī, of the first siege in the time of the Caliph Amīn in the second century A.H.”²

So far as Arabic literature is concerned,³ we possess only three descriptions of some length of these disastrous days of the history of Islām. One is by Ibn at-Tiqṭaqā, who in 701/1301–2 wrote his famous *Al-kīāh al-Fakhrī fī-l-āāb as-sultāniyya wad-duwal al-islāmiyya*, at the end of which¹ he describes the Mongol siege. The second is by Ibn al-Furāt, who lived one century later (died in 807/1404–5), and records the same event in his hitherto unedited *Ta’rīkh ad-duwal wal-mulūk*.² The third is by adh-Dhababī (died in 748/1348), who in his hitherto unedited and voluminous *Ta’rīkh al-islām*³ devotes a separate chapter to the fall of Baghdād,⁴ which not only gives a detailed account of the event, but also includes a *qaṣida* lamenting the decline of the glorious

city.

The Author.—The author of this *qaṣīda* is called by adh-Dhahabī Taqīaddīn Ismā‘īl ibn abī’l-Yusr. His name is not to be found in any European bibliographical work on Arabic literature, because no literary work bearing this name has come down to us. In Oriental bibliographical works on Arabic literature we only find two references to this author. The one is contained in the *Fawāṭ al-Wafayāṭ* of Muḥammad ibn Shākir al-Kutubī (died in 764/1362–3), the continuator of Ibn Khallikān’s *Wafayāṭ al-a’yān*. At the beginning of his work al-Kutubī gives a short biographical account on the author of our *qaṣīda*.⁵ His name is accordingly Taqīaddīn ibn abī’l-Yusr Ismā‘īl ibn Ibrāhīm ibn abī’l-Yusr, “*musnid ash-Shām*.” His uncle was a scribe of the chancery of the Ayyūbid Nūraddīn, and he himself was scribe to an-Nāṣir Dā’ud,⁶ who was also a good poet. He is characterized by al-Kutubī as being “distinguished in letter-writing, excellent in poetry and very eloquent in speaking”. He was charged with the prince’s chancery, with the superintendency of the cemetery, and with other administrative affairs.

Al-Kutubī’s record is supplemented by a reference in as-Suyūṭī’s continuation of the *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥuffāz* of adh-Dhahabī,⁷ where we read that it was from a certain Ibn abī’l-Yusr that the grammarian Shamsaddīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbās ibn abī Bakr ibn Ja‘wān (died in 674/1275–6) learnt. As this scholar lived at the time of an-Nāṣir Dā’ud, this reference undoubtedly relates to our author, not to his father, who bore the same name of Ibn abī’l-Yusr.



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Our author's excellent qualities as recorded by al-Kutubī, and in particular his talent for poetry, were certainly well known in his own time. Al-Kutubī quotes some lines from his poetical works, but does not mention any independent anthology or other work by him. This is probably due to the circumstance that his poems were read only by a limited number of courtiers and scholars in Damascus. In view of this, it is fortunate that adh-Dhahabī, who lived about half a century later, could still recover a *qaṣīda* by him and preserve it in his *Ta'rikh al-Islām*, in the narrative of A.H. 656.

The Poem.—It is owing to adh-Dhahabī's conscientious citation of his sources that this poem remains as the only work known to be extant of Taqīaddīn Ismā'īl ibn abī'l-Yusr. Considering the care shown by adh-Dhahabī in quoting and copying his authorities, there can be no doubt that this poem also was rendered by him as accurately as possible.

Among the MSS. of the *Ta'rikh al-Islām* we possess two volumes containing our *qaṣīda*. One is in the Bodleian Library, No. 654 in the catalogue of Ury, In this MS., which was written by a hand later to adh-Dhahabī, the *qaṣīda* is contained on foll. 249–9b. The other MS. is in Istanbul in the Aya-Sophia library, No. 3013, and has not been yet catalogued. As, according to Professor O.Spiesz, who has seen this MS., it is an autograph of adh-Dhahabī himself,¹ it is from this latter MS. that I have copied the text of the *qaṣīda*,² to which. I have appended an English translation.

لِسَائِلِ الدَّمْعِ عَنْ بَعْدَادَ إِخْبَارُ فَكَأُفُوفُكَ وَأَلْحَابُكَ قَدْ سَارُوا
يَا زَائِرِينَ إِلَى الزُّوْرَاءِ لَا تَقْدُوا فَكَأُفُوكَ الْيَحْيَى وَالْبَارِ دَبَارُ
تَأْجِ الْخِلَافَةِ وَالرَّبْعِ الَّذِي شَرَفَتْ بِهِ الْمَعَالِمُ قَدْ عَفَاهُ إِفْقَارُ
أَضْحَى لِعَطْفِ الْبَلَى فِي رُبْعِهِ أَثَرُ وَلِلدَّمْعِ عَلَى الْأَثَارِ آثَارُ

6 يَا زَائِرَ قُبَى مِنْ تَارِ يَحْبِرُ دَعَى شَبَّتَ عَلَيْهِ وَذَا قَى أَنْزَعَ إِعْصَادُ
عَمَلُ السَّيْلِ عَلَى أَعْلَى مَنَارِهَا وَقَلَمُ بِالْأَمْرِ مِنْ يَحْيَوِي زُنَارُ
وَكَمْ حَرَمٍ سَبَّهَ أَطْرُقَ غَاصِبَةً وَكَانَ مِنْ دُونِ ذَلِكَ أَلَسْتُمْ أَسْنَارُ
وَكَمْ بَدُو عَلَى الْبَدْرِ الْخَسْفَتُ وَلَمْ يَمُدَّ لِيُذَوِّرْ بِشَةِ إِبْنَادُ
وَكَمْ دَخَارٌ أَضْحَتْ وَهَى عَائِدَةً مِنَ الْقِيَابِ وَقَدْ حَارَتْهُ كَفْهَارُ
10 وَكَمْ حُلُودٌ أَيْسَتْ مِنْ سَيُوفِهِمْ عَلَى الرُّقَابِ وَحُفَّتْ فِيهِ أَوْزَارُ
نَادَيْتُ وَالسَّيْنِ مَهْدُوكَ جُرْهُمُ إِلَى الْفِتَاحِ مِنَ الْأَعْدَاءِ دَعَارُ
وَهُمْ يُسَافِرُونَ لِلذُّوْتِ الَّذِي عَمِدُوا الْفَارُ يَا رَبِّ مِنْ هَذَا وَلَا الْفَارُ
وَأَنَّهُ يَسْلَمُ أَنْ الْقُدُومُ أَغْلَقَهُمْ مَسَاكِنَ مِنْ نَيْمٍ فِيهِمْ إِكْلَارُ
فَالْعَمَلُ جَانِبَ الْجِبَارِ إِذْ عَمَلُوا جَاءَهُمْ مِنْ جُنُودِ الْكَفْرِ جَبَارُ
16 يَا لِدَرْجَالِ بِأَعْدَاتِ تَحَرُّوْنَا بِمَا عَدَا فِيهِ إِفْقَارُ وَإِنْفَارُ
مِنْ بَنُو أَسْرَبِي الْقَبَاسِ كَلِمُهُمْ فَلَا أُنَارُ يُوجِبُهُ الصَّبْحُ إِسْفَارُ
مَا زَاقَ لِي قَطُّ خَشْيَةٍ بَمَتَّ يَتَوَهَّمُ إِلَّا أَسَاوِيَتْ أَوْدِيْعَا وَأَتَارُ
لَمْ يَبْقَ لِلذَّيْنِ وَالذَّنَا وَقَدْ دَعَبُوا سُرْقَ لَيْجَةٍ وَقَدْ بَنَارُوا وَقَدْ بَلَّارُوا
إِنْ الْقَيْسَةَ فِي بَشَادَ قَدْ وَجِدَتْ وَحَسَبَا حَجِينَ لِإِلَاقَتِي إِيذَارُ
20 أَلِ الثَّوْبِ وَأَعْلَى الْعِلْمِ قَدْ سَيَّرُوا فَمَنْ تَرَى بِنْدَهُمْ تَغْوِيْعُ أَمْسَارُ
مَا كُنْتُ أَمَلُ أَنْ أَقْبَى وَقَدْ دَعَبُوا لَكِنْ أَتَى دُونَ مَا أَخَذَارُ أَقْدَارُ

¹ MS. تصف

² MS. Bail. الجي

³ Bail. الحاج

⁴ Tadd. U.

⁵ Tadd. نجد

⁶ (Bail)

⁷ MS. Baal. الحار

1. The fast-flowing tears give tidings of [the fate of] Baghdād; why stayest thou, when the lovers have departed?
2. Ye pilgrims to az-Zawrah¹ go not forth; for in that sanctuary and abode is no inhabitant.
3. The crown of the Caliphate and the house whereby the rites of the Faith were exalted is laid waste by desolation.
4. There appear in the morning light traces of the assault of decay in its habitation, and tears have left their marks upon its ruins.
5. O fire of my heart, for a fire of clamorous war that blazed out upon it, when a whirlwind smote the habitation!
6. High. stands the Cross over the tops of its minbars, and he whom a girdle² used to confine has become master.
7. How many an inviolate household has the Turk taken captive with violent hands, though before that curtain were many protecting bastions!
8. How many [youths like] full moons [in beauty] upon al-Badriyya³ have been eclipsed, and never again shall there be a rising of full moons therefrom (v.l. “of the tribe or quarter”)!

9. How many treasures have become scattered abroad through plundering, and passed into the possession of infidels!

10. How many punishments have been inflicted by their swords upon men's necks, how many burdens [of sin] there laid down!

11. I called out, as the captives were dishonoured and licentious men of the enemy dragged them to ravishment—

12. And they were driven like cattle to the death that they beheld, "The Fire, O my Lord, rather than this—not the shame!"

13. God knows that the people [of Baghdā] were made negligent by what they enjoyed of divine favours, wherein was abundance,

14. So they grew heedless of the wrath of the Almighty, since they became negligent, and there came upon them a mighty one of the hosts of infidelity.

15. Who shall aid men against calamities which. tell us of that wherein is [for us] summons to judgment and warning?

16. After the capture of all the house of al-'Abbās, may no brightening illumine the face of the dawn!

17. Nothing has ever given me pleasure since their departure save Sayings of the Prophet that I pass on and Traditions of the Fathers.

18. There remains for neither the Faith nor the world, now that they are gone, any market of glory, for they have passed away and perished.

19. Truly the Day of Judgment has been held in Baghdā, and her term, when to prosperity succeeds adversity.

20. The family of the Prophet and the household of learning have been taken captive, and whom, think you, after their loss, will cities contain?

21. I never hoped that I should remain when they had gone, but destiny has intervened before my choice.

An Analysis.—As regards its contents, our *qaṣīda* can be divided into three nearly equal parts. The first part (ll. 1–6), after a short invocation, describes Baghdā as a venerated centre of religion which was laid waste by the enemies of Islam, who are accused of promoting Christianity (l. 6). The second part (ll. 7–14) poetically describes the sack and plundering of the once rich city and the slaughter of its inhabitants, and hints that those terrors are a punishment inflicted by God for the heedlessness of His people (ll. 13–14). The third part (ll. 15–21) is a mournful final accord which is not unlike the "lasciate ogni speranza" of Dante: there is no hope left after the fall of the 'Abbāsids under whose rule the city flourished and the sciences were cultivated; even the poet himself had not hoped to remain alive after that veritable Day of Judgment (l. 21).

Our poem is consequently a funeral ode and belongs to a special

class of *qaṣīdas*. In their development all the earliest varieties of Arabic poetry assumed the *qaṣīda*-form, and the dirge (*marthiyya*) also shared in this process. The sentiments felt at the death of the beloved were first expressed by the simple unpoetical *niyāḥa*, then by *sajʿ*-verses, of which there developed short metric sayings of some length, and finally the perfect *marthiyya* in the metric varieties of the *qaṣīda*.¹ Our *qaṣīda* consequently belongs to the class of the *marthiyya-qaṣīdas*.

But whereas the *marthiyya*, as a rule, laments the loss of a prominent person or a tribe, enumerating his or its qualities, our *qaṣīda* is a typical example of a funeral ode lamenting the fall of a city.

Our poem, nevertheless, has all the necessary requisites and characteristic features common to every *qaṣīda*. Short as it is—consisting only of twenty-one double verses—it is a fine piece of post-classical Arabic poetry written in elegant language, and in the *basīṭ* metre, the solemn rhythm of which is especially suited to the dirge.

But, in addition to these common characteristics of the *qaṣīda*, our poem also shows some peculiarities shared by the *marthiyya-qaṣīdas* only.

(1) The absence of the *nasīb*. Whereas in the ordinary *qaṣīda* the opening *nasīb* is an essential requisite, it never occurs in the *marthiyya-qaṣīda*, since the object of the funeral ode is quite different.¹ Instead of the *nasīb* there are some constant formulæ with which a *marthiyya* begins. Thus the poet sometimes refers to the tears shed on a tragic event, which is also to be seen in our *qaṣīda* referring to the tears of those who lament the fall of Baghdād (1.1).

(2) The repetition of the name of the lamented person,² which is represented here by some poetical names of Baghdād, as *az-Zawraʾ* (1.2) and *Tāj al-khilāfa* (1.3).

(3) The repetition of the same phrase at the beginning of several consecutive double-verses. This had been regarded from the beginning as a peculiarity of the *niyāḥa*, and, retained through its later poetical development, it was also used in the period of decadence as an archaistic rhetorical trick employed not only in the *marthiyya-qaṣīda*, but also in other classes of *qaṣīdas*.³ Thus we see in our *qaṣīda* the four-fold repetition of the phrase *wa kam* “and how many” (ll. 7–10).⁴

With these characteristic features our *qaṣīda* is a fine *marthiyya-qaṣīda* from the period of decadence of Arabic literature. It is worthy of our attention for two reasons.

Firstly, it is the only hitherto known work of Taqīaddīn Ismāʿīl ibn abī'l-Yusr and a specimen of post-classical Arabic poetry written in the refined style of the court-poets.

Secondly, it is to our knowledge the only poem lamenting the fall of Baghdād and is an excellent poetical expression of the contemporary

sentiment felt at the fall of the ‘Abbāsids and at the tragedy of their capital. Despite the decadence of the last ‘Abbāsids, their prestige was still so great throughout the Muslim world that even the court-poet of the then flourishing Ayyūbid dynasty in Damascus could not help lamenting that with them the splendour of Islām had passed away and that after the capture of the Prophet’s family he could not hope either to remain alive. His presentiment was justified, because one generation later, in 699–700/1299–1301, his own city, Damascus, and the Ayyūbid empire were invaded by the same Mongols who, after destroying the “crown of the caliphate”, swept over all the Muslim Orient.

Footnotes

¹ For the details see G. Le Strange, *Baghdād during the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate*, Oxford-London, 1900, p. 343.

² See Le Strange, op. cit., p. 340.

³ As for Persian literature, the following historical works contain narratives of this event: (1) The *Ṭabaqāt an-Nāṣiri*, written shortly after 656/1258, is a contemporary authority on the times of Ḥūlāghū; (2) the *Jāmi' at-tawārīkh*, Rashīd-addīn's well-known work, finished in 710/1310–11, provides a fairly clear account of the siege operations; (3) the history of Wassaṭ, the historiographer of Ghāzān, the Ilkhān of Persia, written in 700/1300–1, contains only the data related also by Rashīdaddīn. See Le Strange, op. cit., pp. 340–1.

¹ See the edition of W. Ahlwardt, Gotha-Göttingen, 1860, pp. 383–8.

² See Le Strange, op. cit., p. 343, note.

³ See my paper, “*The Ta'rīkh al-islām* of adh-Dhahabī,” *JRAS.*, 1932, pp. 815–855.

⁴ See the MS. of the Bodleian Library (Ury), No. 654, fols. 248–250, under the title *Kā'ina Baghdad*.

⁵ See the edition of Būlāq, A.H. 1299, vol. i, pp. 12–14.

⁶ See the *Mukhtasar ta'rīkh al-bashar* of Abulfidā, printed at Istanbul 1286, vol. iii, pp. 204–5, according to which an-Nāṣir Dā'ud, the son of al-Malik al-Mu'azzam, died on 27 Jumādā' 1-*U*lā, 656/2 June, 1258.

⁷ See the edition of Wüstenfeld, xxi, 3.

¹ See his “Beiträge zur arabischen Literaturgeschichte”, *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Leipzig, 1932, p. 70.

² I have to thank the obliging courtesy of the direction of the *Archaeologisches Institut des Deutschen Reiches, Abteilung Istanbul*, which has been so kind as to have the poem photographed from the MS. of the Aya-Sophia library and to obtain for this purpose a special permit from the Ministry of Public Instruction at Ankara. The photograph is reproduced in the accompanying plate.

³ In the MS. of the Bodleian Library **الديار**.

¹ Baghdād, said to be so called because one of its inner gates was set askew (*izwarrat*—so *Qāmū*s, s.v., but for other explanations see Le Strange, *Baghdād*, p. 11).

² The *zunnār*, or cord waistband, was one of the distinguishing marks of Jews and Christians.

³ A quarter of Baghdād near the Bāb Badr; Le Strange, op. cit., pp. 270–2.

¹ See Goldziher, *Bemerkungen zur arabischen Trauerpoesie*, *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vol. xvi, 1902, pp. 307–311.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 327–330, where we read that according to Ibn Rashīq in his ‘*Umda fī maḥāsīn ash-shi‘r*’, he could not find any *nasīb*s in the *marāthī* with the exception of a *qaṣīda* by Durayd ibn al-Ṣimma. But even this exception is explained by the circumstance that this poem was written one year after the death of the lamented person, when the blood-ransom for his sake had been fulfilled already, so that the poet could employ a *nasīb* to express his other feelings with the deceased person.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 313–14.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 314–320.

⁴ The same *wa kam* is repeated by Abū Nuwās thirteen times in a *qaṣīda* (Dīwān, ed. by Iskandar Asaf, Cairo, 1898, p. 140). See the note in Goldziher, op. cit., p. 315.

Notes on the Arabic Materials for the History of the Early Crusades

By H.A.R.GIBB

THE publication of the first volume of M.René Grousset's history of the Crusades, which is reviewed elsewhere in this issue, brings out again, and all the more vividly because of its wealth of detail and effort to present a complete and rounded-off picture, the very serious gaps in Orientalist research on this period. Whereas the study of the Western and Greek sources has progressed to a point at which it may be said that little more remains to be done, research on the Oriental sources is incredibly backward. The European scholar has at his disposal, apart from the topographical studies of van Berchem¹ and M.René Dussaud,² only two works of any size, Derenbourg's study of Usāma ibn Munqidh,³ and Professor W.B.Stevenson's *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), together with such articles as those on the Syrian cities by Honigmann and others in the *Encyclopædia of Islam*. Valuable as these are, they do not carry him very far. Usāma presents a lively picture of certain aspects of Syrian life, but he was a minor figure and the scope of his material is too restricted. Professor Stevenson attempted for the first time to situate the Crusaders in their eastern surroundings, but the main object of his work was the careful sifting of the Oriental sources for data of political history and chronology.

It is not, however, one or two general works which are required; it is a whole series of monographs on important figures, on specific aspects of the political and social life of the time, and on the Oriental sources themselves. Not a single political figure prior to Saladin and the Third *Tuḡtagān*, ʾĪl-Ghāzī, Zankī, Nūr ad-Dīn—has ever been studied in detail; we know next to nothing of the composition of the population in the various regions of Syria, their relations with one another and with ʾIrāq and Egypt, or of the significance of the Shiʿite, and more especially the *Bāṭini*, movements in Syria; the criticism of the Oriental sources, Arabic, Syriac, and Armenian, has not even begun. Failing these, the Muslim princes and peoples remain, even in M.Grousset's work, so many lay figures, a kind of vague patchwork backcloth against which the Western knights make a brave enough show, until it presently falls down and envelops them, still valiantly struggling, in its folds.

It is not the object of the present paper to remedy these deficiencies forthwith, but to touch on certain points relating firstly to the social situation in Syria, and secondly to the Arabic sources, which have emerged in the course of several years' study of the period of the early Crusades.

I

It is one of the principal services rendered by M. Grousset that, for the first time in any general history of the Crusades, he brings out the importance of the Byzantine "Crusades" of the tenth century as the forerunners of the Latin Crusades, and as establishing a certain juridical claim by the Eastern Empire to the restoration of its former Syrian territories, the last of which it had lost only in 1084. But it has generally escaped notice that the same fact played a very important part in determining also the nature of the first Muslim reactions to the Latin Crusades. For more than a century the Muslims of Egypt, 'Irāq, and Persia had been accustomed to the spectacle of Christian principalities in Antioch and Mesopotamia, and even of intermittent Christian protectorates over Aleppo and parts of inner Syria. The Christian states had taken their place in the normal political framework of Syria, and the religious aspect of the struggle had long since ceased to hold any prominent place in the minds of its population. Muslims and Christians were intermingled with one another, especially after the extensive immigration of Armenians into northern Syria; Christians ruled over Muslims and Muslims over Christians, without interference from either side. Though the Christian states had been temporarily recovered by the Saljūqids, the report that fresh Christian armies were on their way through Anatolia to recapture them roused no more than ordinary apprehensions,¹ and was regarded with comparative indifference by all the Muslim princes except the one directly concerned, the ruler of Antioch itself, Yāghī Siyān. That the newcomers were Franks, instead of Greeks, conveyed very little to them. The Crusaders' occupation of Antioch and Edessa merely restored, from their point of view, the *status quo ante*. The Fātimid wazīr, al-Afdāl, had been quick to seize the opportunity of renewing with them the traditional Fātimid-Byzantine defensive alliance against the Saljūqids, temporarily interrupted in 1055.¹ It is true that the negotiations came to nothing when the Franks themselves seized Jerusalem from the Egyptians, but even that failed to inspire an immediate uprush of religious feeling and of resolve to drive them out. It was not merely the disintegration of the Saljūqid empire, therefore, which was responsible for the absence of any vigorous counter-attack from without.² For a century and a half, Syria and Mesopotamia had been left to fight their own battles, with some intervention from Egypt, and

for the most part Syria and Mesopotamia were left to fight them now.

If this view be accepted, it is clearly a false conception to speak, as M.Grousset has done, of every offensive against the Latin states as a “counter-crusade”. No doubt every war against non-Muslims, from the days of Heraclius to those of ‘Abd al-Karīm, has been styled a *jihad* by its supporters, but that in itself shows the cheapening of the term. What distinguished the Crusades was that they were a mass movement, in which men of all ranks and classes were caught and swept forward by a wave of emotion. There was nothing corresponding to this amongst the Muslims until the time of Nūr ad-Dīn at the earliest, perhaps not until the time of Saladin. Some faint hint of it may doubtfully be detected in the undertakings of Mawdūd, but even these were conducted as routine expeditions, differing in no respect from any others. Only in one minor episode of this period does one sense on the Muslim side something of the Crusaders’ exaltation of feeling, namely in the defence of Damascus against Baldwin II’s raid in January, 1126.³

It is almost equally misleading to regard the expeditions of the governors of Moṣul as so many instances of Saljūqid intervention, as when Karbūqa, for example, arrives with a “grande armée seljūqide”.¹ None of the Oriental sources suggest that Karbūqa had more than his own troops, together with those of his minor vassals and of Ḥims and Damascus. It should be recalled that, although he was formally recognized as governor of Moṣul, Karbūqa had in fact captured it for himself with a force of adventurers only two years before,² and that on the arrival of the First Crusade the Saljūqid armies were engaged in Khurāsān and almost immediately afterwards in the long civil wars between Barkiyārūq and Muḥammad. It is unlikely that there was a single Saljūqid squadron in Karbūqa’s force, and the size of his private ‘askar may be gauged from that of which his successor Jikirmish disposed in the battle of Ḥarrān, namely 3,000 horsemen.³ The governors of Moṣul were drawn into the conflict by the Frankish conquest of Edessa and the resulting political complications in the Jazīra; and even when they held an official mandate to engage the Franks, it in no way affected the essentially personal character and objects of their operations, unless perhaps under Mawdūd.⁴ The one genuine instance of Saljūqid intervention in the whole history of the Crusades was the expedition under Bursuq b. Bursuq, the governor of Hamadhān, in 1115; and the authorities are singularly unanimous that this “counter-crusade” was openly directed against the Muslim princes, and only as an afterthought against the Franks. It had the striking result of bringing into temporary existence a Syrian bloc, Franks and Muslims (except for two minor chieftains)

making common cause against the Eastern invader. Several causes may be and have been assigned in explanation of this development, but in view of the absence of detailed studies of the principal characters concerned, it is premature to come to any definite conclusions. But two points, at least, seem to emerge from the fact itself: one, that “counter-crusade” was the last idea entertained by the princes of Syria and ‘Irāq alike at that time¹; the other that the Franks had with surprising speed adapted themselves to the traditional atmosphere and alignments of Syrian politics.

In regard to another aspect of the politico-social situation in Syria, the Sunni-Shi‘a schism, it is still difficult to reach absolute conclusions. A careful study of the scanty contemporary materials, nevertheless, leads to the impression that all historians of the Crusades have greatly exaggerated its significance in Syria at the time of the First Crusade and in the following decades. This is due partly to the fact that Western historians, seeking a guiding thread in the labyrinth of Oriental politics, have thought to find it in the religious schisms, and interpreting these as rival political groups have used them as a kind of universal clue²; partly (and herein is their excuse) that Ibn al-Athīr and the other writers of the Ayyubīd and Mamlūk periods were themselves obsessed to a great extent by an anti-Fāṭimid bias. In reality the lines of political division had little to do with dogmatic differences, and least of all in eleventh- and twelfth-century Syria. Had the Fāṭimids been inclined to religious intolerance, the case might have been different, but they were (apart from the personal eccentricity of al-Ḥākim) one of the most tolerant dynasties in Islam. If the Islamic world had been otherwise unified, the emergence of political Shi‘ism would have been disastrous³; but though it prevented union, it was not in itself a prime cause of disunion. The healing of the schism was a necessary prelude to the union of forces against the Crusaders, but the schism was not a factor of importance in their first success.

The real mainspring of Syrian politics, it can hardly be doubted, is to be found in the principle of “beggar-my-neighbour” which had governed the relations of the amirs of Syria and Mesopotamia ever since the disintegration of the Caliphate. Where ambition, jealousy, and fear were the dominant motives, questions of religious conformity and belief were of small account. Religion had long since abdicated the claim to control political action,¹ and the only other restraining force, love of country, while not absent amongst the general population and possibly even such minor local chiefs as the Banū Munqidh, was obviously ineffective where foreign Turkish governors were concerned. No student of Islamic history in the tenth and eleventh centuries needs to be reminded that when the Saljūqid Ruḍwān of Aleppo declared for the Fāṭimids in 1097 in view of an alliance

against Damascus, he was but following the footsteps of numerous amīrs and princes, who had accepted or rejected the nominal suzerainty of one or other Caliph for the sake of securing a momentary tactical advantage over a local rival. Similarly, the readiness of Ibn ‘Ammār of Tripolis to assist the Franks and even to accept a quasi-protectorate, could find more than one parallel in the history of Syria since the days when the Arab Shi‘ite **Hamdānids** of Aleppo had invoked the Byzantine protectorate and seen the great Basil II himself hastening to defend them against their fellow-countrymen and co-sectaries, the **Fāṭimids**.

Thus the refusal of Aleppo and Damascus, and that of Damascus and Egypt, to co-operate against the Crusaders were due to the same general causes, into which religion scarcely entered. In the former case, they took a personal form: the rivalry between the sons of Tutush, and in particular the resentment of **Ruḍwān** at the loss of Damascus.² In the second case, they were rather historical: the spectre of the former Egyptian occupation of Damascus on the one side, and of the former kingdom of Tutush on the other. The rulers of Damascus were afraid that the **Fāṭimids** should attempt to reassert their claim to the city; the Egyptian government feared lest a restored Saljūqid kingdom should attempt the coup which Tutush may have planned, but never carried out. Both sides were consequently not ill-pleased, in the long run, that the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem interposed a buffer between them—provided the buffer did not turn into a boa-constrictor. Nothing is more instructive in this connection than to observe the deliberate inertia of Damascus on the Palestine front between 1099 and 1105, while Godfrey and Baldwin I were engaged in establishing the kingdom and securing it against the Egyptian counter-attacks, and how, as soon as **Tughtagīn** was convinced that the Egyptians were unable to dislodge the Crusaders, he willingly co-operated with them, not in combined attacks with full forces, but in minor operations designed to harass the Franks and prevent the expansion of the kingdom. Note, too, how the relations between Egypt and Damascus grew progressively more cordial, to the extent that **Tughtagīn** even instigated Egyptian raids (if Ibn Muyassar¹ is to be believed), and that finally he and his successors accepted **Fāṭimid** robes of honour and diplomas.² The same indifference to sectarian divisions was shown by **Usāma b. Munqidh**, who served Zankī and the **Fāṭimids** with equal zeal, by Ibn ‘Ammār of Tripolis, and even by the Egyptian wazīr **al-Afdāl**, whom the **Fāṭimid** history asserts to have been a fervent **Ismā‘īlī**³ but the Damascus chronicler claims as “a firm believer in the doctrines of the Sunna”.⁴ Before the close of the twelfth century, however, there can be little doubt that Shi‘ism was thoroughly discredited in Syria, but it remains to be investigated how far the activities of the **Bāṭinis** were responsible for this change, or whether it was a by-product of that

waxing religious enthusiasm which led up to the real Counter-Crusade under the leadership of Saladin.

II

The second field in which Orientalist research has lagged behind, and which is a prerequisite for any real study of such problems as are touched on above, is the critical examination of the Oriental sources. Every historian of the early Crusades has up to the present used the *Kāmil* of Ibn al-Athīr as the principal Arabic source, and has accepted his version of affairs under the control of Kamāl ad-Dīn's Chronicle of Aleppo and Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī's *Mir'āt az-Zamān*. The recovery of Ibn al-Qalānisi's Damascus Chronicle completely changes the situation. It is not only that Ibn al-Qalānisi is a contemporary and reflects the contemporary attitude, whereas Ibn al-Athīr is permeated by the very different mentality of the thirteenth century,⁵ nor is it that the former views events from the angle of Damascus and the latter from the wider but more distant angle of Moṣul. The important point for our present purpose is that Ibn al-Qalānisi is one of the *original sources* of Ibn al-Athīr—the only one for this period so far recovered—and a comparison of the two accounts enables us to investigate his methods of compilation, and to check in some degree the accuracy of his information in this portion of his chronicle. The results of this examination are not reassuring, and go to show that while Ibn al-Athīr, because of his much wider field than that of either the Damascus or the Aleppo chroniclers, must always remain a principal source, he is not to be relied on in details of fact, of chronology, or of interpretation, and must always be used with caution.¹ Outstanding though his work is, in comparison with the historians of his own age whose productions have come down to us, he is yet not entirely free from those romantic and empirical tendencies which are visible over a wide range of mediaeval Islamic literature.

A detailed analysis being impossible within the limits of an article, it is proposed in the following paragraphs to examine briefly a few typical passages, illustrating how Ibn al-Athīr's methods may result in misleading or suspect information, and to touch, still more briefly upon Kamāl ad-Dīn's work in the same connection.

(1) Ibn al-Athīr very frequently suppresses elements of the original narrative, and occasionally uses the rest to support a false interpretation. Under A.H. 494 (1100–1) Ibn al-Qalānisi relates an attempt by Sukmān b. Ortuq to *recapture* Sarūj, and its recovery by the Franks. His text reads as follows: فيها جمع الامير سكيان بن ارتق خلقاً كثيراً

من الترمكان وزحف بهم الى افرنج الرها وسروج في شهر ربيع الاول

فتسلم سروج واجتمع اليه خلق كثير وحشد الافرنج ايضاً الخ

“In this year the amīr Sukmān b.Ortuq collected a great host of Turkmens and marched with them against the Franks of ar-Ruhā [Edessa] and Sarūj in the month of First Rabi‘. He captured Sarūj and was joined by a large body [i.e. of volunteers], while the Franks also collected their forces.”² Ibn al-Athīr, apparently because he found no account in his sources of the capture of Sarūj, rewrites this and misrepresents it as the capture of Sarūj:

وفيهام ملك الفرنج مدينة سروج من بلاد

الجزيرة وسبب ذلك ان الفرنج كانوا قد ملكوا الرها... فلما كان الآن

“In this year, the Franks captured the town of Sarūj in Mesopotamia. The cause of this was the Franks had already captured ar-Ruhā...and at this time Sukmān collected a great host of Turkmens in Sarūj and marched against them.”¹

(2) The frequency with which. Ibn al-Athīr alters the dates given by Ibn al-Qalānisī (and always does so wrongly)² raises a question of motive, which cannot be answered at present. But occasionally also he alters the tenor of a sentence or phrase in the original. An example will be found in his account of the Crusaders’ capture of Tripolis in 1109

(A.H. 502), which is freely quoted from Ibn al-Qalānisī. The relevant

passage in the latter reads: ذلت نفوسهم لاشتغال اليأس

من تأخر وصول الاصطول المصري في البحر والميرة والنجدة وقد كانت غلة

“Their spirits were lowered by universal despair at the delay of the Egyptian fleet in bringing provisions and reinforcements by sea, for the stores of the fleet had been exhausted and the direction of the wind remained contrary, through the will of God that that which was decreed should come to pass.”³ Ibn al-Athīr, to begin with, places this (wrongly) under the year 503, and renders the passage above by:

ذلت نفوسهم وزادهم ضعفاً تأخر الاصطول (sic) المصري عنهم بالميرة

والنجدة وكان سبب تأخره له انه فرغ منه والحث عليه واختلفوا فيه اكثر

“Their spirits were lowered and their weakness was increased by the delay of the Egyptian fleet in bringing them provisions and reinforcements.

Now the cause of his [presumably al-Afdal’s] dilatoriness in regard to it (the fleet) was that he did not give his attention to it and to hastening on its preparations,¹ and they [? the Egyptian ministers] disagreed (or shilly-shallied) about it for more than a year; and it set off, but the wind drove it back, so it became impossible for them to reach Tripolis, in order that God should bring about a matter which was to come to pass.”²

The difference between these two versions is obvious. Ibn al-Qalā

niṣī implies that the stores and provisioning for the fleet and the town of Tripolis were not available until the harvest in the spring of 1109, that the necessary measures were then taken without any stinting (cf. *Damascus Chron.*, p. 91), and that the delay was a fatality due to the contrary wind. If he does not explicitly absolve the Egyptian government from the charge of dilatoriness, at least he says nothing to incriminate it. Ibn al-Athīr, on the other hand, makes a definite accusation against **Fāṭimid** the government, and particularly asserts that the fleet was detained in Egypt “for more than a year”. There is, fortunately, no dubiety in this instance; Ibn al-Athīr’s statement is untrue. For Tripolis fell in July, 1109; in August, 1108, the Egyptian fleet was in Syrian waters, and had very effectively come to the assistance of Sidon, defeating a considerable squadron of Italian vessels and relieving (and presumably reprovisioning) the town.³ It had therefore returned to Egypt only in the late autumn, and the story that it was kept back “for more than a year” is a fiction due to **anti-Fāṭimid** bias.⁴ Whence, then, did it find its way into Ibn al-Athīr’s chronicle? That he derived it from another written source seems to be excluded by his otherwise close following of the text of Ibn al-Qalāṇiṣī. There can therefore, it would seem, be little doubt that the source is a certain oral tradition current in **Moṣul**, in accordance with which Ibn al-Athīr “corrected” the statements of his written authority.

(3) Another of Ibn al-Athīr’s tricks of compilation is to group together a number of items, sometimes quite unconnected, sometimes even of different dates, which as a result of this grouping convey, whether by accident or design, a certain impression. Thus, under A.H. 504, after relating Tancred’s capture of al-Athārib in that year (December, 1110),¹ he proceeds: “And great was the fear of them amongst the Muslims, whose hearts rose into their throats, for they were convinced that the Franks were about to capture all the rest of Syria, for lack of any to defend it and repel them from it. So the lords of the Islamic cities in Syria set about negotiating an armistice with them, but the Franks would not agree to any terms except a tribute in ready money, and that only for a short period.” He then appends a list of rulers and places and the amounts which they undertook to pay: Ruḍwān of Aleppo, 32,000 dinars and other objects; the lord of Tyre, 7,000 dinars; Ibn Munqidh of Shaizar, 4,000 dinars; ‘Alī al-Kurḍī of Ḥamāh, 2,000 dinars; and concludes: “the armistice to run only up to the time of the ripening and harvesting of the crops.”² Note that this passage is inserted *after* Mawḍūd’s victory at **Ḥarrān** in July, 1110, and conveys the impression that even this brought no real relief to the Muslim territories, which were just as exposed to Crusading attacks as they had been before. The idea that undoubtedly influenced Ibn al-Athīr

contained the following phrases: ‘A nation which has slain its support, on its festival day, in the house of the Being whom it worships, justifies God in exterminating it’”). The story has every appearance of being legendary; it is derived from oral tradition at **Moṣul**, and attributes to Baldwin I a pretty taste in Arabic rhymed prose; but it serves the purpose of giving telling expression to Ibn al-Athīr’s own conviction without actually committing him to it in his own words.¹ For the rest that conviction strongly colours his account of the relations between **Tuġhtagīn** and Mawdūd during the previous campaigns, and leads him even to revise the story of the assassination itself, where he heightens the dramatic effect (and at the same time implicitly contradicts Ibn al-Qalānīsī’s careful description of its actual setting) by asserting that “they were walking hand in hand”.

(5) These, and many other instances which could be cited, raise the very important question of how far Ibn al-Athīr is to be trusted when he is the sole authority for an alleged event. It is impossible, of course, to lay down any general principles. While he is likely to be more trustworthy in dealing with events in **Moṣul** and the neighbouring provinces than with those which took place at a distance, a certain caution is surely justified in receiving his unsupported statement, and the more sensational and picturesque it is the greater need there is of hesitation to accept it at face value. Two cases may be briefly examined here by way of illustration.

In connection with the attack made on Damascus by the united Latin forces in the late autumn of 1129,² Ibn al-Athīr has a long and circumstantial story to the effect that the wazīr at Damascus, Abū ‘Alī al-Mazdaqānī, and his **Bāṭinī** protégés entered into a conspiracy with Baldwin II to deliver Damascus to the Franks in return for the possession of Tyre. This is represented as being the cause of the Crusaders’ attack, which was, however, forestalled by the massacre of the **Bāṭinīs** in Damascus in the preceding September. There is no hint of this in Ibn al-Qalānīsī (and on this occasion there is no reason why he should have adopted a reticent “official” attitude, since the existence of such a plot would have given additional point to his vigorous denunciations of the sect), nor, more strangely still, in the Latin historians, and the suggested retrocession of Tyre is highly suspicious.¹ The **Bāṭinī** plot is not necessary to account for the Frankish attack on Damascus, in view of the death of **Tuġhtagīn** in 1128 and the arrival of the new Crusading army. Thus the story, though not impossible, seems to be nothing more than romantic invention, the starting-point of which was supplied by the massacre of the **Bāṭinīs** in Damascus and their subsequent surrender of **Bānyās** to the Franks.

The second example is offered by Ibn al-Athīr’s story of Zankī’s capture of al-Atharīb in 1130, which it is the more important to

correct since even Professor Stevenson makes one of his rare slips in this connection.² Under the year 523 (1129) Ibn al-Qalānisi inserts, in an abridged form, the narrative which Ibn al-Qalānisi gives under 524 (1130). There can be no question that 524 is the correct date. Sawāḥ, who was apparently at the time governor of Ḥamāh for the amīr of Damascus, took part with the ‘askar of Ḥamāh in the operations against the Crusaders round Damascus in December, 1129, i.e. in the last days of 523.³ His transference of his services to Zankī is therefore correctly dated by Kamāl ad-Dīn early in 524, and accounts for the appointment of Sawinj. to the command of Ḥamāh. Zankī’s “jihad” in this year (524/1130) consequently consisted of two treacherous assaults on the possessions and persons of his Muslim allies. But Ibn al-Athīr, having placed all this in 523, is left with the task of finding suitable employment for his hero in 524. Now it happened that during the conflict between Alice of Antioch and her father Baldwin in that year a body of Muslims unnamed made a raid on the suburbs of al-Athārib and of Ma’arrat Maṣrīn.⁴ The raid *may* have been made by Zankī’s troops, during his stay at Aleppo prior to the seizure of Ḥamāh. It is this quite minor expedition which has apparently been seized upon by the Moṣul tradition and exultantly magnified into the full-dress opening of the Counter-Crusade, signalized by the siege, capture, and dismantling of al-Athārib after a tremendous defeat of the entire Frankish forces. And with an impressive rhetoric which seems to carry its own conviction, Ibn al-Athīr concludes the detailed narrative of these mythical exploits with the words: “The fortunes of the Muslims were revolutionized in those districts; the power of the Infidels weakened and they realized that there had come into the land that which had never entered into their calculations, and the most that they could do henceforth was to hold what they possessed, whereas heretofore they had nursed the ambition of conquering it outright.”¹

(6) Kamāl ad-Dīn, in his Chronicle of Aleppo, bases himself largely on independent sources, but sometimes quotes Ibn al-Athīr and sometimes also Ibn al-Qalānisi, usually without abridgment. He is less sensational than Ibn al-Athīr and more straightforward, probably also more reliable in detail. Yet he too sometimes adds to his sources, whether with or without justification can rarely be said. Thus the passage in which he relates the surrender of Artāh by its Armenian garrison is transcribed textually from Ibn al-Qalānisi,² but he adds at the end: “And this was all due to the evil conduct of Yaghī Siyān and his tyrannical government of his lands” (وهذا كله لفساد سيرة يغى (سيان وظلمه في بلاده). This is clearly an unauthorized supplement, an attempt to explain an unwelcome fact by the familiar method of throwing the blame upon an individual. In this instance, the solidarity which the Armenians of Cilicia and the Taurus had shown with the Crusaders

renders the explanation unnecessary; and even were Yaghī Siyān a particularly bad governor (and there may well have been a tradition at Aleppo to that effect), he can hardly be held responsible for their action at this juncture.

A more complicated problem is offered by the narrative of the unsuccessful siege of ‘Azāz in the year 517 (1123–4), which according to the existing text of Ibn al-Qalānisi was undertaken by Tughtagīn and Aqsunqur in June, 1123, and according to Kamāl ad-Dīn in January, 1124, by the combined forces of Balak b.Ortuq and the other two.³ The difference of dating is the more remarkable since, except for his introductory sentence, Kamāl ad-Dīn quotes Ibn al-Qalānisi almost textually. The change has therefore been deliberately made, and for the obvious reason that during June and July, 1123, Balak was engaged in occupying Aleppo and as much as possible of the territory to the south-west of it.¹ It is unlikely, on the other hand, that Ibn al-Qalānisi was mistaken as to the month, and it is surprising to find no mention of Balak in his narrative. The explanation is that by some error the whole paragraph relating to this campaign in Ibn al-Qalānisi’s book (or some copies of it) was inserted under A.H. 517 instead of A.H. 519 (1125–6). It followed naturally on Aqsunqur’s relief and occupation of Aleppo in January, 1125, and is mentioned in its proper place by Fulcher of Chartres (iii, 42), whose description tallies with that of Ibn al-Qalānisi, as well as by Kamāl ad-Dīn himself and by Ibn al-Athīr.² Moreover, Aqsunqur spent the year 517 in ‘Irāq, where he was engaged in hostilities with Dubais, and did not return Mosul until 518.³ It is clear also that the paragraph was accidentally misplaced from the fact that Ibn al-Qalānisi follows up the account of the battle by relating the despatch of an envoy from Damascus to Egypt, the reply to which arrived in August, 1126.⁴ The only possible conclusion is that Kamāl ad-Dīn, finding this expedition related under A.H. 517 in his copy of Ibn al-Qalānisi, and unable to accept the date there given, transferred it and combined the narrative with that of an isolated attack made on ‘Azāz by Balak at the close of 517, and thus unwittingly transformed a minor raid into a major operation terminating in a serious defeat for the Muslims.

These few examples may serve to show how much there is to be done in the textual and historical criticism of the Arabic sources, and also that the materials at our disposal, however incomplete, enable it to be done to a certain extent. Such a critical scrutiny must, obviously, be made on the Arabic texts themselves; for this reason, it is not on the historian as such that the work must fall in the first instance, but on the Orientalist who possesses an adequate equipment for this new field of “higher criticism”. Not until he does his part will a satisfactory and fully balanced history of the Crusades become possible.

Footnotes

¹ “Notes sur les Croisades” in *Journal Asiatique*, 1902, mai-juin.

² *Topographie historique de la Syrie* (Paris, 1927).

³ *Vie d'Ousama (Ousâma ibn Mounqidh, Ire Partie*, Paris, 1889).

¹ Is William of Tyre a good enough authority for the accusation that the Muslims “brutally eliminated” the indigenous Christian elements in Jerusalem on the arrival of the Crusaders (Grousset, 284–5)? The statement seems to be contradicted by numerous passages in which Fulcher and others speak of the native Christian population (e.g. the jubilant passage on the reception of Baldwin I, quoted G. 213).

¹ See Ibn Muyassar, ed. Massé, p. 7, and E. Laurent, *Byzance et les Seljoucides*, p. 22. The fact that the calculations of the Fātimid government were based upon the history of the earlier Byzantine invasions is noted by all historians; but there is a tendency to over-emphasize in this connection the importance of Jerusalem to the Fātimids. At the time of the First Crusade the possession of Jerusalem was of little political importance, except as implying control of southern Palestine. It was the establishment of the seat of the Latin kingdom at Jerusalem that caused it to acquire subsequently the symbolic significance which it had by the time of Saladin.

² Although, of course, the disintegration of the local Syrian kingdom of Tutush was responsible for the absence of a united resistance within Syria.

³ Ibn al-Qalānisi, ed. Amedroz, 213 (*Damascus Chronicle*, 175).

¹ Grousset, pp. 97, 107.

² Cf. *Encyc. of Islam*, s.v. Kurbūkā.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, ed. Tornberg, x, 256, 5–4 from foot; on the same expedition Šukman had 7,000 Turkmen horsemen with him. Cf. the army of Saif ad-Dīn, prince of Mosul, early in 1176, when, with the aid of the Ortuqids of Ḥiṣn Kaifā and Mārdīn, “numerous forces assembled to join him, reaching 6,000 horsemen” (ibid., xi, 283, 5–7).

⁴ In the *Damascus Chronicle*, p. 99, n. 4, there is a serious error; Mawūd was the son of a certain Altūtagīn, and was not the nephew of Karbūqā.

¹ The episode of the émeute at Baghdad in 1111 (cf. Grousset, 460–1) shows the Caliph himself, so far from being moved by the Syrian appeal, furious at the affront to his personal dignity and only restrained from taking violent measures against the ringleaders by the tact of the Sultan; see the original and more detailed account in the *Damascus Chronicle*, pp. 110–12.

² M.Grousset, for example, seeks to explain the refusal of **Ruḍwān** of Aleppo to co-operate with the other Syrian princes and with Mawḍūid by his patronage of the **Bāṭinis**, thereby inverting cause and effect. The true reason is more probably to be sought in his embitterment at the repeated disappointment of his ambitions.

³ As it was later on, in the sixteenth century; cf. A.J.Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. i (Oxford, 1934), pp. 347–400.

¹ This is, notwithstanding its external conformity, the note sounded by **Nizām** al-mulk in the *Siyāset-Nāmah*, and is frankly acknowledged by no less an authority than al-Ghazālī (*Thiyā' Uḷūm ad-Dīn*, ii, 124).

² The possible influence exerted in this and similar situations by a certain historic antagonism between the populations of Aleppo and Damascus may be suspected, as a supplementary factor, but the whole subject awaits investigation.

¹ Ed. Massé, p. 63.

² *Damascus Chronicle*, pp. 179, 280. According to Ibn Muyassar (p. 70) similar advances were made by the **Fāṭimids** also to **Āqsunqur al-Bursuqī** after his occupation of Aleppo.

³ Idrīs 'Imād ad-Dīn: *Uyūn al-Akḥbār*, vol. vii (MS. of Dr. A.H.al-Hamdani); cf. *al-Shāra ilā man nāla 'l-Wizāra*, ed. A. Mukhlis, 57–60.

⁴ p. 164 (Ibn al-Qalānisī, 204, 16: (حسن الاختلاف في منعب الة).

⁵ The point has already been observed by M.Grousset in a note to p. 510.

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¹ Somewhat similar conclusions were reached by the writer some years ago after comparing Ibn al-Athīr's narratives of the early history of the Arabs in Central Asia with his sources in **Ṭabari** and **Balādhurī**.

² Ed. Amedroz, p. 138; *Damas. Chr.*, p. 50.

¹ Ed. Tornberg, x, 222 (cf. Grousset, p. 63).

² e.g. Egyptian capture of Jerusalem: I.A. 489 (wrong), I.Q. 491; **Bāṭinī** attack on Shaizar: I.A. 502, I.Q. 507 (i.e. after the expulsion of the **Bāṭinis** from Aleppo, which is surely correct); Crusaders' raid on Damascus: I.A.

520 (wrong), I.Q. 519; and cf. section (5) below. There are many other instances.

³ Ed. Amedroz, 163; *Damas. Chr.*, p. 89.

¹ The text is difficult, and I give this translation subject to correction. The reading of the passage in the *Receuil* (Hist. Or., i, 273) is: وكان سبب نأخره انه فرغ منه وادرجت عليه واختلوا فيه أكثر من كل سنة, which in parts makes no sense at all and is rendered in the translation: “Depuis plus d’un an cette flotte était prête et pourvue de tout, et on ne s’accordait pas sur les instructions qu’on devait lui donner.”

² Ed. Tornberg, x, 334.

³ *Damas. Chr.*, 87; cf. Stevenson, 50; Grousset, 253–4.

⁴ Needless to say, the further reflections on this subject by the author of the *Nujūm* (Abu’l-Mahasin, ed. Popper, ii, 335, 3–9; quoted by M.Grousset, p. 357, as confirmatory of I.A.’s statement) are equally to be rejected; the whole of **Abu’l-Mahasin’s** passage, in fact, deserves to become a classic example of reckless misstatement. It is noteworthy that Abu’l-Fidā, (R.H.C.Or. i, 10) omits the passage entirely.

¹ Cf. *Damas. Chr.*, p. 105.

² x, 338 (R.H.C. Or. i, 278–9); summarized by Röhricht, p. 88, and Grousset, p. 459.

³ That this is an exaggerated view of Zankī’s achievement has already been rightly demonstrated by Stevenson (p. 124).

⁴ Even here Ibn al-Athīr exaggerates the amount of the tribute, which both Ibn al-Qalānisī (*Damas. Chr.*, 106) and Kamāl ad-Dīn put at 20,000 dinars.

⁵ *Damas. Chr.*, 82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹ *Kāmil*, x, 339; *Damascus Chronicle*, 111–13. In regard to the latter it is a little curious that Ibn al-Qalānisī does not explicitly mention either Baghdād or the Sultan.

جئة منك للاصلاح حتى قد ارسل اليك في جهادهم وكان اهل حلب يتولون للسلطان اما نتى الله تعالى ان يكون ملك الروم اكثر

³ x, 347–8.

¹ It is, in any case, impossible to attach to it the weight which it is given by M.Grousset: “A tort ou à raison, Tughtekin se trouva dès lors suspect aux yeux de tout l’Islam [which is in contradiction with Ibn al-Athīr’s former

statement quoted above], et une indication d'Ibn al-Athīr prouve que cette déconsidération l'atteignit aussi aux yeux des Francs" (p. 276).

² I.A. x, 461–2; *Damas. Chron.*, 191–9; cf. Röhrich, 186–7; Grousset, 658–665.

¹ It is difficult to see what good Tyre would have been to the **Bāṭinis**; and, on the other side, what would the Venetians have said?

² *The Crusaders in the East*, pp. 125 and 129. But he decisively rejects the alleged *capture* of al-Athārib in 1130 (p. 129, note 3).

³ *Damascus Chronicle*, 197.

⁴ Kamāl ad-Dīn, R.H.C. Or., iii, 661.

¹ x, 466–7. Zankī did not, in fact, reappear in Syria until 1135.

² R.H.C. Or., iii, 578; Ibn al-Q., 134 (*Damascus Chron.*, 42–3).

³ R.H.C. Or., iii, 640; Ibn al-Q., 210 (*Damas. Chron.*, 169–170); cf. Stevenson, 110; Grousset, 595–6.

¹ Kamāl ad-Dīn, 636–7; *Damas. Chron.*, 167–9. (Note that in the second last line of p. 168 in the *Damascus Chronicle* “First Rabi” is a copyist’s error for “First Jumādā” [began 26th June].)

² R.H.C. Or., iii, 651; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 443.

³ According to Ibn al-Athīr, x, 439.

⁴ *Damas. Chron.*, p. 179.

The Influence of Chingīz-Khān's Yā sa upon the General Organization of the Mamlūk State

By A.N.POLIAK

IN an article published several years ago we have collected evidence corroborating al-Maqrīzī's statement (mistrusted by Quatremère in *Histoire des Mongols*) that *siyāsa*, the legal code of the Mamlūks, was founded upon the Great Yāsa of Chingiz-Khān.¹ The Great Yāsa was not merely a code of criminal and civil law but a system of rules governing the entire political, social, military, and economic life of the community which adopted it. The expansion of this system outside the Mongol nation was due to the belief that it was responsible for the extraordinary military success of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and that it might be regarded as a talisman ensuring victories on the battle-field.² The Yāsa rules concerning communal organization were even more important from this point of view than the laws treating of the behaviour of individuals. It is natural, therefore, to suppose that not only the Mamlūk criminal, civil, and commercial law but also the general organization of the Mamlūk state was based upon the Yāsa. The present article, inspired by the attempts made in modern times to collect and systematize the fragmentary evidence concerning the contents of the Yāsa,³ is intended to show that this organization is indeed comprehensible only in the light of such evidence.

Some preliminary remarks are necessary. The Turkish states founded within the Moslem caliphate prior to the advent of the Mongols and to the promulgation of the Great Yāsa already possessed their own Yāsas, codes obligatory exclusively upon the Turkish-speaking military castes, not upon the natives, and based upon Turkish tribal traditions. The foundation of these states closely resembled the establishment of Teutonic kingdoms within the Western Roman Empire: in both cases the fiction of imperial unity continued to exist, and the subjugated indigenes were administered, according to imperial laws and usages, by their own magistrates, who employed the imperial language as the official one. The conquerors formed a military feudal caste, which was headed by its kings—who, from the standpoint of imperial constitution, were regional commanders of troops engaged by the empire—and which had its own language, laws, and courts of justice. The separation of the two castes was slightly relaxed by the conversion of the conquerors to the imperial religion, which necessitated some respect for the native clergy and the use of the

imperial language in religious matters; but the relations between the two castes were regulated by the law of the rulers. Nūr al-Dīn b. Zangī was the first who compelled the Turkish military caste to comply with the demands of Islamic law,¹ and he is explicitly stated to be one who abandoned in favour of this law the *siyāsa*, a term evidently designating here not the Great Yāsa, which did not yet exist, but the local Yāsa of the Zangid state.² The early corruption of the word Yāsa to *siyāsa* is a noteworthy point, as also the similarity of that Yāsa to the Great Yāsa in recommending more cruel punishments for rebels and highwaymen than those ordered by Islamic law. Quite possibly, technical terms used in the Great Yāsa, or at least in its version used by the Mamlūks, were largely derived from these earlier codes; one is tempted to give the rein to fancy and suppose that the Great Yāsa was originally conceived as an improved edition of the Yāsas of Moslem Turkish rulers, which were doubtless more elaborated and adapted to the needs of a large empire than the kindred traditions of Mongol herdsmen and of those Turkish tribes which remained outside the Moslem empire. this statement is difficult to ascertain from the biographical dictionaries, as they are concerned only with those mamluks who reached the amirate, a rank usually attained via the *khāṣṣakīya* corps.

It seems that, owing to the semi-magic power ascribed to the Great Yāsa, this code was in general concealed by the rulers from subjugated populations: among the Arabic, Syriac, Persian, and Armenian authors who tell us about it, not one explicitly pretends to have seen it himself or appears to be familiar with the order of its chapters and articles. As to the members of the military caste, in the Mamlūk state they were evidently acquainted not with the Mongol text written in Uigur characters but with a version written in their Turkish dialect in Arabic letters. Those of them who did not specially prepare themselves for the career of military judges, *ḥujjāb*, but had to perform judicial functions in their quality of sultans and governors, were sometimes illiterate,¹ and could learn by heart oral lessons from this version. At any rate, this version could not differ considerably from its Mongol source, and since the materials concerning the organization of the Mamlūk state are more numerous than those regarding any part of the Mongol empire, we may, if our thesis is correct, consider them as the best instrument for reconstructing the Great Yāsa. We must only remember that, according to the tradition inherited by the Mamlūks from earlier Turkish states, a Yāsa regulated the internal life of the ruling caste and its relations with the natives, whereas the internal affairs of the latter were governed by Islamic law and, within limits fixed by it, by religious codes of non-Moslem communities. both cases the ruler was elected by chief

dignitaries of the state, who were simultaneously commanders of the army. The Mamlūk state council, *majlis*, as the Mongol *quriltay*, was an advisory body summoned by the *khān* whenever he wished to hear the opinion of his electors and other learned and influential persons on important problems. The numerous and turgid titles applied to the Mamlūk rulers and emirs in Arabic official documents seem to violate the Great Yāsa's rule ordering extreme simplicity in this respect; but the Mongols regarded this rule as obligatory upon themselves only, while their clerks, recruited from conquered populations and composing documents in their languages, had to call the Mongol lords by titles which were traditionally applied by these peoples to their masters.¹ One Mongol was a comrade for another, but not for a captured native; and the Mamlūk-“Turks”, who considered themselves as a branch of the imperial people, followed the usage of its main body and musketeers, instead of recruiting such specialists from slaves and serfs, this action was bitterly resented by Ibn Iyās, whose admiration for traditional arms was doubtless shared by other knights.¹

The Mamlūks did not consider the Great Yāsa as a code of an entirely strange people. As the Mongols admitted Turkish tribes to their military caste (cf. the evolution of the term “Tatars” in the Golden Horde), so the Mamlūk-“Turks” regarded the Mongols—and the Circassians, the Alans, the Russians, and all the peoples regularly recruited for Mamlūk troops—as Turks,² which meant for them primarily “horsemen of the steppes”. The number of peoples represented in various times in the Mamlūk army was very great, but regular recruiting took place only among populations acquainted, partly or wholly, with steppe horsemanship. Though most of the Mamlūks were brought through ports of Crimea, and numerous merchants and religious officials of the Mamlūk state were Qirimīs, viz. Turkish natives of the agricultural, mountainous, Crimea regions,³ there was no Qirimī group in the army. The Turks of the South Russian steppes, Qypchaq, were, on the contrary, an important element in it⁴ until the transformation of these steppes towards the end of the fourteenth century into an almost depopulated expanse, “the Wild Field,” as the Russians later called it, owing to the excessive emigration into the Mamlūk and Lithuanian possessions, and to the Black Death of 1348.¹ The Russians (*Rūs*, *Urūs*), at first very numerous in the army, ceased to play there an important part at the same time as the Qypchaqs, which indicates that they did not originate from forested agricultural Russian principalities but were nomads (*brodniki*) of the Qypchaq steppes.² Ibn Khaldūn describes these Slavic nomads as herdsmen of oxen and sheep, living under the same conditions as Turks.³ If the horticultural inclinations of the Circassian sultan al-

Ghawrī show his nostalgia for the Caucasian mountain-gardens,⁴ the diet preferred by the first Circassian ruler of the Mamlūk̲s, Barqūq, was characteristic of a steppe herdsman of horses: horsemeat and koumiss.⁵ It appears that the Circassians, like their eastern neighbours, the Alans or Ossets, whose Christian religion they shared,⁶ inhabited then not only the mountains but also adjacent steppes, and that the subsequent shrinking of the Circassian and Ossetic territories was a consequence of the mass emigration to the Mamlūk̲ state. This situation may explain the long dependence of Circassia on the Golden Horde, mentioned by al-Qalqashandī as late as 1412. Owing to it the Circassians could participate in this emigration from early times, especially in view of their military reputation which was increased by the similarity of their ethnic name in sound and in spelling to a Mamlūk̲ word meaning “courageous”.¹ Significantly, the Georgians, who became under the Ottomans the principal element of the Egyptian Mamlūk̲ corps,² did not play an important part in the army of the Mamlūk̲ sultans; the share of the Alans was there more considerable than that of the western neighbours of Circassia, the Abkhasians, whose connection with the steppes was smaller³; and those Armenians who participated under Sultan Qalāūn in the Burjī regiment of the royal Mamlūk̲ corps were recruited in Armenian colonies scattered to the north of the Black Sea rather than among the inhabitants of Armenia proper, military foes of the Mamlūk̲s. The first nucleus of the Mamlūk̲ army consisted mainly of northern Oghuz, *Turk*, plur. *Atrāk* (the special application of this name to them in the Mamlūk̲ sources recalls its similar use, in the form of “Torks”, in early Russian sources, and seems to have been customary in their area), or Ghuzz; both of these ethnic names became general appellations of the military caste, and their language was the basic element of the Mamlūk̲ dialect.⁴ Under Sultan Ḥājji they yielded for the first time their privileged position to the Circassians,¹ and after Barqūq this change became firm; but even later their share in the Mamlūk̲ army was not negligible. A striking phenomenon is therefore the relatively humble part played there by southern Oghuz scattered over Western Asia, *Turkumān*, *Tarākima*, or *Tarākimūn*²: those of them who dwelt within the Mamlūk̲ state had the status of natives, prohibited from wearing “Turkish” uniforms³, and supplying auxiliary troops only; natives of Mārdīn and Asia Minor (Rūm) were admitted to “Turkish” regiments, but not to the *Turk* faction there.⁴ The reason seems to be that they had lost those traditions of steppe horsemanship which ensured the Mamlūk̲ military superiority over native (bedouin) cavalry. Similarly, though the Mamlūk̲s admitted at first to their troops some Kurdish warriors of the former Ayyūbid principalities,⁵ later this Kurdish element disappeared, and new immigrants from

Kurdistan received only the status of native auxiliaries. The Mongols were always welcome in the Mamlūk army, and only their high standing prevented them from becoming there very numerous, because they had to be enlisted as free and qualified warriors, and not as apprentices who remained temporary slaves until the completion of their military education. This temporary slavery was not a great humiliation, because since the time of Nūr al-Dīn every Mamlūk who reached the age of majority had to be manumitted; but those knights who had never been slaves felt themselves superior to those who had to pass such an apprenticeship.⁶ Only towards the end of the Mamlūk state was it imposed on the Mongols as on others.⁷ The Egyptian al-Maqrīzī admired the physical beauty of the Oyrats settled in Cairo, just as the Iranian Sa‘dī admired the Mongoloid features of Central Asian Turks.

2. The Ruler

As we know from *Codex Cumanicus*, a manual of West Turkish spoken in southern regions of the Golden Horde,¹ and other sources, there were in the Golden Horde only three ranks above the common knight: emperor *qān* or *khān*, king *sultān*, and prince or baron *bay* (*beg*)=*amīr*. We find the same graduation in the Mamlūk sources, which describe the Mamlūk sultan as the suzerain of the local beysemirs and sometimes as a vassal of the emperor (*khān*) of the Golden Horde, who was in his turn a vassal of the higher emperor of the Mongols, “the Great Qān.” Owing to the absence of a rank intermediate between sultan and emir, strong vassals of the Mamlūk sultan, as princes of Mecca, Medina, and Yanbū‘, were called in the documents issued by the royal chancellery emirs only, though they were designated by their own subjects—and frequently even by Mamlūk writers—as sultans.¹ The comparison of the Mamlūk graduation of titles with that of the Golden Horde sheds a new light on the action of Baybars I, who called his son Barka-Khān (*al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, v, s.v., explicitly vocalizes this name Barka and not Baraka) after the latter’s maternal grandfather, the emperor of the Golden Horde: its purpose was evidently not only to please the emperor but also to promote the son and his successors from kingship to imperial rank. The promotion was particularly important because the title of sultan was not Mongol but one conceded by the Mongols to native rulers and chieftains subjugated by them in the west, while the title of *khān* or *qān* was, according to the testimony of Juwaynī and Bar Hebraeus, the only one accorded to the rulers by the Great Yāsa. This object was attained, and the subsequent emperors of the Golden Horde did not demand their mention as overlords in the Friday sermon in Mamlūk mosques; and if the Mamlūk *khān* continued to be called in Arabic sources *sultān*, it was because of his post of *sultān al-Islām*, administrator of the Moslem community in the name of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph, so far as the Sunnīs were concerned, and as lieutenant of the Fātimīd caliphs, so far as the Ismā‘īlīs were concerned.² When the Mamlūk ruler became again a vassal of a foreign lord, Tamerlane, the Mamlūk chancellery was compelled to underline the latter’s superiority by applying to him the ancient title of Qara-Qytai’s emperors, *gurkhan*.³ The elective character of the Mamlūk monarchy recalls that of the Mongols. In both cases the ruler was elected by chief

dignitaries of the state, who were simultaneously commanders of the army. The Mamlūk state council, *majlis*, as the Mongol *quriltay*, was an advisory body summoned by the *khān* whenever he wished to hear the opinion of his electors and other learned and influential persons on important problems. The numerous and turgid titles applied to the Mamlūk rulers and emirs in Arabic official documents seem to violate the Great Yāsa's rule ordering extreme simplicity in this respect; but the Mongols regarded this rule as obligatory upon themselves only, while their clerks, recruited from conquered populations and composing documents in their languages, had to call the Mongol lords by titles which were traditionally applied by these peoples to their masters.¹ One Mongol was a comrade for another, but not for a captured native; and the Mamlūk-“Turks”, who considered themselves as a branch of the imperial people, followed the usage of its main body.

3. The Military Caste

The Great Yāsa obliged every inhabitant to devote a part of his time to performance of some service for the state. The Mongols themselves were not divided into two castes, charged with military service and public works respectively: Juwaynī expresses his admiration for the fact that a Tartar soldier was a peasant, expected in the time of peace to pay taxes, to maintain post service, to perform works of public utility, and to prepare arms, munitions, and everything necessary for warfare. When, however, the Mongols in foreign countries captured by them became a military caste dominating the disarmed native peasantry, military service had to be separated from labour service, and the Mamlūks did likewise. Under Baybars I the knights and emirs still participated sometimes in public works, such as repairs of Egyptian irrigating canals in 1264–5,² but later such cases do not occur. The term *bīgār*, which continued in Iran to designate the compulsory labour-service of peasantry,³ was used by the Mamlūks as peculiar to the military service of the Turkish-speaking troops, and hence to these troops themselves,⁴ while the labour-service of the Arabic-speaking peasants was called ‘*awna*, the Arabic translation of *bīgār*.¹ By the way, the word *bīgār* was applied from early times to active military service of Turkish troops in the caliphate’s service,² and might be used in early Yasas for these troops, just as Juwaynī uses it (in its Iranian connotation) when speaking of the Mongol Great Yāsa; we cannot, however, affirm that it was then already connected with the idea of general compulsory service for the state. Similarly, only the “Turks” exempt from active military service were called *tarikhāns*, the appellation given by the Great Yāsa to persons immune from general state-service. This is another example of technical terms brought by the Turks to Moslem countries long before Chingiz-Khān³; adopted by the Great Yāsa, which modified their meaning in accordance with its laws and with Mongol connotations of the respective words⁴; and then borrowed again by Moslem Turks from the Mongols together with the latter’s Yāsa. In order to ensure the accurate performance of the general state-service, the Great Yāsa ordered that the population be distributed into fixed divisions attached to specified areas and charged with specified services and taxes, and that every person be forbidden to pass from one division to another without permission. The Mamlūks complied with this rule when they compelled every

province to maintain its own troops; forbade the transfers of troopers from one province to another without sanction of the central government; and located their fiefs, as a rule, within the respective province only, and the habitual residence of a trooper in the administrative centre of his province. The Ottoman feudal system inherited this usage, but an Ottoman feudatory was more frequently enabled to inhabit his fief. A survival of the Mongol system of general state-service was the duty of the Mamlūk knights and emirs to know not only how to use arms but also how to make them, not only how to ride horses but also how to breed them.⁵ It was perhaps responsible for the extreme dislike of fire-arms by the Mamlūk troops. These arms never became normal weapons of “Turkish” emirs and knights, and when al-Ghawrī established a mercenary corps of gunners and musketeers, instead of recruiting such specialists from slaves and serfs, this action was bitterly resented by Ibn Iyās, whose admiration for traditional arms was doubtless shared by other knights.¹

The conquest of Moslem countries by Turks was rendered possible by the superiority of Turkish cavalry. In the steppes occupied by Turkish tribes grass annually grew longer than in the more southerly areas of the Arab bedouins, and therefore these steppes were able not only to support greater numbers of men, horses, and cattle, but also to accustom horsemen to longer annual migrations from winter encampments to summer pastures and vice versa, and, consequently, to extreme mobility. The Arabs could not, like the Turks, shoot arrows without ceasing or reducing their gallop²; and while in both cases cavalry was distributed during battles into three autonomous divisions, called by Arabic sources *qalb* “heart, centre”, *maymana* “right wing”, and *maysara* “left wing”,³ the Arabs sought only to surround, if possible, by their wings the enemy’s flanks or one of them, whereas the Turks, as later the Chingizid Mongols, aimed at surrounding the entire army of the enemy as by a ring, *ḥalqa* in Arabic sources.⁴ The Turkish system of military education, which was further elaborated by the Mongols and made a part of the Great Yāsā, was founded upon this manœuvre. It included various exercises during which horsemen had to form mobile rings,⁵ and the annual great hunt of the Mongol army, headed by the *khān* in person, which took place in early winter, was also such an exercise, the game being surrounded by the ring of warriors in the same manner as a hostile army. The game occurring in the deserts of Arab countries was negligible in comparison with that of the Mongolian, Central Asian, and South Russian steppes; but as the annual great hunt was prescribed by the Great Yāsā, the Mamlūk sultans practised it in the Libyan desert, and their Syro-Palestinian governors-general in areas specified by them.¹ The Ayyūbid army was divided into “the royal special warriors of the ring”

al-ḥalqa [al-sulṭāniyya] al-khāṣṣa, viz. small feudatories who formed the centre commanded by the sultan,² and the knights in the emirs' service, who constituted the two wings; the Mamlūks reorganized these two corps in accordance with the decimal system required by the Great Yāsa, which necessitated the graduation of emirs according to the number of tens of Mamlūks in their service, and the distribution of *al-ḥalqa* into hundreds and thousands, often nominal only. The adjectives *al-sulṭāniyya* *al-khāṣṣa* gradually fell into desuetude, as the ruler became connected with his Mamlūk corps more than with free "warriors of the ring", who ultimately ceased to be a military body.

4. The Serf Caste

The general obligatory service for the state established by the Great Yāsa assumed in the case of native peasants the form of labour-service. According to Pétis de la Croix, the Great Yāsa compelled those who did not go to war to participate during a specified season of the year in public works, and to devote a day weekly to some work for the *khān*. The seasonal labour-service took in Egypt the shape of annual repairs of irrigating dams and canals, for which the peasants had to supply money, implements, and working cattle, in addition to their manual work. The repairs of great dams, *al-jusū al-sultāniyya*, were supervised by regional “inspectors of the soil” *kushshāf al-turāb*, who were emirs appointed to these positions by the sultan, while small dams, *al-jusū al-baladiyya*, were under the control of local feudatories.¹ The maintenance of the irrigation-system was always one of the chief duties of the Egyptian governments, but according to al-Maqrīzī the ‘Abbāsid governors and the Fātimid caliphs entrusted it to their feudatories (he does not make things clear when-speaking of the Ayyūbids, but it appears from contemporary chronicles that they followed the example of their predecessors). Peasants were mobilized also for construction of new canals, bridges, and fortresses.² As to the compulsory regular work for the *khān*, it was carried out in demesne farms of the Mamlūk ruler and his fief-holders, to whom he transferred this prerogative.³ Another service imposed on the peasants was, as in the Mongol state, the maintenance of post-stations along principal routes. In both cases horses, forage, and money were supplied by neighbours of such a station.⁴ Another Mongol institution adopted by the Mamlūks, public granaries, was probably established in the same manner. They were divided, like irrigating dams, into royal, *sultāniyya*, and local, *baladiyya*. In 1315 the former contained in Egypt alone 160,000 *irdabbs* of grain, i.e. approximately 316,800 hectolitres.⁵ Their main purpose was to supply to cultivators loans in kind as seeds and as food until the harvest (in Egypt also to enable them to use green manure, which was not utilized in Syria and Palestine). The royal public granaries must not be confused with the private granaries of the sultan, or with granaries of the crown domains.

The law which prohibited the peasants from leaving their respective villages without permission of their lords, and then only for a specified time,¹ was not brought into existence under Frankish influence, since it

was established not by the last *Fātimids* or the *Ayyūbids*, when the Franks were a strong and imposing power, but by the first *Mamlūk* sultans, when the remnants of the Frankish states were moribund. Moreover, in Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon it was applied less rigorously than in Egypt.² Its source was the Great *Yāsa*, which ordered distribution of the population into fixed divisions, attached to specified areas. While in the case of a *Mamlūk* warrior the area within which he could freely move, when not on duty, was identical with the province to whose troops he belonged and in whose centre he dwelt, a native peasant could freely move only in the lands utilized by his village community. These lands formed for the purpose of cadastral surveys a unit, *nāhiya*, whose cultivators could inhabit either the village (*balad*, *qarya*) or small hamlets (*kufū*) in its vicinity; but if the population of such a hamlet became numerous, it was transformed into a particular village-community and *nāhiya*.³ The division to which a peasant belonged, *hamūla* “loaded beast” (the name seems to be a translation of a Mongol one, like the corresponding Russian *tiaglo*), could contain either the entire community or its fixed subdivision, clan, entitled to a fixed share of the common arable land, which was expressed either as a fraction whose denominator was 2, 3, 4, 6, 24, less frequently 5 and 7 (redvisions of great clans into smaller resulted in redvisions of common lands into a greater number of “shares” *ashum* or “portions” *hiṣṣa*, which was a multiple of the previous ones), or as some number of *faddāns* (in Egypt 1 *faddān* was 5,929 square metres, while in Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon its extent differed in various villages); and such a division with its lands formed the local “portion” (*hiṣṣa*, *naṣīb*) of an estate-holder, lord of this division (his other possessions, if any, being usually situated in other parts of the respective province).⁴ As we have remarked elsewhere, the main principles of the *Mamlūk* feudal land-tenure were brought from the Golden Horde, and the principal tax paid by the peasants, *kharāj* of Arabic sources, was nothing but the Mongol *qalān*.¹ Whereas the Islamic *kharāj* was the tribute imposed on those lands whose proprietorship was vested in the state and whose holders had only the right of hereditary lease, as opposed to the tithe levied on allodial grounds,² the *Mamlūk* tax was paid by tenants of all cultivated lands, whether “tribute-paying (*kharājī*)” or “tithe-paying” from the standpoint of Islamic law, to their immediate lords. Even in documents emanating from religious authorities, such as the endowment-deed of Sultan *Qāitbāy*,³ the term “*kharājī* lands” was applied to allodial estates whose tenants paid these rents.

Native townsmen were, from the standpoint of *Mamlūk* law, not a particular caste having a common status, but they were exempt in groups from duties imposed on the serf-caste. Small towns were from

this standpoint villages, and cities, military settlements; and native merchants, artisans, clerks, and physicians, were nowhere citizens and normal inhabitants, but only exceptions. When during the last Mamlūk-Ottoman war the Ottomans utilized against the Mamlūks the slogan of ‘*adl* “justice”,⁴ which meant from Nūr al-Dīn’s time the annulment of *Yāsas* and the return to Islamic law, it easily attracted the bulk of these townsmen, because it implied their emancipation, or at least made their own position and that of their property more certain.

The MS. of this valuable article was sent in two years ago, and, in view of the difficulty of communications, the proofs have not benefited by Dr. Poliak’s final corrections. Here are a few points on which, in normal times, the author’s opinion would have been duly consulted:—

P. 863. The hypothesis of the existence of “the *Yasas* of Muslim Turkish rulers” needs further proofs. The term itself (*yasa*) does not occur either in the Orkhon inscriptions, or in Uyghur texts, or in *Kāshghari* (470/1077).

P. 865. It would be more adequate to explain *brodniki* not as “nomads”, but as “free-lances”.

P. 866. The Arabic name of the Circassians, *Jārkas*, apparently stands for Persian **Chahār-Kas*, i.e. “the Four (tribes) of Kas”. *Kas* was the ancient name of the Circassian people: in Ossete *Kas-ag*, in Old Russian *Kas-og*, in Arab geographers *al-Kas-ak-iyya*, see *Hudūd al-‘Ālam*, 446. The popular etymology of *Jārkas*, as current in Egypt, should be explained as “[equal to] four persons”.

P. 866. A mistake about the language of the military caste is difficult to admit. Two centuries before the author of the *Bulghat al-mushtāq*, the author of the glossary published by Houtsma also describes the “Qipchaq-Turkish” language, which he distinguishes from Turkmanī.

P. 868. The Turkish-Mongolian name *Bärkä* (sometimes *Bärkäy*) apparently means “a hostage”; *Kāshghari*, i, 357.

P. 868. Barthold’s assertion concerning the disappearance of the title *gūrkhān* is right. The title *kūrkhān* has nothing to do with **gür-khān*. It must be read *kürākān*, “a son-in-law”, as, for example, Tamerlane was surnamed.

P. 871. *Nerge* has hardly the same meaning as *halqa*. It seems to be a variant of *jirga* “a row” in Juvaynī: “a line of communications,” or “a line of beaters”. In Turkish **y* can give both *j* and *n*, cf. *yumurtqa/nimurtqa*.

V.M.

Footnotes

¹ *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1935, pp. 235–6. Cf. also our *Feudalism in Egypt Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon*, p. 15, n. 1.

² Cf., e.g., al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭat*, ed. A.H. 1270, ii, p. 221.

³ The long series begins with Pétis de la Croix, *The History of Genghizcan the Great* (French, 1710, English, 1722). To cite only his latest followers: Vladimirtsov, *Social Organization of the Mongols*, Russian, 1934; Alinge, *Mongolische Gesetze*, 1934; Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law*, 1937; Vernadsky, with Minorsky's collaboration, *On the Contents of the Great Yāsa*, Russian, Brussels, 1939.

¹ Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-Rawḍatayn*, ed. A.H. 1287, i, p. 6, 1.37, to p.7, 1.2; p.7, 1.12; p. 11, 1.1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13, ll. 18–25, etc.

¹ Sultans Aynāl and Yalbāy may be cited as examples: Ibn Iyās, ed. A.H. 1311, ii, p. 64, 1. 29; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, p. 335, 1.17; p. 608, ll. 8–11.

² This view is endorsed by Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, ii, p. 10, 11. 6–12; iii, p. 534, 1. 26; iv, p. 501, 1. 8, etc.

³ Al-Sakhawī, *al-Dawʿ al-Lāmiʿ*, ii, p. 276, 1. 17; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vi, p. 784, 1. 8; p. 812, 1. 6, etc.

⁴ *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 221, ll. 14–15, etc. Such evidence must be carefully distinguished from that which applies the term Qypchaq to the Golden Horde. In the Zangid and Ayyūbid times the same name designated a province of Kurdistan (after one of its rulers), whose lords were Turcomans: Abū Shāma, ii, p. 138, 1. 33.

¹ *Nujūm*, v, p. 63. Ibn al-Wardī in *Taʾrīkh* of Abū l-Fidāʾ, ed. A.H. 1286, iv, p. 150.

² Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 372. Al-Qalqashandī, *Subḥ*, iv, pp. 182, 216. “Wladimir” in Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-Kāmina*, iv, p. 408, 1. 2=Vladimir? But in general the Russians, as others, adopted Turkish names: cf. Baybughā Rūs or B. Urūs, d. 1353. During the ethnic conflict among the Mamlūks in A.H. 870, there was no longer a Russian faction: *Ḥawādith*, p. 525, ll. 14–16. The “Slavic” regiment of “Turkish” troops in the Yaman, which existed in the

fifteenth century (*Sakhāwī* x, p. 215, No. 937), possibly retained its name from earlier times.

³ i, p. 102, ll. 18–21.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 56, ll. 8–9; p. 102, ll. 8–15; p. 149, ll. 8–17; p. 195, ll. 2–8, The appellation al-Ghawrī is derived not from the place of birth but from the barracks where he received his military education, *ṭabaqat al-ghawr*: Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *al-Kawākib al-Sā'ira*, MS. Damascus (Zāhiriyya), i, f. 123 (the author, who lived in the seventeenth century, already ignores the meaning of the word *ṭabaqa*!). Cf. on *ṭabaqat al-ghawr*, situated in the citadel of Cairo, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, MS. Paris, v, f. 113a, l. 16).

⁵ Ibn Iyās, i, p. 269, ll. 10–15, 17; p. 309, l. 23.

⁶ Cf. e.g., Abū l-Fidā', Ta'rīkh, p. 97, l. 28; Ibn Khaldūn, ii p. 282, ll. 8–9; *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 462, l. 5. Under the Circassian sultans the citadel of Cairo contained for some time a Christian church, probably for Circassian women, who were not compelled to give up their faith as were men: al-Sakhāwī, *al-Tibr al-Mastak*, ed. 1896, p. 73, ll. 2–5. The native biographers of Mamlūk emirs and knights were not allowed to write about their Christian past, not even to mention the date of their conversion to Islam.

¹ *Charkas*=*ārkas*=*jārkas*, lit. "[owner of] four souls": *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, i, f. 173a. Used as personal name. Under the Ayyūbids we still find its original form, *chahārkas*=*jahārkas*: Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, i, p. 397, l. 3.

² C.F. Volney, *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte*, Paris, 1787, i, p. 166.

³ The Alans (*Alān*, *al-Lān*, *Ās*, *Ās*, *al-Lās*, *al-Āz*) were numerous there throughout the Mamlūk epoch: cf., e.g., Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 372; *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 182; *Ḥawādith*, p. 525. The Abkhazians (*Abāzā*, Abaza) only during its last century: *Ḥawādith*, loc. cit., etc.

⁴ Cf. our remarks in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1935, pp. 236–8. Unfortunately, owing to the opposition of the military caste to the study of its tongue by the natives (*Feudalism*, p. 1, n. 2), the surviving Arabic-Turkish glossaries of the Mamlūk epoch have been written not by members of this caste but by outsiders, who had little connection with it. Perhaps they do not reflect the official dialect but are due to the fact that the natives did not distinguish one Turkish dialect from another, the official being, of course, not the only one used in the Mamlūk state. The only published glossary whose author claims to be a Turk by birth, *Bulghat al-Mushtāq* of 'Abdullāh al-Turkī (ed. A. Zajaczkowski, Warsaw, 1938), is the work of one whose Arabic name shows clearly that he did not belong to the military caste (cf. *Ḥawādith*), p. 616, ll. 5–8; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw'*, iii, p. 71), and who honestly admits that the Turkish words compiled by him became known to him through the medium of earlier books and of persons better acquainted with

Turkish than himself. He too evidently believed in the identity of “Turkish” proper with the language of Qypchaq (cf. the text, p. 1, ll. 1, 10), the latter being in this case probably not one of South Russian Qypchaqs but the tongue of North Mesopotamian Qypchaq, which included that region of Irbil in which he was particularly interested (cf. p. xiii). This tongue belonged, indeed, to the same Ghuzz family as the” Mamlūk Turkish, though it hardly was quite identical with the latter. The claim of North Syrian Turcomans to be Qypchaqs (*Ṣubḥ*, xiii, p. 37, l. 7) might be also a reminiscence of their being descendants of *that* Qypchaq, since, according to many evidences, this Turcoman tribe was brought to North Syria by the Atabeg Zangī from the east:

cf., e.g., Ab ū Shāma, i, pp. 43–4 (on the tribal name cf. *Ṣubḥ*, vii, p. 190; *Zāhiri*, *Zubdat Kashf al-Mamlūk*, ed. Ravaisse, p. 105). At any rate, though the material cited in such works is possibly of more heterogeneous stock than the official Mamlūk vocabulary, it also proves the latter’s Ghuzz origin.

¹ *Nujūm*, v, p. 56.

² Cf., e.g., *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 549, l. 18.

³ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 182, l. 12.

⁴ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 525, ll. 14–16.

⁵ *Khīṭat*, i, p. 95, l. 4. *Sulūk*, Quatremère’s transl., i, p. 24, l. i, ii, p. 45, n 53.

⁶ Ibn Iyās, i, p. 168, l. 6.

⁷ *Ḥawāḍith*, loc. cit.

⁸ Cf. the chapter *Nobilitas hominum et mulierum* in the editions of Kuun, 1880, and Grønbech, 1936.

¹ *Zāhiri*, *Zubdat Kashf al-Mamlūk*, ed. Ravaisse, p. 16, ll. 11–13, etc.

² Poliak in *REL*, 1935, p. 236, n. 3; *Feudalism*, p. 1, n. 4; and *JRAS.*, 1939, pp. 429–430.

³ *Ṣubḥ*, xiv, p. 102, l. 18; p. 103, l. 7 (rendered as *kūrkan*). While in Central Asia this title was so forgotten that V. Barthold supposed it to have never been used after the Qara Qytai epoch (*12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, p. 123), the Mamlūks preserved the ancient tradition of the steppe.

¹ We find this tendency already in a charter of Ḥūlāgū of A.H. 658; *Ṣāliḥ* Ibn *Yahyā*, *Ta’rīkh Bayrūt*, 2nd ed., p. 57, ll. 2–8.

² *Sul ūk*, Quatremère's translation, i, ii, pp. 19, 25.

³ Cf. Minorsky in *BSOS.*, ix, p. 950, after Juwaynī, i, p. 22, 1. 20.

⁴ *Subh.* xiii, p. 94, 1. 8; p. 97, ll. 6, 13. Arabic sources render it, of course, as *bīkār*.

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¹ This term survived in Egypt until the nineteenth century: Jabartī, iv, p. 207, ll. 17–20; the Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, the chapter on the corvée.

² Cf., e.g., Ab ū'l-Fidā', ii, p. 172, ll. 18, 20, 21; Ab ū Shāma, ii, p. 185, 1. 31; p. 203, 1. 12.

³ Cf., e.g., the personal name Ūlugh Tarkhān (Ibn Khald ūn, ii, p. 297, 1. 21), third century A.H. H.W.Bailey, *Turks in Khotanese Texts* (*JRAS.*, 1939, p. 91), sums up some non-Moslem materials.

⁴ Mong. *darkhan* "freedman"; cf. Vladimirtsov, pp. 69, 93.

⁵ Cf. the sources cited in *Feudalism*, p. 15, n. 6.

¹ He was a knight of *al-halqa* and a fief-holder: iv, p. 136, ll. 10–12, etc.

² Cf. Poliak in *RÉI.*, 1934, p. 262, n. 4.

³ Cf., e.g., the application of these terms by Ab ū Shāma (ii, p. 82, 1. 6; p. 144, 1. 20; p. 179, ll. 13–18) to Ayy ūbid cavalry. The centre was commanded by the ruler, the two wings by senior generals. On the corresponding terms used afterwards by Iranian Turks—*manqalay* Mong. "forehead, front", *sagh* "right" and *sol* "left"—cf. Minorsky in *BSOS.*, x, p. 165.

⁴ Cf., e.g., Ab ū Shāma, ii, p. 82, ll. 6, 11; p. 144, ll. 3–4; p. 202, 1. 24, and numerous Arabic treatises on physical culture (*fur ūsiyya*) and hunting. The corresponding term employed by Juwaynī when speaking on Mongol imperial hunts is *nerge*. Those treatises on warfare whose authors were faithful disciples of the Arab military school (e.g. Ibn Khald ūn, i, pp. 226–233) ignore *halqa*.

⁵ Thus, *Kiāb fī'Ilm al-Fur ūsiyya*, MS. Aleppo (Ahmadiyya), f. 18a, mentions a *halqa* play during which horsemen surrounded a single rider, who had to flee from their ring. Lāchīn al-Ḥusnī al-Tarābulusī, *Tuhfat al-Mujāhidīn fī'l-'Amal bi-'l-Mayādīn*, MS. Aleppo (Ahmadiyya), mentions *halqa* *bife al-jāris*, two concentric rings constituted by "rival" parties; *halqatayn al-muqābala*, two rings formed by them behind their respective commanders, who met each other in the middle; *maydān al-ahilla*, two concentric crescents; and *halqas*

of horsemen round their own commanders or round the line on which they were formerly placed. These two small treatises (for the use of excellent photographs of them I am indebted to Dr. S.Reich),

describe plays performed on public festivals by Arabic-speaking professional lance-players (*rammāḥ*). These lance-players were a hereditary corporation, anxious to conceal the secrets of their professional education from the general public (*Furūsiyya*, f. 27b); and since the “Turkish” warriors concealed in their turn technical particulars of their military art from natives, the art *rammāḥ* was of a conservative one, claiming descent from Sasanian and early Islamic warriors (ibid., ff. 24, 34), not from the Turks and Mongols. The author of *Furūsiyya* calls various exercises *al-ḥa'n al-ḥijāzi* (f. 4b), *Khurāsānī* (f. 28b), *Shāmī* (f. 32a), never by names indicating a Turkish or a Mongol origin. Still, some Turkish influence infiltrated through the medium of those Mamlūks discharged from service who had to derive their subsistence from lessons of horsemanship given to despised natives and adapted to their needs. The author of *Furūsiyya* evidently had only native teachers, as Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Rammāḥ (f. 5a) and Najm al-Dīn Avvāb al-Rammāḥ (f. 15b ff.), and for him a private Mamlūk, Sayf al-Dīn *Tuquz*, who condescended to write something on this subject, was a most venerable person (f. 14b); but the name of Lāchīn al-Ḥusāmī indicates that he was some time a Mamlūk, though he prefers not to speak about his past; and the fact that he is much more versed in the *halqa* plays than the native author corroborates our view that at least these plays were adopted by the *rammāḥ*s from the military caste. By the way, the word *halqa* is always vocalized by him as *ḥalaga*, possibly after its popular pronunciation.

¹ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 22; xiv, pp. 166–171. Abū l-Fidā', iv, pp. 30, 31, 93, 134.

² Abū Shāma, ii, p. 179. ll. 17–18; p. 180, ll. 4, 36, etc. Quatremère's explanation of the term *al-ḥalqa* in this case as the guard surrounding the ruler and protecting him (*Sulūk*, his translation, i, ii, pp. 200–2, cited by Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, s.v.), is not founded by him on any sources. In fact, *al-ḥalqa* did not surround the ruler but fought beside or, more frequently, before him.

¹ *Ṣubḥ*, iii, p. 449. *Khitāt*, i, p. 101. Zāhiri, p. 129.

² *Sulūk*, Quatremère, i, ii, p. 26, n. 29. Abū l-Fidā', iv, p. 120, ll. 19–22.

³ Cf. *Feudalism*, pp. 71–2.

⁴ Cf. on the Mamlūks: *Matériaux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum*, ii, 1, 62; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks*, p. 249, n. 7; *Ṣubḥ*, xiv, p. 377. ll. 1–3.

⁵ *Khitāt*, i, p. 91, ll. 18–19.

¹ Cf. *Feudalism*, pp. 64 ff., and *RÉI.*, 1936, pp. 261–3.

² Al-Subkī, *Muʿīd al-Niʿam*, ed. Myhrman, p. 48, 1.15.

³ Ibn al-Jīʿān's *al-Tuḥfat al-Saniyya* is a list of Egyptian *nāḥiyas*. On the term *kufū*, *sing. kafr*, cf. *ibid.*, p. 9, 1.4; p. 15, ll. 22, 27, etc.; Jabartī, i, p. 346, ll. 26–8. On transformation of *kufū* into particular *nāḥiyas*, see Ibn al-Jīʿān p. 9, 1. 4; p.13, 1. 4; p. 15, ll. 22, 27; p. 22, 1. 6; p. 59, 1. 16, etc.

⁴ Ṣāliḥ Ibn Yaḥyā, *Taʾrīkh Bayrūt* (the cited feudal charters). Ibn al-Jīʿān (the cases of villages divided among several lords). *The Buildings of Qāyṭāy*, ed. Mayer, i (text), 1938, pp. 52–60. Ibn al-Shihna, *al-Durr al-Muntakhab*, ed. 1909, p. 75, ll. 10–11;

p. 119, ll. 1–6. *Sulūk*, Quatremère, ii, i, p. 89. *Matériaux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum*, i, p. 354, etc. Poliak in *JRAS.*, 1937, pp. 105–6, and *Feudalism*, pp. 19, 69–70.

¹ *RÉI.*, 1935, pp. 238–241; 1936, p. 264; *Feudalism*, pp. 65–7.

² We refer to its final form. The article devoted to the early history of this tax in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, 1940, pp. 50–62, written long ago and never seen by me in proofs, utilizes but a part of materials proving that this form differed from early ones.

³ *The Buildings of Qāyṭāy*, i, p. 52, right margin.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 463, 1. 12; p. 471, ll. 18–23; v, p. 159, 1. 11.

Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army¹—I

By DAVID AYALON

The Army stationed in Egypt

CONTEMPORARY sources furnish fairly ample information on the structure of the Mamluk army and the units from which it was composed; but, though some of their definitions and descriptions come near to the truth, the present writer has found none of them to be completely accurate.² He is of the opinion that the treatment of this question by modern Orientalists is also in need of some emendation,¹ and he here submits the composition of the Mamluk army which, in his opinion, is the correct one, and the grounds for his suggestion will be presented in the course of the discussion.

The Mamluk forces stationed in Egypt were divided into three main parts:

I. The Royal Mamluks (*al-mamālīk as-sulṭāniyya*, very rarely: *mamālīk as-sulṭān*). These were of two categories:

(a) The mamluks of the ruling sultan (*mushtarawāt, ajlāb, or julbān*).

(b) Mamluks who passed into the service of the ruling sultan from the service of other masters (*mustakhdamūn*). These were divided into two parts:

1. Mamluks who passed into the service of the reigning sultan from that of former sultans (*mamālīk as-salāṭīn al-mutaqaddima, qarānīs, qarāniṣa*);
2. Mamluks who passed into the service of the reigning sultan from that of the amirs, because of the death or dismissal of their masters (*sayfiya*).

II. The Amirs' Mamluks (*mamālīk al-umarā', ajnād al-umarā' 2*).

III. The troops of the *ḥalqa* (*ajnād al-ḥalqa*) a corps of free, i.e. non-mamluk, cavalry. There was within the *ḥalqa* a special unit composed of the sons of the amirs and of the mamluks, called *awlād an-nās*.

The Royal Mamluks

The Royal Mamluks constituted the backbone of the Mamluk army. They were given first-rate training, and in the **Bahri** period numbered not less than 10,000 troops; in the Circassian period they apparently never exceeded this figure, and usually fell far short of it (see section on the numbers of the mamluks, pp. 222–8). In the major engagements fought by the Mamluk kingdom, the brunt of the fighting invariably fell on the Royal Mamluks, who formed the main force in all military expeditions. In the words of al-Qalqashandī: ‘The Royal Mamluks are the most important and the most honoured part of the army, the closest to the sultan, and the owners of the largest feudal estates (*iqṭā’āt*) and it is from among them that the amirs of various ranks are appointed.’¹ The history of the Mamluk kingdom is actually first and foremost the history of the Royal Mamluks. No other unit could compare with this corps either in military strength or in political power.

The Royal Mamluks were not spread out as garrisons in scattered parts of the kingdom, but were all concentrated in the capital, with a large contingent of them quartered in barracks in the Cairo citadel. It is only at rare intervals that some of them, representing but small fractions of the corps, are found serving as garrison troops. At **Qūs** in Upper Egypt, far from the centre of the realm and linked to it by poor communications, we find in the second half of the 7th century A.D. a garrison of Royal Mamluks, charged with repressing the Nubians.² After the conquest of Cyprus, there was also a garrison of Royal Mamluks on that island.³ Towards the close of the Mamluk era, Royal Mamluks were sent in comparatively small groups to trouble-spots within Egypt itself.⁴ Mostly chosen for such tasks were members of the corps who had incurred the disfavour of the sultan, or who were considered as deserving punishment. On the eve of the fall of the Mamluk state, aged mamluks were sent out to garrison various sectors of Egypt.⁵ There was in Mecca, for a large part of the Circassian period, a garrison of a few dozen Royal Mamluks. The bulk of the corps, however, remained in Cairo during the most difficult times, and were not even evacuated during a plague which wrought havoc among the mamluks.⁶ They left the capital only when forming part of an expeditionary force.

Mamluk sources offer an immense fund of information on the several components of the Royal Mamluks. The greater part of this

material is, however, of an unvaried character, and is restricted almost exclusively to accounts of these units' struggle for power, of their coalitions, and of their rivalries. The description of political strife among the various army units is, in fact, one of the pivotal points of Mamluk historiography. Data as to the military value, efficiency, degree of training, etc. of these units are found scattered throughout the sources, but are far less abundant than this type of information. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the degree of cohesion of each of the component units and its rivalries with its sister units were factors which had a direct influence on the strength and efficiency of the army, a description of them, at least in outline, cannot be omitted.

Before proceeding to a description of these units, brief mention should be made of the Royal Mamluks' commanders. These were called *muqaddam ū al-mamālīk as-sulṭānīya*. The numerical proportion of the Royal Mamluks to their commanders is known in one instance only, viz. for the year 715. This ratio emerges from the list of the army compiled in connexion with the redistribution of Egyptian lands between the sultan and his feudatories, which took place under an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwīn (*ar-rawk an-nāṣiri*). The figures given are 2,000 Royal Mamluks and 40 *muqaddam ū al-mamālīk as-sulṭānīya*, i.e. one commander for every fifty mamluks. It should be noted that the ratio of men to commanders in the *ḥalqa* given in the same list is also approximately 50 to 1.¹ This is, however, the only piece of information of its kind, and there is no way of knowing to what extent this proportion was maintained at other times. The term *muqaddam ū al-mamālīk as-sulṭānīya*² is more frequent in the Bahri than in the Circassian period.

THE MAMLUKS OF THE RULING SULTAN

(*mushtarawā^t*, *ajlā^b*, *julbāⁿ*)

Those mamluks who were bought and set free by the ruling sultan constituted the chief support of his rule. The Mamluk system of servitude (the foundations of which are discussed elsewhere³) instilled in the mamluk a feeling of profound loyalty toward his master and liberator (*ustā^d*) on the one hand, and for his fellows in servitude and liberation (*khushdā^{shīya}* or *khushdā^{shīn}*, sing. *khushdā^{sh}*)⁴ on the other. This twofold loyalty was one of the principal axes around which revolved the entire military and social system of Mamluk hierarchy. The sultan and his mamluks formed a tightly-knit association, whose members were united by strong bonds of solidarity. There existed between the sultan and his mamluks a sort of double bond: they were in power only so long as he ruled, and he ruled only so long as his power was based on them. In addition, the sultan buttressed his power by appointing his own *khushdā^{shīya}* to high positions, and similarly, during the Circassian period, by appointing his blood relations as well. Sultan Barsbāy used to say: 'No one executes my orders except my own mamluks', 'my commands are obeyed only by my own mamluks'.¹ Elsewhere the sultan is told: 'By God, were it not for thy mamluks, no one would obey thee'.² When it was said of any one that he was betrayed even by his own mamluks,³ it meant that he was in dire straits indeed.⁴

The mamluks of the ruling sultan were called *mushtarawā^t*,⁵ sometimes *mushtarāwā^t*,⁶ but it should be noted that this name does not occur immediately at the beginning of the Mamluk period. It is, for instance, almost unheard of in the days of az-Zāhir Baybars; his mamluks were then called *az-zāhirīya*, to distinguish them from the *bahīrīya* or the *ṣāliḥīya*, the mamluks of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb.⁷ In the Circassian period, a new name for the mamluks of the ruling sultan appears which becomes more frequent than *mushtarawā^t*, without displacing it entirely, viz. *ajlā^b*,⁸ or *julbāⁿ*,⁹ sing. *jalabī¹⁰* or *jalab¹¹* (which is a generic name as well).¹² The last two forms are almost non-existent in the sources. The earliest historians in whose works we find the terms *ajlā^b* and *julbāⁿ* are Ibn Khaldūn¹³ and Ibn al-Furāt,¹⁴ the latter mentioning them in the closing years of his chronicles. The *mushtarawā^t*, *ajlā^b*, or *julbāⁿ* are often referred to as *al-mamālīk as-sultāniya*.¹ One of the synonyms of *mushtarawā^t* is *mamālīk as-sultān*,² but this appellation is also often synonymous with Royal Mamluks

(*mamālik sultāniya*).³

The new sultan, upon attaining power, attempted to pave the way for the rise of his mamluks. The most frequent concomitant of a new sultan's accession to the throne was a ruthless and large-scale purge, and especially the thorough suppression of the mamluks of the preceding sultan, i.e. those mamluks who had, until that moment, been the *mushtarawā* and the most powerful body of the realm. This procedure is known from the dawn of the Mamluk era, but had a more moderate character during the *Bahri* period, because of the vigour of the legitimacy principle still obtaining at the time: the young sultan could not regard the mamluks of his father, the preceding ruler, as wholly alien to him, just as his father's mamluks did not consider him a wholly alien sultan.

Simultaneously with the purge, the new sultan fostered a new generation of young officers among his mamluks, most of them lacking in experience. The replacement of the old by the new officer class had, of course, to be carried out carefully and step by step, for it would have been impossible entirely to dispense with the services of the veteran officers without greatly endangering the very foundation of the army's existence and efficiency. Thus it was customary for the sultan, in the first years of his reign, to appoint one group after another of his mamluks to the ranks of the lower officers (Amirs of Ten) so that these ranks were often filled by his own mamluks. He would then gradually follow the same procedure with respect to the higher ranks.⁴

The methods employed by the new sultan to destroy the immense power which his predecessor's mamluks had amassed during their master's reign, and to undermine their resistance capacity as a cohesive unit, were not restricted to removing them from influential positions. Much more drastic steps were taken, including imprisonment and exile, mainly of chiefs and leaders, or transfer to the service of the amirs.⁵ The former sultan's youthful mamluks who had not yet received their freedom (the *kutiābiya*) were bought by the new sultan for himself¹; after they had completed their training and received their liberation papers they became an integral part of his *mushtarawā*. One of the most drastic and important steps usually taken by a new sultan, especially in the Circassian period, was to throw all his predecessor's mamluks, bag and baggage, out of the barracks (*ṭibāq*) of the Cairo Citadel (*qal'at al-jabal*) and establish his own mamluks in their stead.² The citadel, being the heart of the whole Mamluk empire, and dominating the capital, thus became the main stronghold of the sultan and his close supporters.

Not all sultans employed the same degree of severity towards the mamluks of the preceding ruler. The record for cruelty is held by Amirs *Mintāsh* and Yalbughā, who, after deposing Sultan Barqūq,

nearly rent asunder the whole body of his *mushtarawā*. There was in this case, however, an important racial factor added to the ordinary circumstances; it has been discussed elsewhere by the present writer.³

There is no doubt that the special structure of the Mamluk army compelled the sultan to act as he did if he was to hold the reins of control. For it must be remembered that he was but a newly appointed ruler, and as such, even had he formerly been commander-in-chief of the army (*atābak al-ʿasākir*), the number of his mamluks was far smaller than that of his immediate predecessor. The buying of thousands of young mamluks and their training in military schools required several years at least; during these years he faced, with but a handful of men, a tightly-knit corps of no less than one thousand, sometimes several thousand, mamluks of his predecessor who, up to the accession of the new sultan, had enjoyed almost absolute power.

On the new sultan's side, it is true, were his *khushdāshīya*, who helped him to reach power, as well as units of the mamluks of the sultans anterior to the immediately preceding ruler, who welcomed the opportunity of taking revenge on yesterday's *ajlāb*. But he could in no way count on these formations as he could on his own mamluks, who were tied to him by the firmest bonds of union and solidarity. To lay solid foundations to his authority, two ways only were open to the sultan: weaken the *ajlāb* of his immediate predecessor as much as possible, and multiply the number of his own mamluks within the shortest possible time. One amir advised Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāūn:

'Do not leave a big ram in thy kingdom, but foster thine own mamluks'. (*lā tatruk fī dawlatika kabshan kabīran wa-anshi' mamālīkaka*.)¹ This brief sentence succinctly summarizes the traditional policy pursued by the Mamluk sultans, especially the Circassians, in their relations with the cohorts of their predecessors.² A most characteristic illustration of the immense power enjoyed by the *mushtarawā*, in contrast with the feebleness of the mamluks of the preceding ruler, is furnished by the historian in connexion with the mamluks of Sultan az-Zāhir Khushqadam. He states that these mamluks formed the numerically largest unit, the strongest and the most respected, but also the most oppressive and the most tyrannical, for they drew their power from the existence of their master-purchaser (the ruling sultan): *wa-z-zāhirīya aṣ-ṣighār hā'ulā' hum akthar at-tawā'if 'adadan wa-aqwāhum shawkatan wa-a'zāmuhum ḥurmatan wa-a'zāmuhum wa-aghshamuhum li-'izzihim bi-wujūd ustādhihim'*.³

So long as the Mamluk kingdom was wealthy and powerful, and so long as its army was well-trained, well-disciplined, and ruled with an iron hand, the feeling of fellowship or *khushdāshīya* constituted a positive factor. An *esprit de corps*, tending to foster moderate

competition among the various units, stimulated the troops and prevented stagnation. When, however, the foundations and principles of the Mamluk military system began to crumble, together with the whole Mamluk state structure, when discipline loosened up and the selfish impulses of the various units burst forth. unbridled, this feeling of solidarity turned against the interests of the army and became one of the main factors in its ruin. The way was opened for the total subordination of all units to the *mushtarawā*, with its accompanying unrestrained extortion and oppression, as well as for indulgence in the political affairs of the realm and neglect of military duty. This state of affairs went so far that we are told of sultans who sent forth to war the members of the veteran units, while their own mamluks were spared that discomfort.¹ Their military training was most ineffective, and they were lacking in warlike spirit. Ibn Taghrībirdi was of the opinion that 100 *qarānīs* could put to flight over 1,000 *julbān*, and that, were it not for respect for the sultan, even the lowest black slaves of Cairo would be sufficient to rout them.² Elsewhere we find the *ajlāb* unable to overcome a small troop led by an amir, in spite of their large number and superior armament, because of their poor training and their ignorance of the arts of war. They were put to flight while the engagement was in full swing.³ We are also told of an encounter between the *ajlāb* and a Cairo mob, in which the *ajlāb* fled shamefully.⁴ Helplessness in combat and unwillingness to fight were common failings among them in the later Mamluk period.⁵ But whereas in combat they were wanting both in ability and in courage, they distinguished themselves in the political intrigues by which they were able to control and subjugate the weaker units. They similarly distinguished themselves in all manner of wanton and irresponsible acts. The signs of this deterioration of discipline appeared early at the beginning of the Circassian period, and had some sporadic forerunners even in the *Bahri* period. But the complete breakdown began in the second half of the 9th century A.H.

The historians point to the reign of Sultan Aynāl as the time when all restraint was removed from the caprices of the *julbān*. In 858, says Ibn Taghrībirdi, 'is the first appearance of the mamluks of al-Ashraf (Aynāl) and that which is to follow is yet more awesome'.⁶ The sultan no longer exercised any control over his mamluks.⁷ All of Aynāl's virtues were rendered void by the escapades of his *ajlāb*, which caused extreme damage to the kingdom.⁸ The people prayed for his death during his illness out of hatred of his mamluks,⁹ who committed deeds never perpetrated by the mamluks of his predecessors.¹ The same stories appear in connexion with Sultan Khushqadam (whose mamluks even surpassed those of Aynāl in their misdeeds)² and especially in connexion with the mamluks of Sultan Yalbāy.³

From the middle of the 9th century onward, Mamluk sources are permeated with the terror of the *ajlāb*, and a very great number of pages are devoted to its description. There are whole years in which little would remain in the chronicles if the description of these nefarious activities were removed. Hundreds of stories are told of the expulsion of high state officials (mostly those connected with payments to the army) the burning of their houses, the pillaging of the markets and shops of the capital, the burning down of the townspeople's houses, the abduction of women without any voice being raised in protest, the amirs' fear of the *ajlāb*, from whom they hide their treasures, etc.⁴ The sultan completely loses control of the *ajlāb*,⁵ who stone him and put him to shame in public.⁶ Whenever they wish to extort something from the sultan, they prohibit his going up to the citadel.⁷ They intervene in questions of appointments and depositions of sultans,⁸ and they have their way in the appointment of the king of Cyprus and that of the highest amirs of the kingdom.⁹ This situation had the effect of terrorizing the population, for it was known in advance that 'whatever they do will be permitted them, and the sultan will not protect those oppressed by them'.¹⁰ In such an anarchical state of affairs, the law-courts lost all their value, and whoever desired anything addressed himself not to the tribunals, but to the *ajlāb*.¹¹ One of the main reasons for the Circassian sultans' infrequent departures from the capital was the constant state of upheaval into which the city was thrown by the activities of the *julbān*. When Qāytbāy allowed himself to leave the city more frequently than his predecessors he came in for severe criticism.¹²

For all their misdeeds the *julbān* were given surprisingly light penalties. when the sultan has one of them soundly trounced his act is described as being in opposition to accepted usage.¹ Elsewhere we are told of an offender being merely beaten, while his armour-bearer is put to death.² Some *ajlāb*, who had killed a mamluk amir, were only beaten and imprisoned.³ We do hear of sultans cutting off the hand and the foot of a thief from among the *julbān*,⁴ but this is an exceptional occurrence. Moreover, even in cases where the sultan had intended firm punishment and condemned the offenders to death or to having their hands cut off, he commutes the penalty to lashing.⁵ The sultan's order to the *qādīs* forbidding them to marry the *ajlāb* without his permission was totally ignored by the latter.⁶

*The Khāṣṣakīya*⁷ (bodyguard, select retinue, pages)

The *khāṣṣakīya* (sometimes called *khāṣṣakīya*,⁸ especially in the Bahri period) were the sultan's corps of bodyguards and select retinue. Mamluk sources furnish two basic descriptions of this body, due respectively to al-Qalqashandī⁹ and to az-Zāhiri.¹⁰ The second is the superior one, and describes the *khāṣṣakīya* as those who surround the sultan even in his hours of solitude (*fī khalawātihi*, i.e. outside official duties); they lead the ceremonial litter of the *ḥajj* (*maḥmil*), are charged with bringing to the governors the robes of honour confirming their appointment, and are sent out on political missions. They are the prospective amirs, and are the closest to the sultan. Al-Qalqashandī adds that they are differentiated from the other members of the service in that they bear their swords on them; they wear brocaded bands (*ṭuruz zarkash*); they are admitted into the sultan's presence in his private moments without previous permission; they are meticulous in their dress and their riding. These descriptions are fully supported by the chronicles. From the amirs' biographies it can be said that most of them reached the amirate by way of the *khāṣṣakīya* corps¹ (see Part II). The sources also stress the great prestige of the *khāṣṣakīya* and the honour derived from being related to them.² Frequent reference is made to their being sent on special missions to foreign states, their being appointed governors of *al-bilād ash-shāmīya*,³ and their being dispatched to arrest and imprison rebellious amirs and governors.⁴ According to az-Zāhiri, there were among them ten pen-box holders (*dawādārīya*), ten special cup bearers (*suqāt khāṣṣ*), four treasurers (*khāzindārīya*), seven masters of the robe (*ra's nawbat jamdārīya*), four armour bearers (*silāḥdārīya*), and four shoe-bearers (*bashmaqdarīya*).⁵ The same author indicates that ordinary Royal Mamluks, not belonging to the *khāṣṣakīya*, could hold similar offices.⁶ The accuracy of this statement is difficult to ascertain from the biographical dictionaries, as they are concerned only with those mamluks who reached the amirate, a rank usually attained via the *khāṣṣakīya* corps.

The *khāṣṣakīya* were of course Royal Mamluks,¹ and generally belonged to the *mushtarawāt*.² The *khāṣṣakīya* of Sultan al-Ghawri, who numbered 1,200, were all from among his *mushtarawāt*.³ Nevertheless, one finds among the *khāṣṣakīya* a small number of men who not only were not *mushtarawāt* or Royal Mamluks, but who were not mamluks at all. Thus, for instance, Aḥmad b. Badlīk as-Sāqī;⁴ Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm al-Makhzūmī at-Talūlī.⁵ The father-in-law of

Sultan Barqūq, **Aḥmad** b. ‘Alī b. Abī Bakr b. Ayyūb, who was the chief engineer of the kingdom, became a *khāṣṣakī* and afterwards an Amir of Ten.⁶ The eunuch *Shāhīn*. al-Ḥasanī was a *khāṣṣakī*.⁷ The *awlād an-nās al-khāṣṣakīya* will be discussed under the heading ‘The *Ḥalqa*’, in Part II of this article.

As to the numbers of the *khāṣṣakīya*, they underwent great changes from one period to another. According to az-Zāhirī they numbered about 40 under Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāūn, and multiplied to the point of reaching 1,200 in the days of Sultan Barsbāy.⁸ According to Qalqashandī, they numbered at first 24, equalling the number of the Amirs of a Hundred; in the days of the historian (the sultanate of an-Nāsir Faraj) they had reached 400.⁹ Another source has it that Faraj increased their number to over 1,000; al-Mu’ayyad Shaykh is then said to have reduced them to 80, the number they reached under Barqūq, and to have reduced to six the number of the *dawādārīya*, who had numbered 80 under Faraj. This latter sultan similarly reduced the number of the treasurers (*khāzindārīya*), the shoe-bearers (*bashmaqdaārīya*), and the chamberlains (*ḥujjāb*).¹⁰ In 891 the *khāṣṣakīya* of Qāyṭbāy numbered ‘40 *khāṣṣakīs* and no more’.¹¹ Al-Ghawrī, who inflated the kingdom’s officer corps, greatly increased the number of the *khāṣṣakīya* as well. In 908 he fixed their number at 800, and they subsequently reached 1,200.¹² In 922, the last year of Mamluk rule, the *khāṣṣakīya* still numbered 1,200 men, all from al-Ghawrī’s *mushtarawāt*.¹³ A description of the offices held by the *khāṣṣakīya*, and a history of these offices within the Mamluk kingdom, would have to be based on broader material than we have used here.¹⁴ Suffice it to say that toward the end of the Mamluk era the master of the robes (*jamdār*) was not of the *khāṣṣakīya*, but that his office constituted a preliminary stage to membership in that corps. This may be seen from such expressions as: ‘*wa-a‘taqahu wa-ṣār min jumlat al-mamālīk al-jamdārīya thumma baqiya khāṣṣakīyan*’,¹ ‘*wa-kān min jumlat mamālīk as-sultān al-jamdārīya wa-lam yakun khāṣṣakīyan*’,² ‘*khāṣṣakīya khamṣa wa-jamdārīya mi’a wa-khamṣīn*’.³ The chief of all the *jamdārīya* was called *ra’s nawbat al-jamdārīya*.⁴

THE MUSTAKHDAMŪN

Whereas *ustādh* usually refers to the purchasing master, or the master who buys and frees, the usual meaning of *makhdūm* is the master into whose service the mamluk enters after he has received his liberation from the *ustādh*.⁵ The root *khadama* is found in various forms, having the meaning of ‘service with a master following service with the liberating master’, thus: ‘*huwa ‘atīq fulān thumma khadam ‘inda fulān*’⁶ and many other instances.⁷ The recurrent phrases ‘*thumma ittaṣal bi-fulān*’,⁸ ‘*thumma ittaṣal bi-khidmat fulān*’,⁹ refer to a mamluk’s transfer from the service of the original master to that of another. The term *istakhdam*, as applied to mamluks, generally refers to bringing into one’s service a mamluk liberated by another master.¹⁰ *Mustakhdamūn* (rarely: *mamālīk al-khidma*) thus refers to mamluks who passed from the service of the original master to that of a new one, and this term is set in opposition to *mushtarawāt*.¹

Within the framework of the Royal Mamluks, both the *qarānīs* and the *sayfīya* were *mustakhdamūn*, for both groups entered the service of the ruling sultan after having served other masters.

The Mamluks of Former Sultans

The mamluks of former sultans were called *mamālīk as-salātīn al-mutaqaddima*,² *qarānīša*, or *qarānīs*.³ Very frequently, however, they were not all included under one appellation, but appeared as separate units under the surname of their respective masters. Thus, in the days of al-Ashraf Barsbāy, the mamluks of the sultans who had preceded him included the *zāhirīya* (Barqūq), the *nāṣirīya* (Faraj), the *mu'ayyadīya* (Shaykh), and others (see n. 2, p. 218). Much more rarely these units were designated not by the sultan's surname, but by his first name, e.g., *al-khushqadamīya*, *al-aynālīya*, *al-jaqmaqīya*, etc.⁴ Each such unit was generally called 'group' or 'faction' (*ṭā'ifa*, pl. *ṭawā'if*).⁵ In contrast to the *mushtarawāt*, who formed a single and united front, the mamluks of former sultans did not, naturally enough, constitute a united front. Their factions were separate and often inimical, and their sole unifying factor was their hatred of the *mushtarawāt*, who were their juniors and lorded it over them. The mamluks of ex-sultan B could not forget how the mamluks of ex-sultan A had forcibly displaced them from the status of *mushtarawāt*, and the same grudge was borne by the mamluks of ex-sultan C against those of ex-sultan B, and so on. The chances for conflict among the various units of former sultans' mamluks were considerable, especially in the Circassian period, when the number of these units was very large as a result of the sultans' brief reigns (al-Maqrīzī notes seven such units for his own time).¹ This in turn gave rise to all sorts of coalitions and combinations of forces, of which Mamluk historiography records many instances. Such coalitions were generally of a most temporary nature, and the stability of each sultan's rule was to a large extent dependent on his ability to take full advantage of the rivalry among the various units.

A detailed presentation of the vast material supplied on this topic by Mamluk sources is of no special interest. Only the overall conclusion is of importance; the actual political skirmishes and intrigues offer little variety. Some of the material gathered in this connexion will be found in the footnotes.² We shall content ourselves here with a single example drawn from the reign of sultan Khushqadam, showing the extent to which these coalitions were fluid, and the dexterity needed by the sultan to consolidate his position on such shifting sands. In his obituary notice reviewing Khushqadam's life, Ibn Taghrībirdī relates that it was the constant friction among the various *ṭawā'if* that gave

the sultan peace of mind and a feeling of security from sudden attack, since he was aware of the disunity prevailing among the several mamluk units.³ When, however, we examine the career of that sultan, the picture becomes less idyllic. Ibn Taghrībirdi himself offers some interesting details of Khushqadam's precarious situation in 868, when he was compelled to administer an oath of loyalty to his Amirs of a Thousand. This lack of security derived from his strained relations with the various mamluk *ṭawā'if*. These were, in the order of their seniority: *al-mu'ayyadīya Shaykh*, *al-ashrafīya Barsbāy*, *az-zāhirīya Jaqmaq* and *al-ashrafīya Aynāl*. The *mu'ayyadīya* were the colleagues (*khushdāshīya*) of the sultan. They were few in numbers (less than fifty) but most of them were amirs. The governors of Aleppo and Damascus, as well as other important Damascus amirs, were of their number. In Egypt the *amīr majlis* (lord of the audience), the *amīr akh ūr kabīr* (grand master of the stable), the *dawādār kabīr* and one other of the Amirs of a Thousand belonged to this *ṭawā'if*. The rest of the *mu'ayyadīya* were Amirs of Forty and Amirs of Ten (see the amirs' offices and ranks below) so that much power was concentrated in the hands of the members of this group in spite of their low number: '*wa-hum kathīr ūn bi-hādhihi al-kayfiya*'. As for the *ashrafīya Barsbāy*, they formed the greater part of the army (or of the amirs?) and many of them were Amirs of a Thousand, Amirs of Ten, *khāṣṣakīya*, and office holders (*arbāb waṣā'if*). They were among the sultan's adversaries, for many of them had been exiled and imprisoned by him, together with their important amirs. The *zāhirīya Jaqmaq* constituted the backbone and main strength of the army of that time: '*wahum ḥayl al-'askar al-miṣrī al-ān*'. Many of them were Amirs of a Thousand, Amirs of Forty, Amirs of Ten, and office holders. The sultan put their leader Jānībak ad-Dawādār in prison, as well as Tanam *Raṣās*, and exiled and imprisoned many others of them. They, like the *ashrafīya Barsbāy*, stored up much resentment against the sultan. The *ashrafīya Aynāl*, i.e. the mamluks of the sultan's immediate predecessor, were numerous, but lacked leaders, since the sultan persecuted them with the utmost ruthlessness, especially since the time they had conspired against him with his *mushtarawāt*. From that day, the sultan had pursued, dispersed, and harassed them without respite, going so far as to kill their leaders or drown them in the Nile. In the same year his relations with his *mushtarawāt* were greatly strained, and he had a great fear of them. It thus emerges that he had no military unit left on which he could rely except the *sayfiya*; these had no feeling of comradeship, and allied themselves always with the winning side (see p. 220). Under these circumstances, the sultan was compelled to attempt a *rapprochement* with the *zāhirīya Jaqmaq*, and to make amends for having persecuted them in the past. His apologies were accepted

for want of a better choice, and the *ẓāhiriya* became his allies in outward appearance. Inwardly they kept their grudge against him, convinced as they were that he was the source of all their misfortunes. The sultan was well aware that their allegiance was mere lip service, and that they would cease supporting him as soon as they had reconciled themselves with their rivals, the *aynāliya*. When this occurred, the sultan would have to depend on the handful of *mu'ayyadīya*, who were, as has been noted, his *khushdāshīya*, against the combined forces of these two large groups. But he could not even rely entirely on the *mu'ayyadīya*, for he suspected one of their leaders of coveting the throne. In such a situation, the sultan might very well remain without any supporters at all, for the *mu'ayyadīya* were the *khushdāshīya* of the contender as well, and thus quite liable to turn their backs on Khushqadam and support his rival. Such instability, Ibn Taghrībirdi concludes, shook to the very foundations the Mamluk kingdom at that time.¹

In spite of the disunity and antagonism which reigned among the *qarānīs*, it would be unjustified not to consider them a single unit. Their ill-treatment at the hands of the *mushtarawāt* and the ruling sultan forced the various *tawā'if* of the *qarānīs* into each other's arms, and they were often moved to take united action against their common oppressors.

The Sayfīya

It has been pointed out above that the *sayfīya* were those mamluks who passed from the service of the amirs to that of the sultan, because of their master's death or dismissal.¹ They may also be said to be, as another definition has it, Amirs' Mamluks serving at the *bāb as-silsila*.² That they were of the Royal Mamluks is clear from the expression *al-mamālīk as-sultāniya as-sayfīya*,³ and, in addition, we are told of a large number of mamluks who served the amirs but were made Royal Mamluks after they had been transferred to the sultan's service.⁴

Of course, the *sayfīya*, each of whom had served under a different master before he was thrown together with the others into a single corps, were indifferent and strange to one another, to the *mushtarawā*, to the *qarānīs*, and to the sultan. They lacked the essential unifying factor of loyalty to the *khushdāsh* on the one hand and to the *ustād*h on the other. Their allegiance to any particular sultan was lax and vacillating. The words of the historian offer a succinct characterization: 'They are as nothing, for they generally follow the majority; none of them is tied to any particular sultan (*wa-lā yaktarith aḥaduhum bi-sultān bi-'aynihi*) but they serve whoever happens to ascend the throne much. in the manner of the popular dictum: 'Whosoever marries my mother, to him I cry: "O my father" (*kull man tazawwaj bi-ummī, shiḥt lahu yā abī*).'⁵

Al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, who did not strictly adhere to mamluk criteria of respectability, but paid greater heed to military talent, introduced into his service large numbers of *sayfīya*, claiming that they were time-tested and battle-tried veterans.⁶

But he was an exception in that respect, as in many others. In general, the status of the *sayfīya* was far inferior to that of the other units of Royal Mamluks (for data on their inferior pay see [Appendix B](#)). The sultan sternly upbraided the members of an expeditionary force for having appointed as their commander the *atābak* of Tripoli, a *sayfī* and a stranger (*rajul sayfī gharīb*).⁷ The appointment of Amir Yūsuf as governor of Safed aroused the hostility of the amirs because he was a *sayfī*.¹ On the other hand, it happened that membership in a weak body such as the *sayfīya* was of assistance in being promoted. Thus, for instance, the appointment of Barsbāy as governor of Damascus suited the sultan better than that of Birdibak, for Barsbāy was a member of the *sayfīya* and a stranger (*rajul sayfī gharīb*) from

whom nothing need be feared, while Birdibak was among the leaders of the *zāhirīya Barqūq*.² But though a few individuals could indirectly benefit from the fact that they belonged to the *sayfīya*, the group as a whole was treated, especially towards the end of the Mamluk period, with the utmost harshness and cruelty, as can be seen from the following event:

In Sha'bān 903 the plague (*tā'ūn*) which burst out in Egypt some months earlier, reached its peak. On the 20th of that month the *julbān* caused considerable trouble and mischief in the citadel, and smashed some of the amirs' saddles, saying that while the plague carried off most of them (*akhadha ghālibahum*) only very few of the amirs and the *mamālūk sayfīya*, were affected by it. So the *julbān* declared: 'If the *sayfīya* are not afflicted by the plague, we shall kill them by the sword (*idhā lam yut'ānū as-sayfīya naqtuluhum bis-sayf*).'³ This threat of the *Julbān* bore immediate fruit. The sultan decided to diminish the number of the *sayfīya* by transferring a considerable part of them back to the amirs. The *arābak al-'asākir* alone had to receive 160 *sayfīya*.⁴ The *sayfīya* had hardly time to recover from this blow when another followed: many of them were forced to take part in a prolonged campaign in Upper Egypt.⁵

This attitude of the *julbān* seems to be, on the face of it, rather odd and unreasonable; but in reality it was based on very sound grounds. The plagues, which visited Egypt much more frequently during the Circassian period than during the period which preceded it, played a very important role in the struggle for power of the various Mamluk units. The *julbān*, who were comparative newcomers to Egypt, and therefore less immune, suffered during a plague far heavier losses than the experienced units. Sometimes more than a third or a half of them would be wiped out.⁶ The whole numerical proportion between the various Mamluk factions will thus be transformed almost overnight to the detriment of the *julbān*. Naturally they and their master, the ruling sultan, would endeavour to mitigate the effects of the calamity. Among other means they would try to weaken their opponents. Of the two rival factions (*qarānīs, sayfīya*) they would more readily turn to the latter who were weaker and whose members lacked the feeling of mutual solidarity; and this is what they actually did during the above-mentioned plague.

The *sayfīya* were extremely weak as a political unit, and seldom acted independently to improve their position.¹ They usually made common cause with the mamluks of former sultans in their struggle for a better status.²

FIGURES ON THE ROYAL (AND OTHER UNITS)

We are in possession of fairly abundant contemporary information on the numbers of mamluks serving in the kingdom. Most of it is, however, restricted to a single unit of the Royal Mamluks, viz. the *mushtarawā*. Data as to the total number of Royal Mamluks are scanty, while no accurate picture can be formed as to the numbers of the Amirs' Mamluks or their alterations from one period to another, except for the fact that they were greatly reduced in the Circassian period (see section 'The Mamluks of the Amirs' in Part II of this article). The sources are sometimes not clear as to whether figures cited include non-mamluk soldiery or refer to mamluks only. So far as is known to the writer, only al-Maqrīzī gives a list containing the numbers of the mamluks from the inception of the Mamluk kingdom until his time.³ This list is very incomplete, and should be supplemented by many additions and corrections based on the chronicles and other sources, as we shall attempt to do below.

In addition, Mamluk sources have handed down two other lists, giving the numbers of mamluks in service during the reign of a particular sultan. The first of these, also cited by al-Maqrīzī, gives figures on the new organization and composition of the army encamped in Egypt, which resulted from the *rawk an-nāṣirī* carried out by Sultan an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn in A.H. 715.⁴ The second list, of unknown date, includes army figures for the whole Mamluk kingdom and is cited by Khalīl b. Shāhīn az-Zāhiri; the numbers seem greatly out of proportion.⁵

Below will be found the numbers of the mamluks from the rise of the Mamluk state until its fall.

Of Ayybak, the first Mamluk sultan, Ibn Taghrībirdī says that he had soldiers, mamluks, and retinue exceeding by several times those of the sultans of the historian's own time, despite the fact that the latter ruled over a much greater territory. But Ibn Taghrībirdī cites no figures whatever.⁶ As to the army of Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, there is great disparity among the various accounts. He had 12,000 troops according to one version, 16,000 according to another,⁷ but a third claims that, whereas the armies of the later Ayyubid sultans al-Kāmil Muḥammad and his son as-Ṣāliḥ Ayyub numbered 10,000 soldiers, Baybars raised an army four times as large, which was also given better equipment,

better clothes, and much larger pay.¹ This would put the total figure at 40,000, but there is no doubt that this does not refer to mamluks only, since the same source states in an earlier passage that Baybars' mamluks numbered only 4,000.² Qalā'ūn had 12,000 purchased Turkish and Mongol mamluks according to one version, 7,000 according to another; Mamluk sources themselves tend to accept the lower figure.³ The historian Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Qalā'ūn's devoted mamluk, and the most important authority on the kingdom during that sultan's time, states that the number of Qalā'ūn's mamluks, comprising all regiments and ranks, was at the end of his rule only over 6,000, a number which he considers to be very high: 'wa-ammā man ḥawathu yaḍūhu ba'da as-saltāna min al-mamālīk al-manṣūrīya alladhīna ishtarāhum bi-anfas al-athmān wa-afāda 'alayhim malābis al-iḥsān fa-innahum intahū fī ākhir dawlatihi ilā mā yanīf 'an sittat ālāf mamluk arbāb iqṭā'āt wa-aṣḥāb jāmakīyāt wa-umarā' ṭabliḥānāt wadhawū rutab wa-ṭabaqāt fa-minhum al-jamdhārīya wal-khāṣṣakīya wal-majārida wal-baḥrīya wal-muqaddamūn walburjīya'.⁴ A special corps d'élite, the burjīya, created by the same sultan, numbered 3,700 mamluks. It is claimed that the number of Qalā'ūn's mamluks, who were highly disciplined and showed unusually great respect for their lord and master,⁵ surpassed that of the mamluks of any preceding sultan.⁶ The sources make no mention, so far as is known to the writer, of the number of mamluks owned by al-Ashraf Khalīl. Al-Maqrīzī, in the list referred to above, claims that that sultan had 12,000 purchased mamluks,⁷ but this figure is doubtful, since it is unlikely that Khalīl could have managed, in his three-year reign, to buy such a large number of mamluks. Moreover, al-Maqrīzī himself states elsewhere (in his al-Khiṭaṭ) that al-Ashraf aimed at creating an army of 10,000 men,⁸ indicating that the mamluks he actually owned numbered less than that figure. Data concerning the number of the mamluks owned by an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn are insufficient, despite the statement that he bought them on a scale previously unknown.¹ Here again the only information available is that of al-Maqrīzī's list, which gives the figure 12,000 once more.² The repetition of this figure three times as regards the mamluks of three different sultans is suspicious. It is only for the beginning Muḥammad of b. Qalā'ūn's third sultanate, during which he gained independence, that a reliable account exists. According to this account he owned in 715, during ar-rawk an-nāṣirī, a total of 2,000 mamluks.³ But of course this figure in no way reflects the situation during that sultan's rule, for two reasons: on the one hand, he was unable to buy as many mamluks as he wished before his third sultanate, hemmed in as he was by the supervision of his rivals, the amirs Baybars and Salār, who used their best efforts to restrict his power,⁴ and, on the other hand, his third sultanate extended over as

long a period as twenty-six years. It was during *that* period, in which he was fully independent, that he bought the greater part of his mamluks. In addition to the explicit statement cited elsewhere⁵ regarding that sultan's large-scale buying of mamluks, it is important to recall that he increased the fertility of Egypt so that, as the historian clearly states, he was able to cover the expenditure required by his large army. He augmented Egypt's fertile soil area by one half: 'zādat miqdār an-niṣf'.⁶ (See pp. 225–7 the intimate connexion between the numerical strength of the Army, the number of available fiefs, and the economic situation of the realm.)

In the interval between the death of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 741 and the first years of the reign of al-Ashraf Sha'bān, we have no information as to the mamluks' numbers. In 769, viz. after four years of rule, Sha'bān had no more than 200 mamluks.⁷ This low figure is probably due to the fact that the sultan did not enjoy independence during the first years of his reign.

The accession to power of the Circassian sultans marks a distinct decrease in the mamluks' numbers. It is said of Barqūq, the first to rely on mamluks from this racial stock, that he bought many mamluks as soon as he came to power, and that he owned 3,000 of them within a few years.⁸ On the other hand, it is also reported that during the whole of his first reign he bought no more than 2,000, excluding those he favoured and promoted from among the great amirs and the *khāṣṣakīya*, who were his *khushdāshīya*.¹ As for figures covering the total duration of his rule, there are diverse accounts: according to Ibn Tahgr ībirdī's *an-Nujūm az-Zāhira*, he had 5,000 *mushtarawāt*,² while the same author's *al-Manhal aṣ-Ṣafī* credits him with the same number of *mushtarawāt* and *mustakhdamūn* combined³; whereas according to al-Maqrīzī, the combined total of his *mushtarawāt* and *mustakhdamūn* was 4,000.⁴ In the days of Barqūq complaints were voiced as to the 'depleted army of Islam' and the amirs, having consulted with each other as to the best cure for this ill, came to the conclusion that waqfs dating from Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn's time or later should be dissolved and handed over to the army. This was done, in spite of the vigorous opposition of the clerics. These drastic measures were taken under the pressure of an impending offensive of Timur Lang against the Mamluk kingdom.⁵ The same claim is repeated under Barqūq's son, Faraj: the Mamluk armies have been reduced because of the increase of waqfs, which must be dissolved so that it may be possible to re-hire the idle soldiery (*al-ajnad al-baṭṭālīn*).⁶

For the reign of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, the total number of Royal Mamluks may be computed, but we have no information concerning the number of the *mushtarawāt*. In 820 he disbursed 8,000 dinars for the clothes (*kiswa*) of the Royal Mamluks⁷; every mamluk then

received 500 dirhams for the *kiswa*, so that we arrive at the figure of 5,500–5,700 for the aggregate of the Royal Mamluks.⁸ That this tallies with the facts may be judged from the report that in 824 the sultan, at a parade attended by the majority of the Royal Mamluks, gave out the pay of 4,000 soldiers.⁹ The extent to which the purchasing of mamluks was reduced during the Circassian period may be inferred also from the accounts concerning the mamluks of al-Ashraf Barsbāy. It is related that he was addicted to buying large numbers of mamluks, that in this he emulated Barqūq, and that, had it not been for the plague he would have owned more than 2,000 (!).¹⁰ In other words, he owned even less than that small number. What is even more surprising is Ibn Taghrībirdī's statement that until his own time the mamluks of Barsbāy formed the bulk of the Mamluk forces ('*wa-ilā al-ān mamālīkuhu hum mu'zam 'askar al-islām*').¹¹ This statement is even repeated in his chronicle for the year 868, viz. twenty-seven years after Barsbāy's death.¹² To this must be added the account of al-Maqrīzī, who lived under Barsbāy, concerning the strength of the Mamluk army in his days. According to that author, the troops of the *halqa* and the Royal Mamluks, if combined, would amount to no more than 5,000, of which 1,000 or less would be suitable for combat.¹

This sombre picture of the numerical strength of the Mamluk army during Barsbāy's reign seems, however, to be somewhat mitigated by the following information furnished by Ibn 'Arabshāh in his biography of sultan Jaqmaq. According to this historian 120,000 dinars were distributed among the Royal Mamluks during one pay parade in 841, the year of Barsbāy's death, and every mamluk received 30 dinars (*wa-fī hādhā al-yawm unfīqa fī al-mamālīk as-sultāniya kull wāhid mablagh thalāthīn dīnāran fa-kāna jumlatuhā mi'at wa-'ishrīn alf dīnār*).² This implies that the number of the Royal Mamluks in 841 was about 4,000, a figure which is considerably smaller, indeed, than that of 824, but still it shows that the decline of the numerical strength of the Mamluk army was not, perhaps, as precipitate as might be inferred from the overwhelming evidence supplied by other Mamluk sources.

It is interesting to note the causes to which Ibn Taghrībirdī attributes the numerical decline of the army during the Circassian period. He relates that when az-Zāhir Barqūq took power by force of arms, the amirs began buying up the fiefs (*iqṭā'āt*) for themselves or their mamluks. Not stopping at this, they obtained from the sultan a monthly salary (*jāmakīya*) for their mamluks. In this manner, every one of the latter became at the same time a soldier of the *halqa*, a Royal Mamluk, and an amir's mamluk, so that the earnings of three persons were pocketed by a single individual. Hence the decline of the Egyptian forces, '*now three times smaller than formerly*'. There was

an additional factor which, in the historian's view, greatly contributed to the reduction of the army, viz. the loss of many military fiefs as a result of their being transformed into *rizaq* (estates granted as pensions) or into *amlāk* (allodial lands). The number of these was 'enormous and beyond all bounds'. Ibn Taghrībirdi concludes as follows: 'Whoever gives careful consideration to what we have said will understand the original and the present state of the Egyptian army. Were it not for the factors enumerated above, and were it not for the destruction which has befallen some of the regions of the realm, because of continuous oppression, increased taxation, and the rulers' neglect of the country's welfare, there would be no adversary capable of resisting the Egyptian forces, and no army worthy of comparison with them.'³

Among the factors listed above by Ibn Taghrībirdi to account for the numerical decline of the Mamluk army, two are of prime importance. The first is the reduction in the number of feudal estates (cf. above the endeavours of Barqūq and his son Faraj to increase it by the dissolution of the waqfs); and the second was the decline of Egyptian economy.⁴ On the other hand, the historian greatly overestimates the role played by the Amirs' Mamluks, for, as we shall see in Part II of this article, these were far from occupying the important position which he attributes to them. But, as to the very fact of the numerical decline of the Mamluk army under the Circassians, Ibn Taghrībirdi speaks in unequivocal language, and his statements are borne out by all the data that can be gathered on this subject from Mamluk sources.

We have not been able to obtain any information on the number of Jaqmaq's *mushtarawāt*. Aynāl had, at the time of his death, about 1,000 mamluks 'or a little less or a little more', not including 200 which he had bought from his predecessor.¹ A most important piece of information—the only one of this type known to the writer—is available regarding *all* types of Royal Mamluks in the services of Sultan Khushqadam: The *nāṣiriya* Faraj constituted an unimportant quantity; the *mu'ayyadīya* Shaykh numbered 30, most of them occupying high posts; many of the *ashrafiya* Barsbāy were Amirs of *Ṭablkhāna* and Amirs of Ten, and many were *khāṣṣakīya*; the *zāhiriya* Jaqmaq numbered more than 600, including five Amirs of a Hundred; the *ashrafiya* Aynāl counted some 1,600 (!); Khushqadam himself had 3,000 *mushtarawāt*, of whom 400 were *kuttābīya* and the rest *khāṣṣakīya* and holders of offices.² Ibn Iyās claims that Khushqadam owned 4,000 mamluks,³ but this author shows a general tendency to exaggerate in comparison with preceding historians (thus he claims, for example, that the numbers of the *mushtarawāt* of Barqūq, *excluding mustakhdamīn*, were 7,000,⁴ of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, 5,000,⁵ of Barsbāy, 5,000⁶). It is related of Qāytbāy that he was fond of buying mamluks, and that,

had it not been for the plague, the number of his mamluks would have reached 8,000.⁷ It should be borne in mind that that sultan's reign was very long, 873–901 (1468–1495) so that he was able to buy a larger number of mamluks than the other Circassian sultans. According to his biographer Qāyṭbāy had at the end of 877, i.e. about five years after his accession to the throne, more than 2,000 mamluks (*wa-ishtarā min al-mamālīk mā yazīd 'alā alḥay mamlūk*).⁸ As for az-Zāhir Qānṣūh, we learn that when he was besieged in the Citadel by Tīmānbāy the Dawādār, all his supporters deserted him, except his own mamluks (*mamālīkuhu; mamālīkuhu mushtarāhu*) who numbered less than 2,000.⁹ This figure seems to be rather exaggerated at the first glance for a sultan who ruled only a few months. But it should be remembered that az-Zāhir Qānṣūh was sultan Qāyṭbāy's brother-in-law and one of his favourite amirs, and that during the reign of Qāyṭbāy's son, an-Nāṣir Muḥammad Abū as-Sa'ādāt, he was the dominating figure in the Mamluk kingdom. Under such exceptionally favourable circumstances he could easily purchase most of his mamluks before he even came to the throne. The number of the mamluks of Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī is not known, but those who completed their training at the military school during his reign numbered about 2,500; this figure is lower than the number of the sultan's purchased mamluks, as we have attempted to show elsewhere.¹

As for figures including all categories of Royal Mamluks, three, relating to the Circassian period, have been cited above: for the reign of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, 5,500–5,700; for the reign of Barsbāy, about 4,000; and for the reign of Khushqadam, approximately 5,500. We may add that an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, in the first half of the 14th century, built barracks (*ṭibāq*) which could accommodate 12,000 Royal Mamluks.² In his detailed list of the kingdom's army (see [Appendix A](#)) az-Zāhiri puts the number of Royal Mamluks at 10,000. G.de Lannoy, who visited the Mamluk kingdom at the beginning of the 15th century, also estimates the Royal Mamluks at 10,000.³

It may be pointed out that we have nowhere found any instance in which the sources mention the numbers of the *sayfīya*.

The above list concerning the numbers of the Royal Mamluks is, of course, far from being full; but it should be emphasized here that it is doubtful whether a similar list can be compiled for many Moslem armies in the past, with the exception of that of the Ottoman Empire in its later stages. Moreover, the above list covers the greatest part of the Mamluk period, and is, most probably, quite accurate as far as it goes. This can be judged by the smallness of the figures and, what is more important, by the fact that these figures generally tally with the information furnished by the sources concerning the numerical strength of the Mamluk military expeditions and the numbers of

mamluks present in pay parades and in other general parades.⁴

Footnotes

¹ The present paper is a chapter from a work on the Mamluk Army. It deals only with the regular forces, and is devoted for the most part to the army stationed in Egypt, which constituted the main force of the Mamluk kingdom. The *ḥalqa* has been included in the regular forces because it formed, before the Mamluk era and during a considerable part of that period, one of the most important components of the kingdom's army. The troops stationed in Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon are dealt with in broad outline only. The army of the whole kingdom was called *al-ʿasākir as-sultāniya* or *al-ʿaskar as-sultāni* (*Nujūm*(C), viii, p.162. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 703, l. 20; vii, p. 91, l. 3; p. 97, l. 19. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 645, ll. 16–18. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 270, l. 3. Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 496, l. 6). This appellation was usually reserved for the army during military expeditions, not in ordinary circumstances. It was sometimes also known as *al-ʿasākir al-islāmīya* (Abū al-Fidāʾ, iv, p. 45 (twice on that page); p. 70, l. 13; p. 88, l. 8. Ibn al-Furāt, viii, n. 192, l. 16). The army stationed in Egypt was known as *al-ʿaskar al-miṣri* or *al-ʿasākir al-miṣriya* (*Nujūm* (P), vii, p.67, l. 22; p. 68, l. 1; p. 92, l. 19; p. 95, l. 8. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 300, l. 4; p. 301, l. 19; p. 550, ll. 4–5; p. 633, l. 14, ll. 19–20; p. 641, l. 14. Ibn Iyās, iii, p. 243, l. 3. Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 41, l. 13; viii, p. 223, ll. 17–18; ix, p. 64, l. 1. See also references given in next note.)

Contingents stationed in Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon (al-Bilād ash-Shāmīya) were called *al-ʿasākir ash-shāmīya* (Zetterstéen, p. 60, l. 23; p. 80, ll. 1–2. Abū al-Fidāʾ, iv, p. 21; p. 22, l. 11; p.23, l. 4; p. 58, l. 4. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 25, l. 13; p. 202. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 645, l. 15; p. 646, l. 6; p.688, ll. 5–6; p. 695, l. 18; p. 712, l. 9; vii, p. 92, ll. 7–8; p. 97, ll. 12–13. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 514, l. 3; p. 630, ll. 21–2; p. 633, l. 22; pp. 634, l. 15–635, l. 9; p. 646, ll. 2–3; 647, l. 16, ll. 22–3. Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 117, l. 8; p. 176, l. 7. *Tibr*, p. 63, l. 10. *Dawʿ*, iii, p. 9, l. 4). This name was, however, sometimes used in the narrower sense of 'troops of the governorship of Damascus', as distinguished from *al-ʿasākir al-farābulusiya, al-ḥamāwiya, as-safādiya*, etc. (Zetterstéen, p. 144. Abū al-Fidāʾ, iv, p. 49, ll. 14–15. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 479, ll. 12–13. *Ḥawāḍith*, p.490, l. 21; p. 645, l. 14, l. 18; p. 647, ll. 19–20; p. 653, ll. 9–10. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 237, ll. 1–2. Ibn Iyās, v, p. 71, ll. 4–5). The term 'askar *as-sāhil* (Abū al-Fidāʾ, iv, p. 57, l. 6, et al.) is encountered for a brief period only, viz. during the first years following the expulsion of the Crusaders from the Muslim-held littoral.

² *Ṣubḥ*, IV, p. 14, ll. 8–16, l. 11. *Dawʿ as-Ṣubḥ*, pp. 244, l. 18–245, l. 18. *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 386–387. *Zubda*, p. 113, ll. 4–18; p. 116, ll. 7–19. *Khiṭaṭ*, i, pp. 91–5; ii, pp. 216–17. *Husn*, ii, pp. 111–13. The following division of the Mamluk army given by al-ʿAsqalānī is worthy of note: *al-ʿaskar kāna qabla ad-dawla as-sāhiriya* (i.e. of Barqūq) *thalāthat aqsām, al-awwal mamālīk as-sultān, wa-hum ʿalā qarbayn, mustakhdamīn wa-mamlūkīn; wa-li-*

kullin minhum jawā^āmik wa-rawā^ātib ‘al^ā ^{as-sulṭān} wa-min ^{sharṭ} al-
 mustakhdamīn hunā^ā wa-hunā^ā ka an lā^ā yakūⁿ min al-qism ath-thā^ālith,
 wa-hum ajnā^d al-ḥalqa (Sul^{ūk} [trsl. Quatremère], i, pt. 2, p. 161). It is
 hard to translate this passage literally, as its language is very confused (the
 author uses *mustakhdamīn* in two different meanings, and though he speaks
 of three units he mentions only two, the first of which is divided into two
 sub-units); but, in our opinion, its idea is quite clear: the Mamluk army was
 divided into three units: (a) *mustakhdamūn*; (b) *mamlūkūn* (i.e.
mushtarawān); (c) *ḥalqa*. The two first units, who were paid and
 maintained by the sultan, belonged to the same category (*mamlūkūn*
^{as-sulṭān} = *mamlūkūn sulṭāniya*) from which the third unit, the *ḥalqa*, was
 excluded. Also of interest is the division, quite erroneous for the most part
 but containing some glimpses of truth, offered by de Lannoy, who visited
 Egypt and Palestine at the beginning of the 15th century. He states that the
 Mamluk army was divided into four parts, as follows: (a) the *ḥaṣṣakīya*, who had
 distinguished themselves in the use of arms, and from among whom were
 selected the commanders of fortresses, the captains, and the governors of the
 towns, some

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received their pay from the *dīwān* of the sultan in ready cash, while the rest
 shared among themselves the profits from the villages and citadels; (b) the
sayfīya, who were foot-soldiers and carried no arms but the sword (*sayf*);
 they received their pay from the *dīwān* of their master; (c) *qarāniṣa*, who
 were held on call, received their foodstuffs outside the rations regularly
 allotted to the soldiery, and were given nothing over and above their
 expenses; when one of the regular mamluks died, one of the *qarāniṣa* would
 take his place; (d) the *jalab*, who were recent arrivals, knew no Turkish or
 Arabic (Moorish), displayed no bravery and had no opportunity to show
 their strength and personal qualities (*Archives de l'Orient Latin*, vol. iiA, p.
 90).

¹ Quatremère, in his various comments to *Sulūk*. Sobernheim, *Enc. of Is.*,
 art. 'Mamlūks' (a classification full of errors). Demombynes, in his
 introduction to *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks*. Lane-Poole, *A History of*
Egypt in the Middle Ages, pp. 242 ff. Blochet, *Patrologia*, xiv, p. 570, n. 3
 (an incorrect division). G. Wiet, *Précis de l'Histoire d'Égypte*, Cairo, 1932,
 vol. ii, L'Organisation militaire et administrative, pp. 237–249. W. Popper in
 his glossaries to Ibn Taghrībirdī's *an-Nujūm az-Zāhira* and *Ḥawāḍih ad-Duh*
ūr. The best classification hitherto given is that of Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 2,
 although it contains some serious inaccuracies. Its main fault is that it relies
 too extensively on the 'encyclopaedic' literature without sufficiently testing
 it in the light of the information supplied by the chronicles.

² The amirs' soldiers were also called *ḥawāḍhiya*, but this designation is very
 rarely mentioned in the sources, and only for a brief period of time. See Part
 II of this article.

¹ *Daw' az-Shubh*, p. 245, ll. 11–12.

² Ibn al-Fur^āt, viii, p. 52, ll. 19–23.

³ Ibn Iy^ās, ii, p. 67, ll. 13–14.

⁴ *Ḥawādith*, p. 444, ll. 18–23.

⁵ The dispatching of Royal Mamluks to serve as garrison troops in various parts of the Mamluk kingdom is treated in greater detail in other chapters of the author's work on the Mamluk army. See also Appendix B, to appear in Part III of this article.

⁶ See D.Ayalon, 'The Plague and Its Effects Upon the Mamluk Army', *J.R.A.S.*, 1946, pp. 67–73.

¹ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 218, ll. 7–8, 1. 31.

² Note that the *muqaddam ū al-mamāīk* were not eunuchs. The head of the sultan's military schools was indeed a eunuch called *muqaddam al-mamāīk as-sultāniya*, but there existed other posts bearing identical titles and not occupied by eunuchs. Thus it is known that the commander of the Mamluk garrison of Mecca was also called *muqaddam al-mamāīk as-sultāniya* (one of a series of many titles pertaining to this post), though he was not a eunuch; see the chapter dealing with the Mecca garrison. As for the *muqaddam ū al-mamāīk as-sultāniya* who were the commanders of the Royal Mamluks, it is clearly seen that they were not eunuchs from their distinctly Mamluk names (Jarkas, *Mughulṭāy*, Bakilmish), their titles (*Sayf ad-Dīn*), their offices (*amīr akh ū r, ustādār, ra's nawba*), their high ranks (Amir of a Thousand). The writer deals with the eunuchs in a special chapter of his work on the Mamluk army. There he discusses, *inter alia*, their names, titles, offices, and ranks. Cf. Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 58, ll. 13–14, ll. 16–17. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 47b, 1. 7. *Manhal*, viii, fol. 259b, ll. 10–13; as well as from the fact that they had sons (*Manhal*, iii, fol. 17a, ll. 16–23. *Daw'*, iii, p. 100, ll. 2–6. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 486, 1. 12; p. 633, ll. 10–12). For additional data on the *muqaddam ū al-mamāīk* indicating that they were the commanders of the Royal Mamluks both in official reviews and in the battlefield, see: *Sulūk*, i, p. 286: p. 612, 1. 5; p. 935, ll. 16–18. *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 162, ll. 13–15. Ibn al-Fur^āt, vii, p. 7, ll. 15–18; ix, p. 163, ll. 11–12. Abū al-Fidā', iii, p. 167, ll. 14–15. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 111, 1. 39–112, 1. 1; p. 218.

³ In D.Ayalon, *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*, The Israel Oriental Society (Oriental Notes and Studies), Jerusalem, 1951.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 59, 63. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, p. xxiii.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 709, ll. 14–15; vii, p. 423, 1. 2.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 641, 1. 13.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 262, 1. 12.

⁴ Cf. also *Manhal*, viii, fol. 434b, 1. 10.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 157, ll. 6–7; vi, p. 641, 1. 13; vii, p. 262, 1. 12.

⁶ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 235, 1. 10; vii, p. 462, notes. Ibn Iyās, iii, p. 168, 1. 10; iv, p. 241, n. 4; the editor here remarks that this spelling occurs frequently in the text in question; v, p. 5, 1. 6.

⁷ The term *mamālīk sulṭāniya* itself had not yet become stabilized. The term is encountered as early as 636 (*Sulūk*, i, p. 281, 1. 11; p. 286; p. 343, ll. 7–8), viz. in the Ayyubid period, but this may be an anachronism on the part of the later Mamluk historian, since Ayyubid sources do not appear to employ this designation. For additional material on *mamālīk sulṭāniya*, see: Zetterstéen, p. 164, ll. 12–13. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 34, 1. 12. *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 172, ll. 3–4. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 112, 1. 5; p. 149, 1. 19; p. 213, 1. 16; pp. 230–1; p. 235; p. 320, 1. 22; p. 321, 1. 1; p. 396, ll. 11–13; p. 582, 1. 21; vi, p. 38, 1. 2. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 129, 1. 11. *Dawʿ*, i, pp. 65, 1. 26–66, 1. 1. Ibn Khaldūn frequently refers to the mamluks by the name of *mawālī*, thus: ‘Baybars *min* *mawālī* Aydaḳīn al-Bunduqdārī *mawālī* aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’ (Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 381, ll. 6–7), and similarly many other passages (Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 143, 1. 12; p. 358, 1. 5; p. 361, ll. 2–4; p. 384, 1. 5; p. 394, 1. 28; p. 395, 1. 1; p. 409, 1. 10, 1. 20; p. 411, 1. 11, 1. 24; p. 451, 1. 15; p. 452, 1. 12; p. 422, 1. 16).

⁸ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 457, 1. 3, 1. 9, 1. 14; p. 509, note. *Ḥawāḍiḥ*, p. 191, 1. 20; p. 301, 1. 6. *Tibr*, p. 314, ll. 2–3. *Dawʿ*, iii, p. 43, 1. 28. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 342, 1. 15.

⁹ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 191, 1. 9, 1. 14, 1. 17; p. 192, 1. 17; p. 198, 1. 13; p. 205, 1. 14. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 6, 1. 12. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 214, 1. 17; iii, p. 142, 1. 19, 1. 20; p. 150, 1. 1, 1. 3, 1. 4, 1. 5; p. 161, ll. 13–14; p. 314, ll. 16–18; iv, p. 443, ll. 14–16. The first one is preferred by Ibn Taghrībirdī, while Ibn Iyās uses the second almost exclusively. For identity of *ajlāb* and *mushtarawāt*, cf. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 123, 1. 2, also notes, as well as *Ḥawāḍiḥ*, p. 479, ll. 7–15. Ibn Zūnbul, pp. 13, 1. 24–14, 1. 2. That the *ajlāb* or *julbān* were mamluks owned by the ruling sultan may also be inferred from Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 6, 1. 12. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 65, 1. 17; p. 77, ll. 2–3; p. 137, 1. 8; iv, p. 404, 1. 13, 1. 14, 1. 15; v, p. 22, 1. 19; p. 29, 1. 17.

¹⁰ Ibn Iyās, v, p. 15, 1. 5.

¹¹ *Ḥawāḍiḥ*, p. 534, ll. 11–17.

¹² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 203, ll. 1–2.

¹³ Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 457, 1. 14, 1. 18; p. 458, 1. 1, ll. 8–9, 1. 24.

¹⁴ Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 6, l. 12.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 219, l. 23; p. 401, ll. 9–10; vi, p. 757; pp. 768–9; vii, p. 189, ll. 6–7; p. 190, ll. 1–2; p. 457 and note; p. 527, ll. 7–8; p. 530, ll. 1–2; p. 776, l. 3. *Ḥawādith*, p. 21, ll. 14–15; pp. 37, l. 8–38, l. 3; p. 205, l. 1; p. 273, l. 3; p. 301, l. 6; p. 532, l. 1. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 31b, ll. 19–20. Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 43, ll. 4–5. On very rare occasions, *ajlāb* is used to designate amirs' mamluks as well (*Manhal*, i, fol. 193b, l. 3; v, fol. 49a, ll. 16–17).

² *Ḥawādith*, p. 460, l. 14. Ibn Iy^ās, p. 400, l. 8; v, pp. 35, l. 23–36, l. 1; p. 48, l. 11. Cf. also *Patrologia*, xx, p. 41, l. 2. *Sulūk*, i, p. 433, l. 12. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 723, ll. 3–9; vii, p. 797, ll. 10–11. Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 250, l. 21. *Tibr*, p. 279, l. 13; p. 293, ll. 24–5; p. 310, l. 7. Ibn Iy^ās, ii, p. 170; p. 178, ll. 1–2; p. 184, l. 21; p. 221; iii, p. 121, l. 14, l. 16; p. 267, l. 4, l. 6; p. 281, ll. 6–7. *Daw'*, iii, p. 10.

³ Zetterstéen, p. 26, ll. 24–5. Ibn al-Fur^āt, viii, p. 170, ll. 11–12. *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 317, ll. 28–9. Cf. also *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 218, ll. 7–8, with l. 13.

⁴ Cf. also references in following footnotes, as well as the description of the sultan's first years of rule in the Mamluk chronicles.

⁵ *Nujūm* (C), viii, pp. 48, l. 16–49, l. 7; p. 277, ll. 4–7. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 81. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 457; p. 459, ll. 1–2. Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 107, ll. 18–23; p. 108, ll. 19–21; p. 115, ll. 14–16. Ibn Khaldūn, v, pp. 461–2; p. 462, ll. 27–9; p. 486, ll. 22–3. *Daw'*, x, p. 280, ll. 5–6. See also references given in note 2, p. 210 below.

¹ Material on this subject has been gathered in *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*, pp. 5, 19–20.

² The following references contain information on the *julbān* as the dwellers in the barracks of the citadel, and on the driving out of the mamluks of the immediately preceding sultan (these took up their abode in Cairo): *Nujūm*, vi, p. 514, ll. 11–13; vii, pp. 12–18 (and also the previous pages from the beginning of the volume); p. 193, l. 7; p. 452, ll. 1–5; p. 467, ll. 4–10; pp. 491, l. 10–492, l. 3; p. 745, ll. 12–15; p. 836, l. 14. *Ḥawādith*, p. 191, ll. 20–3; pp. 203, l. 14–206, l. 3; pp. 239, l. 18–240, l. 1; p. 251; p. 443, l. 15. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 193a, ll. 1–2; viii, fol. 451b, ll. 12–14 (and also the description preceding these lines). Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 302, ll. 6–18. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 79b, ll. 22–5. *Tibr*, p. 41, ll. 7–8. Ibn Iy^ās, iii, p. 341, ll. 1–2; p. 391, ll. 1–2; p. 397, ll. 15–18; iv, p. 41, ll. 15–17; p. 359, ll. 6–8; p. 428, ll. 14–22; p. 484, ll. 5–6; v, p. 48, ll. 19–20; p. 63, l. 15.

³ See my 'The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom', *J.A.O.S.*, 1949, pp. 135–147.

¹ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 94. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 27, ll. 12–15.

² Mamluk sources furnish extremely abundant material on the methods

followed by the new sultan, on his accession to the throne, in order to establish his rule. Because these methods produced most profound effects

upon the relative strengths of the *mushtarawā*t and the mamluks of the former sultans, a selection of references larger than the usual is here given.

Zetterstéén, p. 151. *Patrologia*, xiv, pp. 596, l. 5–597, l. 5. Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 34, ll. 28–9. *Sulūk*, i, p. 384, ll. 7–8; p. 658, ll. 5–6; p. 671, l. 14; p. 792, l. 6; p. 808, pp. 826–7; p. 833, ll. 10–13; ii, p. 20; p. 77; p. 118; p. 119;

p. 207; p. 230, note; p. 405, l. 11; p. 455, ll. 4–10. *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 84, ll. 1–6; pp. 99–101; p. 269, ll. 14–15; ix, p. 13, l. 13; p. 16, ll. 1–2; p. 34, ll.

10–11. *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 42–3; p. 46; pp. 55–6; p. 117, ll. 4–6; p. 150, ll. 14–16; p. 153, l. 5; p. 155, ll. 4–8; pp. 206–7; p. 295, ll. 8–9; pp. 295–6; p. 319; pp. 373–4; p. 380, ll. 15–18; p. 403, ll. 8–10; p. 448, ll. 10–12; pp. 454–5; p. 456, ll. 11–13; p. 457, ll. 6–8; p. 459, ll. 1–2; pp. 469–470; p. 470, ll. 3–5; p. 489, ll. 8–9; p. 492, ll. 17–18; p. 567, ll. 13–15; p. 587, ll. 2–4; p. 588; vi, 2, 239, ll. 15–21; pp. 264–5; pp. 312–13; p. 333; p. 343; p. 354; p. 363, ll. 2–5; p. 373; p. 384, ll. 4–5; p. 507, ll. 4–9; p. 537; p. 621, ll. 22–3; vii, pp. 6–9; p. 31, ll. 12–13; p. 51, ll. 13–16; pp. 72, l. 20–73, l. 2; p. 77, ll. 13–15; p. 105; p. 147, ll. 5–7; p. 337, ll. 4–5; p. 388, ll. 1–2; pp. 558, l. 19–559, l. 7; p. 662, ll. 3–17; p. 664, ll. 2–3; pp. 718–19, *Ḥawādith*, p. 175, ll. 10–13; p. 237, ll. 19–21; p. 238, ll. 3–4, ll. 6–8; pp. 439, l. 13–440, l. 4; p. 444, ll. 11–17; pp. 445–6; p. 607, ll. 18–22; p. 618, ll. 8–22; p. 619, ll. 10–20; p. 627, ll. 11–19. *Manhal*, v, fol. 46b, ll. 12–16; fol. 54b, ll. 1–25. Ibn Qāḍī

Shuhba, fol. 39b, ll. 7–10; fol. 55a, l. 24. Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 409, ll. 8–9; pp. 457–9; p. 486, ll. 22–3. Ibn al-Furāt, viii, p. 98, ll. 9–12; p. 150, ll. 5–7; pp. 166, l. 26–167, l. 2; p. 170, l. 8; pp. 173–4; p. 195, ll. 22–3; p. 223, ll. 7–8, ll. 9–11; p. 229, ll. 18–20; ix, p. 56, ll. 3–5; pp. 96–101; p. 106; p. 107, ll. 18–23; p. 108, ll. 9–21; p. 117, ll. 3–7; p. 115, ll. 14–16; pp. 125–6; p. 130, l. 3; p. 131; p. 143, ll. 13–25; p. 185, ll. 9–10; p. 192, l. 4; p. 194, ll. 4–7, ll.

12–15; p. 290, ll. 12–13; pp. 299–301; p. 370, ll. 16–17. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 5, l. 15; p. 10; p. 12, ll. 2–6; p. 13, ll. 21–3; p. 16; p. 25, ll. 20–1; p. 35, l. 4; pp. 37–8; p. 41, ll. 14–19; p. 52, ll. 18–20; p. 72, ll. 6–7; p. 73, ll. 2–4; p. 74, ll. 2–3; p. 76, ll. 20–1; pp. 84–5; p. 86, ll. 9–10; p. 99, l. 25; p. 152; p. 190, ll. 1–4, ll. 16–19; iii, p. 4, ll. 11–21; p. 6, l. 17; p. 19, ll. 1–6; p. 153, ll. 4–5, ll. 12–16; p. 154, ll. 17–20; p. 155, ll. 7–8; p. 199, ll. 16–20; p. 281, ll. 17–20; p. 290; pp. 309, l. 20–310, l. 2; p. 327, ll. 12–15; p. 431, ll. 2–3; p. 466, ll. 9–16. Durar, i, pp. 482, l. 21–483, l. 1. *Khifāt*, ii, p. 309, ll. 3–5; p. 310, ll. 5–7. When the sources wish to indicate that the sultan fostered or favoured a certain mamluk, they make use of the term 'ansha'a':

Zetterstéén, p. 101, ll. 17–20. *Sulūk*, i, p. 797, l. 4; p. 858, l. 13. *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 319, l. 14; vii, p. 242, l. 8. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 305, l. 1. *Manhal*, i, fol. 163a, ll. 11–12; fol. 164b, ll. 1–4; fol. 191b, ll. 10–11, ll. 18–19; fol. 194a, ll. 20–2; fol. 196b, ll. 13–14; fol. 210a, l. 3; ii, fol. 8b, ll. 15–16; fol. 11b, ll. 2–3; fol. 25a, ll. 8–9; fol. 40a, ll. 3–4; fol. 50a, l. 8; fol. 111b, ll. 12–13; fol. 133b, ll. 15–16; fols. 138a, l. 23–138b, l. 1; iii, fol. 189b, ll. 10–11. *Daw'*, iii, 276, l. 17; p. 284, l. 4; p. 296, l. 18.

³ *Ḥawādith*, p. 551, ll. 20–2.

¹ See Appendix B, to appear in Part III of this article.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 641, ll. 2–5. See also errata on p. lii in same vol. of *Nujūm*.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 643, ll. 2–4.

⁴ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 531, l. 14–533, l. 10.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 25, ll. 8–14.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 452, ll. 6–7.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 550, ll. 4–11.

⁸ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 559, ll. 8–11.

⁹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 348, ll. 22–3.

¹ Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 57, l. 23; pp. 64, l. 28–65, l. 17; p. 69, l. 24.

² *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 735, l. 11–736, l. 2; p. 760, ll. 5–7. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 554, ll. 13–14. Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 82, ll. 25–6. *Daw'*, ii, p. 329, ll. 7–15.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 822, ll. 5–8; p. 828, ll. 15–17; p. 839, ll. 13–17.

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 10, ll. 17–21; pp. 175–180; p. 469, ll. 13–15; p. 473, ll. 15–17; p. 507, ll. 1–4; p. 509, ll. 10–11 and note; pp. 525, l. 6–527, l. 5; p. 744, ll. 3–4; p. 320, ll. 11–20. *Manhal*, viii, fols. 495–9; fol. 496a, ll. 3–5.

Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 102, ll. 21–4. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 115a, ll. 6–7. *Tibr*, p. 311; p. 346, ll. 1–4. Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 141, ll. 23–7; p. 144; p. 188; p. 214, ll. 16–18; p. 215, ll. 22–4; p. 280, ll. 6–7; iii (KM), p. 79, ll. 1–4; p. 150, ll. 1–6; p. 190, ll. 8–10; p. 192, ll. 2–4; pp. 196, l. 19–197, l. 9; iv, p. 313; p. 315, ll. 15–18; pp. 385–6 p. 463, ll. 14–19; v, p. 6, ll. 14–16.

⁵ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 583, ll. 10–11.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 475, ll. 1–3, ll. 12–15; p. 476, ll. 1–9.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 123, ll. 1–9. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 460, ll. 12–21. Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 99, ll. 1–3, and many other references.

⁸ *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 857–869.

⁹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 188, ll. 15–20; p. 339, ll. 1–9. Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, pp. 331, l. 23–332, l. 1.

¹⁰ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 469, ll. 4–6.

¹¹ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 494, ll. 1–11.

¹² Ibn Iyā^ās (KM), iii, p. 152, ll. 17–21.

¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 343, ll. 9–10; see also pp. 494, 1. 16–495, 1. 17.

² *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 497, ll. 1–13.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 518, 1. 15–519, 1. 2.

⁴ Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, p. 229, ll. 23–4. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 278, ll. 5–17.

⁵ Ibn Iyā^ās (KM), iii, p. 72, ll. 5–7; pp. 90, 1. 17–91, 1. 6; p. 213, ll. 13–15; iv, p. 98, ll. 1–4. See also *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 471, notes; pp. 528, 1. 17–529, 1. 16. Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, p. 137, ll. 8–10; (KM), iii, pp. 93, 1. 24–94, 1. 2. For additional material on the absolute hegemony and unceasing wantonness of the *ajlāb*, see *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 757–8; vii, p. 716, ll. 1–4; p. 717, ll. 1–12; pp. 761, 1. 2–762, 1. 4. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 191, ll. 18–23; p. 219, ll. 12–18; p. 221, ll. 9–10; p. 223, ll. 1–23; p. 231, ll. 7–15; p. 273, ll. 3–4; p. 301, ll. 6–9; pp. 307, 1. 23–308, 1. 9; p. 324, ll. 16–20; p. 338, ll. 13–15; p. 409, ll. 16–24; pp. 495–6; p. 608, ll. 1–5; p. 659, ll. 19–20. *Tibr*, p. 97, ll. 22–5. Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, p. 47, ll. 24–6; p. 54, ll. 1–3; p. 56, ll. 4–6; p. 57, ll. 13–23. Ibn Iyā^ās (KM), iii, pp. 92, 1. 17–93, 1. 2; p. 95, 1. 5; p. 200, ll. 1–3; p. 214, ll. 6–7; p. 237, ll. 4–7; p. 315, ll. 1–5; p. 341, ll. 16–20; p. 363; pp. 365, 1. 14–366, 1. 2; p. 378, ll. 1–5; pp. 378, 1. 23–379, 1. 8; p. 427, ll. 20–1; iv, p. 7, ll. 6–8; p. 26; p. 123, ll. 18–23; p. 127, ll. 13–22; p. 156, ll. 2–9; p. 166, ll. 10–18; p. 241, ll. 16–20; p. 277, ll. 22–3; p. 400, ll. 1–15; p. 432, ll. 4–16; p. 464, ll. 18–19; p. 465, ll. 15–22; p. 482, ll. 19–23; p. 484, ll. 15–21.

⁶ Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, pp. 228, 1. 15–229, 1.1. On the depredations and escapades of the *juḷbān* see also M. Mostapha, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens', *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, pp. 221–3.

⁷ On the *khaypakīya* see: Quatremère, *Histoire des Sultans Mamelouks par Makrizi*, Paris, 1837–1842, vol. i, part i, p. 11; part ii, p. 158. M. Van Berchem, *Matériaux pour un corpus inscriptionum Arabicarum*, Première Partie, Égypte, Paris, 1903, p. 287, p. 543. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'Époque, des Mamelouks*, Paris, 1923, p. xxxiii; p. 1; p. c. L. A. Mayer, *Saracenic Heraldry*, Oxford, 1933, p. 5, p. 11, p. 60, n. 1, p. 63, etc. A. N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon*, London, 1939, p. 2, p. 6. G. Wiet, *L'Égypte Arabe*, Paris, 1937, p. 569. J. Sauvaget, 'Décrets Mamelouks de Syrie', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 1933, p. 24, p. 25. M. Mostapha, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens', *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, pp. 212–14.

⁸ Zetterstéen, p. 14, 1. 7; p. 22, 1. 4; p. 25; p. 27, 1. 11; p. 30, 1. 7; p. 135, 1. 2; p. 164, 1.23. Zetterstéen calls attention to this spelling in his annotations, p. 1, and cites further examples. *Patrologia*, xiv, p. 463, ll. 5–6. Ibn al-Furā^ā t, ix, n. 28, 1. 8; p. 54, 1. 10; p. 250, ll. 5–6; p. 270, 1. 4. Ibn al-Furā^ā t and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (fol. 95a, 1. 22; fol. 114b, 1. 8) are the latest instances of the use of this spelling.

⁹ *Sul ūk* (trsl. Quatremère), ii, pt. 1, p. 159. See also *Nuj ūm* (C), vii, p. 179, n. 4. *Sul ūk*, i, p. 644, n. 4.

¹⁰ *Zubda*, pp. 115–16.

¹ See, for instance, *Manhal*, ii, fol. 139b, ll. 4–7; fol. 46a, margin. *Daw'*, ii, p. 324, ll. 27–8; p. 328. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 113, l. 1. *Nuj ūm* (P), vii, p. 35, ll. 16–17; p. 398, ll. 8–11; p. 590; p. 691, ll. 8–10; p. 824, ll. 3–10. *Uṣūḍiṭh*, p. 154, ll. 17–21; p. 378, ll. 11–13. *Daw'*, v, p. 168. See also *Daw'*, ii, p. 267; p. 270; p. 273; p. 311, p. 312; p. 315; p. 318; p. 319; p. 324; p. 328; iii, p. 2; p. 6; p. 7; p. 10; p. 12; p. 23; p. 35; p. 36; p. 39; p. 42; p. 44; p. 53; p. 56; p. 60; p. 62; p. 63; p. 64; p. 66; p. 175; p. 230; p. 273; p. 277; p. 280; p. 284; p. 285; iv, p. 214; p. 219; p. 298; vii, p. 235.

² *Nuj ūm* (P), vi, p. 7; p. 511; p. 512. *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 7, ll. 7–9. Ibn Iyās, v, p. 21, l. 23.

³ See, for instance, Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 162, l. 20; (KM), iii, p. 245, ll. 9–13. *Ṣubb*, vii, p. 324, l. 6. *Daw'*, iii, p. 91, ll. 13–16, and many other passages.

⁴ *Nuj ūm* (P), vii, pp. 74–5; p. 703.

⁵ On the *ṣāqīs* see: *C.I.A., l'Égypte*, p. 36. *Saracenic Heraldry*, p. 11 and n. 1; p. 5; p. 29; p. 31; p. 33, etc. On the *dawādār*: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 118. *C.I.A., l'Égypte*, p. 363. *La Syrie*, pp. lvii–lviii. *Heraldry*, p. 4; p. 5; p. 12; p. 60, n. 1; p. 65; p. 77; p. 87, n. 1; p. 127, etc. On the *khāzindār*: *La Syrie*, p. lxi. *Heraldry*, p. 60; p. 135; p. 142; p. 162; p. 244; p. 248. On the *jamdār*: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 11. *La Syrie*, P.C. *Heraldry*, p. 5; p. 11, n. 1; p. 14; *C.I.A., l'Égypte*, p. 390. *La Syrie*, p.c. *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 202; p. 212, n. 4. On the *silāḥdār*: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 159. *C.I.A., l'Égypte*, p. 195. *La Syrie*, p. lvii. *Heraldry*, p. 4; p. 5; p. 13; p. 14; p. 58; p. 65, etc. On the *bashmaqḍār*: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 100. *La Syrie*, p.c. *Heraldry*, p. 5; p. 264.

⁶ *Zubda*, pp. 115–16. Al-Maqrīzī gives a very confused account of the *khāṣṣakiya*. According to him, al-Ashraf Khalīl specially selected the Kipchakis and *Khiṭā'īs* to enter the hall called *qdh-dhahabīya* and *az-zumurr ūdīya*, appointed masters of the robe (*jamdārīya*) and cup-bearers (*suqāṭ*) from among them, and called them *khāṣṣakiya*. Similarly, from among the *burjīya*, who belonged to the races of the *As* and the Jarkas, he appointed armour-bearers (*silāḥdārīya*), *jamdārīya*, tasters (*jashnikīrīya*), and pages (*ūshāqīya*) (*Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 214). One gets the impression from this passage that al-Maqrīzī attributes to al-Ashraf Khalīl the founding of the *khāṣṣakiya*. The term is, however, encountered fairly frequently before his reign, for example in the days of al-Malik as-Sa'īd Berke Khān (*Sul ūk*, i, p. 644; p. 645; p. 650; p. 651; p. 652. *Patrologia*, xiv, p. 765). We have not encountered the term during Baybars' reign, though *silāḥdārīya* and *jamdārīya* are mentioned (*Sul ūk*, i, p. 458). Further, it is not clear why al-Maqrīzī restricts the *khāṣṣakiya* to the offices of *jamdārīya* and *suqāṭ*, since it is known that the other offices, which he attributes to the *burjīya*, were also held by *khāṣṣakiya*. On the *ūshāqīs*

see: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 108. *C.I.A., l'Égypte*, p. 619. *Heraldry*, p. 148. On the *jashnakīrs*: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 2. *Heraldry*, p. 4 and n. 4; p. 5; p. 11; p. 15, n. 5, etc.

¹ Ibn al-Fur^āt, vii, p. 95, l. 20. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 213, ll. 2–3.

² *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 518, ll. 8–9. Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 413, l. 5, l. 14.

³ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 5, ll. 5–7. Nevertheless, it is not clear why Ibn Iy^ās remarks that al-Ghawri, unlike his predecessors, cared for his *khāṣṣakīya* (Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 358, ll. 11–16), for the *khāṣṣakīya* were the sultan's favourites at all periods.

⁴ *Durar*, i, p. 114, l. 9.

⁵ *Ḍaw'*, iii, p. 91, ll. 13–16.

⁶ *Ḍaw'*, i, p. 222, l. 27.

⁷ *Ḍaw'*, i, p. 33, l. 18.

⁸ *Zubda*, p. 116.

⁹ *Suluk* (trsl. Quatremère), i, pt. 2, p. 159. Unfortunately data on the number of the *khāṣṣakīya* during the whole of the **Bahri** period are extremely deficient.

¹⁰ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 429–439.

¹¹ Ibn Iy^ās (KM), iii, p. 218, l. 11.

¹² Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 34, ll. 14–15.

¹³ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 5, ll. 5–7.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Zettersteen, p. 75; p. 184, l. 14; p. 188, ll. 3–4.

Patrologia, xx, p. 130. *Sulūk*, i, p. 368, l. 3; p. 433; p. 743, n. 2; ii, p. 75, l. 9; p. 156, l. 12; p. 183, notes; p. 531, l. 1. Ibn Kathīr, xiii, p. 225, l. 17, l.

20. *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 5, ll. 1–3; p. 126, l. 4. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 458, ll. 5–7; p. 555; vii, p. 317, ll. 15–17; p. 318, l. 2; p. 354, l. 14; p. 430, ll. 6–9; p. 691,

ll. 11–13. *Ḥawādith*, p. 178, ll. 1–6; p. 399, ll. 10–13. *Manhal*, iii, fol. 4b, l. 12.

Ibn Iy^ās (KM), iii, p. 324, n. 3; iv, p. 19, l. 19; p. 29, ll. 4–8; p. 45, ll. 15–17; p. 50, l. 16; p. 309, ll. 9–10. Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 111, ll. 3–9. *Ṣubḥ*, v, p. 454, ll. 14–15; pp. 458–460; p. 463. *Ḍaw' az-Ṣubḥ*, p. 314; pp. 343–5; pp. 345–6; p. 348. *Zubda*, pp. 124–5.

¹ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 2; p. 200.

² Ibn Iyā^ās (KM), iii, p. 339.

³ Ibn Iyā^ās, iv, p. 467, 1. 3.

⁴ *Manhal*, iv, fol. 222, ll. 19–20. *Daw'*, iii, p. 56, 1. 29; p. 294, ll. 22–3.

⁵ *Daw'* iii, p. 7, ll. 6–10; p. 18; p. 30; 11. 2, 9, 11, 13, 23. Cf. also *Ṣulūk*, ii, p. 342, ll. 14–15. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 310, 1. 10. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 645, 1. 7. The bulk of the material dealing with this question has been gathered in *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*, pp. 28, 29, 33, 57, 58, where it has also been pointed out that the sources are sometimes lax in their use of the terms *ustādh* and *makhḍūm*, the meanings of which are in some cases reversed. An outstanding example of such laxity is provided by Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who calls Qalāwīn throughout his chronicle *al-makhḍūm*, though this sultan was the master who purchased and set him free.

⁶ Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 180, 1. 17.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 505, 1. 18, 1. 21; p. 621, ll. 22–23; vii, p. 337, ll. 4–5. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 49b, 1. 3. *Daw'*, iii, p. 61, 1. 8; p. 177, ll. 20–5; p. 277, ll. 14–15.

⁸ *Tibr*, p. 279, 1. 8. *Khiṣṭ*, ii, p. 68, ll. 1–2. *Durar*, iv, p. 489, 1. 13. *Daw'*, iii, p. 11, ll. 3–4; p. 36; p. 285, 1. 10, 1. 29; vi, p. 194, ll. 3–4; p. 224, 1. 14; x, p. 165, ll. 4–5.

⁹ *Fawā'id*, i, p. 232. *Manhal*, i, fol. 18b, 1. 7, 1. 10; fol. 143b, 1. 7; fol. 192a, 1. 17; ii, fol. 190a, 1. 7; vii, fol. 260b, 1. 3. Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, p. 162, ll. 8–9. *Daw'*, iii, p. 174; p. 289, ll. 23–4; p. 295, ll. 24–8; vi, p. 194. In connexion with notes 1 to 5, cf. material gathered on the same question in *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*. It is likely that the phrase 'thumma intamā li-' has a meaning similar to 'thumma ittaṣal bi-khidmat...' (cf. *Daw'*, iii, p. 16; p. 17; vi, p. 231, 1. 8; pp. 211, 1. 29–212, 1. 1). To indicate passing from rank to rank, from duty to duty, the sources use such expressions as 'tanaqqal fī al-khidam', 'tanaqqal fī al-iqtā'āt wa-l-imrīyāt', 'taqallabat bihi al-aḥwāl'. (*Manhal*, i, fol. 203a, ll. 21–2. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 43, 1. 12; p. 277, ll. 12–13, ll. 15–16, ll. 22–3; p. 279, 1. 23; p. 293, ll. 4–5; p. 318, 1. 14; p. 356, 1. 21; p. 447, 1. 11. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 72a, 1. 6. *Daw'*, x, p. 279, 1. 17.)

¹⁰ *Daw'*, iii, p. 82, ll. 27–9. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 105, ll. 18–19. *Manhal*, v, fol. 46b, ll. 12–16.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 452; pp. 454–5; vi, pp. 264–5; p. 384, ll. 4–5. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 56, ll. 3–5; p. 89; p. 106; p. 107, ll. 18–23; p. 143, ll. 13–25; p. 162. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fo. 39b, ll. 7–10. Ibn al-Furāt twice mentions *mamālīk mustakhbara* as a body antagonistic to the *mushtarawāt* (ix, p. 88, 1. 3; p. 93); the context would seem to indicate that the term is synonymous with *mustakhḍama*, but its etymology is not clear. It is possible that the *mustakhbaza* mentioned by Ibn Taghrībī (Nujūm (P), vii, p. 450, notes)

have some connexion with *al-mustakhbara*. For *mustakhdam* **ū**_n, cf.: Quatremère, vol. i, pt. i, p. 64; p. 160. *La Syrie*, p. xxxiii. *Feudalism*, p. 55.

W. Popper, Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, pp. xxiii–xxiv.

² *Zubda*, p. 116, ll. 13–14. The epithet ‘*sulṭāniya*’ which *as-Zahiri*, and after him Poliak (*Feudalism*, p. 2) apply to the mamluks of the former sultans is not accurate, for *mamālik sulṭāniya* was the accepted appellation of the Royal Mamluks, as shown by the references presented above and below, which form but a very small part of the material supplied on this subject by the sources. It must, however, be indicated that the writer has encountered a few isolated cases in which the term *sulṭāniya* seems to apply to the mamluks of the former sultans (Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 25, ll. 14–16; iii (KM), p. 362, ll. 4–10), but these are extremely rare.

³ Evidence as to the identity of the *qarānīs* with the mamluks of the former sultans will be presented in Appendix B, to be included in Part III of this article.

⁴ Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, pp. 2, l. 21–3, l. 3; p. 73, l. 13; p. 92, l. 21; p. 132, ll. 22–3. So far we met the designation of a mamluk unit by the sultan’s first name and not by his surname only in Ibn Iyās’s chronicle.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 770, l. 9; vii, p. 29, l. 18; pp. 656, l. 15–657, l. 5; p. 666, ll. 2–18. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 205, ll. 17–18; p. 443, ll. 8–9; Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, pp. 2, l. 21–3, l. 3; p. 92, l. 21; p. 132, ll. 22–3. The tightness of the bonds which tied to each other the members of the same *ṭā’ifa* may be judged from the fact that Mamluk history knows of no single instance of the merger of the mamluks of one *ṭā’ifa* with those of another to form a single *ṭā’ifa*. Every Mamluk *ṭā’ifa* kept its separate existence and disappeared only with the death of the last of its members.

¹ *Khiṭaṭ*, i, p. 95.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 374, ll. 3–5; pp. 425–6; p. 532; p. 538; vii, pp. 12–19; p. 13, ll. 18–20; p. 16, ll. 16–17; p. 19; p. 29, ll. 18–22; p. 75; p. 87, l. 9; p. 392; p. 396, ll. 11–12; p. 398, ll. 11–12; p. 756; p. 460, ll. 5–10; p. 461, ll. 12–16; pp. 657, l. 18–658, l. 9; pp. 663, l. 16–664, l. 13; p. 666, ll. 2–18; pp. 666–8; p. 672, ll. 5–18; p. 697; p. 699, l. 2; p. 701, ll. 2–3; p. 720; p. 754, ll. 4–5; pp. 834–8; p. 854, ll. 9–11. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 183, ll. 10–18; pp. 233, l. 21–234, l. 5; p. 371; p. 372; p. 410; pp. 442–1; pp. 520, l. 20–521, l. 6; p. 550, ll. 4–9; pp. 550, l. 20–551, l. 14; p. 553, ll. 19–21; pp. 610–15; p. 643, ll. 8–9. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 71, ll. 23–5; p. 76, ll. 16–17; p. 93, ll. 2–3, ll. 5–8; p. 176, ll. 24–6; (KM) iii, p. 73, l. 13. The fact of belonging to any military group or political unit is denoted in the sources by the term ‘*kān min ḥizb*’ or by similar expressions containing the word ‘*ḥizb*’: *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 30, ll. 12–15; (P) v, p. 360; p. 403, l. 14; vi, p. 213, l. 12; p. 524; vii, p. 44, ll. 15–16; p. 789, l. 6. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 352, l. 14; p. 596, l. 10; p. 719, l. 22. *Manhal*, i, fol. 200b, l. 18; fol. 201a, ll. 2–3; fol. 203a, l. 10; ii, fol. 32a, ll. 6–7; fol. 128a; iv, fol. 110a, l. 1. Ibn Qāḍi Shuhba, fol. 85a, l. 14. *Daw’*, ii, p. 318, l. 9; iii, p. 36; p. 41, ll. 25–6; x, p. 345, ll. 21–2. To denote grouping around a certain individual for common action, political or otherwise, the

sources use the term 'iltaff *al-ā*' (Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 363. *Manhal*, i, fol. 3a, 1. 14; ii, fol. 17b, 1. 17).

³ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 550, ll. 4–9.

¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 442, 1. 7–444, 1. 10.

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¹ *Zubda*, p. 116, ll. 14–15. It seems plausible that the *sayfīya* were so called because during the Circassian period almost all the Mamluk amirs bore the title of Sayf ad-Dīn.

² *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 543, note. Cf. also *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 443, ll. 16–17.

³ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 334, ll. 4–5. Cf. also *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 425, 1. 10.

⁴ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 216; p. 513, ll. 22–3. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 59b, ll. 3–6. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 24, ll. 21–2. *Daw'*, iii, p. 209; p. 287, ll. 13–14; vi, p. 231, ll. 22–3; x, p. 165. *Durar*, ii, p. 196, 1. 16. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 209, 1. 14; v, p. 14, ll. 21–2. In fairly rare instances, one encounters the expression *al-mamālīk as-sultāniya was-sayfīya* (Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 25, 11. 14–16; (KM) iii, p. 362, ll. 4–10), but it seems that this is mere laxity in terminology.

⁵ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 443, ll. 15–19.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 430, ll. 16–18.

⁷ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 448, ll. 7–11.

¹ Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 46, ll. 22–3.

² *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 454, ll. 7–9.

³ *Al-Anṣārī, Ḥawāḍith az-zamān wa-wafayāt ash-shuyūkh wal-aqrān*. Cambridge MS., Dd. 11, 2, fol. 21b, ll. 5–10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 24b, ll. 8–13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 25b, 1. 13–27a, 1. 4; fol. 29a, ll. 4–10.

⁶ See the author's 'The Plague and its Effects upon the Mamluk Army', *J.R.A.S.*, 1946, loc. cit.

¹ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 43, 1. 28. On the cutting down of the wages of both the *sayfīya* and the *awlād an-nāṣ*, see Ibn Iyās, iv, pp. 65, 1. 23–66, 1. 1.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 425–6; pp. 770, 1. 15–771, 1. 5; vii, p. 13, ll. 18–20; p.

396, ll. 11–12; p. 298, ll. 11–12; p. 672, ll. 13–18; p. 836, l. 3; p. 837, l. 7. So far as we know, the term *sayfīya* appears only in the Circassian period. In the **Bahri** period, mention is made of *al-mamālik al-manṣūriya as-sayfīya* (*Sulūk*, i, p. 821, ll. 2–3), but it is not clear whether this refers to amirs' mamluks.

³ *Khiṭaṭ*, i, pp. 94–5.

⁴ To be described under the heading 'The *Ḥalqa*', in Part II of this article.

⁵ Both lists will be reproduced in full in [Appendix A](#), in Part III of this article.

⁶ *Nujūm* (C), vii, p.15, ll.3–4.

⁷ *Zubda*, p.116. *Sulūk*, i, p. 638.

¹ *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 192, ll. 5–10. *Fawā'id al-Wafayā'id*, i, p. 115. Baybars' army was completely equipped; during one review, the entire army marched past him, so that it would not be said that a single soldier had had to borrow anything (*Sulūk*, i, p. 517, ll. 5–17). During that same review, he told the political envoys that that was the army of the capital only (*Sulūk*, i, p. 519, ll. 6–8), but this was doubtless great exaggeration, since the first-class troops of the whole kingdom were, for the most part, concentrated in the capital. Al-Maqrīzī is of the opinion that the Mamluks imitated the Ayyubids (*ḥadīth ḥadīthum*) in all matters of military organization.

² *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 179, ll. 15–17. In the passage cited here, it is specified that these were *khāṣṣakī* amirs and office holders; we are unable to determine whether the source meant that all of Baybars' mamluks were holders of offices and ranks, or whether the figure quoted here refers only to those among them who did hold such ranks and offices.

³ *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 327, ll. 3–7. *Manhal*, i, fol. 133a, ll. 20–3. *Sulūk*, i, p. 755, l. 20. Ibn al-Furāṭ, viii, p. 97, ll. 21–6. *Khiṭaṭ*, i, pp. 94–5; ii, p. 214. Ibn Iyās, i, p. 20.

⁴ Baybars ^{al-Manṣūrī}, *Zubdat al-Fikra fi Ta'rīkh al-Hijra*, B.M. MS., Add. 23, 325, fol. 99a, l. 13—99b, l. 1.

⁵ *Nujūm* (C), vii, pp. 327, l. 15–328, l. 2.

⁶ Ibn al-Furāṭ, viii, p. 97, ll. 21–6.,

⁷ *Khiṭaṭ*, i, p. 95.

⁸ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 214.

¹ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 524, l. 13–525, l. 15.

2 *Khīṭat*, i, p. 95.

3 *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 218, l. 10.

4 On the basis of this figure of 2,000 Royal Mamluks, Poliak draws an unwarranted conclusion as to the accuracy of the figures of mamluks cited by the sources (*Feudalism*, p. 6 and n. 7). On numbers of mamluks see also: G.Wiet, *Précis de l'Histoire d'Égypte*, Cairo, 1932, vol. ii, p. 242.

5 Cf. *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*, pp. 2–8.

6 *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 198, l. 4; pp. 192–3. It is related of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn that he knew his own and his father's mamluks by name, as well as the rank and pay of each of them (*Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 173, ll. 12–14). The Mamluk amir Azdamur al-Mujīrī, who was brought before the Khān Ghāzī, told him that the above-named sultan possessed 10,000 Turkish mamluks like himself, but one of the Mongol Khan's courtiers contested the accuracy of this figure (Zetterstéen, p. 103, ll. 10–20). On an-Nāṣir Muḥammad's virtues in comparison with subsequent sultans, see *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 191, ll. 3–7; p. 195, ll. 1–14.

7 *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 208, ll. 17–19.

8 *Manhal*, ii, fol. 61b, ll. 17–18.

1 *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 420, ll. 13–15. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 89, ll. 7–8.

2 *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 592.

3 *Manhal*, ii, fol. 72b, ll. 3–4.

4 *Khīṭat*, i, p. 95.

5 *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 312, ll. 7–11; p. 384, ll. 14–21; vi, p. 47, ll. 4 ff.

6 *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 47, ll. 4 ff.

7 *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 422, ll. 11–12.

8 For the ratio between the *dirham* and the *dīnār* in the Mamluk period, see *L'Esclavage, du Mamelouk*, p. 42, and E. Strauss, 'Prix et Salaires à l'Époque Mamelouke', R.E.I., 1949, pp. 49 ff.

9 *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 481.

10 *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 773, ll. 6–12.

11 *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 773, ll. 12–17.

¹² *Ḥawadith*, p. 442, ll. 15–17.

¹ *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 95, ll. 9–14.

² B.M. MS., Or. 3026, fol. 115a, ll. 10–11.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 387, ll. 10–21.

⁴ The Mamluk sources furnish ample and very convincing information about the terrible decline which has befallen the whole Egyptian economy since the beginning of the 9th century A.H. till the destruction of the Mamluk kingdom (this problem is discussed elsewhere by the present writer). There can hardly be any doubt that this economic decline was one of the main causes for the drastic reduction in the numerical strength of the Mamluk army.

¹ *Nujūm*(P), vii, p. 671, ll. 15–20.

² *Ḥawadith*, pp. 550, 1. 22–551, 1. 10. As-Sakhāwī states that Sultan Khushqadam bought many mamluks (*Ḍaw'*, iii, p. 176, 1. 1).

³ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 81, ll. 9–10.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, i, p. 315.

⁵ Ibn Iyās, ii, pp. 13–18.

⁶ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 21, ll. 1–2.

⁷ Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 318, ll. 7–9.

⁸ *Ta'rikh Qayṭbayyāt-tarjama ash-sharīfa al-ashrafīya*, B.M. MS., Or. 3028, fol. 15a, ll. 4–8.

⁹ Al-Anṣārī, *Ḥawadith az-zamān wa-wafayāt ash-shuyūkh wal-aqrān*. Cambridge MS., Dd. ll. 2, fol. 54a, ll. 1–11.

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¹ See *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk*, pp. 18–20.

² *Zubda*, p. 27, ll. 5–7.

³ *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, vol. iiA, p. 91.

⁴ The figures of the auxiliary armies in the Mamluk kingdom are far less reliable.

Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army—II

By DAVID AYALON

The *Ḥalqa*¹

THE term *ḥalqa*, as a name of a military unit, seems to be mentioned for the first time in 1174, when Tūrānshāh set out, under Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn's orders, on his expedition to the Yemen.² This unit is also mentioned a few times during the siege of Acre in 587/1191.³ The sources do not indicate the date of its founding, and no authoritative explanation of the meaning of its name is available. Two opinions as to the latter may be submitted with all due reservations: Quatremère thinks that the *ḥalqa* was so called because it was a corps which surrounded the sultan and constituted his bodyguard,⁴ and indeed the sources' description of its position and part in combat support the impression that it was composed of the *élite* of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn's forces⁵; A.N.Poliak disagrees, and holds that the name is derived from the special tactics the Turkish peoples used to employ in attack, i.e. that of surrounding the enemy in the form of a ring (*ḥalqa*). Poliak supports his view by alluding to the frequent recurrence of these tactics in the combat manoeuvres described in the *furūṣiyya* literature and in the hunting expeditions which the Ayyubid and Mamluk sultans frequently organized.⁶ In the present state of our knowledge, both explanations must be viewed as hypothetical, since no data are available to support either the one or the other; the writer inclines to favour Quatremère's view.

The *ḥalqa* underwent a number of transformations over the years, so that descriptions of this unit by Mamluk sources are incomplete and imprecise. Qalqashandī says that its soldiers are very numerous, and that it often admits to its ranks non-military people, such as civil functionaries and others.⁷ This description fits the author's own time (end of the 14th and beginning of the 15th centuries), but can apply neither to the beginning nor to the end of the *ḥalqa's* history. In order to gain an understanding of the structure and status of the *ḥalqa* at its various stages, one must turn to the chronicles, which supply abundant information on this subject.

As has been stated, the *ḥalqa* had its most honoured standing under Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. At the siege of Acre, it occupies a privileged position and escorts the sultan under the name of *al-ḥalqa al-khāṣṣ* or *al-ḥalqa as-sultāniyya*.

¹ Its development during the Ayyubid period after Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn has not been systematically examined by the writer.² As for the Mamluk

era, its early years saw the *ḥalqa* preserve its power and lofty position.

It occupied an honoured place at the various official ceremonies, side by side with the *bahriya*, then the *élite* of the Mamluk army, and was sometimes mentioned before that unit.³ We find, at that period, frequent recurrence of the expression ‘victorious *ḥalqa*’ (*al-ḥalqa al-manṣūra*),⁴ a title which gradually disappears at a later period.⁵ Its commanders, called *muqaddamū al-ḥalqa*, were holders of honoured positions at the beginning of the Mamluk era, and their names appear side by side with those of the amirs in the most important ceremonies, including those of oath-taking and coronation. At the allocation of fiefs in 712 they received their grants even before the Royal Mamluks,⁶ a procedure which would have appeared quite incongruous at a later period. Speaking of the *ḥalqa* and its prominent position in former times, al-Maqrīzī says that even a simple *ḥalqa* trooper would go out with a string of horses and that the *muqaddam al-ḥalqa* would appear as an Amir of Ten: ‘*wa-kān al-jundī kharaj ilā as-sukkān bi-tuwālat khayl wa-yakhruj muqaddam al-ḥalqa ka-amīr ‘ashara*’.⁷ But what seems most significant is that among the soldiers of the *ḥalqa*, and especially among their *muqaddamūn*, one finds, at this early period, not only local citizens and sons of mamluks, but also mamluk soldiers and even amirs. In 712 an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn reviewed the Royal Mamluks and transferred some of them to the *ḥalqa*.⁸ That mamluks were sometimes members of the *ḥalqa* is apparent from the following examples: Muqbil b. ‘Abdallāh al-Ṣirghitmilī was of the *ajnad al-ḥalqa*⁹; Altunbughā b. ‘Abd-allāh al-Jāwīlī received from Amir Tankiz, governor of Damascus, an *iqṭā’* in the *ḥalqa*¹⁰; the village of an-Nāṣiriya was portioned out to ten of the *ajnad al-ḥalqa*, including Sunqur as-Sa’dī.¹¹ Mamluk amirs, some of Ṭablkhāna rank, then served in the *ḥalqa*, some of them as *muqaddamūn*.¹² Thus for instance the amirs Bayram Qujā,¹³ Qarāqūsh al-Kāwundukī,¹⁴ Lājīn al-Muḥammadi,¹⁵ Ghurlū al-Baktimurī,¹⁶ Jarkas as-Sayfī Mankalī bughā,¹⁷ Aybak al-Ḥusāmī,¹⁸ Baghdī al-Ashrafī,¹⁹ were of the *ḥalqa*. The *muqaddamū al-ḥalqa* also served as envoys to important states, and as escorts for foreign envoys on their way home from Egypt.¹ These posts, as pointed out above, were usually reserved for the *khāṣṣakīya*. It must be stressed, however, that the pay of the *muqaddamū al-ḥalqa*, even at that early period, was much lower than that of the amirs. In one case, the grand amir receives from the sultan 10,000 dirhams or less, the Amirs of Ten, 1,000 dirhams, and the *muqaddamū al-ḥalqa*, 500 dirhams.² In another instance, Amirs of Ṭablkhāna are paid some 5,000 dirhams, Amirs of Ten, 1,000 dirhams, and the *muqaddamū al-ḥalqa* 500 dirhams.³ It also occurred that besides Royal Mamluks, amirs’ mamluks were also included in the *ḥalqa*.⁴ In 678 it is reported of one individual that he was the first of the amirs’ mamluks to receive an *iqṭā’* in the *ḥalqa*.⁵

The Turkish and Mongol tribesmen who entered the Mamluk kingdom in quest of asylum, *al-wāfidīya*, and most of whom were incorporated in the *ḥalqa*, have been discussed elsewhere by the present writer.⁶

The commanders of the *ḥalqa* were, at least in theory, distributed in proportion to the rank and file as follows: the *amīr mi'a muqaddam al* commanded 1,000 troops; the *bāsh* and the *naqīb*, whose exact role is difficult to ascertain from the sources, were in command of 100 troops; the *muqaddam ḥalqa* commanded 40 troops, but his authority was restricted to actual military expeditions, and lapsed as soon as the expedition was over.⁷ It is difficult to determine how long this arrangement was carried out in practice, but it is certain that during the greater part of the Circassian period, this chain of command had but a paper existence. The *ḥalqa* had by that time become greatly reduced and impoverished, and took virtually no part in combat. *Ḥalqa* troops of various ranks who were under the command of a particular amir in combat were called *muḏāfūn*, but this appellation was not restricted to them, and applied to mamluks of amirs under the same commander as well.¹

The members of the *ḥalqa* were generally called *ajnād al-ḥalqa*,² sometimes *rijāl al-ḥalqa*,³ and sometimes simply *ajnād*, while mamluk troops were called *mamālīk*. Such expressions as '*al-umarā' wa-l-mamālīk wa-ajnād al-ḥalqa*', '*al-mamālīk wa-l-ḥalqa*', '*al-umarā'-wa-l-mamālīk-wa-l-ajnād*', are extremely frequent.⁴

BEGINNINGS OF THE DECLINE OF THE

ḤALQA

Until the reign of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, we find no clear indications of the decline of the *ḥalqa*. During the reign of his father, Qalāwūn, we still hear of 4,000 *ḥalqa* soldiers participating in the war against the Mongols in 680 as *élite* troops fighting in the centre (*qalb*) of the front; the number of Royal Mamluks fighting in the centre was 800 only.⁵

The first conspicuous sign of a turn for the worse in the status of the *ḥalqa* appears during the land redistributions (*rawk*) conducted in the Mamluk kingdom at the end of the 7th and the beginning of the 8th centuries of the Hijra, and accompanied by cadastral surveys. The *rawks* caused a profound change in the structure of the Mamluk army, serving especially to reinforce the position of the Royal Mamluks and to deal a heavy blow to that of the *ḥalqa*.

It does not fall within our purpose to describe here the various *rawks* and their importance for the feudal and economic structure of the Mamluk state; this has already been thoroughly done by A.N.Poliak.⁶ We merely propose to indicate the effect the *rawks* had on the *ḥalqa*. Three such land re-allotments took place in the Mamluk kingdom within a relatively short period: the first was *ar-rawk al-ḥusāmī*, in 697, the second *ar-rawk an-nāṣirī* in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine (*al-bilād ash-shāmīya*), in 713, and the third *ar-rawk an-nāṣirī* in Egypt, in 715. Poliak rightly remarks: 'The aim of these re-allotments was to render the feudal landlords more and more dependent upon the central government'. At the beginning of the Mamluk era, the Mamluk feudal system was still under the influence of the Ayyubid system, as well as under that of the Latin crusader states, in which the fief was handed over as inheritance from father to son. The *rawk* was the means used by the Mamluk sultans to eradicate the hereditary character of feudal grants.

The enormous changes which the *rawks* brought about in the structure of the army are apparent even from a mere comparison of the lists of feudal grants during and before the *rawks*. Before the land surveys, only four of the 24 units (*qirāṭs*) into which Egypt was divided belonged to the sultan and to the Royal Mamluks; ten units went to the *ḥalqa*, and the remaining ten to the amirs. Thus by far the greater part of Egyptian lands was equally divided between the amirs

and the *ḥalqa*, while the sultan and his *élite* corps, the Royal Mamluks, received a mere sixth of the fiefs. In the *rawk al-ḥusāmī*, four units were allotted to the sultan alone, nine to the Royal Mamluks (in payment of the feudal revenue and the monthly salary), and only eleven units to the amirs and the *ḥalqa* together. In the *rawk an-nāṣirī*, the sultan received ten units, and only fourteen were distributed as fiefs.¹

These figures alone clearly show that the aggrandizement of the Royal Mamluks was carried out at the expense of the amirs and the *ḥalqa*. Indeed, the sources proclaim the same fact in unequivocal language. We are told by one of them that 'it was an incomparably foul act, and it was the cause of the weakness of the Egyptian army, especially of the *ḥalqa*, as will be shown later'.² Another source points to the *rawk al-ḥusāmī* as a prime factor in the enfeeblement of the Egyptian army; it had, moreover, no compensating advantages, according to that source: on the one hand, no one obtained a satisfactory quantity, and on the other, the many fiefs that were saved by means of the *rawk* were all distributed after the murder of Sultan Lāʾīn.³ The same source holds that, as a result of the *rawk al-ḥusāmī*, the position of the *ḥalqa* deteriorated as compared with the reign of Qalāʾūn: under that sultan, the minimum and maximum incomes from *ḥalqa* fiefs were 10,000 and 30,000 dirhams respectively, whereas after the *rawk al-ḥusāmī* they were 5,000 and 20,000 dirhams respectively. The members of the *ḥalqa* received their letters of enfeoffment with marked dissatisfaction, as did the amirs. Some of the more intrepid *ḥalqa* amirs threw their letters back at Mankūtimūr, Lāʾīn's mamluk and right-hand man, and demanded to be transferred to the amirs' service, or to be entirely released from military service.⁴

The *rawk an-nāṣirī* similarly dealt a heavy blow to the army, and aroused much resentment.² The land distribution provided for by that *rawk* was still in force in the days of the historian Ibn Taghrībirdī.³

The great importance of the above information lies, first, in that it constitutes the earliest clear evidence of the decline of the *ḥalqa*, and the corresponding rise of the Royal Mamluks at its expense; and second, in that it shows that the repression of the *ḥalqa* was carried on systematically and on a state-wide scale. From that time on, the decline of the *ḥalqa* proceeds apace, and degrading restrictions become a matter of common occurrence.

A detailed description of the various stages of this down-grade process after an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, and of the progressive inclusion of foreign elements in the *ḥalqa*, is given by al-Maqrīzī, who cites exact dates. He states that after the death of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, it became usual for members of the *ḥalqa* to exchange their feudal estates against payment or compensation (*muqāyada*), with the result that many foreign elements entered its midst (*fa-kathura addakhīl fī al-ajnāḍ bi-dhālik*).

Pedlars and common people (*as-sūqa wa-l-‘āmma*) bought up estates, to such an extent that in the days of al-Maqrīzī the great majority of the *ḥalqa* was composed of artisans. These upstarts caused the rapid ruin of their newly acquired estates. The first to introduce this exchange system was Sultan al-Kāmil Sha‘bān b. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, who came to power in Rabī‘ ath-Thānī 747, and was under the influence of Amīr Shujā‘ ad-Dīn Ghurlū, the superintendent of chanceries (*shādd ad-dawāwīn*), and who established for that purpose, in Jumādā al-Ūlā of the same year, a special department called *dīwān al-badal*.⁴ Through this department, a member of the *ḥalqa* could give up his estate in exchange for a sum of money, and another person could obtain the estate in exchange for another sum. This system was abolished as a result of the amirs’ intervention with Sultan Sha‘bān. It was restored, however, when Amir Manjak al-Yūfī became wazīr in 749. Members of the *ḥalqa* would sell their fiefs for sums ranging up to 20,000 dirhams, according to the size of the *iqṭā‘*, and the wazīr would collect a special tax on every sale. These sales were again abolished, and again reinstated in 753, with the appointment of Amir Sayf ad-Dīn Qilā (?), as vice-sultan (*nā‘ib as-saltāna*). Corruption was rife, and *ḥalqa* estates, including those of the *muqaddamūn*, were bought up by the shopkeepers and the rabble. A special group of 300 was even organized, whose members, called *al-mahīṣīyin*, would visit the members of the *ḥalqa* and persuade them to sell their fiefs. Such activities did much to weaken the *ḥalqa*, and caused its disintegration. When this trading in feudal estates had reached dangerous proportions, it was stopped by Amir Shaykhūn al-‘Umarī while he served as chief of a corps of mamluks (*ra’s nawba*). He forbade officials of the *dīwān al-jaysh* to collect a tax of more than 3 dirhams for issuing letters of enfeoffment, whereas the former charge had been 20 dirhams.¹

This account of al-Maqrīzī’s, which is substantiated by Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī in his biographical dictionary, *ad-Durar al-Kāmina*,² is couched in unequivocal terms, and is indeed confirmed by various other sources.

The disintegration of the *ḥalqa* reached its peak as early as the beginning of the Circassian period. In 791, the year of the well-known wars of ‘succession’ to the sultanate, the sources abound in data on the *ḥalqa*. It is then already considered, for the most part, unsuited for combat. Amir Mīntāsh says to the *ḥalqa*: ‘You are weak and unfit to take part in the expedition’.³ He selects only the best of them.⁴ None but holders of fiefs with annual incomes of 4,000 dirhams or over go into battle,⁵ and even they go forth each according to his means, some on foot and some on horseback.⁶ It would seem that as early as 791, the principal task of the *ḥalqa* was the guarding of vital places in Cairo

during the absence of the fighting forces: some of its members go into battle, some remain behind to guard the citadel (*qal'at al-jabal*), some to guard the gates of Cairo, and some the old city and its suburbs.⁷ The guarding of Cairo in the absence of the main force was the chief duty of the *ḥalqa* during the whole Circassian period.⁸

Al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, who reigned from 815 to 824 A.H., attempted to reorganize the selection of the *ḥalqa* for participation in military undertakings. In one of his expeditions, he employed the following twofold system. First, he combined low income fief holders with high. income fief holders, viz. those holding fiefs with 3,000 dirham yearly income had to hand them over to holders of fiefs with 7,000 dirham yearly income, so that the latter might take part in the expedition. Second, he combined four holders of small estates, who were to finance the participation of one of them, according to their choice. A total of some 400 members of the *ḥalqa*, rich and poor, great and small, were involved in this arrangement,¹ so that those who actually took part in the expedition were much. fewer than that number, itself extremely low.

We have pointed out elsewhere in our work on the Mamluk army that all the reforms carried out by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. were short-lived and were virtually abolished by his son. This holds true of the *ḥalqa* reform as well. As early as 832, when Sultan Barsbāy organized an expedition against Shah Rukh, the *ḥalqa* was sent forth. without any manner of order or control. He ordered a review in the Royal Square (*al-ḥawsh as-sultānī*), at which the aged, the young, and the blind were present, and told them that he would not do as al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh had done, but would require every man to go out: 'Whoever has a horse, let him go to battle on horseback, and whoever has an ass, let him ride forth on an ass'.² Ibn Taghrībirdi considers this one of Barsbāy's grave errors. He attributes it to the fault of his *dawādār*, who was inexperienced, and cites in contrast numbers of *dawādārs* who handled the *ḥalqa* in an appropriate manner.³ The connexion between the *dawādār* and the *ḥalqa* seems to be that it was their function to handle the feudal charters (*manāshīr*) issued by the sultan.⁴ It is reported of the *ḥalqa* that they received their *manāshīr* from the sultan, as did the amirs.⁵

From then on, the *ḥalqa* is on a steady down-grade. The very term '*ḥalqa*' is gradually replaced by the term '*awlād an-nās*' as will be seen below.⁶

What were the reasons for the decline of the *ḥalqa*? The principal one was, of course, that its members were not mamluks, and could in no way compete with. the military ability of the mamluks, who had been steppe or mountain dwellers accustomed to the rigours of war. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether in the Mamluk régime, which

opened the gates of the highest military society only to freed slaves, the *ḥalqa* would have been able to hold its ground for any length of time, even had its members been endowed with the finest military talents. Another major factor was Egypt's economic situation: the country being unable to bear the huge cost of maintaining its armies, reductions in effectives and salaries were unavoidable. In the event of such curtailments, of which Mamluk history shows repeated instances, the *ḥalqa* was the first victim. Further, beginning with the reign of Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn, the slackening of the westward migration of peoples from the Eurasian steppe completely deprived the *ḥalqa* of a very important element, viz. the *wāfidiya*, many of whom were incorporated in the *ḥalqa* and the amirs' troops. These were tribesmen of Turkish, Tatar, or related stocks, and were incomparably superior in warlike qualities to the population of the Mamluk kingdom. The *ḥalqa* had an additional disadvantage in that it lacked the feeling of solidarity linking companions in slavery and freedom (*al-khushdāshīya*) which constituted the very foundation of the Mamluk army's structure; its struggle for survival could in no way have been as grimly determined as that of the mamluk regiments. The *ḥalqa* was, in fact, gradually relegated to the side-lines without any resistance on its part. Except for the dissatisfaction expressed by its members during the *rawk al-ḥusāmī*, and the threat voiced by some of them to leave the military service, it seems that there was not any serious attempt to resist the increasing repression to which the corps was submitted, or any determined effort to hold back the disintegration of its political and military importance.

SPECIAL GROUPS WITHIN THE *Halqa*

1. The *Awlāḍ an-Nāṣ*

There was within the *ḥalqa* a special unit to which belonged the sons of the amirs and mamluks. These sons were born and bred in Islam; their great majority bore Arabic names, and the proportion of theologians among them was fairly high. In as far as they joined the army they were automatically cast off from the pure mamluk corps and assigned to the *ḥalqa*, a much lower unit, in which they formed socially the most select element. They were known as *awlāḍ an-nāṣ* 'children of the people', i.e. 'of the best people, of the gentry', for the 'people' were the mamluks, the members of the ruling class.¹

The entry of the sons of the amirs into this unit took place in the following manner. When the son of an amir came of age, his father would provide him with 'pay, foodstuffs, meat, and fodder' until he was old enough to receive a fief in the *ḥalqa*. Among these amirs' sons, some would ascend to the rank of Amir of Ten, some to that of Amir of Forty, 'all according to chance'.² According to al-Maqrīzī, Qalāwūn was extremely strict in his insistence that no amir's son should enter the *ḥalqa* before his majority; he acted thus with his own sons as well, even if they had taken part in combat.³ The historian's claim that the *awlāḍ an-nāṣ* attained no higher rank than that of Amir of Ten or Amir of Forty is accurate on the whole. Nevertheless we find some members of this unit (especially in *al-bilād ash-shāmīya*, and to a lesser extent in Egypt) who reached the rank of Amir of a Thousand. That rank was also reached by some members of the *ḥalqa* who were not *awlāḍ an-nāṣ*.¹ The *awlāḍ an-nāṣ* were sometimes favoured for political reasons: to reduce the power of the mamluk amirs. Thus Sultan Ḥasan preferred amirs from the *awlāḍ an-nāṣ* to mamluk amirs; during his reign, most of the governors of fortresses (*nuwwāb al-qilā'*) of the *bilād ash-shāmīya* were of their number, and it is the chronicler's view that this is the reason why no rebellion took place in these provinces. In Egypt, eight of the Amirs of a Thousand were, during that sultan's reign, from the *awlāḍ an-nāṣ*; these, together with the sons of the sultan, numbered ten out of a total of 24 Amirs of a Thousand.² The privileged position of the *awlāḍ an-nāṣ* under Sultan Ḥasan was, however, exceptional, and contrasted sharply with their status under other rulers. Since theirs was an element which, by its very nature, was excluded from the ranks of the mamluks, their chances for advancement and for attaining key positions were seriously handicapped. In the course of time they declined together

with the *ḥalqa*, and saw the same restrictions applied to them as to the rest of that body, viz. reductions in pay, sale of their fiefs, exemption from military expeditions in exchange for cash payment (*badl*), tests in the use of the bow and arrow designed to prove that they were badly trained and thus not entitled to all the privileges of full-fledged soldiers.³

Toward the end of the Mamluk era, the name '*ḥalqa*' slowly falls into disuse, while that of the *awlād an-nās* becomes extremely common. One still, though rarely, encounters the term '*awlād an-nās min ajnād al-ḥalqa*',⁴ but the name *ajnād al-ḥalqa* as such, virtually ceases to exist separately. Nor is that all: at that period the *awlād an-nās* are even called Royal Mamluks, and the expression '*awlād an-nās min al-mamālīk as-sulṭāniya*' is fairly frequent.⁵

We have even found once the term '*awlād an-nās al-khāṣṣakīya*'.¹ This should in no way be taken to indicate an improvement in the status of that unit, for the sources clearly point to the exact opposite. It is possible, therefore, that the term *mamalik sulṭāniya* during that period occasionally took on a wider meaning, as a result of the incorporation of additional units to the Royal Mamluks into the *dīwān al-mufrad*.

There was, both among the *awlād an-nās* and the other members of the *ḥalqa*, a strong leaning toward piety and preoccupation with other-worldly affairs. Many of them left the military service and became theologians (*faqīhs*).²

2. The Sons of the Sultans

The sons of the sultans, who were also included in the *awlād an-nās* unit of the *ḥalqa*,³ constituted its most respected element, and were called *al-asyād* or *awlād al-mulūk*. Each one was addressed as 'sayyidī'. The reigning sultan would treat the sons of the former ruler with strict severity, precisely because of their importance and of the fear that they might be used by his adversaries. Until the reign of Barsbāy, most of them were restricted to their quarters in the Cairo citadel; many had never even seen Cairo and had little notion of what a city looked like. They were ordered by Barsbāy (c. 825) to come down from the citadel and to take up residence in the city. The tumultuous life of the metropolis soon corrupted them; many became impoverished, and all their former splendour left them.⁴ The most eminent and most dangerous among them, especially those who had discharged the office of sultan after their father's death, were usually sent to the Alexandria prison.⁵ A sultan might sometimes display his magnanimity by bringing one of them to Cairo, regaling him with sumptuous feasts and even permitting him to make the pilgrimage to Mecca⁶; but these were isolated instances which imposed no obligations on the sultan, and the status of the sultans' sons remained unimproved until the end of the Mamluk era.⁷

3. The *Ajnād al-Mi'atayn*

Among the units of the Egyptian *ḥalqa* which were not stationed in Cairo one is worthy of special mention: it was called *ajnād al-mi'atayn*, and was stationed at Alexandria. Its history dates back to the Frankish raid on Alexandria in 767, which caused a number of changes in the defences of the city. Among these was the posting of a garrison of 200 men of the *ḥalqa* called *ajnād al-mi'atayn*.¹ In the days of the historian Khalīl b. Shāhīn *az-Zāhiri*, their numbers had increased, but the name was preserved; they were then 360, headed by twelve commanders each. in charge of 30 men.²

The Mamluks of the Amirs

The mamluks of the amirs were called *mamālik al-umarā'*,³ or *ajnad al-umarā'*.⁴ The troops of each. amir were at first registered in the *dīwān al-jaysh* (q.v. below), but in the days of Qalqashandī this arrangement was replaced by separate lists prepared by each. of the amirs, who would send copies to the *dīwān*. The number of mamluks each amir could take into his service was fixed, and new ones could be introduced only when some of the original number died or were cashiered. No mamluk could be dismissed by an amir until the latter had convinced the vice-sultan (*nā'ib as-sultān*) that there were just causes for his dismissal. The amirs' troops received their pay and the deeds to their estates from their master. According to his feudal charter (*manshūr*), the amir was to receive one-third of the income of his fief, and two-thirds were to be distributed among his mamluks. The amir or his clerks could levy no part of the mamluk's portion for the amir without the mamluk's consent. It seems probable that this apportionment was not strictly observed; in the year 767 it even became necessary to enact a law requiring the amir to share his income *equally* with his troops, and our source claims that much good accrued to the army from this procedure.¹ Thus we are entitled to assume that before the enactment of this law, the amir was wont to take for himself more than *half* the income, though he was legally entitled only to a third.

Service under an amir was known as *khidma bi-abwāb al-umarā'*.² Such. service was of course considered much inferior to service under the sultan (*khidma bi-abwāb as-sultān*) and a Royal Mamluk fated for some reason to serve under an amir was thought ill-starred.³ The amirs' mamluks constituted no serious political factor in the Mamluk army; rebellions of great proportions among them were extremely rare.⁴ In addition, they were necessarily less well trained than the Royal Mamluks, for they did not have access to the first-rate military schools in which the latter grew up and studied. It seems, however, that they attended the military schools (*ṭibāq*) of their masters.⁵ The political weakness of the amirs' mamluks as a group and their precarious position, as individuals, even in the highest posts, may be deduced from the following incident. Qajqar al-Qurdumī, who served as amīr *silāh*, was imprisoned by Sultan **Tatar** with the help of the *mu'ayyadīya* and the *zāhirīya* (Barqūq) who were the sultan's

‘colleagues’ (*khushdāshīya*). **Tatar** feared that this arrest would cause disturbances, but nothing occurred: ‘For Qajqar al-Qurdumī lacked followers, because he was one of the amirs’ mamluks, bereft of power and of colleagues’ (*wa-dhālika li-‘adam ḥāshiyat Qajqar al-Qurdumī, fa-innahu aḥad mamālīk al-umarā’*, *laysa lahu shawka wa-lā khushdāshīn*).⁶

When an amir died or was dismissed, his mamluks passed on to the service of the sultan or of other amirs, or were divided between the sultan and the amirs.⁷ It sometimes also happened that they were joined to the *ḥalqa*.⁸ When an amir was transferred from one province to another, he was almost invariably unable to take his mamluks with him; when the amir Aljāy was appointed governor of **Ḥamā**, he asked permission to take his mamluks with him, but this was denied him.¹ We know of no instances where such permission was granted. The same rule was thus apparently applied to the amir’s mamluks as to his estate: he lost both when he was transferred to a new province.

Little is told us of the mamluk’s duties and obligations toward his amir. Something on this question is learned from the interesting biography of Amir **Sūdūn** al-Balāṭī (died A.H. 842), whose conduct was the reverse of that accepted among the amirs. From his unusual behaviour, the more conventional relations between the amir and his mamluks may be indirectly inferred. He lived in a barrack (*tabaqa*) in the Cairo citadel even after he had become a high-ranking amir. When he moved, by order of the sultan, from the citadel, and settled in town like the rest of the amirs, he continued to act in his own manner. He would order his mamluks to escort him on horseback after parades (*mawā kib*) up to the door of his house. He would then arrange the horses on the left and right of the door, and no one would dismount. He would leave them and enter his house alone; as **Sūdūn** dismounted, he would be approached by a *bābā*, who served him after the manner of the *khāṣṣakīya*, for **Sūdūn** had neither master of the robe (*jamdār*) nor armour bearer (*silāḥdār*). He did not serve meals for his mamluks at his house, but would eat alone. In compensation he allotted each one of his mamluks three *raṭls* of mutton; and as someone remarked upon this, he replied: ‘My mamluks will reap greater benefit from this arrangement: whoever of them is married will share his portion with his family. Were he to take his meals at my table, he would have to incur additional expenses for his family’. **Sūdūn** then gathered his mamluks and asked them whether they would agree to have their allotments diminished and dine with him instead; but they replied that they were satisfied with the existing arrangement. (Of ordinary amirs it is said explicitly that they always took their meals together with their mamluks.)² He had in his service 150 mamluks, exclusive of the *kuttā bīya*, i.e. young mamluks who had not completed their training and

had not received their liberation certificates. He would distribute their pay and their fodder and meat allotments at the beginning of the month from his private stocks. They would escort him on horseback on parade days only.³

As for the amir's court, it was a copy on a reduced scale of the court of the sultan. He had a coat of arms (*rank*, pl. *runūk*),⁴ with a special design serving as his emblem, such as a cup (*hanāb*), an inkwell (*dawāṭ*), a napkin (*buqja*), a *fleur-de-lis* (*faransīsa*), and the like. This coat of arms, which bore a colour of the amir's choice, was painted on the gates of his house and his other possessions, such as the grain storehouses, the sugar refineries, the ships, as well as on his sword, his how, and the caparisons (*barkustuwānāṭ*) of his horses and camels.

When the amir rode out of his house, the important members of his corps would escort him as follows: the *ra's nawba*, the *dawādār*, the *amīr majlis*, and other high-ranking office holders would precede him; the *jamdārīya* would follow him, and the *amīr akhūr* would come last, leading the reserve horses (*al-janā'ib*). The sultan rode in the same manner.¹

THE NUMBERS OF THE AMIRS' MAMLUKS

The contemporary sources are interspersed with fairly numerous data concerning the numbers of the mamluks owned by various amirs. These data pertain, however, mostly to amirs who distinguished themselves by unusually large-scale acquisitions of mamluks, while virtually nothing at all has reached us regarding ordinary amirs. The only exception is the very valuable information we have on the numbers of mamluks owned by the amirs who took part in the battle of Marj Dābiq.² There is thus no way of ascertaining whether or not the amirs actually employed the number of horsemen to which they were entitled by law (cf. pp. 467–71). A list giving the numbers of mamluks owned by the most important amirs of the realm and covering the entire Mamluk era will be found below. This list, together with the historians' comments which we shall cite, clearly indicates the great numerical decrease of the amirs' mamluks in the Circassian period as compared with the **Bahri** period.

A. The *Bahārī* Period

Qarāṣunqūr had 600 horsemen.³ Sunqur al-Ashqar demanded to be made an amir disposing of 600 horsemen.⁴ Asandumūr, governor of Tripoli, had 500 mamluks.⁵ Qawṣūn an-Nāṣirī had 700,⁶ Shaykhūn al-ʿUmarī, 700⁷; Ayanbak assembled, for one of the battles near the Cairo citadel, 200 of his mamluks.⁸ There were 1,500 mamluks in the service of Jakam.⁹ When Baybars al-Muẓaffarī al-Jashnakīr was deposed from the sultanate, he asked for 300 mamluks and obtained only 100.¹⁰ The grandest of all amirs with respect to the numbers of his mamluks was Yalbughā an-Nāṣirī al-Khāṣṣakī; he had, according to one version, 1,500 mamluks,¹¹ and according to another, 3,000, including four Amirs of a Thousand.¹² Ibn Taghrībīrdī states that the mamluks of Yalbughā (*al-yalbughāwīya*) constituted at the beginning of the 9th century the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian army, and that the greatest amirs were from their ranks.¹³ Manjak had only 75 *kuttābīya*.¹⁴ Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī had 1,000 mamluks, each receiving a monthly pay (*jāmākīya*) ranging from 10 to 100 dinars; the total of the salaries of his mamluks and retinue after he had rebelled against the sultan was between 20,000 and 30,000 dinars.¹ Mankalībughā had approximately 200.² Ṣirghitmish had 800.³ In 791 the commander-in-chief (*atābak al-ʿasākīr*) had in his *ṭulb* (see n. 8, p. 464) 300 mamluks.⁴ Two hundred out of the *atābak al-ʿasākīr*'s 500 mamluks take part in the expedition to Upper Egypt.⁵ There were 150 mamluks in the *ṭulb* of Baybughā and 60 in that of each of the Amirs of a Thousand.⁶ Kamishbughā had over 300 mamluks.⁷ Aytamish al-Bajāṣī, who was commander-in-chief, had 1,000 mamluks.⁸

B. The Circassian Period

The above-named Aytamish was the last of the amirs who possessed large numbers of mamluks. Concerning him, the following noteworthy passage is found in Ibn Taghrībirdī: ‘He was the last of the mighty amirs of Egypt until our own days. When my father became commander-in-chief under an-Nāṣir Faraj, several people suggested to him that he follow the example of Aytamish. al-Bajāṣī. To this he replied, “How small are we in comparison with those grand seigneurs! (*hayhā t m ā nahnu min khayl hādha al-maydān*)”. And these words were said by my father when he had in his service 400 mamluks, and when his daily portion was 1,000 *raṭls*’.⁹ Thus 400 mamluks in the service of the highest-ranking amir in the days of Ibn Taghrībirdī was considered an unusually high. number. The decline of the courts of the amirs in the Circassian period is also reflected in such comments as ‘a single ordinary mamluk of Jānībak’s had better and more suitable table and furnishings (*simāt wa-barak*) than many of our present-day Amirs of a Thonsand’.¹⁰ The same Jānībak is said to have followed in the footsteps of the former kings (*al-mulūk as-sāliḥ*)¹¹ in the large number of his mamluks and all the varied ceremonies and regalia connected with the rank of amir.¹² With the close of the Bahri period, there is a gradual disappearance of the magnificent amirs owning several hundreds or even thousands of mamluks. In the Circassian period, their lofty position becomes a distant and rarely reached ideal. We are told of Yashbak as-Sudūnī, one of the important Circassian amirs, that he followed former generations in his magnificence and the large number of his mamluks ‘in accordance with the times’ (*bi-ḥasab al-waqt*),¹ i.e. he was considered great and his mamluks numerous within the limits of the conceptions of his own day. The number of amirs who possessed large numbers of mamluks had, as a matter of fact, been greatly reduced at that time. Khudābirdī had 300 mamluks²; Jānībak, governor of Jidda and comptroller of its customs, had between 200 and 300 mamluks³; Aynāl al-‘Alā’ī had 200.⁴ The only amir of the Circassian period on a scale reminiscent of the Bahri period is Yalbāy, a commander-in-chief, who had over 1,000 mamluks.⁵ It must be stressed that the acquisition of a large number of mamluks by any particular amir, especially in Circassian times, was considered a clear indication that he was fomenting some rebellion against the sultan.⁶

THE *ṬAWĀSHIYA*

In connexion with the amirs' mamluks, attention should be paid to a special military formation whose members were called *ṭawāshiya*. These should not be confused with eunuchs, who were designated by the same term. This unit had almost completely disintegrated by the early Mamluk period, but it was still at the peak of its power in the Ayyubid period, especially in its beginnings. A discussion, therefore, of the *ṭawāshiya* under the Ayyubids will serve to clarify their position among the mamluks.

It is a noteworthy phenomenon that we do not know much concerning **Ṣalāḥ** ad-Dīn's army from published Ayyubid sources.⁷ The best single description known to the writer is found in al-Maqrīzī's *Khīṭat*, and the source on which the Mamluk historian bases his statements is al-Qādī al-Fāḍil. In 567 **Ṣalāḥ** ad-Dīn reviewed his troops; 140 *ṭulbs*⁸ were present, 20 absent; approximately 14,000 troops were present, most of them *ṭawāshiya*, and the rest *qarāghulāmīya*. In the description of this review, the *ṭawāshiya* are defined as follows: 'the *ṭawāshi* is the holder of an income ranging from 700 and 1,000 and 1,200; he has a baggage train (*barak*) composed of ten or less heads of animals, including pure-bred horses, ordinary horses, mules, and camels; he has a page-boy (*ghulām*), who bears his arms'.¹ Ten years later, in 577, **Ṣalāḥ** ad-Dīn again held a review of his troops (after having inspected the feudal estates and their incomes) and reduced their number to 8,640 horsemen, distributed as follows: amirs, 111; *ṭawāshiya*, 6,876; *qarāghulāmīya*, 1,553.² Thus the *ṭawāshiya* formed the majority of **Ṣalāḥ** ad-Dīn's regular army, both in its original and its reorganized forms. The *ṭawāshiya* are met on several other occasions in the Ayyubid period, either participating in military expeditions or on pay parades; they are also mentioned in the *Qawānīn ad-Dawāwīn*, among the units composing the Ayyubid army.³

In the Mamluk period the term *ṭawāshiya* gradually falls into disuse. One comes across it here and there during the first few decades, but afterwards it disappears almost completely. Below are some examples of its appearance.

The historian Ibn Shaddād, who lived at the end of the Ayyubid and the beginning of the Mamluk eras, relates that the town of Qurs paid in his day sufficient land tax (*kharāj*) to cover the expenses of 40 *ṭawāshiya* with their commanders. Every *ṭawāshi* received 4,000 dirhams, and the commander one-third of the *kharāj*.⁴ When, in 700, Amir Sal

Ār goes to Shawbak, 100 *ṭawāshiya* are there assigned to him with their feudal estates.⁵ Amir Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qaymarī is reported to have given his estate, a fief of 100 *ṭawāshiya*, to his son.⁶ One source has it that in 683 he ‘was granted a fief for his inner circle of favourites and for ten *ṭawāshiya*’ (*uqṭi’a iqtā’an li-khāṣṣihi wa-li’asharat ṭawāshiya*)⁷ while another source states in reference to the same event simply: ‘he was granted (a fief of) ten’ (*uqṭi’a ‘ashara*).⁸ In the *Ta’rīf* of Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī, holders of *ṭablkhāna* rank are mentioned as having estates of 40 *ṭawāshis*.⁹ On the basis of the foregoing, it may well be asked whether or not the *ṭawāshiya* were mamluks. As for the Ayyubid period, there seems to be no room for doubt; the *ṭawāshiya* are a very important military factor as early as the beginning of that period, and, according to al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, formed the greater part of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s regular army. Most of the Ayyubid sultans did have mamluks in their service; but until the end of their rule, i.e. the reign of Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb, who founded the Bahrī regiment, their mamluks did not constitute a decisive factor numerically, militarily, or politically. The *ṭawāshiya*, therefore, cannot possibly be identified as mamluks for that period.¹ With respect to the early Mamluk era, it is clear, especially from the last two quotations, that the *ṭawāshiya* were amirs’ troops, but the question remains whether they were mamluks, as Poliak thinks,² or not. Nothing in the above material specifically identifies them as such. Later in this work it is pointed out that at the dawn of the Mamluk era the sources mention amirs who had in their service so many *horsemen* and not mamluks, and there are other specific indications of horsemen who are *not* mamluks in the service of the amirs, as we shall see later. What we know of the *ṭawāshiya* seems to tally with this evidence. The following examples make it quite clear. When Baybars al-Manṣūrī is promoted in 685 to the rank of Amir of Eighty he says: ‘*wa-an‘ama as-sultān ‘alayya bi-thamanina fārisan*’,³ while the royal decree issued in this connexion runs: ‘*wal-‘idda khāṣṣuhu wa-thamānīna ṭawāshiyan*’.⁴ In 660 when Nāṣir ad-Dīn Aghulmish as-Silāḥdār aṣ-Ṣāliḥī receives an amirate of Three Hundred on the northern border of the Mamluk kingdom the historian says: ‘*wa-‘ayyana lahu thalāthmi’at fāris wa-aḡṭa’ahu fī ar-Rūm*’.⁵ Immediately afterwards he repeats the same information in the following words: *wa-kataba as-sultān li’l-amīr Nāṣir ad-Dīn al-madhkur manshūrān bi-thalāth mi’at ṭawāshin wa-aḡṭa’ahu Āmid wa-a’mālahā*.⁶ Thus the identity between *ṭawāshī* and *fāris* is very evident from these two last examples. It is true that Ṣaliḥ b. Yahyā, in his *Ta’rīkh Bayrūt*, calls the troops serving under the amirs of al-Gharb *mamālīk ṭawāshiya*, but a detailed list of names makes it clear that these were not mamluks, but *Arabs and sons of Arabs*.⁷ This example arouses the suspicion that even when certain sources specifically mention the word ‘mamluk’, they may not be referring to mamluks in the technical sense

of the word.

The term ‘*ṭawāshī*’ in the above-mentioned meaning almost entirely ceases to appear at a very early date, viz. as far back as the current annals of the first half of the **Bahri** period. It is, nevertheless, still met with in official documents,⁸ whose language tends to be more conservative. It should be added that by far the greater part of our information on the *ṭawāshīya* during the Mamluk period comes not from Egypt, but from Syria (*al-Bilād ash-Shāmīya*). Such a peripheral area was more apt to preserve obsolete forms than the centre of the realm, where innovations originated and from where they spread forth. We do not encounter the term after the reign of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, with the following exception: al-Qalqashandī states that in official letters addressed to an amir’s soldier, this soldier would be called *al-ṭawāshī*.¹

The Amirs and their Ranks

The officer of the Mamluk army was called *amīr*.² The rank of officer was called *imra*,³ or *imrīya*,⁴ while the rank of private was called *jundī ya*, the private himself being called *jundī*.⁵

Mamluk encyclopedic literature, especially the works of Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, al-Qalqashandī, al-Maqrīzī, az-Zāhiri, and as-Suyūṭī, gives detailed descriptions of the amirs and their various ranks.⁶

In Egypt, the amirs were divided into the following ranks:—

(a) The highest rank was that of *amīr mi'a muqaddam alf*, viz. an amir entitled to keep in his service 100 horsemen and to command 1,000 soldiers of the *ḥalqa* in the field. This rank is only rarely designated in the sources by its full title⁷; a variation of the full title, *amīr mi'at farīs muqaddam 'alā alf*,⁸ is also found, but very rarely, and that only in the beginning of the Mamluk period. Much more frequent are the following: *muqaddam alf*,⁹ *amīr muqaddam*,¹⁰ or simply *muqaddam*,¹ *amīr mi'a* (pl. *umarā'* al-mi'īn),² *amīr alf*,³ and sometimes simply *alf* (pl. *ulūf*).⁴ Some of these titles occur most frequently in the plural. The designation of the rank itself rarely appears in its full form of *imrat mi'a wa-taqdimat alf*⁵; much more frequent are the abbreviated forms *taqdimat alf*⁶ or *taqdimā*,⁷ while the term *imrat mi'a* is less common.⁸ The term designating the act of appointing to that office is *qaddama*,⁹ and for receiving such an appointment, *taqaddama*.¹⁰ The number of horsemen in the service of such amirs might reach 110 to 120, and we have seen above that the important amirs actually had much greater numbers. The holders of the most important posts of the state were selected from among these amirs, whose total number was twenty-four, nine of whom were office holders: commander-in-chief (*atābak al-'asākīr*), grand master of the armour (*amīr silāḥ*), lord of the audience (*amīr majlis*), grand dawādār (*dawādār kabīr*), grand master of the stable (*amīr akhūṛ kabīr*), chief of the corps of mamluks (*ra's nawbat an-nuwab*), grand chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*), grand treasurer (*khāzindār kabīr*), and leader of the Egyptian pilgrims' caravan (*amīr ḥajj*); cf. below, the section on office holders. The total of twenty-four was fixed at the time of the redistribution of Egyptian land conducted by an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (*ar-rawk an-nāṣirī*), but when the *dīwān al-mufrad* was established by Barqūq and many of the Royal Mamluks were transferred to it, that number was diminished. In the days of al-Qalqashandī, their number

a'tāhu 'ashara' ⁴ ('he granted him. an amirate of ten'), *ta'ammara* 'ashara' ⁵ ('he was appointed Amir of Ten'). All such. amirs were entitled to keep in their service ten horsemen. According to al-Maqrizī, al-Qalqashandī, and Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, amirs keeping twenty horsemen were included under the Amirs of Ten, but az-Zāhiri puts them in a category apart which he calls *al-'ishrīnā*. According to the latter author, their number had formerly been twenty. Mamluk sources also frequently make mention of *umarā* 'ishrīn or 'ishrīnā. ⁶ The number of the Amirs of Ten, again, was not fixed, and varied for the reasons already mentioned in connexion with the Amirs of Forty.

(d) The fourth rank was that of Amirs of Five (*umarā* 'khamṣa). These were amirs holding fiefs with incomes equal to half that of the Amirs of Ten. Their number, according to al-Qalqashandī, was exceedingly low (*aqall min al-qalīl*), especially in Egypt. Most of the Amirs of Five were the sons of deceased amirs, and received their titles out of deference for their fathers; in practice they were on an equal footing with the more honoured private soldiers. ⁷ This statement of al-Qalqashandī's is accurate, for it is only very rarely that one encounters Amirs of Five in Egypt during the whole of the Mamluk era ⁸; they are not very numerous in Syria (*al-bilād ash-shāmīya*) either. ¹ Ṣāliḥ b. Yahyā also mentions an Amirate of Four, *imrat arba'a*, ² a rank which occurs much less frequently even than the *imrat khamṣa*.

The numbers of the Amirs of a Thousand during the various Mamluk periods have been given above. We now turn to the numbers of the amirs of diverse ranks, especially those of Amir of Forty and downwards, in so far as they are found in the sources.

According to az-Zāhiri, the numbers of the amirs had 'formerly' (*qadīman*) been as follows: Amirs of a Hundred, 24; Amirs of Forty, 40; Amirs of Twenty, 20; Amirs of Ten, 50; Amirs of Five, 30, ³ giving a total of 164 amirs or, exclusive of the Amirs of Five, 134. There is, of course, no way of knowing to which. period he is referring; at any rate, the figures cited do not at all conform to those of the list of *ar-rawk an-nāṣiri* (cf. Appendix A). There, the number of the Amirs of a Hundred is indeed 24, but the Amirs of Forty numbered 200, as did the Amirs of Ten, totalling 424 amirs. In 891 we find: 15 Amirs of a Hundred, 10 Amirs of Forty (i.e. less than the number of Amirs of a Hundred!), 60 Amirs of Ten, 40 *khāṣṣakīya*, ⁴ or a total of 85 amirs. In 908 there were 24 Amirs of a Hundred (of whom 7 were office holders), 75 Amirs of Forty (of whom 10 held offices), and 185 Amirs of Ten, ⁵ totalling 284 amirs. In 912 the sultan appoints, from among his *khāṣṣakīya*, ⁴⁰ additional Amirs of Ten, over and above the number of amirs who had been in his service in 908, ⁶ making a new total of 324. In 922 the total of the Amirs of Forty and the Amirs of Ten alone exceeded 300. ⁷

TERMS FOR AMIRS' RANKS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MAMLUK PERIOD

The designations of the amirs' ranks given above are presented in their crystallized and definitive forms, which were in use during the greater part of the Mamluk period. These titles were, however, as yet almost non-existent at the end of the Ayyubid and the beginning of the Mamluk eras; an examination, therefore, of the earlier and looser forms is vital for an understanding of their origin and development.

In the 13th century it is only seldom that one encounters the terms *amīr* 'ashara, *amī* *ṭablikhāna*, *amīr mi'a muqaddam alf*, or the variants listed above.⁸

With, reference to the appointment of amirs, we are confronted most frequently with expressions such as the following: *u'tiya khubz mi'at fāris*, *mi'at wa-khamsīn fāris*; *u'tiya imrat khamsīn fāris*, *imrat mi'at fāris*, *imrat sittīn fāris*, *imrat thamānīn fāris*; *al-tāhu iqṭā'a mi'at fāris*; *nisf wa-aqla nābulus wa-jinīn wa-a'māliḥā bi-mi'at wa-'ishrīn fārisan*; *iqṭā' li-imrat sittīn fāris*, etc.¹ What stands out in such passages is that, in every case, there appears a feudal grant of a highly variable number of *horsemen*, whereas the rigid division of the amirs' ranks into their main categories, as listed above and as found on virtually every page at a later period, has not as yet made its regular appearance. It should be emphasized that the above expressions only designate the *appointment* to a particular rank, while holders of ranks mentioned *after* their appointment are usually referred to, in the current annals, as *al-amīr*, without the indication of any specific grade. This represents a system completely different from that in use later on, after the fixing of the definitive terminology.

At a somewhat later time, we find an intermediate nomenclature between the loose terms of early Mamluk days and the final ones.

Thus: *taqdimat alf fāris*; *taqdimat alf wa-imrat mi'at fāris*; *imrat ṭablikhāna wa-arba'in fārisan*; *an'ama 'alayhi bi-imrat mi'at fāris wa-qaddamahu 'alā alf*, etc.² Here also the form 'amirate of so many *horsemen*' consistently recurs.

On the basis of this information, it seems to us feasible to inquire into the type of troops the amirs had under their orders. It is our opinion that the amirs' troops did not consist of purely mamluk units, especially in the first half of the period dealt with. A study of the information handed down by contemporary sources respecting the

division of the amirs into their various ranks reveals the following picture: later sources indicate that Amirs of a Hundred, of Forty, and of Ten are respectively entitled to keep 100, 40, and 10 *mamluks*, while the earlier Ibn **Faḍl** Allāh al-ʿUmarī states that these amirs are authorized to have 100, 40, or 10 *horsemen* under their command,¹ viz. not necessarily mamluks, for there were very many horsemen in the armies of the Mamluk kingdom who were not mamluks. This observation of al-ʿUmarī's is no mere accident, and is strongly supported by the fact that early Mamluk sources *almost invariably* speak of 'amirates of so many *horsemen*', and not mamluks, as pointed out above (cf. footnote 1, p. 472). The existence of non-mamluk soldiers in the armies of the amirs can be proved by additional evidence: a large percentage of the *wāḥidīya*, who were free horsemen, were transferred to the service of the amirs, although most of them went to the *ḥalqa*. Instances of *ḥalqa* troops dissatisfied with the *rawk an-nāṣirī*, demanding to be transferred to the amirs, and of amirs' troops passing over to the *ḥalqa*, have been cited above. Demands such as the *ḥalqa's* would not, it seems to us, have been raised, had not the transfer of *ḥalqa* troops to the amirs been a standard procedure (see also below). It has been pointed out that *ṭawāshī* generally corresponds to horseman (and *not* to mamluk) in the service of an amir. It also seems to us that the fact that the amirs' troops are called, for most of the Mamluk era, alternatively *mamālīk al-umarā'* and *ajnad al-umarā'* shows that they were composed of mingled mamluk and non-mamluk elements. It has been indicated that *ajnad* is the most common designation of the free, non-mamluk *ḥalqa* troops. On the other hand, we have *never* found the Royal Mamluks, though they are mentioned thousands of times, to be called by any such name as *ajnad* *as-sultān* or *al-ajnad as-sultāniya*, instead of *mamālīk as-sultān* or *al-mamālīk as-sultāniya*. Similarly, the very frequent combination '*al-mamālīk wa-l-ajnad*' for '*al-mamālīk wa-ajnad al-ḥalqa*' implies that *mamālīk* and *ajnad* are distinct in meaning.² Of special importance is the fact that *even in the Circassian period* there were still soldiers of the *ḥalqa* in the service of the amirs, as may be learned from this most interesting piece of information: in 821 Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh holds a review of all the *ḥalqa*, and offers two alternatives to those of them serving with the amirs, namely, either to remain members of the *ḥalqa* and leave the service of the amirs, or to be entirely transferred to the amirs and give up membership in the *ḥalqa*. Some chose the first, and some the second alternative.³ The preceding examples indicate that there was considerable overlapping between the amirs' troops and those of the *ḥalqa*, while the last passage shows clearly that even in the days of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, members of the *ḥalqa* could be totally absorbed into the service of the amirs. In other words, as late as

the first half of the 9th century A.H. the army of the amirs was not yet composed solely of mamluks.

The manner in which the amirs' troops were composed developed, in the writer's view, somewhat as follows: in the Ayyubid period, the bulk of the troops of the kingdom consisted of free horsemen; the Ayyubid sultans did buy some mamluks, but these did not form a predominant part of their army. The first to purchase mamluks on a very large scale was al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb, the last of the Ayyubids, but even his corps of mamluks (*al-Baḥrīya*) did not exceed 800 to 1,000 men.¹ The gradual ascendancy of the mamluk element in the realm was, presumably, a rather slow process going from the centre to the periphery, from the select Royal Mamluks to the less pre-eminent units. This process was accelerated by the *rawks*, carried out 50 to 60 years after the rise of the Mamluk state; but there nevertheless remained, among the amirs' troops, whose importance ranked second to the sultan's, a considerable number of free horsemen long after the *rawks*, as we have seen above. The slow pace at which the predominance of the mamluk element in the amirs' armies asserted itself is due partly to an important economic factor: the buying of a mamluk at a tender age, his rearing and training until he became a full-fledged soldier, cost considerable sums of money, and not every amir could afford such expenses. At the beginning of the Mamluk era, when the *ḥalqa* was strong and the *wāfidiya* flocked to the Mamluk kingdom, the amir could include in his service free soldiers who were not greatly inferior to the mamluks, and who, on the other hand, required no investment of capital for their training. Later, however, as a result of the decline of the *ḥalqa* and the stoppage of the *wāfidi* influx, the amir no longer had at his disposal any such cheap source from which he could draw without considerably undermining the efficiency of his troops; only the local population was left, and these could not replace the Kurdish, Turcoman, Turkish, and Mongol free horsemen. Thus the amir was driven to recruiting more and more soldiers from among the mamluks, expensive as such recruitment might be. He had, as a matter of fact, no other alternative, if he wanted to build up an army of his own that would be of any value.

THE PROMOTION OF AMIRS

One of the fundamental principles of the Mamluk system was the strict selection of the fittest of the military school graduates for incorporation into the *élite* corps of the *khāṣṣakīya*, followed by promotion at a very slow rate. This principle was largely adhered to in the **Bahri** period, during which, accelerated promotion was infrequent; this is, no doubt, one of the distinct marks of the superiority of that period over the Circassian period.

It is owing to Ibn **Hajar** al-‘Asqalānī that we know who was the first sultan who allowed accelerated promotion. According to this historian, Baktimūr al-Abū Bakrī al-Manṣūrī was appointed by al-Manṣūr Qalāwīn to the rank of Amir of Forty, and he ‘was the first to pass from the rank of private to that of Amir *Ṭablkhāna*’.¹ Thus we learn that during the first 30 or 40 years of Mamluk rule there was no case of accelerated promotion. Examination confirms this information, for we have found no other such instances until Qalāwīn’s time.² The basis for corruption in promotions and in the obtaining of ranks or feudal estates was laid in the reign of Sultan al-Kāmil Sha‘bān, of the Qalāwīn dynasty, when Amir Ghurī founded the *dīwān al-badal*.³ But what occurred in the **Bahri** period was very moderate in comparison with the Circassian period. From the reign of Barqūq on, accelerated promotion has become almost the general rule. Ibn Taghrībirdī states that since the days when al-Ashraf Sha‘bān was deposed from the throne, everyone who achieved greatness and participated in disturbances and political intrigues had been, during the preceding year, either a private or an Amir of Ten, and virtually unknown. This situation remained unchanged until Ibn Taghrībirdī’s own days.⁴ Thus the number of amirs who, during the Circassian period, are stated to have passed directly from the rank of private to that of the highest amirs, is exceedingly great. The common expression used for such elevations is ‘(promoted) at one stroke’ (*daf‘atan wāḥidatan*).⁵

The only Circassian sultan who vigorously opposed such rapid promotion among his mamluks was al-Mu‘ayyad Shaykh, who was described as an expert in the deployment of the army in battle and as a fearless hero.¹ He attempted to bring back to life the principles upon which the Mamluk system had been founded, and which had been dealt severe blows by the Circassian sultans.² He showed no favouritism: all doors were opened to the good soldier, and the bad soldier was not even granted a fief with a yearly income of 10,000

dirhams.³ He refrained from taking into his service amirs' mamluks who had led luxurious lives at their masters' expense, and who wore sumptuous clothes.⁴ A soldier upon whom he conferred the rank of amir was for years not permitted to wear the *takhfīfa*.⁵ With his amirs he was a strict disciplinarian.⁶ He distinguished himself in the upbringing and training of his mamluks, and he let long periods elapse between promotions; this is the reason, says Ibn Taghribirdi, why every single one of his mamluks was promoted to a higher rank and achieved fame after his death.⁷ The historian's words are borne out by the great number of al-Mu'ayyad's purchased mamluks who did, in fact, reach very high positions only after his death, whereas during his lifetime they had remained comparatively obscure.⁸

Footnotes

¹ On the *ḥalqa* see: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 7; p. 246; part ii, p. 158. *C.I.A.*, 'L'Égypte', p. 458. *La Syrie*, pp. xxxii–iv. *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 219. *Feudalism*, p. 2; p. 3; pp. 5–10; p. 13; p. 16; p. 19, p. 21; p. 24; pp. 27–9; p. 31; p. 33; p. 40. J.Sauvaget, *La Chronique de Damas d'Al-Jazari*, Paris, 1949, p. 46; p. 68.

² H.A.R.Gibb, 'The Armies of Saladin', *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*, Cairo, 1951, p. 305. This article became available to the writer after the present paper was ready for publication, and therefore it is only sporadically referred to.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, xi, p. 349; p. 369; xii, p. 33. Abu Shāma, *Kirāb ar-Rawḍatayn*, ii, p. 179, ll. 17–18; p. 180, l. 4.

⁴ *Sulūk* (trsl. Quatremère), i, part 2, pp. 200–2.

⁵ See n. 1 above, and n. 1, p. 449.

⁶ *B.S.O.S.*, x, p. 872.

⁷ *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 16. *Daw' as-Ṣubb*, p. 245, ll. 14–16.

¹ *Sulūk*, i, p. 122, ll. 6–7.

² See, for instance, the information given for the year 646 (*Sulūk*, i, p. 330).

³ Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 7, ll. 1–2.

⁴ Zetterstéen, p. 158, ll. 5–6; p. 172, l. 10; p. 220, ll. 10–13.

⁵ Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 451, l. 1.

⁶ Zetterstéen, p. 164, ll. 10–14. cf. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, p. L.

⁷ *Khiṭaṭ*, i, p. 87, ll. 38–9.

⁸ Al-Mufaḍḍal b. Abī al-Faḍāl, *an-Nahj as-Sadīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xx, pp. 221, l. 5–222, l. 2.

⁹ Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 451, ll. 10–11.

¹⁰ *Manhal*, ii, fol. 16a, ll. 1–2.

¹¹ *Khiṭaṭ*, i, p. 250, ll. 4–5.

¹² Zetterstéen, p. 219, ll. 14–15.

¹³ Zetterstéen, p. 167, l. 5.

¹⁴ Zetterstéen, p. 172, l. 10.

¹⁵ Zetterstéen, p. 200, ll. 16–17.

¹⁶ Zetterstéen, p. 219, ll. 7–8.

¹⁷ Zetterstéen, p. 221, ll. 1–4.

¹⁸ *Sulṭ*^ū*k*, ii, p. 403, ll. 13–14.

¹⁹ *Nujū*^ū*m* (C), vi, p. 376, ll. 12–13; vii, p. 43, l. 8. *Manhal*, i, fol. 3b, l. 15. cf. also Ibn al-Fur^āt, viii, pp. 136, l. 23–137, l. 1; ix, p. 245, ll. 3–8.

¹ Zetterstéen, p. 17, ll. 9–10; p. 161, ll. 5–6, ll. 14–16.

² Zetterstéen, p. 161, ll. 20–3.

³ Zetterstéen, p. 228, ll. 9–12. For details on the position of *muqaddam* ^ū*al-ḥalqa* who were not mamluks, see Zetterstéen, p. 220, ll. 10–13. *Durar*, iv, p. 381, ll. 9–10, and many other passages. On the *muqaddam* ^ū*al-ḥalqa* in the early Mamluk period, and their civil and military functions, see Zetterstéen, p. 24, ll. 19–20; p. 30, l. 5; p. 32, ll. 13–14; p. 33, l. 10; p. 41, l. 13; p. 42, l. 10; p. 43, l. 8; p. 51, l. 12; p. 54, l. 12; p. 106, l. 23; p. 107, l. 13; p. 131, l. 1; p. 144, l. 14; p. 190, ll. 3–4; p. 218, ll. 9–10. *Patrologia*, xii, p. 166, ll. 6–7; xiv, p. 487, l. 7; p. 534; p. 596, l. 5; xx, p. 41, ll. 1–2. Ibn Kathīr, xiii, p. 264, ll. 12–14; p. 290, ll. 20–21; xiv, p. 212, l. 5; p. 222, l. 27; p. 240, l. 12. *Sulṭ*^ū*k*, i, p. 493, ll. 1–2; p. 507; p. 518, ll. 5–6; p. 534, ll. 16–17; ii, p. 499, l. 3, l. 9. *Nujū*^ū*m* (C), vi, p. 125, l. 9; vii, pp. 160, l. 17–161, l. 2; viii, p. 102, l. 15; p. 173, l. 1; p. 180, l. 26; p. 213, ll. 12–13.

Durar, iii, p. 229, l. 5. *Ta'rīkh Bayr*^ū*t*, n. 58, ll. 14–15; p. 95, ll. 6–15. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 112, l. 33; p. 209, ll. 37–9. *Ṣubḥ*, vii, p. 159, l. 15. In the early Mamluk period, one often encounters a military category designated by the term *mufradīya* or *maj*^ā*rida*, sing. *mufradī*. Its nature is not known to us, and it is not clear whether it belonged to ^{ḥalqa} the or to another unit. It seems, however, that its members ranked as honoured privates or lower amirs. They are mentioned as fairly regular participants in various official ceremonies together with the amirs, the *muqaddam* ^ū*al-ḥalqa* and others (*Sulṭ*^ū*k*, i, pp. 507, 518, 520, 612). After a long interval, they suddenly reappear in 791 (Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 166), then vanish again. cf. also

⁴ *Sul ūk*, ii, p. 20, l. 20. cf. also Zetterstéen, p. 132, ll. 3–6.

⁵ *Sul ūk*, i, p. 673, ll. 16–17.

⁶ ‘The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom’, *Islamic Culture*, Jubilee Number, 1951, pp. 89–104, cf. also Quatremère, vol. ii, part i, p. 245.

⁷ *Zubda*, p. 115. *Khīṭaṭ*, ii, p. 216. *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 16. *Ḥusn al-Mubādāra*, ii, p. 110, ll. 22–4.

¹ *Sul ūk*, i, p. 838; p. 922, l. 21; p. 930, l. 9; p. 932, l. 17; p. 949, l. 6; ii, p. 33, l. 6; p. 63, l. 10; p. 90, ll. 16–19; p. 109, l. 11, l. 16; p. 139, l. 15; p.

236, l. 2. *Nuj ūm* (P), vi, p. 255, l. 18. Ibn al-Furāṭ, vii, p. 169. A term of frequent occurrence in the sources is *alzāṁ*, sing. *lazīm* (‘retinue, escort, troops attached to an amir’). The exact position of the *alzāṁ* is not entirely clear. Thus, ‘*mamāṭīkuhum wa-ajnaduhum wa-alzāmuhum*’ (Ibn al-Furāṭ, viii, p. 180, l. 20), or ‘*khawāṣṣ wa-alzāma*’ (*Sul ūk*, ii, p. 69, ll. 11–12). For additional material on this term, see *Sul ūk*, i, p. 346, ll. 1–2; ii, p. 34, l. 6; p. 70, l. 1; p. 385, l. 2. *An-Nahj aa-Sadīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xiv, p. 574, ll. 5–6. Abū al-Fidā’, iv, p. 81, l. 15; p. 96, l. 22. *Nuj ūm* (C), viii, p. 221, ll. 4–5. *Nuj ūm* (P), vi, p. 243, l. 3. Ibn al-Furāṭ, vii, p. 101, l. 17. *Ta’rīkh Bayrūt*, p. 165, l. 6. *Durar*, i, p. 540, l. 4; iv, p. 288, l. 11.

² *Sul ūk*, ii, p. 146, l. 2. Ibn al-Furāṭ, xi, p. 444, l. 15; p. 451, ll. 10–11. *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 250, ll. 4–5. See also Feudalism, p. 5.

³ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 477, ll. 14–15; p. 450, ll. 2–3. *Duwal al-Islām*, ii, p. 15, ll. 7–8.

⁴ See, for instance, Abū al-Fidā’, iv, p. 57, l. 25. *Nuj ūm* (C), viii, p. 157, l. 8; p. 158, l. 6. *Sul ūk*, i, p. 512, l. 13; p. 518, l. 5; p. 527, l. 9; p. 743, l. 4; p. 768, n. 1; p. 846, l. 1; ii, p. 49, l. 18; p. 146, l. 2; p. 156, l. 8; p. 356, ll. 5–6. Ibn al-Furāṭ, vii, p. 5, l. 14; ix, p. 123, l. 2; p. 186, l. 20; p. 348, ll. 7–8.

⁵ On the battlefield the Mamluk army was divided into three principal bodies: the centre (*al-qalb*), the right wing (*al-maymana*) and the left wing (*al-maysara*). The centre was the most important part, and in it the best troops were concentrated.

⁶ See especially *Feudalism*, pp. 23–5; p. 27, p. 68. *History of the Land-tenure Relations in Egypt, Syria and Palestine in the late Middle Ages and Modern Times* (in Hebrew: *Toldoth ha-yeḥasim ha-qarqa’iyim be-miṣrāyim suriya ve-eretz yisrael be-sof yemey ha-beynāyim uvazzeman ha-badash*) Jerusalem, 1940, pp. 20 ff. *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 239–241.

¹ See references listed in preceding note.

² Zetterstéen, p. 45, ll. 16–19. The author of the text, unfortunately, does not return to the subject, in spite of a promise to do so.

³ *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 95, ll. 12–15.

¹ *Nujūm* (C), viii, pp. 95–9. cf. also *Khīṭaṭ*, i, pp. 87, l. 23–88, l. 3.

² *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 90, ll. 1–11; pp. 90, l. 35–91, l. 1. *Ta'rīkh Bayrūt*, pp. 95, l. 9–96. 1. 2. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 146, ll. 5–6, ll. 13–17. For data on the *rawk an-nāṣiri* until 806 and on the decline of Egypt from that date onward, see *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 91, ll. 12–16. For additional data on the *rawks*, see *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 82, l. 11; pp. 87–91; ii, pp. 206, l. 39–207, l. 3. Zetterstéen, p. 164, ll. 10–14. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 69, ll. 18–22; p. 75, ll. 25–6; p. 865. *Durar*, i, p. 251. *Ṣubḥ*, iii, p. 302, ll. 15–17; p. 387, ll. 25–35; p. 436, ll. 6–7. *An-Nahj as-Sadīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xiv, p. 601, ll. 1–2; xx, p. 236, ll. 1–3; pp. 255, l. 1–256, l. 1. *Sulūk*, i, pp. 841–6; p. 858, ll. 16–18. p. 865, ll. 5–7; ii, pp. 146–7; pp. 149–150; pp. 154–7; pp. 174–5; pp. 176–7; p. 264, ll. 4–5.

Zetterstéen, pp. 160, l. 25–161, l. 1. *Manhal*, v, fol. 55a, ll. 7–19. *Abū al-Fidā'*, iv, p. 37, ll. 1–3. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 36, ll. 1–2; pp. 42–55 p. 163, ll. 2–3; p. 177, ll. 4–19; p. 296, ll. 9–11. On incomes from feudal estates, see *Sulūk*, ii, p. 146, ll. 5–6. *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 88, ll. 15–20; pp. 90, l. 36–91, l. 1; p. 97, ll. 1–22; ii, pp. 216–17. For the *rawk*, cf. also: Quatremère, vol. ii, part ii, p. 65. *Feudalism*, pp. 5–23; p. 27; p. 68. Sauvaget, *Jazari*, p. 69.

³ *Manhal*, v, fol. 203b, ll. 3–4.

⁴ On *dīwān al-badal* see: *La Syrie*, p. xlv. *Feudalism*, p. 29.

¹ *Khīṭaṭ*, ii, p. 219.

² *Durar*, iv, p. 361, ll. 6–10.

³ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 165.

⁴ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 165.

⁵ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 163.

⁶ *Nujūm* and Ibn al-Furāṭ, in the chronicles for the year 791. cf. also references listed in n. 6, p. 455.

⁷ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 163.

⁸ *Zubda*, p. 116. *Tūmānshāy*. Unlike his predecessors, is said to have relieved the *ḥalqa* from guarding the Cairo citadel in the absence of the army's main body (Ibn Iyās, v, p. 48, ll. 1–10).

¹ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 389.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 739.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 739–740.

⁴ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 222.

⁵ *Sulūk* (trsl. Quatremère), ii, part 1, p. 200. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 216, l. 1.

⁶ On the status of the *ḥalqa* during the Circassian period, see: *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 120, ll. 20–1; p. 407, ll. 20–1; vi, p. 55, ll. 18–20; pp. 70–1; p. 72, l. 15; p. 385, ll. 3–5; pp. 388–9; pp. 391–2; p. 394, ll. 8–10; pp. 481–2; p. 483, ll. 13–14; pp. 738–9; p. 740, ll. 4–6. *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 697, l. 18–698, l. 5. *Manhal*, viii, fol. 441b. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 11, ll. 8–10; p. 150, l. 12; p. 160, ll. 20–1; p. 163, ll. 5–10; p. 165, ll. 6–11; p. 350, l. 20; pp. 362, l. 25–363, l. 3. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 22, ll. 10–13; p. 47, ll. 3–6; p. 101; p. 104; p. 110, ll. 2–3; (KM) iii, p. 20, ll. 4–14; pp. 24, l. 21–25, l. 1; pp. 40, l. 24–41, l. 4; p. 323, ll. 6–9; v, p. 26, ll. 6–12; p. 27, ll. 1–5.

¹ The term ‘*an-nāṣ*’, however, is also found in its ordinary meaning, i.e. ‘the public, the people’. The two meanings should not be confused; they occur in the sources with approximately equal frequency. For the second meaning, see, for instance: *Sulūk*, i, p. 789, l. 6. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 13, l. 16; p. 16, l. 19; p. 32, l. 15; p. 40, l. 1; p. 312, l. 10; p. 322, ll. 12–13; p. 404; p. 407, l. 16; p. 418, l. 1; p. 522, l. 8; vii, p. 684, l. 5, l. 7. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 53, l. 22; v, p. 75, l. 14. Cf. also *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, pp. 217–18. Glossary to *Ḥawāḍith*, p. xxix. *Feudalism*, p. 10; p. 14; p. 20; p. 33; p. 38; p. 40; p. 54.

² *Ṣubḥ*, vi, p. 51, ll. 10–12. *Daw’ as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 258, ll. 19–21. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 216, ll. 18–24.

³ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 216, ll. 18–24. cf. also *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 174, l. 17. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 177, l. 20; iv, p. 47, ll. 11–17; p. 195, ll. 2–3; p. 363, l. 9; v, p. 26, l. 1; p. 176, l. 3; p. 347, l. 15; p. 395, l. 4; p. 402, ll. 9–10.

¹ See, for instance, Zetterstéen, p. 157, l. 22. *Sulūk*, i, p. 770. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 262, ll. 6–8. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 206, ll. 21–3; p. 301, ll. 13–14; vi, p. 145, ll. 1–2; p. 173, ll. 7–14; p. 393, ll. 9–10; p. 475, l. 14; vii, p. 225, ll. 2–5; p. 625, ll. 16–18. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 107, ll. 6–8; p. 318, ll. 10–16. *Manhal*, i, fol. 147b, ll. 8–10; vii, fol. 354a, ll. 10–11. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 165, ll. 15–16; p. 173, ll. 16–17; p. 239, ll. 3–4; p. 275, ll. 14–20; p. 276, ll. 1–5; p. 477, ll. 15–16. *Tibr*, p. 354, ll. 9–11. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 40, ll. 4–5; p. 104, ll. 9–23; p. 143, l. 11; iii, p. 23, ll. 8–12; iv, p. 354, ll. 17–19. *Durar*, i, p. 115, l. 1; ii, pp. 50–1. *Daw’*, iii, pp. 100, l. 17–101, l. 6; p. 106, l. 29. The governors of the provinces of Alexandria, Kerak, Jerusalem, *Ḥamā*, etc., were sometimes non-mamluks as well (*Ḥawāḍith*, p. 603, l. 14. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 297, ll. 9–11. *Daw’*, i, p. 66, ll. 19–21; p. 226, ll. 13–18; iii, pp. 100, l. 27–101, l. 6; p. 102, ll. 12–13; p. 106, ll. 26–7, l. 29; p. 131, ll. 12–14).

² *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 159–160.

³ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 228, ll. 14–18. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 21, ll. 5–10; p. 137, ll. 2–4; v, p. 48, ll. 1–10. In the relevant chapter of our work on the Mamluk army we discussed in detail the curtailments and cuts in the payments to the *ḥalqa* and the *awlād an-nāṣ*; see also: Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 118, l. 9; p. 174, ll. 28–9; (KM) iii, p. 130, ll. 3–4; p. 266, ll. 11–12; p. 432, ll. 6–7. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 18a, ll. 24–5. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 79, ll. 11–13; p. 219, ll. 11–13; p. 350, ll. 19–21; p. 379, ll. 8–9.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 21, ll. 5–6; p. 212, l. 11; iv, p. 150, l. 13; v, p. 48, ll. 10–11.

⁵ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 140, ll. 4–5; p. 850, ll. 7–9. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 175; ll. 10–13; p. 616, l. 1; p. 681, l. 8. Ibn Iyās, v, p. 43, ll. 3–4; as well as *Feudalism*, p. 29, and n. 10.

¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 175, in the notes.

² See, for instance, *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 236, l. 13. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 11, ll. 7–10; p. 854, ll. 5–6; vii, p. 339, ll. 6–8. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, i, fol. 71b, ll. 1–2; fol. 89a, ll. 11–12. *Durar*, i, p. 27, l. 17; ii, p. 91, ll. 6–7. *Daw'*, ii, pp. 97–8; iii, p. 120, ll. 1–2; v, p. 155, ll. 1–2; vii, p. 147; viii, pp. 171, l. 28–172; l. 6. The terms indicating that a civilian or an amir's son belonged to, or joined, the *ḥalqa* were: *tazayyā bi-zīy al-jund*, *labisa zīy al-jund*, *kān bi-zīy al-jundīya*, *dakhala fī al-jundīya*, etc. (*Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 27, ll. 15–16. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 292, ll. 1–2; p. 328, l. 1; p. 853, ll. 20–1. *Manhal*, i, fol. 103a, l. 22. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 283, l. 17; p. 471, ll. 3–5. Ibn Iyās, v, p. 105, ll. 1–6. *Durar*, i, p. 231, ll. 16–19; p. 239, ll. 17–19; ii, p. 86, l. 10; iv, p. 280, l. 7; p. 345, ll. 16–19; pp. 370, l. 21–371, l. 1; p. 489, ll. 9–10. *Tibr*, p. 48, l. 15. *Daw'*, i, p. 146, l. 4; iii, p. 205, l. 18; v, p. 36; viii, p. 230, ll. 18–20; x, p. 318, ll. 8–9).

³ *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 159–160; vii, p. 293, notes. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 142, ll. 2–3.

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 683. *Manhal*, i, fol. 55a, ll. 2–13; fols. 179a, l. 21–179b, l. 2. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 15, ll. 11–14.

⁵ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 14, ll. 25–6, and many other passages.

⁶ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 706, l. 10–707, l. 15. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 66, ll. 12–16; p. 150, ll. 6–14; p. 152, ll. 21–4.

⁷ For material on the *asayd* and their status in the Mamluk kingdom, see *Sulūk*, ii, p. 490, l. 13. *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 216–17; p. 228, ll. 18–19; p. 229, l. 3; p. 282, l. 3; p. 320, l. 21; p. 397,

ll. 15–17; p. 505, l. 12; vi, p. 266, ll. 2–3; p. 432, ll. 5–7; p. 514, ll. 7–8; p. 545, ll. 8–9; p. 772; vii, p. 320, l. 1; p. 426, l. 1; pp. 508–9; p. 511; p. 644,

ll. 1–8; pp. 664–5; p. 678, ll. 8–9. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 149, l. 1; p. 305. Ibn al-Fur^ā, ix, p. 56, ll. 15–18; p. 91, ll. 18–21; p. 176, l. 21. Ib'n Iy^ās, ii, p. 15, ll. 1–2; p. 60, l. 4; p. 79; p. 108, l. 1; p. 113, ll. 6–10; iii, p. 188, ll. 10–12; p. 195, l. 12; iv, p. 9, l. 7; p. 399, ll. 15–23; p. 406, l. 9. *Daw'*, iii, p. 53, ll. 8–10; p. 87, ll. 6–7; p. 124, ll. 2–3; p. 201; p. 217; vi, p. 73; vii, p. 274. *Zubda*, p. 111, ll. 5–12. *Ṣubḥ*, xiii, p. 167, ll. 16–19. One of the surprising facts connected with the Circassians is that even the later rulers, who were well aware of the fate met by sultans' sons who were appointed to the sultanate by their fathers, grew no wiser from experience and followed the same policy, knowing full well that their own sons would be deposed. This fact arouses the amazement of Ibn Taghrībirdi, who can find no explanation for it. He says in one passage: 'We have seen the same retribution meted out time and again from the day when Barq^ūq deposed al-Manṣūr Ḥājjī down to our own day. All are made to drink the same cup by the *atābak*, and the beverage contained therein is prepared by the mamluks of their fathers. This matter has already been discussed by us in many places, but silence is more fitting'. (*Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 419, ll. 2–6). Elsewhere, he states that he fails to understand why the sultan appoints his son as successor at the last minute, knowing as he does with certainty that his son will be dealt with as he himself dealt with the son of the previous sultan (*Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 394, ll. 9–13. See also *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 228–230; vii, pp. 394–6. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 134, ll. 1–2).

¹ *Daw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 265, l. 15. *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 24, ll. 6–16; p. 63, ll. 11–12; p. 64, ll. 3–9. ll. 9–15.

² *Zubda*, p. 134, ll. 11–13.

³ *Nujum* (C), viii, p. 261, l. 11. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 229, l. 4.

⁴ See, for instance, Zettersteen, p. 132, ll. 3–6; p. 163, l. 21; p. 168, l. 23; p. 170, l. 8; p. 177, l. 1. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 176, ll. 6–7.

¹ *Khiṭāṭ*, ii, p. 216, ll. 1–4, ll. 13–14. *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 62, ll. 12–16. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 318, ll. 15–17. In connexion with the repartition of fief incomes between the amir and his mamluks, in the proportion of two-thirds to one-third, it is interesting to note that Amir Qalamīṣay az-Zāhiri Barq^ūq willed one-third of his possessions to his freed mamluks and his freed slave-women (*Manhal*, v, fol. 34a, ll. 18–19).

² Ibn Iy^ās, ii, p. 62, l. 12. *Daw'*, iii, p. 36; p. 276, l. 12; p. 284, l. 13.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 581, ll. 17–18; p. 597, ll. 18–19; p. 616, ll. 3–5; p. 772, l. 1; p. 798, notes. *Daw'*, iii, p. 36; p. 276, l. 12; p. 284, l. 3; x, p. 205, l. 28. *al-abwāb as-sultāniya* are called in the sources also *al-abwāb ash-sharīfa* or *al-abwāb al-āliya* (Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 62, ll. 13–14; p. 79, l. 3; p. 96, l. 27. Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 46, l. 5; p. 119, l. 14; p. 130, l. 21. *Ṣubḥ*, vi, p. 60, ll. 18–20). The houses of the amirs were also called *al-buyūt al-karīma* (*Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 60, ll. 18–20).

⁴ cf. Ibn Iyā^ās, ii, p. 218.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 472, l. 19. Only additional data will make it possible to reach more definite conclusions on this point.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 478, ll. 6–11.

⁷ See, for instance, *Manhal*, ii, fol. 61a, ll. 17–21. *An-Nahj as-Sadīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xiv, p. 535, ll. 2–4. cf. also section on the *sayfiya* in this chapter.

⁸ Zetterstéen, p. 132, ll. 3–6.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 219, ll. 19–20.

² *Khīṭaṭ*, i, pp. 87, l. 37–88, l. 3.

³ *Manhal*, iii, fol. 132b, ll. 4–17. For additional information on this amir and his peculiar ways see *Daw'*, iii, pp. 277, l. 13–278, l. 15.

⁴ For *rank*, cf. Quatremère, vol. ii, part i, p. 14; p. 15. *Heraldry*, p. 5; p. 26, p. 34, n. 4. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. v, p. xxvi.

¹ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 60, l. 11–63, l. 3; p. 61, ll. 12–15; pp. 61, l. 20–62, l. 5. *Daw' az Ṣubḥ* pp. 264–5. cf. *La Syrie*, p. ciii.

² Ibn Iyā^ās, v, pp. 42–3.

³ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 100, ll. 4–5. *Khīṭaṭ*, ii, p. 390, ll. 1–2.

⁴ *Sulūk*, i, p. 687.

⁵ *Durar*, i, p. 388, l. 1.

⁶ *Durar*, iii, p. 258, ll. 2–3.

⁷ *Manhal*, iii, fol. 178b, l. 17. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 135, ll. 6–7.

⁸ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 301, ll. 11–13.

⁹ *Zubda*, p. 132, l. 20.

¹⁰ Abū al-Fidā^ā', iv, p. 57, ll. 28–9.

¹¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 208, l. 19. *Manhal*, i, fol. 193b, ll. 8–9.

¹² *Zubda*, p. 148, ll. 12–14. *Durar*, iv, p. 438, ll. 12–13. Ibn Iyā^ās, i, p. 219. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 200.

¹³ *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 460–1.

¹⁴ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 63, l. 16.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 442–3. *Manhal*, viii, fol. 390b, ll. 6–9. For the expenses of other amirs, see *Khiṭāṭ*, ii, p. 169, ll. 27–30. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 412, ll. 8–9.

² *Manhal*, viii, fol. 367b, ll. 13–15.

³ Ibn Iyās, i, p. 208.

⁴ Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 59.

⁵ Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 148.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 80–1.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 141.

⁸ *Manhal*, ii, fol. 33a, ll. 16–17.

⁹ *Manhal*, ii, fol. 33b, ll. 4–5. In another passage, the same historian reports that the mamluks owned by Taghrībirdī exceeded 300 (*Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 141, ll. 5–6), and that when he served as governor of Damascus, their number reached 970 (*Manhal*, ii, fol. 125b).

¹⁰ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 659, ll. 17–18. This statement of Ibn Taghrībirdī should not, of course, be taken at its face value, but it contains undoubtedly a substantial grain of truth.

¹¹ The historians of the Circassian period call the sultans of the first Mamluk period *mulūḳ as-salaf* or *al-mulūḳ as-sāliḳa*. To them they attribute all noble virtues, and set them in contrast to the sultans of their own day.

¹² *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 566, l. 20–567, l. 1. The term *mulūḳ* referred not only to sultans, but also to important amirs, cf. for instance, *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 611, ll. 10–13.

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¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 142, ll. 17–18. Amir Baraka had an *ustāḍār* who was an Amir of a Thousand, ‘an unheard-of thing’ (*Nujūm* (P), v, p. 311, ll. 5–8).

² Ibn Iyās, v, p. 118, ll. 1–3.

³ *Ḍaw'*, iii, p. 58, l. 25.

⁴ *Ḍaw'*, ii, p. 328, ll. 17–18.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 478.

⁶ *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 272, ll. 5–6, ll. 7–8. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 36, l. 7. *Manḥal*, ii, fol. 12b, ll. 12–13; fol. 62b, ll. 20–1. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 389, ll. 10–12; p. 391, ll. 9–17; p. 577, l. 22.

⁷ See now Gibb, op. cit.

⁸ The *ṭulb* was the military unit which the sultan or amir would lead during the military expedition, or during processions and parades. Al-Maqrīzī (*Khīṭat*, i, p. 86) alone among Mamluk sources defines this term, but his definition is unsuited to the actual usage of the term during the Mamluk period. cf. Quatremfère, vol. i, part i, pp. 34–5; part ii, pp. 271–2. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, p. xxxix. Gibb, op. cit., pp. 308–9.

¹ *Khīṭat*, i, p. 86, ll. 26–34. Gibb, op. cit., p. 309, n. 31. The whole question of the *ḥawāḍith* in Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn's army is comprehensively dealt with by Gibb.

² *Khīṭat*, i, p. 86, ll. 34–9; p. 87, l. 1. The same list appears in *Sulūk*, i, p. 75, ll. 3–7, but is much more corrupt than that given in *Khīṭat*. Both should be read together in order to obtain a correct picture. On the *kinānīya* (as well as *kinānīya*?) mentioned together with the *ḥawāḍith* in the above list, see also *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 17. *Sulūk*, i, p. 150, l. 12. For the etymology of the term *ḥawāḍith*, see Blochet's view (*Patrologia Orientalis*, xii, p. 494, n. 4).

³ *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 12, l. 4. *Sulūk*, i, p. 76, ll. 1–3. *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 120, ll. 13–15. Ibn al-Ḥaṭīb, p. 225, ll. 10–14. *Al-Mashriq*, 1935, p. 212, ll. 14–18. *Qawānīn ad-Dawāwīn*, p. 356, l. 2.

⁴ *Al-Mashriq*, 1935, p. 212, ll. 14–18. Ibn al-Ḥaṭīb, p. 225, ll. 10–14.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 424, ll. 22–5.

⁶ *Sulūk*, i, p. 509, ll. 2–5.

⁷ Ibn al-Furāṭ, viii, p. 2, l. 3.

⁸ *Sulūk*, i, p. 722, l. 8.

⁹ *Ta'rīf*, p. 89, ll. 3–4.

¹ To put it in other words: if the *ḥawāḍith* are mamluks this means that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn had by far a greater number of mamluks than Najm ad-Dīn al-Ayyūb, the founder of the Bahriya regiment, from which the Mamluk kingdom sprang up (see below, p. 474). The writer did not succeed in

establishing the connexion between the *ṭawāshīya* and the *ḥalqa* under *Ṣalāḥ* ad-Dīn.

² *Feudalism*, p. 3, n. 4. The whole question concerning the term 'amirs' horsemen' is discussed in pp. 471–5.

³ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-Fikra*, fol. 157a, 1. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 158a, ll. 6–7.

⁵ Muḥyi ad-Dīn ibn 'Abd Aṣ-Ṣāḥir, *Sīrat aṣ-Ṣāḥir* Baybars, B.M. MS., Add. 23, 331, fol. 41a, ll. 3–5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 41b, ll. 15–17. See another interesting example: *ibid.*, fol. 42a, ll. 7–9.

⁷ *Ta'rīkh, Bayrūn*, pp. 96–98. cf. also p. 79, ll. 6–10; p. 89, 1. 11, 1. 14; pp. 92–4.

⁸ cf. references cited in the preceding note, as well as some of those given by Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 3; *R.E.I.*, 1935, p. 247, n. 4.

¹ *Ṣubḥ*, vii, p. 159, ll. 15–16. The writer is not certain as to the meaning of *ṭawāshī* in Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 287, 1. 26, and *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 487, ll. 23–5.

² Ibn Iyās, v, p. 205, ll. 5–6.

³ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 536, 1. 7; vi, p. 7, 1. 14. *Daw'*, iii, p. ll, 1. 4.

⁴ Zetterstéen, n. 168, 1. 3. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 91, 1. 6; p. 523, 1. 22; vi, p. 803, 1. 5. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 70b, 1. 25. *Manḥal*, iv, fol. 110b, 1. 3. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 25, 1. 4; p. 48, 1. 22; p. 92, 1. 28; (KM) iii, p. 296, 1. 1; p. 314, n. 2; p. 374, 1. 23; iv, p. 105, 1. 6; p. 450, 1. 19.

⁵ Thus: 'wq-lam *yahṣul* li-Lājīn *hādhā* *imrat* 'ashara, wa-māta wa-huwa *jundī*' (*Manḥal*, v, fol. 56a, ll. 20–1); cf. also: Zetterstéen, p. 199, 1.

12. *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 63, 1. 11. *Fawā'id al-Wafayāt*, i, p. 99. *Manḥal*, i, fol. 195b, 1. 1; fol. 196b, ll. 6–7; iii, fol. 18a, ll. 19–20. That *jundīya* referred to the rank of private may be inferred from the following examples: *wa-intaqala Barqūq min al-jundīya ilā imrat ṭablkhāna daf'atan waḥidatan* (*Manḥal*, ii, fol. 61a, ll. 21–2) and *wa-tālat ayyāmuhu fī al-jundīya ilā an ta'ammarq 'ashara'* (*Manḥal*, v, fol. 16a, ll. 3–4); cf. also Zetterstéen, p. 101. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 297. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 100, ll. 17–18; p. 319, ll. 8–9; p. 325, 1. 2; p. 419, ll. 4–5. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 304, 1. 19; pp. 332–3; p. 450, ll. 12–16; p. 575, ll. 20–2; vi, p. 536, 1. 20; p. 675, 1. 15; vii, p. 301, 1. 5. *Manḥal*, ii, fol. 176b, ll. 11–12; viii, fol. 420b, ll. 14–15. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 73b, ll. 3–4; fol. 78b, 1. 13. *Durar*, i, p. 216, ll. 1–2; p. 514, 1. 11. *Daw'*, iii, p. 60, 1. 26; vi, p. 215, 1. 22. We may point out here that *jundī* and *jundīya*, meaning 'private soldier' and 'rank of private' respectively, ought not to be

confused with *ajna* **ād**, meaning, as stated above, ‘soldiers of the *ḥalqa*’. For the term *jund* **ī**, cf. *C.I.A.*, ‘L’Égypte,’ p. 544. *La Syrie*, pp. xxxiv–v. *Heraldry*, p. 5. Glossary to *Ḥawādīth*, p. xxv.

⁶ *Ta’rīf*, pp. 73–4. *Ṣubb*, iv, pp. 14 ff. *Daw’ as-Ṣubb*, pp. 244–5. *Khiṭaṭ*, i, pp. 95 ff.; ii, pp. 215 ff. *Ḥusn al-Muhādara*, ii, pp. 110–113. *Zubda*, pp. 111–116. *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 386–7.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 204, l. 2. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 393, l. 15. For *muqaddam alf*, *taqdimat alf*, cf.: Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 26; p. 112. *C.I.A.*, ‘L’Égypte,’ p. 410; p. 545. *La Syrie*, p. 38. *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 214. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. v, p. 1.

⁸ Ibn ash-Shihna, p. 259, l. 1.

⁹ Zetterstéen, p. 163, l. 5. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 338, ll. 20–1. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 362, l. 8. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 42, l. 3; iv, p. 230, ll. 5–6; p. 398, ll. 7–8.

¹⁰ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 113, l. 9; p. 137, l. 21; p. 165, l. 16; p. 195, l. 5; v, p. 53, l. 2; p. 76, l. 4; p. 83, l. 2. *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 55, ll. 7–8.

¹ Zetterstéen, p. 157, l. 21; p. 162, l. 13. *Sulūk*, i, p. 681, ll. 12–15. *Ḥawādīth*, p. 62, ll. 3–5. *Tibr*, p. 357, l. 15. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 163, l. 16; v, p. 37, l. 23. *Daw’*, ii, p. 275, l. 7; p. 276, ll. 5–6; (KM) iii, p. 382, l. 25; vi, p. 212, l. 10.

² *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 10, l. 7. *Daw’ as-Ṣubb*, p. 244, l. 21; p. 261, ll. 5–6. *Ḥusn al-Muhādara*, ii, p. 110, l. 10, l. 25. *Khiṭaṭ*, p. 202, l. 2.

³ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 326, ll. 8–9; p. 470, l. 14. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 47; p. 155, l. 23; p. 278, ll. 1–2; p. 428, l. 21; p. 429, l. 20; p. 430, l. 10; pp. 444, l. 2–445, l. 19; p. 520, ll. 12–15; p. 634, l. 13; iv, p. 7, l. 4; p. 228, l. 20; p. 234, ll. 20–1; p. 249, l. 16; p. 250, l. 8; p. 278, l. 8; p. 825, l. 21; vii, p. 166, l. 14; p. 391, ll. 12–13; p. 410, l. 12; p. 722, l. 16.

⁴ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 405, l. 12. *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 61, l. 6, l. 9.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 264, l. 15; p. 426, l. 5.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 28; vi, p. 825, l. 4, l. 13. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 89, l. 6; iv, p. 63, l. 3.

⁷ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 237. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 5, l. 22; p. 33, l. 21. *Ḥawādīth*, p. 452, ll. 16–22. *Tibr*, p. 122, l. 11. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 60, ll. 21–2; p. 114, l. 27. *Daw’*, ii, p. 312, l. 14; iii, p. 59, l. 23; p. 196, l. 7; p. 282, l. 4; x, p. 279, l. 12, ll. 28–9.

⁸ *Daw’*, vi, p. 218, l. 14.

⁹ *Daw'*, ii, p. 267, l. 17; p. 273, l. 6; p. 311, l. 11; p. 318, ll. 6–7; iii, p. 36; p. 41, l. 25; p. 60, l. 13; p. 66, ll. 27–8; p. 277, l. 27; vi, p. 164, l. 7; p. 194, l. 24; p. 201; p. 214, l. 19; p. 215, l. 5; p. 224, ll. 3–4; x, p. 271, l. 6; p. 275, l. 3, ll. 6–8; p. 280, l. 15; p. 288, l. 7; p. 290, l. 28; p. 345, l. 21; xi, p. 150, ll. 7–8.

¹⁰ *Sulūm*, ii, p. 320, ll. 2–3. *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 280, l. 7. *Daw'*, ii, p. 312, l. 13; p. 315, l. 2; p. 316, l. 28; iii, p. 8, l. 3; p. 10; p. 28; p. 29, p. 67, l. 6; p. 161, l. 8; p. 295, l. 15; iv, p. 10, l. 16; vi, p. 195, l. 24; p. 233, l. 4.

¹¹ This description is based on the material cited in note 6, p. 467, above; cf. also *Daw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 244, ll. 23–4.

¹ *Sulūm*, ii, p. 221, l. 15; cf. also p. 280, ll. 6–7. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 65, ll. 9–10.

² *Daw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 244, ll. 23–4.

³ *Nujūm*(P), v, p. 457, ll. 15–18.

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 237, ll. 1–10.

⁵ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 281, ll. 11–12.

⁶ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 344, l. 3.

⁷ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 452, ll. 21–2.

⁸ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 631, ll. 16–17.

⁹ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 30, l. 14; p. 277, l. 8.

¹⁰ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 358, ll. 6–7.

¹¹ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 434, l. 7.

¹² Ibn Iyāṣ, v, p. 2, ll. 13–14.

¹³ *Manḥal*, iii, fol. 155a, l. 6. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 276, l. 1. Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 3, l. 3; p. 87, ll. 4–6; p. 221, l. 27; (KM) iii, p. 396, l. 18; p. 440, l. 17. *Durar*, i, p. 418, l. 5; p. 424, l. 12; iii, p. 255, l. 8. *Daw'*, ii, p. 275, l. 12.

¹⁴ *Durar*, i, p. 418, l. 5. Ibn ash-Shibna, p. 260, l. 17. *Daw'*, iii, p. 26; p. 281, l. 9; vi, p. 196, l. 2.

¹⁵ Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 16, l. 5.

¹⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 515, ll. 5–6. *Daw'*, x, p. 289, l. 16. For *ṭabliḥkhāna* and *amir ṭabliḥkhāna*, cf. Quatremère, vol. i, part i, p. 129; p. 173. *C.I.A.*, 'L'Égypte,' p.

543. *La Syrie*, p. xxxiv; pp. xxxvii–viii; p. liv. *Feudalism*, p. 3; pp. 7–9; p. 13; p. 14; p. 21; p. 31; p. 54. G. Wiet, *Syria*, 1926, p. 160; p. 171; p. 175.

Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, p. liv. Glossary to *Ḥawāḍith*, p. xxx.

¹⁷ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 128, ll. 1–3; p. 400, ll. 12–14. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 85a, l. 15. *Durar*, i, p. 201, ll. 16–17. *Ḍaw'*, iv, p. 9, l. 29; vi, p. 211, l. 26.

¹⁸ See references listed in n., p., above.

¹⁹ Besides basic data cited in n., p., above, cf. also *amīr khamṣīn* (Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 103, l. 1; p. 106, l. 24. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 378, ll. 19–20) and *amīr thamānīn* (*Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 9, ll. 10–11, ll. 19–20; vii, p. 570, notes); those belonged, by definition, to the Amirs of *Ṭablkhāna*.

¹ *Zubda*, p. 113.

² *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 8, l. 17–9, l. 4. On *af-ṭablkhāna as-sultāniya*, see *Sulūk*, ii, p. 521, n. 2. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 209, l. 2; p. 221, l. 23. *Ḍaw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 244. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 338, ll. 8–10. See also *Sulūk*, ii, p. 326, l. 11. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 9, ll. 10–11. *Zubda*, p. 113, l. 8. On the *kūṣāt*, see *Patrologia Orientalis*, xx, p. 153, l. 4. Ibn Kathīr, xiii, p. 347, ll. 7–9. *Sulūk*, i, p. 136, l. 2. *Sibt*, p. 402, l. 5.

³ Zetterstéen, p. 177, l. 13; p. 208, l. 24. *Sulūk*, ii, p. 376, l. 18. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 597, ll. 16–17. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 40, l. 18; p. 44, l. 6; p. 56, l. 1; p. 58, l. 26; p. 100, l. 26; p. 108, l. 6; p. 191, l. 21. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 44, l. 16. *Ḍaw'*, iii, p. 296, l. 6; vi, p. 198, l. 27; x, p. 205, l. 13; p. 289, l. 17. For amir of Ten, cf. *C.I.A.*, 'L'Égypte,' p. 543. *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 214.

Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, xliii.

⁴ Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 71b, l. 14; fol. 75b, l. 15.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 617, ll. 12–13. *Ḍaw'*, vi, p. 221, l. 10.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 572, l. 7; vi, p. 16, l. 17; p. 25, l. 15; vii, p. 426, l. 14. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 358, ll. 17–19. *Manhal*, i, fol. 165a, l. 18. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 61, l. 21; p. 67, l. 21; p. 135, l. 7; p. 164, l. 14. *Tibr*, p. 147, l. 8. *Ṣubḥ*, viii, p. 221, l. 1. *Ḍaw'*, vi, p. 224, l. 17.

⁷ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 16 ff. *Ḍaw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 245, ll. 9–10. cf. *C.I.A.*, 'L'Égypte,' p. 543.

⁸ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 182; vii, p. 453, l. 8; p. 597, l. 15. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 299, ll. 5–10; p. 554, l. 10. *Manhal*, i, fol. 166, l. 2; fol. 209, l. 21; ii, fol. 113b; iii, fol. 109b, l. 20.

¹ *Ta'rīkh Bayrūt*, p. 142, l. 14; p. 184, l. 3.

² *Ta'rīkh Bayrūt*, p. 149, l. 15.

³ *Zubda*, p. 113, ll. 4–18.

⁴ Ibn Iy^ās (KM), iii, p. 218, ll. 1–13.

⁵ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, pp. 30–4.

⁶ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 105, ll. 5–7.

⁷ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 5, ll. 8–9. Following are references on the places of residence of the amirs and of the army generally: Abū al-Fid^ā’, iv, p. 67, ll. 24–5. *Sulūk*, i, pp. 341, 1. 18–342, 1. 1; p. 668, n. 1. *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 72, n. 2; p. 191, ll. 3–4; ix, p. 121, ll. 11–12. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 8, 1.12; pp. 523–4; vii, p. 416, 1. 18. *Manhal*, i, fol. 193a, 1. 3; iii, fol. 132b, ll. 1–4; iv, fol. 171a, ll. 3–4; viii, fol. 432b, ll. 6–7. Ibn al-Fur^āt, ix, p. 343, 11. 5–8. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 91b, ll. 15–17. Ibn Iy^ās (KM), iii, p. 404, ll. 1–2. *Khīṭat*, i, p. 125, ll. 19–21; p. 342, ll. 24–9; ii, p. 23, ll. 20–8; pp. 68 ff.; p. 73, 1. 33; p. 116, ll. 34–8; p. 131, ll. 3–6; pp. 133, 1. 28–134, 1. 24; p. 135, ll. 8–13; p. 205, ll. 5–8. *Zubda*, pp. 28, 1. 22–29, 1. 1.

⁸ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 99a, ll. 7–10; 99b, 1. 13–100a, 1. 4; 114a, ll. 6–7; 122a, 1. 13; 183a, ll. 7–8; 245a, ll. 8–9, ll. 15–16; 259b, ll. 7–8.

¹ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 362, ll. 13–14; vii, p. 88, ll. 7–8; p. 89, 1. 11; p. 99, ll. 12–13; p. 320, ll. 5–6; p. 350, 1. 6; viii, p. 13, ll. 12–14; ix, p. 11, ll. 17–18; p. 228, 1. 15; p. 282, 1. 1; p. 287, 1. 2. Ibn al-Fur^āt, viii, p. 37, 1. 7. *Sulūk*, i, p. 239, 1. 1; p. 415; ll. 7–8; ii, p. 185, 1. 4. Zetterstéen, p. 128, 1. 22; p. 173, ll. 3–4. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 312, ll. 3–5. *Sulūk*, i, p. 580, ll. 11–12; p. 587, 1. 1; p. 681, 1. 6; p. 687, 1. 18; p. 702, 1. 8; p. 770, 1. 5; p. 794, ll. 8–9; ii, p. 47, 1. 8; p. 97, 1. 12. We could not ascertain which of these expressions is the earliest.

² Ibn Kathīr, xiii, p. 309, 1. 18. Zetterstéen, p. 224, ll. 19–20. Abū al-Fid^ā’, iv, p. 29, ll. 24–5. *Sulūk*, i, p. 735, ll. 5–6. In *Sulūk* (ed. Ziada) we encounter, as early as the days ^{ṣalāḥ} of ad-Dīn, a sentence such as the following: ‘umar^ā’ mi’a ^{aḥada} ‘ashara’, which, if taken at face value, might lead us to conclude that the office of *amīr mi’a* was already in existence at that early period. Such a conclusion would, however, be erroneous, for the text is here corrupt, and ought to read: ‘umar^ā’—mi’a ^{wa-aḥada} ‘ashara’. This has already been pointed out in this chapter, in connexion with the ^{ṭawāḥiya}. As early as the year 680, the term *amīr mi’a* muqaddam alif (Ibn al-Fur^āt, vii, p. 238, 1. 14) is encountered. We find, in the early Mamluk period, the following expressions which do not seem to recur during the later period: *amīr bi-ṭabikhāna* (Zetterstéen, p. 46, 1. 17; p. 101, 1. 14; p. 166, 1. 25); *rakiba li-imrat ṭabikhāna* (Zetterstéen, p. 201, 1. 5, 1. 7; p. 202, 1. 21; p. 206, 1. 1, 1. 10; p. 214, 1. 24). In the year 661 we find the following: ‘*wa-a’ṭā al-‘Azīza ibn al-Malik al-Mughīth imrat mi’at fāris wa-khala’a’alayhi*’ ^{wa-a’ṭāhu ṭabikhāna}’ (*Sulūk*, i, p. 493, ll. 2–3). Must we conclude from the above quotation that at that period the identity of Amir of Forty with Amir of *ṭabikhāna* was not yet firmly fixed? Ibn Taghrībirdī tends, indeed, to assume that the title of Amir of *ṭabikhāna* was granted at the beginning of the

Mamluk period to an Amir of a Thousand as well, since the *ṣabḥāna* played at his gate as well as at the gate of Amirs of Forty (*Mankal*, iii, fols. 181b, 1. 23–182a, 1. 8). See, in this connexion, the interesting passage in Ibn ‘Abd *az-Zāhir*, fol. 57a, ll. 3–8. cf. also *Manhal*, ii, fol. 17a, ll. 1–6; v, fol. 12a, ll. 1–4. *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 287, ll. 4–10, and references in n. 8, p. 471.

¹ See references listed in n. 6, p. 467, above. When later sources copy from earlier ones they use, of course, the word *ḡāris* (horseman).

² See n. 4, p. 451, above, and *Nujūm*, vi, pp. 386–7. *Zubda*, pp. 115–16. *Ḥusn*, ii, p. 111–13.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 386, ll. 8–16.

¹ The rise, decline, and disappearance of this regiment which played such a decisive role in wiping out the Ayyubid kingdom and in establishing the Mamluk kingdom in its stead is discussed by the present writer in ‘Le Régiment *Bahriya* dans l’Armée Mamelouk’ (*R.E.I.*, 1952, pp. 133–141). We shall here only allude to a most interesting passage in Ibn Khaldūn’s *Kitāb al-‘Ibar* (vol. v, pp. 371, 1. 27–372, 1. 8) which stresses that though mamluks were bought by the Ayyubids in considerable quantities from the days of *Ṣalāḥ* ad-Dīn onwards, it was *as-Ṣāliḥ* Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb who by far surpassed all his predecessors in this respect. This passage also mentions a very important factor which greatly facilitated the buying of mamluks on a grand scale by Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb, viz. the attack of the Tatars on the steppes lying to their north-west (*al-jānib al-gharbī min nāḥiyat ash-shimāl*) which uprooted the Kipchakis, Russians, Alans, and others, many of whom were sold as slaves. This statement of Ibn Khaldūn is confirmed by Ibn Duqmāq, who says in his description of the rise of the Mamluk kingdom (*ibtidā’ ad-dawla ash-sharīfa at-turkīya*) that God has expelled them (the mamluks) from their vast and spacious countries of origin, and led them to Egypt, by a wisdom which is beyond the comprehension of man. God has decreed the appearance of the Tatars and their conquest of the eastern and northern countries (*al-bilād al-mashriqiya wash-shimaliya*), and their attacks on the Kipchakis. The Tatars killed the Kipchakis and captured and sold their offspring. These were carried by the merchants to far-off places (*ilāl-āfaq*), and when *as-Ṣāliḥ* Najm ad-Dīn Ayyūb became king he bought about a thousand mamluks (*al-jawhar ath-thamīn fī tarīkh al-khulafā’ was-salāfin*, Oxford MS., Pocock, 352, fol. 35b, ll. 14–21). Such ideal conditions for buying mamluks existed only at the end of the Ayyubid reign, and this was one of Najm ad-Dīn’s greatest advantages over his predecessors. It is worth while to note here, in passing, that the very inception of the Mamluk kingdom is thus closely connected with the Mongols and their invasions.

¹ *Durar*, i, p. 482, ll. 8–9.

² In Qalāūn’s time cases of accelerated promotion were still very infrequent, for this sultan was usually very slow and careful in promoting his amirs (Baybars *al-Maṣṣūrī*, fols. 99b, 1. 13–100a, 1. 4).

³ *Mankal*, i, fol. 197b, ll. 13–16. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 235, ll. 17–20,

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 305–6.

⁵ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 295, ll. 9–10; p. 306, ll. 11–12; p. 333, ll. 17–20; p. 345, ll. 5–6; p. 355, ll. 7–14; vi, p. 432, ll. 21–2; p. 785, ll. 21–2; vii, p. 825, ll. 14–16. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 485, ll. 14–16. *Manhal*, iv, fol. 172b, l. 15.

Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 174, ll. 5–6. These constitute but a few examples. cf. also the description of the office of *awābak al-ʿasākir* in Part III of this article.

¹ See references listed in notes 2 and 6, below.

² See the author's 'The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom', *J.A.O.S.*, 1949, pp. 135–147. On the personality of al-Muʿayyad Shaykh, see *ibid.*, p. 142.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 428, ll. 3–6. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 8, ll. 25–6.

⁴ *Manhal*, v, fol. 18a, ll. 12–17.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 43, ll. 1–2.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 428, ll. 10–12.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 430, ll. 14–18.

⁸ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 430, ll. 14–15; vii, p. 377, l. 15; p. 592, ll. 10–11; p. 687, l. 14; p. 688, l. 1. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 371, ll. 3–7; p. 379, l. 4; p. 658, ll. 4–7; p. 660, ll. 8–9; p. 667, ll. 17–18; p. 716, ll. 10–14; p. 717, ll. 18–21; p. 718, ll. 4–7. *Manhal*, i, fol. 167a, ll. 16–20; fol. 205a, ll. 17–19; ii, fols. 113b, l. 22–114a, l. 2; iii, fol. 134, ll. 12–19; viii, fol. 416b, ll. 3–8;

fol. 429a, ll. 19–21. *Tibr*. n. 129, l. 7; p. 189, ll. 15–16. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 70, ll. 5–6; p. 84, ll. 8–9. *Ḍawʿ*, ii, p. 324, ll. 11–12; iii, p. 33; p. 56, l. 1; p. 60, ll. 18–19; ll. 25–6; p. 76, ll. 26–8; p. 175, ll. 21–2; p. 210, ll. 5–7; p. 276, ll. 23–4; vi, p. 165, ll. 25–7; pp. 200, l. 28–201, l. 1; x, p. 268, ll. 25–7. The fact that al-Muʿayyad Shaykh favoured the *jins at-turk*, the race despoiled of its ascendancy by the Circassians, also indicates that he was exceptional among Circassian sultans. He also favoured the *sayfīya* (see above). Both the *turk* and the *sayfīya* were underprivileged elements, but for entirely different reasons; the first because of racial considerations, and the second because of their low standing in the Mamluk hierarchy, as already pointed out. In both, al-Muʿayyad saw pliable material which could be fitted into any mould that might suit his purposes. (*Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 430, ll. 14–18. *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 378, l. 19–379, l. 13. *Manhal*, iii, fol. 168a, ll. 4–5.)

STUDIES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MAMLUK ARMY—III

By DAVID AYALON

Holders of Offices Connected with the Army

OFFICE-HOLDERS in the Mamluk kingdom were, as is well known, divided into three categories: those who belonged to the Mamluk caste and were called ‘men of the sword’ (*arbāb as-suyūf*), those who were civilians and were known as ‘holders of administrative offices’ or as ‘men of the pen’ (*arbāb al-wazāʾif ad-dīwāniyya*, or *arbāb* or *ḥamalat al-aqlām*), and those who belonged to the clerical class and were called ‘holders of religious offices’ or ‘men of the turban’ (*arbāb al-wazāʾif ad-dīniyya*, or *al-mutaʾammimūn*). We list below some of those offices which had a direct connexion with the army; some have been discussed elsewhere in our work on the Mamluk army, and will therefore be accorded but the briefest attention. We shall in addition outline the evolution of the offices of the Mamluk kingdom as well as the transformations which they underwent in the various periods.¹

THE MEN OF THE SWORD (*ARBĀB-AS-SŪF*)

The Nā'ib as-Saltāna (vice-sultan or viceroy in Egypt)

Until the death of Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn, the nā'ib as-saltāna was the highest ranking amir in the Mamluk kingdom, taking precedence even over the atābak. According to one source, it was he who signed, in the name of the sultan, the applications for fiefs (*qisās*), and he was authorized to give out small fiefs (*iqṭā'āt khafīfa*) without consulting the sultan.² Following another source, he acted as sultan on a restricted scale, appointing the amirs and the office holders, excepting the highest ones, such as that of *wazīr*, of *qāḍī*, and of privy secretary (*kātib as-sirr*). He could, however, propose candidates for these posts, and his suggestions were but rarely overruled. During reviews he would ride at the head of the army. The *ḍiwān al-jaysh* was also under his supervision; the *ṣāhib ḍiwān al-jaysh* (q.v., p. 66) was in close contact with him, while the *nāẓir al-jaysh* (q.v., p. 66) kept close contact with the sultan.³ He was called *an-nā'ib al-kāfil*, *an-nā'ib bi-l-ḥaḍra*, *kāfil al-mamālīk al-islāmīya* (or *ash-sharīfa*), or *as-sultān ath-thānī*, whereas the governor of Damascus was called *kāfil as-saltāna*, and the governors of important provinces *nā'ib as-saltāna ash-sharīfa*, and those of secondary provinces *an-nā'ib bi-fulāna*.¹ At the close of the life of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the office of *nā'ib as-saltāna* was abrogated,² to be renewed later, but without regaining its former pre-eminence. It was only in the days of al-Askraf Sha'bān that al-Yūsufī, who filled that post, was granted extraordinary powers: he could, on his own initiative, grant fiefs with a yearly income not exceeding 600 dinars, dismiss whomever he pleased and appoint Amirs of Ten and Amirs of Forty throughout *al-bilād ash-shāmīya*.³ The last to serve in this capacity was, according to one account, Aqbughā at-Timrāzī, in 842.⁴ According to another version, it was Tunbughā al-'Uthmānī.⁵ The *nā'ib as-saltāna* served as acting sultan when a military expedition or other matters required the sultan's departure from the capital. When the office was abrogated, the duties of acting sultan were carried out by the highest-ranking amir remaining in the capital, who was called *nā'ib al-ghayba*.

The Atābak al-‘Asākīr (Commander-in-Chief)

After the abrogation of the office of *nā‘ib as-saltāna*, the *atābak* was the first of the Mamluk amirs. It was common, especially in the Circassian period, for him to succeed the sultan on the throne. He was commander-in-chief of the army,⁶ but his functions were much broader, as indicated by the frequently appended title of *mudabbir al-mamālīk* or *mudabbir al-mamālīk al-islāmīya*.⁷ He was ordinarily known as *atābak al-‘asākīr*, but he was sometimes also called *atābak al-jaysh*, or *al-juyūsh*.⁸ It is not clear whether the title *amīr al-juyūsh*⁹ refers to him as well. His title was also abbreviated to *al-atābakī*.¹⁰ According to Qalqashandī, the original spelling of that title was *aṭābak*, and it was only later changed to its accepted form.¹ According to az-Zāhirī, the *atābak* was called *baklar bakī*, i.e. *amīr al-umarā’* ‘amir of amirs’,² a title used also among the Turcoman dynasties of Anatolia,³ as well as among the Mongols, with respect to some of their high ranking amirs.⁴ The designation *amīr al-umarā’* is sometimes encountered in Mamluk sources,⁵ but it is very doubtful whether it refers to the *atābak al-‘asākīr*. No source other than az-Zāhirī is known to us to have claimed that the *atābak* was called *baklar bakī*. One of the most common titles of the *atābak al-‘asākīr* was *al-amīr al-kabīr*, and the first to receive this title was Shaykhūn al-‘Umarī⁶ (the term *amīr kabīr* is discussed fully in [Appendix B](#) below). The office of *atābak* was called *atābakīya*, or *atābakīyat al-‘asākīr*.⁷ For a short period it was held conjointly by two individuals.⁸ The residence of the *atābak* was generally at *al-iṣṭabl as-sulṭānī* or the *bāb as-silsila*.⁹

In the interregnum between the Bahārī and Circassian periods, the post of *atābak* was seized a number of times by individuals who rose from obscurity to greatness at one stroke, for prior to their becoming commanders-in-chief they were only privates or low amirs. After the murder of Sultan Sha‘bān, the post was held by a succession of such men: Tashtimūr al-Laffāf, Qurtāy at-Tāzī, Ayanbak ad-Dubrī, Quṭluqtīmūr, Barqūq, and Baraka; their example encouraged many others to emulate them.¹⁰

The Am̄r Majlis (Lord of the Audience)

The *am̄r majlis* had charge of the physicians, oculists, and the like. This office was filled by one person only.¹¹ The sources do not elucidate the connexion between the rank of *am̄r majlis* and this particular task, which seems to be of no special importance. Although the rank of *am̄r majlis* was, in the first Mamluk period, superior to that of *am̄r silāḥ* (see below), neither of them was of great significance at that time. In the Circassian period, the *am̄r majlis*, though inferior to the *am̄r silāḥ*, was third in importance among the highest amirs of the kingdom. (For details on the introduction of this office, see p. 69.)

*The Amīr **Silāḥ** (Grand Master of the Armour)*

It was the duty of the *amīr **silāḥ*** to bear the sultan's arms during public appearances. He also had charge of the Royal Mamluks' *silāḥdārīya*, and was supervisor of the arsenal. The office was held by an Amir of a Thousand.¹

The Ḥājib al-Ḥujjāb (Grand Chamberlain)

The main function of the ḥājib al-ḥujjāb was the administration of justice among the mamluks of the amirs according to the laws of the Yāsa.² His authority was independent, but during the time that the office of *nā'ib as-saltāna* was in existence, he was sometimes obliged to consult with the holder of that office. It was also his duty to present guests and envoys to the sultan, and he was in charge of organizing army parades. It was customary to appoint five ḥujjāb, two of whom (the ḥājib al-ḥujjāb and the ḥājib thānī) were Amirs of a Thousand³; the rank of the ḥājib thānī eventually declined to that of Amir of Ten.⁴ When the office was first created, there were only three ḥujjāb: ḥājib al-ḥujjāb, ḥājib, and ḥājib thānī. The first to increase their number to five was Sultan Barquq; even the lowest of these were at first Amirs of Ten, 'and not the criminal and ignorant riffraff who fill this office to-day'.⁵ The office of ḥājib was known as ḥujjūbiya,⁶ and that of the chief ḥājib, as ḥujjūbiyat al-ḥujjāb.⁷

The Ra's Nawbat an-Nuwab (Chief of the Corps of Mamluks)

According to al-Qalqashandī's definition, this amir had charge of the Royal Mamluks, supervised their conduct, and executed the sultan's or the amirs' orders applying to them. He was also responsible for the parades held by the army before it set out on an expedition. The plural of this title is *ru'ūs an-nuwab*; the ignorant call the holder of this office *ra's nawbat an-nuwab*, whereas the correct designation is *ra's ru'ūs an-nuwab*.⁸ It should be noted, however, that the title indicated as the correct one by al-Qalqashandī is not found anywhere in the sources; only *ra's nawbat an-nuwab* or *an-nuwawāb* is used.⁹ The *ra's nawbat an-nuwab* came into existence only after the abrogation of the office of *ra's nawbat al-umarā'* (see p. 70), and the holder of this office had previously been known as *ra's nawba thānī*, and had the rank of Amir of a Thousand.¹ The office itself is sometimes called *ar-ra's nawbīya al-kubrā*.² The number of the *ru'ūs an-nuwab* was four, one of whom was an Amir of a Thousand, and the rest Amirs of *Ṭablkhāna*.³

*The Wazīr*⁴

The wazīrate was one of the most important offices of the kingdom during the early Mamluk period. Sanjar ash-Shuja'ī (died 693/1294) was the first Mamluk amir to be appointed to that office. After him there came a series of Mamluk *wazīrs* who had bands playing at their gates, in accordance with the practice of the *wazīrs* in Caliphal times.⁵ Some of these were so influential that they could distribute small fiefs in Egypt without consulting the sultan and appoint Amirs of Ten and Amirs of Forty in Syria.⁶ According to one source the wazīrate functioned well only as long as it was headed by a mamluk: *inna al-wizāra in lam-yataqalladhā mamlūk fasada al-ḥāl*⁷; and, indeed, it was but rarely that a mamluk would be appointed to this office. Under Barqūq the wazīrate declined rapidly, after he had created the *diwān al-mufrad*⁸ and transferred to it 5,000 Royal Mamluks. He then divided the wazīrate and its functions into four separate offices: the wazīrate, the *ustāḍārīya*, the *nazar al-khāṣṣ*,⁹ and the *kitābat as-sirr* (the office of Privy Secretary).¹⁰ It was the office of the *ustādār* which gained most from the deterioration of the wazīrate during the 9th–15th centuries. The principal and almost only duty of the *wazīr* at that time was to supply meat to the army.¹¹ Meat merchants and butchers (*laḥḥāmīn, mu'āmilīn al-laḥm*) occupy key positions in that office, and some of them even became *wazīrs*.¹² From the middle of the 15th. century onwards the wazīrate becomes more and more the private domain of butchers and meat dealers.

The Ustāḍār (Grand Major domo)

The *ustāḍār* headed the *ḍiwān al-mufrad* or *ḍiwān al-ustādāriya*, the main function of which was the distribution of the monthly pay (*jāmakīya*) and fodder (*ʿalīq*) and, on rare occasions, clothes (*kiswa*), to the Royal mamluks.¹ The *ustāḍār*'s deputy was called *nāẓir ḍiwān al-mufrad*.² According to al-Maqrīzī the office of the *ustāḍār* was considerably strengthened in his day, and he discharged many responsible duties.³ There is no doubt that he was far more important than the *wazīr*. Yet his position was always precarious because as a rule he was unable to pay the mamluks' salaries in time. Very often he was beaten and put in custody until he paid a considerable part of these salaries from his own pocket.⁴

The Khāzindār al-Kabīr (Grand Treasurer)

The *khāzindār* had charge of the sultan's treasures, including his funds, his precious clothes, and the like. This office was generally held by an Amir of *Ṭablkhāna*, later to be permanently replaced by an Amir of a Thousand.⁵ We have discussed elsewhere the eunuchs filling this office, but we know of no eunuchs serving in this post who held the rank of Amir of a Thousand.

The *Dawādār al-Kabīr* (Grand *Dawādār*)

The basic function of the *dawādār* was the bearing and keeping of the royal inkwell. This office was created by the Saljūqs, and was held by civilians both under their rule and under the Abbasid caliphs. It was *az-Zāhir* Baybars who transferred it to a Mamluk Amir of Ten.⁶ During the *Bahri* period the *dawādār* did not rank among the important amirs, but under the Circassians he became one of the first-ranking amirs of the kingdom.⁷ Some *dawādārs* even became sultans.⁸ One of the *dawādār*'s duties during the later Mamluk period was to decide which of the members of the *ḥalqa* were worthy of setting out on a military expedition.⁹ In addition, he regularly visited Upper Egypt, and sometimes the regions of Jabal Nābulus, ash-Sharqīya, and al-Grharbīya, in order to collect taxes and gather in the crops. These trips would take place amid great pomp and brilliance, and the sources discuss them at length. They were accompanied by cruel oppressions of the local population.¹ At the close of the Mamluk era, enormous power was concentrated in the hands of the *dawādār*. Amir Yashbak was, in addition to his duties as *dawādār*, also *amīr silah*, *wazīr*, *ustādār*, *kāshif al-kushshāf* (inspector-general), *mudabbir al-mamlaka*, and *ra's al-maysara*. No previous Mamluk amir had accumulated such a great number of offices.² The *dawādār* Tūmānbāy, who later became sultan, accumulated exactly the same offices.³

The Amir Akhū

The *amīr akhū* was the supervisor of the royal stables. He was generally an Amir of a Thousand, and resided in *al-iṣṭabl as-sultānī*. He had under his orders three Amirs of *Ṭablkhāna* and an undetermined number of Amirs of Ten and privates.⁴ It appears that for every department which came under the *dīwān* of the *amīr akhū*, there was a special official: thus there was an *amīr akhū at-tibn wa-d-darīs*,⁵ an *amīr akhū al-jimāl*,⁶ etc.

The Amir Jandā

The *amīr jandār* (or *jāndār* pl. *janādīra*⁷ or *jandārīya*,⁸ was in charge of the *zardkhāna* (which served both as an arsenal and as a detention house) and of the execution of those condemned to death by the sultan. The *zardkhāna* was considered a relatively respectable place of detention; its prisoners did not remain there long, and were either released or executed without great delay. The *jandār* also announced to the sultan the amirs' arrival for duty, and he entered the *ḍiwān* before them. He also presented the inkwell to the sultan, together with the *dawādār* and the *kātib as-sirr*. Under his orders were the *barādārīya*, the *rikābīya*, and the *khāzindārīya*. He would lead the *zaffa* (procession?) around the sultan during his expeditions. This office was held by an Amir of a Thousand and an Amir of *Ṭabkhāna*.⁹ In the Ayyubid period and at the beginning of the Mamluk era, this was one of the highest positions of the realm. That office and the post of *ustād ār* were given by the Ayyubid *Tūrān* Shah, upon his coming to power, to the two highest-ranking amirs.¹ In the early Mamluk period, the office of *jandār* was held by Amirs of a Thousand, including even *Aljāy al-Yūsufī* and *Jānībak al-Ḥamzāwī*, but later it deteriorated, reaching its nadir in the middle of the 9th century A.H. From that time until the end of the Mamluk period it was held by privates.²

The Naqīb al-Jaysh

The ordinary designation of the holder of this office was *naqīb al-jaysh* or *naqīb al-juyūsh*, though. at the beginning of the Mamluk period he had been called *naqīb al-‘asākīr*.³ He was a sort of chief of the military police. According to Qalqashandī, it was his duty to bring to the sultan all the amirs, members of the *ḥalqa*, etc., who were summoned to his court. He was also responsible for guarding (the sultan’s life?) during official ceremonies and expeditions. Under him were a number of *nuqabā’*, and his rank was that of a lower *ḥājib*.⁴ This testimony of Qalqashandī’s is confirmed by the chronicles which, however, give some additional functions for the *naqīb al-jaysh*: conveying amirs and administrative officials from prison to court-house,⁵ keeping them in detention,⁶ transporting dismissed amirs and administrative officials to their place of exile or detention,⁷ taking mamluks condemned to death to the place of execution,⁸ announcing to the army that it was to prepare for a parade or expedition.⁹ In order to carry out this last duty, he would send the *nuqabā’ ajnād al-ḥalqa*, who were under his orders, to Cairo and its environs, and the *barīdiyya* to the diverse regions of Egypt.¹⁰ According to Qalqashandī, the *naqīb al-jaysh* was in Syria (*al-mamālīk ash-shāmīya*) called *naqīb an-nuqabā’*,¹ but this designation is also found in Egypt under Qalāūn.²

The Naqīb al-Mamālīk

In addition to the *naqīb al-jaysh*, the early Mamluk period had a *naqīb al-mamālīk*. These two offices were different from one another, as may be seen from the sources. It is said of one amir that he was *naqīb al-jaysh*, and had previously been *naqīb al-mamālīk*.³ Another amir was *naqīb al-mamālīk*, and was later appointed to be *naqīb al-jaysh* as well.⁴ Other amirs served simultaneously in both capacities.⁵ This office is quite frequently mentioned.⁶ Since the *naqīb al-jaysh* often served as *naqīb al-mamālīk*, we may assume that these two offices were similar, but the sources do not make clear in what manner they may have differed. On the basis of the designations, it may be presumed that the functions of the *naqīb al-mamālīk* were restricted to the mamluks, or the Royal Mamluks, while those of the *naqīb al-jaysh* included all (or: all other) branches of the army. It would seem that the existence of a *ṣāhib dīwān al-mamālīk* side by side with a *ṣāhib dīwān al-jaysh* must be explained in the same manner; see p. 66). The first office apparently ceased to exist as early as the first half of the 8th century.

The Muqaddam al-Mamālik as-Sultāniya (Commander of the Royal Mamluks)

The *muqaddam al-mamālik as-sultāniya*, who was usually a eunuch, was head of the military schools of the Royal Mamluks in the Cairo citadel.⁷

The Kātib al-Mamālīk as-sulṭānīya (Scribe of the Royal Mamluks)

The *kātib al-mamālīk as-Sulṭānīya* (or, more usually, *kātib al-mamālīk*) was in charge of the nominal lists of the mamluks. He read out the names of the mamluks during pay parades and other official ceremonies.⁸

The Malik al-Umarā' (King of the Amirs)

This was not an office but a title given to the high-ranking governors of Syria (*al-bilād ash-shāmīya*), Alexandria, and Upper Egypt (*al-wajh al-qiblī*). The vice-sultan in Egypt, however, was called *kāfil al-mamālīk*, to stress his superiority over these governors.¹ Khāyrbak, who bore the title of *malik al-umarā'* in his capacity as governor of Aleppo, kept it even after the fall of the Mamluk state and his appointment as ruler of Egypt under the Ottomans.²

THE MEN OF THE PEN (*ARBĀB AL-AQLĀM*)

The Nāẓir al-Jaysh (Inspector of the Army)

The distribution of, and supervision over, feudal fiefs were in the hands of a special department called *dīwān al-jaysh* or *dīwān al-iqtāʿ*. The department's headquarters in Cairo was divided into two principal sections: (a) the *dīwān al-jaysh al-miṣrī*, responsible for Egyptian fiefs, and (b) the *dīwān al-jaysh ash-shāmī*, in charge of Syrian fiefs. Each section was headed by an official known as *mustawfī*, sometimes as *mutawallī*, *ṣāhib*, or *kātib al-jaysh*. There were two lower *mustawfīs*, one of whom was in charge of the distribution of fiefs to the Beduins, and the other to pensioners. The director of the *dīwān*, the *nāẓir al-jaysh*, was responsible to the sultan, while his chief assistant, the *ṣāhib dīwān al-jaysh*, was responsible to the viceroy. The *dīwān al-jaysh* had branch offices in all regions of the kingdom.³ In addition to the *ṣāhib dīwān al-jaysh*, the *nāẓir al-jaysh* had under his orders the *ṣāhib dīwān al-mamālīk*, *kātib al-mamālīk*, *shuhūd al-mamālīk*, and other clerks.⁴ It seems likely that the last three offices were confined to dealing with the mamluks or the Royal Mamluks only, not with the whole of the army.

*The **Nāẓir** Khazā'in as-Silāh (Supervisor of Arms Stores)*

The holder of this office was charged with supervising the armament used by the army, and with seeing to it that arms manufactured during the year were transferred, on a fixed date, to the arms stores of the Cairo citadel.⁵

The Nāẓir al-Iṣṭablāt as-Sulṭāniyya (Supervisor of the Royal Stables)

The holder of this office was responsible for the royal horses, mules, and camels. He supervised the purchase and sale of these animals, and the payments to the personnel employed in the stables.⁶

RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS (*AL-MUTA‘AMMIMŪ*
N)¹

The Qāḍī al-‘Askar (Judge of the Army)

The main function of Qāḍī al-Askar was to accompany the military expedition, try its members, and decide on such judicial questions as might arise during the march, e.g. the division of booty, the inheritance of dead soldiers, etc.² His peace-time duties are not clear. There were four chief judges of the army, one for each of the four schools (*madhāhib*) of orthodox Islām.³

To conclude the list of offices, two expressions of very frequent occurrence in connexion with Mamluk posts should be discussed. The first of these is ‘*kāna*’, used in the sense of ‘formerly, ex-’, in relation to officials who ceased exercising their functions. Thus: *atābak al-‘asākīr kāna* ‘former *atābak al-‘asākīr*’ ; *nā’ib al-karak kāna* ‘ex-governor of Kerak’, etc.⁴ The second is ‘*sa‘āda*’, used in the sense of ‘success and stability of (an amir’s) career, successful service over a long period of time’. It was customary to say: ‘*ṭālat ayyāmuhu fī as-sa‘āda*’ and similar expressions.⁵

ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICES

The offices of the kingdom underwent very considerable changes under the rule of the Mamluks. They had, at first, been taken over from the Ayyubids, but under Mongol influence, especially during the reign of Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, new offices were introduced, which partially replaced those in use since the Ayyubids, without abrogating them entirely. The evolution of the uppermost offices is of great interest; unfortunately, however, data on this subject were not systematically gathered by the writer, so that the description given below will necessarily fall far short of the prospects offered by the abundant source material. It is, however, his intention to deal with this subject at length. at another opportunity.

Under Tūṣhān Shah, one of the last Ayyubid sultans, the two most important amirs of the kingdom were the *ustādār* and the *amīr jandār*.⁶ Under the Mamluk sultan 'Alī b. Ayybak, the chief amirs were: the *nā'ib as-saltāna*, the *atābak al-'asākīr*, the *wazīr*, and the *amīr jandār*.⁷ The *atābak* and the *wazīr* are mentioned when Qutuz comes to power.⁸ When Baybars came to power in 658, the order of offices was as follows: *nā'ib as-saltāna*, *atābak*, *ustādār*, *amīr jandār*, *dawādār*, *amīr akhū*, *wazīr*, two *amīr ḥājibs*.¹ During Qalā'ūn's reign, mention is made of the *silāḥdār*, *amīr majlis*, *amīr akhū*, and *amīr jandār*.² In the period 693–707 the anonymous author published by Zetterstéen very frequently repeats the list of the offices of the Mamluk kingdom. He generally mentions eight offices, presented in the same order, with some minor changes: *nā'ib as-saltāna*, *wazīr*, *ustādār*, *ḥājib*, *jandār*, *mihmandār*, *dawādār*, and *naqīb al-jaysh*. The number of the *ḥujjāb* varies between two and four; that of the *jandārīya* between one and four; that of the *mihmandārīya* generally remains at two; that of the *dawādārīya* varies between one and three. It is noteworthy that in the several lists given by the above historian for the stated period, the *atābak al-asākīr* is not mentioned at all.³

In 783, i.e. at the close of the Bahri period, we encounter an altogether different order of offices, although it is not yet the one stabilized during the Circassian period: *atābak al-'asākīr*, *ra's nawbat al-umarā*, *amīr silāḥ*, *amīr majlis*, *dawādār kabīr*, *amīr akhū*, *ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*, *ra's nawbat al-thānī*.⁴

In the Circassian period the sources usually mention seven offices in a fixed order: *atābak al-'asākīr*, *amīr silāḥ*, *amīr majlis*, *amīr akhū*, *ra's nawbat an-nuwab*, *dawādār kabīr*, *ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*. The order of the first

four offices was fixed for the whole of the Circassian period, and the office of *hājib al-hujjāb* generally, though not always, retained its seventh place. There was competition between the offices of *ra's nawba* and *dawādār kabīr* for the fifth and sixth places,⁵ possession of which alternated irregularly between them.

Thus it is seen that the office roster of the early Mamluk period differs greatly from that of the Circassian period. As pointed out above, the great changes occurred under Sultan Baybars, one of the Mongols' greatest admirers; he introduced the laws of the Yāsa into the Mamluk kingdom and, in the wake of the Yāsa, many of the institutions and offices of the Mongol state.⁶ Of this, Ibn Taghrībirdī says the following: Some of the offices introduced by Baybars had indeed existed, previously, but their nature was considerably altered during his reign. Thus, for instance, the *dawādār's* function before that sultan's time had been the bearing of the inkwell, and that office was filled exclusively by civilians; the *amīr majlis* was charged with the guarding and arranging of the sultan's audience, and the *hājib* was a sort of gatekeeper. The offices introduced by Baybars were those of *dawādār*, *khāzindār*, *amīr akhūr*, *suqāṭ*, *jandāriya*, *hujjāb*, *ru'ūs annuwab*; *amīr silāh*, *amīr majlis*, *amīr shikār* (master of the hunt). Under Baybars, the *silāhdār's* function consisted in the supervision of the *silāhdāriya*, as well as the conveying of arms to the sultan in battle and on other occasions, such as the Feast of the Sacrifice. At that time, that office did not carry the high dignity which it reached under the Circassians, i.e. the right to sit as *ra's al-maysara* in the sultan's presence. That latter function was, under Baybars, reserved for the *alābak* and, under an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, for the *ra's nawbat al-umarā'*. As for the *amīr majlis*, he was, in Baybars' days, in charge of the physicians, oculists, and medical assistants. He carried, at that time, a higher rank than the *amīr silāh*. The office of *dawādār* went, under Baybars, to an Amir of Ten, and was still chiefly of a civilian character. The office of *ra's nawba* was an entirely new post introduced by Baybars, and there had previously been no office so named, whether under the Mamluks or under the dynasties that preceded them. It had been a very lofty post among the Tatars, and its holder was called, in their language, 'yswl.' The office of *amīr akhūr* had also been greatly revered among the Tatars, and its holder was called, in their language, 'aqṭshy.' As for the *hujjūbiya*, the office founded by Baybars, it steadily grew in importance, until under an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, it equalled that of the vice-sultanate (*niyābat as-sultāna*). The rest of the Mamluk offices were introduced by Qalāwūn and by his son an-Nāṣir Muḥammad; Ibn Taghrībirdī deals with them in his account of the reign of these two sultans.¹

In the **Bahri** period there also existed a supreme council of high-

ranking amirs, called *umar ā* 'al-mash ūra or *umar ā* 'al-mashwar. The president of this council was called *ra's al-mash ūra*.² This council is almost never encountered in the Circassian period.³

During the interregnum between the *Bahri* and the Circassian periods, viz. at the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th centuries, a period marked by severe political crises and upheavals, we find that all the important offices of the kingdom were occupied jointly by two individuals. The purpose of such an arrangement was, apparently, to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in the hands of a single amir by establishing a counterpoise *vis-à-vis* each office holder. One member of each pair was superior in rank to the other and was called 'insider' (*khāṣṣakī*), while his companion was but a 'partner' (*sharīk*), called 'outsider' (*barr ānī*). The most famous such pair were Barq ūq and Baraka. Ibn Taghrībirdi, in his account of the appointment of *Širghitmish al-Ashrafī as amīr silāḥ khāṣṣakī*, and of *Arghun al-Aḥmadī as amīr kabīr barr ānī*, says that he copied this information from the historian al-'Aynī, and that other historians concur with him. He then adds: 'Thus there were in those days an *amīr kabīr khāṣṣ* and an *amīr kabīr barr ānī*, an *amīr silāḥ khāṣṣ*, and an *amīr silāḥ ban ānī*; this is something quite unheard of'.¹ It is clear from this passage that these double offices no longer existed in the days of Ibn Taghrībirdi, and that he unearthed their existence only through reading about them in earlier sources. We have, in fact, found no trace of their existence later than the first years of the 9th century.

At the beginning of the Circassian period, under Sultan Faraj, yet another office is abrogated, namely that of *ra's nawbat al-umar ā*, whose full name was *ra's nawbat al-umar ā at ābak*, or *ra's nawba kabīr wa-aṭābak* (with *ṭ*, apparently to distinguish it from *at ābak*). Below it was the office of *ra's nawba th ānī*, which corresponds to the later *ra's nawbat an-nuwab*. The office of *ra's nawbat al-umar ā* was formerly second to that of *at ābak al-'as ākir*.² The writer has not been able to ascertain the exact nature of this post, especially in what way it differed from the office of *ra's nawbat an-nuwab*.

Appendix A

1. STRENGTH OF THE ARMY DURING AR- RAWK AN-NĀSIRĪ (715) ACCORDING TO AL- MAQRĪZĪ

An-Nāṣir Muḥammad established the number of the total army in Egypt at 24,000 horsemen. These were subdivided as follows: Amirs of a Thousand and their mamluks, 2,424 horse; the Amirs of a Thousand, numbering 24, were subdivided as follows: *nā'ib as-saltāna, wazīr*, 8 *khāṣṣakī* amirs, 14 *kharjī* amirs³; their mamluks numbered 2,400. The Amirs of *Ṭablkhāna* numbered, with their mamluks, 8,200 horse; these amirs, numbering 200, included 54 *khāṣṣakī* amirs, 146 *kharjī* amirs, and their mamluks numbered 8,000 horse. The inspectors (*kushshāf*) and governors (*wulāṭ*) in the sub-provinces of Egypt, together with their mamluks, numbered 574, including 14 *kushshāf* and *wulāṭ* (here the table gives a detailed list by sub-provinces), and 560 mamluks. The number of the Amirs of Ten and their mamluks was 2,200 horse, comprising 200 amirs, of whom 30 were *khāṣṣakīya* and 170 *kharjīya*, and 2,000 mamluks. The *wulāṭ al-aqāṭīm*¹ numbered, with their mamluks, 77 horse; the *wulāṭ al-aqāṭīm* (here the names of the *aqāṭīm* are detailed) were 7, and their mamluks 70. The commanders of the Royal Mamluks and those of the *ḥalqa*, together with the Royal Mamluks and the soldiers of the *ḥalqa*, numbered 11,176 horse,² subdivided as follows: commanders of the Royal Mamluks *muqaddamū al-mamālīk as-sultāniya* 40; commanders of the *ḥalqa* (*muqaddamū al-ḥalqa*), 180; *nuqabā' al-ulūf* (the writer is unacquainted with this rank), 24 ; Royal Mamluks and soldiers of the *ḥalqa*, 10,932 horse, of which the former accounted for 2,000 and the latter 8,932.³

The total of the mamluks of the amirs, in their three categories, is 12,400, a figure which is brought to nearly 13,000 with the addition of the governors' mamluks. This represents over half the total strength of the army stationed in Egypt, a situation entirely inconceivable at a later period. Similarly, the list indicates that every Amir of a Thousand had exactly 100 mamluks, every Amir of *Ṭablkhāna* exactly 40, and every Amir of Ten, exactly ten. Such an exact distribution was no longer in accordance with the facts as early as the days of Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, who wrote only two or three decades after the *rawk an-nāṣirī* (see also below). On the other hand, the low proportion of the Royal Mamluks is noticeable; they comprised only one-twelfth of the entire army. As for the *ḥalqa*, its strength in 715 A.H. was in all probability

approximately 9,000, as indicated in the present list, and not 24,000, as al-Maqrīzī indicates elsewhere,⁴ and as stated by az-Zāhirī in the list presented below. It would seem that they confused the strength of the whole army in Egypt with that of the *ḥalqa*. The *ḥalqa*, in spite of the severe blows it was dealt as a result of the *rawks*, was still numerically important in 715, forming as it did more than one-third of the army's total strength. The extent of the *ḥalqa's* decline at a later period may be gauged from its enormous numerical losses: it numbered only 1,000 men in the first half of the 9th century⁵ or, in other words, its numerical strength dwindled to one-ninth of its former size in 100 years.

2. THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY IN THE WHOLE OF THE MAMLUK KINGDOM, ACCORDING TO AZ-ZĀHIRI

Az-Zāhiri's list of the army of the Mamluk kingdom was composed, according to the historian's statement, in response to a particular set of circumstances.

During the reign of a certain sultan, an envoy arrived, representing the Tatars, and threatened that his nation would conquer Egypt. He boasted that the Tatars had an army of 20 *tūmāns*, comprising 10,000 horse each. The sultan then decided to order a census of his army, the results of which are here listed: *ḥalqa*, 24,000; Royal Mamluks, 10,000; amirs' mamluks, 8,000. *Ḥalqa* troops in Damascus, 12,000, troops of the governor and amirs of Damascus, 3,000; *ḥalqa* troops in Aleppo, 6,000, troops of the governor and amirs of Aleppo, 2,000; *ḥalqa* troops in Tripoli, 4,000, troops of the governors and amirs of Tripoli, 1,000; *ḥalqa* troops in Safed, 1,000, troops of the governor and amirs of Safed, 1,000. In addition, an army of 60,000 men was encamped in the north of the kingdom and in Egypt.

The Beduin tribes ('*urbān*) contributed the following numbers: *Āl Faḍl* Ban *ū* Nu'ayr, 24,000; the *Hijāz* Beduins, 24,000; *Āl 'Alī*, 2,000; 'Arab al-'*Irāq*, 2,000; Lamlam, 2,000; Ban *ū* Saqba and Ban *ū* Maḥdī, 1,000; *Āl Imra* (i.q. Murra?), 1,000; Judhā'm, 1,000; *Āl 'Ā*'id, 1,000; Fazā'ra, 1,000; Muḥārib, 1,000; Qatīl, 1,000; Qatab, 1,000; various tribes, each of which. included more than 100 horse, 3,000.

The tribe of Hawwā'ra had formerly mustered 24,000; the tribes of the Turcomans, from Gaza to Diyār Bakr, numbered 180,000 horse (here follows a list of the names of the tribes). *Al-'Ashīr* (semi-nomadic tribes) mustered 35,000 horse, and their commanders numbered 35. The Kurds had formerly numbered more than 20,000 horse. Every village of the Mamluk kingdom was required to muster two horsemen, and there were 33,000 villages.¹

There can be no doubt that of the two lists presented above, the first gives the more authentic impression. It was put together in response to a great event in the annals of the Mamluk kingdom, which demanded, as a pre-requisite, that the strength. of the army and its various subdivisions be ascertained. Moreover, the figures it offers are generally plausible, except for the small number of the Royal Mamluks, which is difficult to explain (see BSOAS., xv, pp, 222–8). It

seems likely, therefore, that we have here an important historical document, which reflects in a fairly reliable manner the numerical strength of the army stationed in Egypt at the height of the Mamluk era.

The second list is much more suspect. First, it is of unknown date, and even the name of the sultan who ordered it to be compiled is not known; second, it was composed as a reaction to threats by an external enemy, and with the purpose of proving to that enemy that the Mamluk army was larger than his. All the figures given in the second part of the list concerning the number of horsemen the kingdom could muster from among the Beduins, the Turcomans, the Kurds, the semi-nomadic tribes, and the villages, as well as the figures relating to the troops stationed in the north of the kingdom, are entirely devoid of value. This stands out especially in the light of the exact accounts furnished by contemporary sources on the poor participation of all the above-named elements in the wars waged by the Mamluks. The figures presented in the first half of the list may be taken more seriously, although here, too, it is clear that the number *ḥalqa* of troops was much smaller than the figure listed, and that the share of the troops of al-Bilād ash-Shāmīya in the general strength of the army was much less significant than might be imagined from *az-Zāhiri*'s figures.

Appendix B Who Were the *qarānīs*?

In the body of the present chapter, the *qarānīs* have been classified as the mamluks of former sultans. No evidence was adduced for this contention in order not to disrupt the continuity of our description; the term, however, requires a detailed examination since, in the writer's view, our outlook on the foundations of the Mamluk system depends, in no small measure, on its correct definition.

The term '*qarānīs*' has already been dealt with by a number of scholars. Von Hammer,¹ who relied on European sources without testing their validity, described the *qarānīs* in a wholly fictitious manner and even distorted their name to '*qurşān*' (corsairs!). A.N.Poliak describes them in an entirely different vein, which, in the present writer's opinion, is just as incorrect (see below). It seems that the only description which is partially correct is given by Popper in his critique of Poliak.²

In order to enable the reader to follow our line of argument in defining the term *qarānīs* via a critique of A.N.Poliak's views, we here submit our final conclusions in advance.

The term *qarānīs*,³ in Mamluk sources of the Circassian period,⁴ had two interconnected meanings: (a) 'veterans, men with long-standing service'; (b) 'mamluks of former sultans' (who were veterans in comparison to the *julbān*, the mamluks of the reigning sultan).⁵ The second meaning, which we consider to have sprung from the first, is by far the more frequent in the above-mentioned sources.

Poliak, who deals with the *qarānīs* in several places in his works, defines them in an entirely different manner. He says at one point: 'The Mamluk state may be viewed as a colonial empire of the feudal lords and merchants of the region north of the Black Sea... During the first period, the feudal lords and merchants of the metropolis were organized in a united State, the Golden Horde. During the second period, the Circassian *qarānīs* stood at the head of the feudal element, and the merchants of the Crimea stood at the head of the mercantile element'.¹

A second passage of Poliak's reads: 'In view of the fact that the Mamluk sultans and amirs married into the principal families of Circassia, and were doubtless aided by their relatives, who had remained in the home country, one is led to believe that the ruling power was practically held by the same group in Circassia and the

Mamluk kingdom. This group is called in the Mamluk sources *al-qarānīs*, *al-qarānīša*, sing. *qirnāš*. The *qarānīs* were represented in the diverse ranks of the military hierarchy, but were everywhere held in greater esteem than their colleagues, even their superiors, and were the first candidates for promotion. Thus one amir recommended *Tatar* (who later became sultan) to the sultan as *qirnāš*, while *Tatar* was still an unliberated mamluk. There were also *qarānīs* among the *amālik sultāniya*, i.e. the freed mamluks who were in the service of the sultan. A small and special corps was called *al-ajnād al-qarānīs*; its members were candidates for the amirate and holders of large fiefs (*arżāq*), and their social position was similar to that of Amirs of Five. This corps was composed of men who had served in the Mamluk kingdom for a long time. Naturally, there were *qarānīs* also among the *julbān*, the recently arrived mamluks. Needless to say, they were represented also among the amirs, and here also, it was the fact of belonging to this nobility more than the military rank which determined the amir's social standing. The governor of Jerusalem, Khushqadam as-Sayfī (d. 853 A.H.), in spite of his bravery," did not belong to the notables and to those who are the chiefs of their compatriots", while a private soldier (*jundī*), Lājīn (d. 804 A.H.), was considered by the Circassians and even the amirs a certain candidate for the sultanate. The *qirnāš* did not need to wear fine clothes or ride handsome horses in order to gain high esteem but, on the contrary, many of them (i.e. the *qarānīs*) thought it an honour to be distinguished by old and tattered garments. I know of no case in which an *ibn nās* was called *qirnāš*. It is interesting to note that even in al-Jabartī's chronicle, which was very much influenced by the language of the Mamluk sources, we meet the word *al-qarānīša* in the sense of "high amirs". Just as they (the *qarānīs*) constituted the aristocracy of the Circassians, so the Circassians formed the aristocracy of the "Turks",² among whom the proportion of other races was considerable'.³

In a third passage, Poliak states: 'As particular units within the first corps [*ajnād al-ḥalqa*] we may mention: (a) *al-baḥrīya* . . . (b) *al-ajnād al-qarānīs*, i.e. those Caucasian noblemen who were not yet dubbed amirs, but whose social position was already equal to that of Amirs of Five'.¹

A fourth passage reads: 'Under the Circassian sultans, the Caucasian nobility had the right of priority to the fiefs, which was often contested by the freedmen of the reigning sultan'.²

The gist of Poliak's views may be summarized thus: amid the Circassians, who formed the aristocracy of the Mamluk races, there was a yet more select aristocracy, called *qarānīs*, whose influence held sway both in the Mamluk kingdom and in the mamluks' country of origin. Its members were the first to be considered for promotion, and

did not belong to any particular military unit, but were represented in the various formations of the army and in the diverse ranks of the hierarchy.

We shall first take up Poliak's view of the *qarānīs* as belonging to various units and ranks.

The *qarānīs* appear in our sources hundreds of times; yet they are called 'ajnad' in the one and only instance of az-Zāhiri's description of them,³ a description which is not devoid of gross error and distortion, as will be seen below. As against this solitary instance, they are in all other cases regularly named *mamālīk*.⁴ When their full name is given, they are called *al-mamālīk as-sulṭāniya al-qarānīs*, or *al-qarāniša*,⁵ and we have never encountered them in any military formation outside the *mamālīk sulṭāniya*. Just as the *julbān* and the *sayfīya*, who were also Royal Mamluks, appear in the sources under three appellations, viz. *julbān*, *mamālīk julbān*, *mamālīk sulṭāniya julbān* (similarly for 'ajlāb' and 'mushtarawāt'), and *sayfīya*, *mamālīk sayfīya*, *mamālīk sulṭāniya sayfīya*, so the *qarānīs* appear in the sources under only three designations: *qarānīs*, *mamālīk qarānīs*, and *mamālīk sulṭāniya qarānīs* (or *qarāniša*).⁶ No form other than the above three has been encountered by the writer; we thus conclude that the *qarānīs* are Royal Mamluks. As such they can belong only to one of the three subdivisions of that body, viz. the mamluks of the ruling sultan, the mamluks of the former sultans, or the *sayfīya*. Now, while they are frequently mentioned as different from the *julbān* and the *sayfīya*, as having relations with them, as quarrelling with them, or as persecuted and mistreated by the *julbān*,¹ they are never mentioned as different from the mamluks of the former sultans or as having any contact or relations with them. The conclusion is inescapable: a group cannot be mentioned as different from itself or as having relations with itself.

Further, there are public appearances of the sultan at which it is improbable that the mamluks of former sultans should not participate in a most honoured capacity. Unless we assume that the *qarānīs* and the mamluks of former sultans are one and the same body, the question arises as to the whereabouts of the latter, and as to why the *qarānīs* occupy precisely the position which would be theirs. In a series of such public appearances, for example, we are told of the participation of: 'the greater part of the Royal Mamluks' (*ghālib al-mamālīk as-sulṭāniya*),² 'the whole body of the Mamluks' (*jamī' al-mamālīk qātibatan*),³ 'the whole army' (*jamī' al-'askar*),⁴ the whole body of the army' (*al-'askar qātibatan*).⁵ The only units mentioned in all the above instances are the *julbān* and the *qarānīs*. Were we to follow Poliak, we might well wonder at the fact that in reviews including the whole of the army or the majority of the Royal Mamluks, the mamluks of the former sultans do not appear at all; the non-appearance of the

sayfīya, we note in passing, is not surprising in the light of the insignificance of that unit, which we have already discussed.

Special importance should be attached to the composition of the Mamluk expeditionary force to the battle of Marj Dābiq. This force, numbering 5,000 men, was composed of *qarānīṣa*, *julbān*, and *awlād an-nāṣ*, while the army remaining in Egypt was estimated at 2,000 men, also composed of *julbān*, *qarānīṣ*, and *awlād an-nāṣ*.⁶ Again, one might be led to think that in this crucial battle, at which the fate of the Mamluk kingdom was decided, the veteran and battle-trained mamluks of the former sultans did not participate; what is even more astonishing, *they did not remain in Egypt either*.⁷

Of decisive importance, in our view, is the following argument: if the *did* and the mamluks of the former sultans are not identical, we are forced to conclude that the latter received no pay for nearly 90 years, for they are totally absent from all pay parades. The payment of the *jāmakīya* took place once every month; there were, in addition, other categories of pay, of which space does not permit a full discussion here. From approximately the thirties of the 9th century until the end of the Mamluk era, these payments are described in very great detail several hundred times. In a large number of instances, the names of all units receiving payment are mentioned, while in many others only one or a few of these units are listed, but when the parts are joined together, the full number of existing units is easily obtained. In all these payments, only the following four military units are mentioned as ever receiving pay: *julbān*, *qarānīṣ*, *sayfīya*, *awlād an-nāṣ*.¹ In all these instances, we would search in vain for the name of the mamluks of the former sultans, or of any of the components of that unit, while the *qarānīṣ* are almost always listed, usually immediately following the *julbān*, i.e. precisely in the place where we would expect the mamluks of the former sultans. Moreover, whenever a unit was deprived of all or part of its pay, it usually raised a great outcry, or at least the historians pointed to the injustice of such a procedure (which affected not only the military, but also the widows and orphans, who received the *jāmakīya* at the time when it was paid out to the army)²; yet the mamluks of the former sultans forfeit their pay for nearly a century, without protesting even once against this iniquity. Even the historians fail to mention such a glaring injustice, quite in contrast with their custom with respect to all other units treated unjustly by comparison with the *julbān*. This grave contradiction holds true, of course, only if we fail to identify the *qarānīṣ* with the mamluks of the former sultans.

Not less decisive is the following evidence. In connexion with the struggle for succession to the throne after the death of Sultan Barsbāy, the Manhal *as-Ṣāfi* relates that the *mu'ayyadīya* (Shaykh), the *nāṣirīya*

(Faraj) and the *zāhirīya* (Barq **ū**q) supported Jaqmaq al-‘Alā’ī, and were also joined by a part of the *ashrafīya* Barsbāy, headed by Aynāl al-Abū Bakrī. These form a united front against the *ajlāb*, the *ashrafīya* Barsbāy, most of whom remain loyal to the son of the deceased sultan.³ On the other hand, we are told elsewhere in the same source, in connexion with the same events, that the army was split into two camps. The first faction grouped itself around the *atābak* Jaqmaq al-‘Alā’ī, and was composed of the *qarānīs* Royal Mamluks (*akābir al-mamālīk al-qarānīs*; for the term *kabīr*, *akābir*, see below), joined by Amir Aynāl al-Abū Bakrī with his *khushdāshīya*, the *ashrafīya* (Barsbāy). This alliance with a part of Barsbāy’s mamluks increased the power of the *atābak* Jaqmaq. The second faction was headed by Amir ‘Alī Bāy, and was composed of the *mamālīk al-julbān al-ashrafīya* (Barsbāy); it supported the son of the deceased sultan, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.¹ Here it is beyond any doubt that the mamluks of the former sultans, viz. the *mu’ayyadīya* (Shaykh) the *nāṣirīya* (Faraj), and the *zāhirīya* (Barq **ū**q) of the first version, are identical with the *qarānīs* of the second version.²

Ibn ‘Arabshāh, in describing the same events, puts it even more briefly and clearly. He says: ‘The army as a whole became divided into two (rival) sections. One section is said to be called *qarānīs*, and these are the *zāhirīya* (Barq **ū**q) and the *nāṣirīya* (Faraj) and the *mu’ayyadīya* (Shaykh)...and the other section the *mamālīk ashrafīya* (Barsbāy) living in the barracks of the citadel’ *wa-ṣār al-‘askar fī al-jumla qismayn qism yuqāl ‘anhum annahum qarānīs wa-hum aṣ-zāhirīya wa-nāṣirīya wal-mu’ayyadīya...wal-qism al-ākhar al-mamālīk al-ashrafīya sukkān at-tibāq bil-qal‘a*.³

The long series of proofs furnished above by the present writer in support of his argument that the *qarānīs* are identical with the mamluks of the former sultans finds its full confirmation in an unequivocal statement by Ibn Zunbul, who says: ‘All the *julbān*... were the *mushtarawāt* of (sultan *Qānṣūh*) al-Ghawri...He endeavoured to teach them (the Art of War), for his purpose was to create an army of his own mamluks and break the *qarānīs*, i.e. the mamluks of the sultans who preceded him’ (*fa-innahu kāna yaṣtahid fī ta’īm al-julbān wa-kāna qasduhu an yunshi’a lahu ‘askaran min mamālīkihi mushtarawātihi wa yaqta’a al-qarānīs wa-hum mamālīk al-mulūk alladhīna qablahu*).⁴

We shall now return to some of Poliak’s other arguments.

The claim that ‘there were also *qarānīs* among the *mamālīk sulṭānīya*⁵ does not bring out any distinguishing feature of this unit since, as mamluks of former sultans, they were Royal Mamluks (*mamālīk sulṭānīya*) in any case.

Neither does the statement that ‘needless to say, they (the *qarānīs* were represented also among the amirs’⁶ lend them any

distinctiveness, for other units (including even the *awlād awlad an-nā* *s* and *ajnād al-halqa*) were also represented among the amirs. In other words, private soldiers were promoted to the rank of amir from other units, as they were promoted from among the *qarānīs*.

As to the claim that the *qarānīs* also belonged to the *halqa*, we have already pointed out that only *az-Zāhiri* calls them *al-ajnād al-qarānīs*, in contradiction to all we know of them from other sources. The measure of *az-Zāhiri*'s lack of accuracy may be judged, *inter alia*, from his contention that in his days the *qarānīs* numbered less than 100.¹ It is not difficult to refute this claim on the basis of source material. First, the very role played by the *qarānīs* as the main rivals of the *ajlāb* and as the bearers of the brunt of the fighting (see below) eliminates the plausibility of such a small number. Second, the sources furnish unequivocal data as to the numbers of the *qarānīs*. Thus in the struggle of the *qarānīs* against the *mushtarawāt* in 802, the former number about 1,000 men.² In 919 every mamluk *qirnās* whose horse had died has his mount replaced by Sultan Qānṣūh al-Grhawri; 1,000 horses are distributed to the *qarānīs* on this occasion.³ In 920 an expeditionary corps of 2,400 horsemen, composed of *qarānīs* and *julbān*, is sent out; the *julbān* account for only 500,⁴ giving 1,900 *qarānīs*. In 922, a date close to that of the battle of Marj Dābiq, the old and feeble (*shuy ūkh wa-awājiz*) among the *qarānīs* are posted as garrisons in all parts of Egypt and in some sectors of the Red Sea coast, so that they might serve as a barrier against the 'urbān. They are sent to ash-Sharqīya, al-Gharbiya, al-Buḥayra, al-Jīza, at-Tarrāna, al-Manūfiya, al-Iskandarīya, Rashīd, Dimyāt, and Upper Egypt (as-Sa'id); to 'Aqaba, Aznam, and Mecca; they are also charged with the guarding of Egyptian dams.⁵ There can be no doubt that many hundreds of soldiers were needed to carry out this tremendous task, for it should not be forgotten that to repress a single attack or rebellion in only one province, 200 to 500 Royal Mamluks of the first line were required; it stands to reason that the number of 'old and feeble' men needed was even greater. We find, in fact, that 500 old *qarānīs* are sent out on one expedition to Sharqīya, Gharbiya, and Upper Egypt,⁶ whereas 50 are dispatched to Mecca.⁷

Needless to say, all figures quoted above are but *partial* figures of the *qarānīs*, and are considerably lower than their total number. Nevertheless, they are much larger than the figure cited for the total number of the *qarānīs* by *az-Zāhiri*.

As to the claim that 'naturally there were *qarānīs* also among the *julbān*',⁸ it should be noted that Poliak supports it by a single piece of evidence; whereas the sources supply us with an abundance of instances showing clearly that the *qarānīs* were different from the *julbān* and that they fought and clashed with them.¹ In reality, however, even that single reference of Poliak's proves precisely the opposite of

what he intended it to demonstrate. Here is the full text of the passage in question (year 860): ‘Then came the 5th day after the 14th of the month, and the *wazīr*² Ibn an-Naḥḥāl fled. On that day, no one received the meat rations allotted to the *mamālik sultāniya qarānīs*, that is to say, the *julbān* (*al-mamālik as-sultāniya al-qarānīs*, *a’nī al-julbān*), and their attendants and black slaves went up (to the Cairo citadel), but they found nothing. Then they discovered that the *julbān* had received their rations, and the attendants and black slaves took the matter to heart. They went down immediately, acted wantonly in the streets of Cairo and pillaged a few shops.’³

The general meaning of this excerpt is clear and requires no comment. It is one of the usual stories of the mistreatment of the *qarānīs* and the special favouring of the *julbān* (as will be seen below). The latter received meat while the former did not, which provoked their servants to engage in some mischief in the streets of the capital. If, however, we attempt to translate the passage *literally*, we obtain a sentence in which there is an obvious logical contradiction: the *qarānīs*, that is to say the *julbān*, did not receive meat, while the *julbān* did receive meat. It is beyond any doubt that the text is corrupt; and, indeed, the corruption was caused by the fact that between the word ‘*a’nī*’ and the word ‘*julbān*’ the word ‘*ghayr*’ was omitted by the editor. This has already been pointed out by Popper in his above-mentioned critique of Poliak.⁴ The text should read: ‘*al-qarānīs*, *a’nī ghayr al-julbān*,’ i.e. ‘the *qarānīs*, that is to say, those who are *not julbān*’ did not receive the meat rations allotted to them, while the *julbān* did receive them. Thus the contradiction disappears from the text, and a logical meaning is obtained which is opposite to that which Poliak attributes to the source; hence his claim that *qarānīs* may, inter alia, appear among the *julbān* as well, is automatically dispelled.

We have so far attempted to show the incorrectness of Poliak’s claim that the *qarānīs* could belong to diverse units and ranks of the Mamluk army. We shall now endeavour to prove that the contention that they held a position of superiority in the kingdom cannot withstand criticism. Here also, we shall anticipate our conclusions in order to make the argument clearer.

The actual position of the *qarānīs* may be ascertained only by a consideration of the interplay of two opposite tendencies within the Mamluk kingdom. The first is the tendency to bestow great honour on seniority in both service and age, and the second the proneness of the ruling sultan to favour his own mamluks over those of the preceding rulers, who were their seniors in both respects. With the deterioration of the kingdom, the second tendency gradually becomes stronger than the first, and eventually displaces it, and the aura of honour surrounding the veteran wanes considerably in the course of time.

We have already mentioned elsewhere¹ that the young mamluk looked upon his senior *khushdāsh* with the greatest esteem and reverence, especially if the latter served as his instructor (*aghā*). Such respect was not restricted to companions in servitude and liberation, but was much more general. Cases of lapses in the respect due to one's senior were severely criticized, and labelled 'unheard-of behaviour'.²

A number of terms relating to seniority are of frequent usage in contemporary sources, and they are worthy of mention in connexion with the *qarānīs*. They are 'qadīm', 'qadīm', 'qadīm hijra', 'kabīr'.

It seems to us that the original intent of the term 'qadīm hijra', or 'mutaqaddīm fī al-hijra'³ was to indicate that the mamluk had been brought from his home country to the Mamluk kingdom and embraced Islam a long time since. There evolved, however, a secondary meaning, viz. 'having long standing in a particular branch of service', thus: 'wa-lahu qidam hijra fī al-khidam as-sultāniya min ayyām al-malik an-nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalā'ūn'⁴ or 'kāna qadīm al-hijraf wa-ẓifatihi'.⁵ The respect accorded to the qadīm al-hijra is reflected also in the following examples. Amir Barsbāy proposes the sultanate to Amir Jānibak on the ground of his being senior and veteran among his colleagues (*fa-innaka aghā tunā wa-kabīrunā wa-aqdamunā hijratan*).⁶ It is said of two amirs that they are among the most honoured and with longest service among the amirs (*min ajall al-umarā wa-aqdamihim hijratan*); they sat at the right and left of the sultan respectively (i.e. in the most honoured places) in official ceremonies.⁷ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, on giving the list of Qalā'ūn's highranking and veteran mamluk amirs, who were in his service before his becoming sultan, says: *dhikr al-mamālik as-sultāniya al-manṣūriya al-qudamā' al-a'yān alladhina kānū fī khidmatihī min zaman al-imra wa-lahum qidam dl-hijra fī al-'usra wal-yusra*.⁸

From one of the above examples, the similarity between the meanings of 'kabīr' and 'qadīm hijra' may already be deduced (see also below). The veteran amir is also called *amīr kabīr*, *min akābir al-umarā*, *min al-umarā al-kibār*; the individual so called was sometimes an amir of long service holding a high office (or an undefined honoured position), and sometimes merely an amir with long service. The words of the historian concerning the title *amīr kabīr*, are of special importance. He states that this title had formerly been granted 'to all those who had seniority in service and in years' (*li kull qadīm hijra fī al-khidma wa-fī ash-shaykhūkha*); consequently, there was a whole group of amirs of which every individual was called *amīr kabīr*. This situation remained unchanged until the days of Shaykhūn al-'Umarī, when the title of *amīr kabīr* became reserved for the *atābak al-'asākir* only.¹ The connexion between long service and advanced years, on the one hand, and the title *kabīr* (sing. or pl.) on the other, may be seen from the following instances. It is said of

Kahardās b. ‘Abd-allāh that he was ‘*min qudamā al-umarā’ wa-akā birihim*’.² Frequent are the expressions: ‘*akābir*’ (or: ‘*kibār*’) *al-umarā’ al-mashāyikh*’³ and ‘*dhawū as-sinn min akābir al-umarā’*’.⁴ Even after the days of Shaykhūn al-‘Umarī, the expression ‘*akābir al-umarā’*’ in the sense of ‘amirs with long service’ is often encountered. Thus it is said of four individuals holding the not very high rank of Amir of *Tablkhāna* that they were among the ‘greatest’ (!) of the amirs of Egypt (*min akābir umarā’ al-‘asākīr bi-d-diyār al-miṣrīya*).⁵ In this category was included the governor of Alexandria,⁶ who was generally an Amir of *Tablkhāna* and sometimes even an Amir of Ten. There is no doubt that in the last two examples, the meaning of *akābir* is ‘veterans, men with long service, old men’. It is even said of the elders of the *eunuchs* (*mashāyikh al-khuddām*) that each was worthy of being called *kabīr* on account of his great age *yastahiqq kullun minhum likibar sinnihi an yudā bi-l-kabīr*.⁷ Seniority was, however, at times accompanied by high position; thus, for instance, the expression ‘the greatest of the amirs in importance and (the oldest) in years’ (*akābir al-umarā’ qadran wa-sinnan*) is of frequent occurrence.⁸ We are told that Barqūq, before he became sultan, was in fear of the senior amirs (*qudamā al-umarā’*), and the source immediately adds that Aqtimūr was ‘*min akābir al-umarā’*’ and that Barqūq used to sit in a position inferior to his during official ceremonies, because of Aqtimūr’s seniority (*qidam hijratihi*).⁹ In almost all the instances in which we succeeded in identifying the *akābir al-umarā’*, they were mamluks of former sultans.¹⁰

In the light of the foregoing, the case of **Tatar** must be given an entirely different interpretation from that placed on it by Poliak,¹ who adduces this case as the sole proof for his contention that the *qarānīṣ* enjoyed greater esteem than their colleagues and even than their superiors, and were the first to be considered for promotion.² The text of the reference is as follows: ‘And when al-Malik az-Zāhir (Barqūq) wanted to give the above-mentioned **Tatar** his liberation certificate, he caused him to stand in a review, together with others from among the as yet unliberated mamluks of the military school (*al-mamālīk al-kuttābiya*). Now **Tatar** was of short stature, and the sultan thought him too young *as-sultān annahu ṣaḡīr* he therefore returned him to the military school together with the other young mamluks *ṣiḡhār al-mamālīk*). Amir Jarbāsh asli-Shaykhī az-Zāhirī, a *ra’s nawba*, was present at the time, and he caught **Tatar** by his shoulder (?)³ and said: “O our Lord the sultan this is a learned man, a seeker of knowledge, a *qirnās* (*hādha faqīh, ṭālib ‘ilm, qirnās*) and he is therefore worthy of a horse (*yasta’hil al-khayl*)”⁴ Then al-Malik az-Zāhir ordered that he be given a horse, and his liberation certificate was written by Suwaydān, the Qur’ān reader’.⁵

The meaning of this passage is quite clear. **Ṭaṭar** was worthy of being freed, both from the point of view of age and from the point of view of his learning in Islam.⁶ But because he was of short stature, the sultan thought him too young and wanted to send him back to the military school; then he reversed his decision and freed him as soon as his error had been made clear to him. There is here, therefore, 110 question of any special privileges granted to **Ṭaṭar**, but only the granting of a legal right enjoyed by every mamluk of the Mamluk kingdom from its inception until its fall: namely, the right to be liberated and receive the status of a full-fledged soldier when he had completed his training and reached maturity. Similarly, it is clear that the term *qirnās* is here used in a sense opposite to *ṣaghīr*,⁷ with the meaning of 'major, of age, veteran'. This meaning is brought home in a compelling manner by the words of Ibn Tagkrībirdī immediately following the quoted passage. The historian goes on to say that if al-Maqrīzī is right in his claim that **Ṭaṭar** was liberated at a date posterior to that which he (Ibn Tagkrībirdī) proposes,¹ then Amirs X, Y, and Z would have been **Ṭaṭar's** elders (which is impossible): '*fayakūn hā'ulā*' bi-n-nisba ilā *Ṭaṭar qarānīs wa-akābir wa-qudamā hijra*'.² In other words, it is sufficient for mamluk A to be liberated from the military school before mamluk B in order for him to be considered *qirnās* in relation to the latter. Furthermore, we have here incontestable evidence that *qirnās* is synonymous with *kabīr* and *qadīm hijra*, which terms we have attempted to define above. It may be pointed out that also according to az-Zāhiri's definition, the *qirnās* is *qadīm hijra*,³ perhaps the only entirely accurate statement in that definition.

The following instance is also instructive. During a lance play (*la'bat ar-rumh*) of Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī's mamluks in 909, these mamluks are scorned by the *qarānīs* on account of the poor quality of their play in comparison with the accomplished technique of their predecessors (*mā kānat taf'aluhu al-aqdam ūn min al-bun ūd allatī kānat taqa' fī la'bat ar-rumh al-ā al-āda, al-qadīma*).⁴ The *qarānīs* could make such a comparison because they were older and had longer service than the mamluks of the ruling sultan, and had taken part in, or been present at, the contests of previous reigns.

We have attempted to show that *qirnās* and senior or veteran are synonymous. Since men with long service enjoyed some measure of respect, the extent to which a *qirnās* was accorded honour and respect derived from his seniority. The *qarānīs* did not, in the long run, retain this prestige, as a consequence of the ever-increasing ascendancy of the *mushtarawā-ajlāb*, which, since the reign of Barqūq and especially since the middle of the 9th century, overshadowed every other aspect of the Mamluk state. There did remain a certain number

of *qarānīs* who were honoured and respected until the very end of the Mamluk kingdom as *individuals*; but the status of the *qarānīs* as a *group* became progressively worse,⁵ although they remained second only to the *mushtarawā* and constituted the only body capable of offering them any resistance.¹

The sources enable us to determine the status of the *qarānīs* in relation to that of the *mushtarawā* in three essential areas: in battle, in pay, and in the distribution of feudal estates. In all of these, severe discrimination against the *qarānīs* is evident. We shall deal separately with each area.

A. *Qarānīṣ* and *Mushtarawā* in Battle

One of the distinct marks of the reduced fighting spirit among the Circassians was the sultan's practice of relieving his *mushtarawā* of the burden of war in order to place it on the shoulders of the mamluks of the former sultans, especially those of the sultan whom he had succeeded. Thus Aynāl sends the *zāhirīya* Jaqmaq into battle, while Khushqadam sends the *aynālīya*, Qāyṭbāy sends the *khusqadamīya*, and al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawri sends the mamluks of *az-Zāhir* Qānṣūh, al-Ashraf Jānblāt, and al-'Ādil Ṭumānbāy.² Participation in the military expedition was considered a substitute for banishment and exile.³ Instances are known in which expeditionary forces were sent out without including a single one of the *julbān*, a procedure which aroused the wrath of the *qarānīṣ*.⁴ In one such force, numbering 2,400 men, there were only 500 *julbān*, the rest being *qarānīṣ*.⁵ In the battle of Amid (836) Sultan Barsbāy wished to send the *qarānīṣ* to lead the attack and to leave his *julbān* at the rear. He claimed that he was motivated by the *julbān*'s ignorance of the ways of war; but the army was convinced that the real reason was that he wished to spare his own mamluks and to increase the number of casualties in the other categories of mamluks.⁶ It is also mentioned in connexion with other battles that the *ajlāb* fought indolently in comparison with other units.⁷ This was especially evident in the battle of Marj Dābiq, in which al-Ghawri incited his *ajlāb* not to fight, so that the brunt of the battle might fall on the *qarānīṣ*. And, indeed, most of the losses suffered during the engagement were among the *qarānīṣ*, while the *ajlāb* lost only a handful of men 'for they did not fight in that battle at all, and showed no chivalry and no bravery, as though they had been "timbers propped up"' (*fa-innaḥum lam yuqātilū fī ḥādhihi al-waq' a shay', wa-lā zahara lahum furūsīya fa-ka-annahum khushub musannada*).¹ The fact that the sultan protected his own mamluks and spared them from participation in battle had a disastrous effect on their fighting efficiency.² According to this historian, a single *qirnās* is worth ten *ajlāb* in battle.³

B. Payments to the *qarānīs* and the *Mushtarawāt*

The iniquitous treatment of the *qarānīs* stands out even more clearly in matters of pay. Whereas one might expect a veteran soldier to receive higher pay than a more recent recruit of the same rank, we are here confronted with precisely the opposite procedure. The *qarānīs* received at best the same pay as the *julbān*, and generally much less. They sometimes received no pay whatever, while the *julbān* received their full or partial payments; the evidence is presented below.

In 837, while the *julbān* received their customary pay, the *qarānīs* and the *awlād an-nās* received nothing.⁴ In 891 the *julbān* received 50 dinars per man, the *qarānīs* 25.⁵ In 891 there is a bonus of 10 dinars per man for the *julbān*, 5 dinars for the *qarānīs*, 3 dinars for the *sayfiya*.⁶ In 894 the *julbān* receive 50 dinars, the *qarānīs* 25 dinars.⁷ In 894 the *julbān* receive 50 dinars, the *qarānīs* 25 dinars.⁸ In 901 the *julbān* receive 100 dinars, the veterans among the *qarānīs* and the *sayfiya* receive 100 dinars, and those with relatively less service, only 50 dinars.⁹ In 917 the *mushtarawāt* receive 50 dinars, the *qarānīs* and the *sayfiya* receive nothing. This act of the sultan's almost precipitates a rebellion.¹⁰ In 918 only the *julbān* receive the full allowance of 3,000 dirhams for the clothes (*Kiswa*)¹¹; this is one of the rare instances in which the *qarānīs* received equal pay with the *ajlāb*. In 920 the *qarānīs* do not receive payment for their meat rations for some six months.¹² In 920 the *julbān* who were members of the expeditionary corps were paid in Damascus, while the *qarānīs* were not paid.¹³ In 920 the sultan agrees to pay the *julbān* 50 dinars, but he refuses to pay anything to the *qarānīs* and the *sayfiya*.¹⁴ In 921 the *julbān* receive 50 dinars, the *qarānīs* receive nothing.¹⁵ In 921 the *julbān* receive 50 dinars, as do the mamluks of *Qāyṭabāy*, who are young and black-bearded, while the older *qarānīs*, the *sayfiya*, the *awlād an-nās*, and the soldiers of *aṭ-ṭabaqa al-khāmisa*¹ receive nothing.² In 921 the *qarānīs*, *sayfiya*, and *awlād an-nās* receive no pay, unlike the *julbān*.³ In 921 the weaker *qarānīs* and *awlād an-nās* receive no pay.⁴ In 922, when the sultan was absolutely certain that the Ottoman sultan was about to attack his kingdom, he did his best to pacify the *qarānīs* and paid them for their meat ration and for their horses the sums which had been delayed at the *dīwān*.⁵ Nevertheless, at Aleppo, on the day of the battle of Marj Dābiq, he pays the *julbān* and gives nothing to the *qarānīs* and the *awlād an-nās*.⁶

These passages require no comment. We see here how the sources

mention the *qarānīs*, the *sayfīya*, and the *awlād an-nās* in the same breath as units wronged and mistreated in matters of pay. Another striking example of the oppression of the *qarānīs* is provided by the following: Qānṣūh al-Ghawri, who came to power in 906, distributed horses to them for the first time only in 918⁷; thus he neglected the renewal of this unit's mounts *for twelve years*.

C. The Distribution of Fiefs

The same picture obtains in connexion with the distribution of feudal estates. The claim that under the Circassian sultans the *qarānīs* 'had the right of priority to fiefs, which was often contested by the freedmen of the reigning sultan 'puts matters in a totally wrong light, and is contradicted by a number of passages adduced by Poliak himself.⁸ What actually occurred was that the *ajlāb* robbed the *qarānīs* of their estates, and did not shrink from callous and murderous deeds. This they did without any interference, and generally with the sultan's support or tacit approval. Some examples follow.

During the plague of 864 Sultan Aynāl and his *ajlāb* decided to transfer the fiefs of the victims of the plague to the *ajlāb*. Those who suffered most from this plot were the *qarānīs*. Only those of them who made use of the stratagem of registering the request for a vacant fief not only in their own name, but also in the name of one of the *ajlāb* of their acquaintance, received some of these fiefs. During this plague the *ajlāb* massed enormous quantities of fiefs, which were taken from them after Khushqadam's rise to power and were distributed among his mamluks.¹ In other words, their estates were taken from them as soon as they themselves became *qarānīs*.

In Dhū al-Qa'da 912 one of the *mamālīk al-qarānīša* became ill and was about to die. Some of the *ajlāb* hoped to acquire his fief after his death, but the *qirnās* regained his health. The *ajlāb* then killed him as he was on his way to the citadel, so that they might obtain his fief. None was punished, although the fief was handed over to others.²

The following information is most instructive: in Muharram 920, one of the *mamālīk al-qarānīša* was found dead. He had been strangled with a wire, stripped naked, and thrown upon the highway. His assailants were unknown, but it was said that the *ajlāb* had killed him, for *they had similarly treated a great number (jamā'a kathīra) of the mamālīk al-qarānīs on account of their fiefs*. Those *qarānīs* had been slain without protest from any quarter (*wa-lam tantāṭih fī dhāka skā'an*). In those days the situation had become most unstable; the *ajlāb* killed whom they pleased on account of his fief, and if the murderer was brought before the sultan, the affair would be ignored.³

From the foregoing, it becomes evident that the twin contentions, (a) that the *qarānīs* belonged to diverse ranks and units, and (b) occupied a specially honoured position in the Mamluk state, are

entirely without foundation.

There remains Poliak's claim regarding the status of the *qarānīs* in Circassia or rather both in Circassia and in the Mamluk kingdom, as expressed in the following statements: 'the ruling power was practically held by the same group in Circassia and in the Mamluk kingdom. This group is called in the mamluk sources *al-qarānīs . . .*', or 'During the second period, the Circassian *qarānīs* stood at the head of the feudal element...of the region north of the Black Sea'.¹ This claim need not be refuted in detail for two reasons, first: Poliak does not furnish the slightest proof to support it, and second: there is, to the best of our knowledge, no scrap of information in the Mamluk sources from which it might be inferred directly or indirectly that the *qarānīs* constituted a superior caste in Circassia. Further, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that the *qarānīs* had any closer connexions with Circassia than the *juḡbān-mushtarawāt* or the *sayfīya*, or any other group of mamluks which emigrated from its country of origin to the Mamluk kingdom.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ab **ū** al Fid**ā**'

Ab **ū** Sh**ā**ma

Daw'

Dur' al-Fidā

Durar **Hajar**

*Duwal-al-Islā***m**

*Fawā***t**

Husn

Husn

Ibn al-Fur**ā**t

Ibn Iy**ā**s

Ibn Kath**īr**

Ibn Khald**ū**n

Ibn Mam**ā**t**ī**

Ibn Shadd**ā**d

Ibn ash-Shihna

Ibn Zunbul.

Khifāṭ

Manhal

Ab **ū** al-Fid**ā**', *Kitāb* ^{al-Makhar} *jī Ta'rīkh al-Bashar*, Cairo, 1325 H.

Ab **ū** Sh**ā**ma, *Kitāb* ^{al-Bawāṭir} *al-Lāmi'*, Cairo, 1287–8 H.

as-Sakhawī, *ad-Daw'* *al-Lāmi'*, Cairo, 1353–5 H.

Al-Qalqashandī, ^{Dur' al-Fidā} *al-Lāmi'*, Cairo, 1906.

Ibn al-'Asqalānī, *ad-Durar al-Kāmina*, Hyderabad, 1348–1350 H.

Adh-Dhahabī, *Duwal al-Islām*, Hyderabad, 1337 H.

Al-Kutubī, *Fawāṭ al-Wafayā*, Cairo, 1299 H.

Ibn Taghrībīrdī, ^{Husn} *ad-Duhūr*, ed. Popper, Leiden, 1930.

^{al-Sayyid, Iṣṣam al-Makhar} *al-Lāmi'*, Cairo, 1219 H.

Ibn al-Fur**ā**t, *Ta'rīkh ad-Duwal wal-Mulūk*, Beirut, 1936–1942.

Ibn Iy**ā**s, *Badā'i' az-Zuhūr*, vols. i–ii, Cairo, 1311–12 H.; vols. iii–v, ed. Kahle-Mustapha, Istanbul, 1931–6.

Ibn Kath**īr**, *cd-Bidāya wan-Nihāya*, Cairo, 1351–8 H.

Ibn Khald**ū**n, *Kitāb al-Ibar*, Cairo, 1284 H.

Ibn Mam**ā**t**ī**, *Qawānīn ad-Dawāwīn*, Cairo, 1943.

Ibn Shadd**ā**d, *an-Nawādir* ^{al-Bawāṭir} *al-Lāmi'*, Cairo, 1376 H.

Ibn ^{ash-Shihna} *ad-Durr al-Muntakhab*, Beirut, 1909.

Ibn Zunbul, *Kitāb Ta'rīkh* ^{al-Makhar} *Salīm*, Cairo, (litho.), 1278 H.

Al-Maqrīzī, ^{al-Maqrīzī} *wal-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khifāṭ wal-Athār*, Cairo, 1270 H.

Ibn Taghrībīrdī, *al-Manhal as-Sāfi*, Paris MS. (de Slane No. 2068–2072). The quotations from this biographical dictionary refer to photographic reproduction of its MSS. belonging to the library of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. This reproduction comprises the Paris MS. of this work in its entirety

Nahj

Nujūm (P)

Nujūm (C)

Sibt

Ṣubḥ

Sulūk

Sulūk (Quatremère tr.)

Ta'rīf

Ta'rīkh Bayrūt

Tibr

Zetterstéen

Zubda

and the portions of the MS. of the Egyptian National Library which complete that MS. The division of the work into volumes in the Jerusalem library is arbitrary. It is to this division that the quotations figuring below refer.

Al-Madīna b. Abī al-Faḥḥ, *An-Nahj as-Sadīd* (in Patrologia Orientalis, vols. xii, xiv, xx).

Ibn Taghrībīrdī, *an-Nujūm az-Zāhira*, ed. Popper, Leiden, 1909 and onwards.

Ibn Taghrībīrdī, *an-Nujūm az-Zāhira*, Cairo, 1934–1942.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt az-Zamān*, Chicago, 1907.

Al-Qalqashandī, (ḥab al-Faḥḥ), Cairo, 1913–19.

Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-Sulūk li-Ma'rifat ad-Duwal wal-Mulūk*, Cairo, 1934–1942.

Quatremère's translation of *as-Sulūk*, Paris, 1837–1844.

Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *at-Ta'rīf li-ash-Sharīf*, Cairo, 1312 H.

Ṣāliḥ b. Yahyā, *Ta'rīkh, Bayrūt*, Beirut, 1927.

as-Sakhāwī, *at-Tibr al-Masbūk*, Cairo, 1896.

Zetterstéen (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlukensultane*, Leiden, 1919.

Khalīl b. Shāhīn al-Zāhid, *Zubdat Kashf al-Mamālīk*, Paris, 1894.

Footnotes

¹ Basic material in Mamluk sources dealing with the various offices is found in: *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 16–22; v, pp. 461–2; vii, pp. 158–9. *Daw' as Ṣubḥ*, pp. 245–9; p. 343. *Zubda*, pp. 114–15. *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, pp. 111–13.

² Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 127, ll. 5–9. *Zubda*, p. 112, ll. 15–21. On his functions, see *Khifaf*, ii, p. 215. *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 16–22; xi, p. 134, ll. 17–21.

³ *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, p. 111, ll. 8–12. *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 16–22.

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¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 454, l. 5. *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, p. 111, l. 12. *Daw' as-Ṣubḥ*, p. 273. For *nā'ib as-saltana*, cf.: *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 60; p. 210; p. 211; p. 212; p. 215. *La Syrie*, pp. Iv–vi. For *an-nā'ib al-kāfil*, *kāfil al-mamālīk*, cf. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 208; p. 215; p. 216; p. 227. G.Wiet, *Syria*, 1926, p. 155. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vi, p. Ivi.

² Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 443, ll. 2–4, *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, p. 111, ll. 8–9. The name of the last holder of this office is not mentioned in the sources.

³ *Manhal*, viii, fol. 366a, ll. 8–14.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 127, ll. 5–9.

⁵ *Zubda*, p. 116, ll. 16–21. The *nā'ib al-ghayba* was the Mamluk amir who took the sultan's place while the latter was abroad, especially on military expeditions. For additional material on the *nā'ib as-saltana*, see *Sulūk*, i, p. 664, ll. 6–8; p. 665; p. 715, n. 3. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 76, ll. 20–1; p. 140, ll. 15–16. *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 233, ll. 11–12. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 92, l. 13; p. 175, ll. 8–9; p. 200, ll. 3–4; p. 217; p. 223, l. 6; vi, p. 294.

⁶ See, for instance, Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 148; n. 1. *Sulūk*, i, p. 656, l. 8; p. 657, l. 7. For *atabak* cf. *Quatremère*, vol. i, pt. i, p. 2. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 290; p. 396. *La Syrie*, p. xxvii; p. Ivi. *Heraldry*, p. 56; p. 85; p. 88, etc. *Feudalism*, p. 1; p. 14. G.Wiet, 'Notes d'Épigraphie Syro-Musulmane', *Syria*, Paris, 1926, p. 155; p. 164.

⁷ *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 286, ll. 6–7. Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 148, n. 1. *Nujūm* (P), p. 165, ll. 4–5. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 454, l. 19, and many other passages. For *mudabbir al-mamlaka* (*al-mamālīk*), cf. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 420; p. 455. *Heraldry*, p. 65; p. 151; p. 177; p. 252f.

⁸ Zetterstéen, p. 29, l. 10. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 52b, ll. 6–7. *Daw' as-Ṣubb*, p. 364, l. 2.

⁹ *Ta'rif*, pp. 103–4. *Daw' as-Ṣubb*, p. 318.

¹⁰ *Ṣubb*, vi, p. 5. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 10, l. 27; (KM), iii, p. 17, l. 1; p. 126, l. 18; p. 363, l. 8. *Manhal*, i, fol. 111a, l. 7.

¹ *Ṣubb*, vi, p. 6, l. 1; cf. also *Sulūk*, i, p. 794, ll. 7–8.

² *Zubda*, p. 112, l. 22.

³ *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 149, ll. 7–8.

⁴ *Ṣubb*, vii, p. 262, ll. 13–19.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 485, l. 6.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 165, ll. 10–12. *Manhal*, iii, fol. 154a, ll. 10–11. *Tibr*, p. 7, l. 14. For *amīr kabīr*, cf. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 276; p. 290; p. 452; p. 593. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. v, p. xii; vol. vi, p. liv.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 804, l. 7; vii, p. 256, l. 9.

⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, v, p. 458, l. 24. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 175, ll. 5–6; p. 209, ll. 8–11; p. 210, ll. 7–9.

⁹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 319, ll. 4–5; p. 447, ll. 17–20; vi, p. 315, ll. 6–7. For additional material on the *atābak*, see Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 75, l. 13. *Sulūk*, i, p. 146, l. 3; ii, p. 663, l. 10. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 1, l. 14; p. 54, ll. 7–8; p. 124, l. 15; p. 610, l. 10; vi, p. 144, ll. 4–9; vii, p. 7, ll. 1–3; p. 420, l. 10. *Manhal*, iv, fol. 208b, ll. 19–23. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 310, ll. 4–5; p. 333, ll. 9–10; iv, p. 8, ll. 9–10; p. 485, l. 7.

¹⁰ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 355.

¹¹ *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 18. For *amīr majlis*, cf. Quatremère, vol. ii, pt. i, p. 97. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 274; p. 585. *La Syrie*, p. lvii. *Heraldry*, p. 69; p. 101, etc.

¹ *Ṣubb*, iv, p. 18. *Huwn al-Mubādara*, ii, p. 111. The amirs of the *silāḥkāna* were called *az-zardkāshīya*, and their chief was called *az-zardkāsh al-kabīr* (*Ṣubb*, iv, p. 18). cf. p. 110, n. 6a.

² This has already been dealt with in detail by A.N.Poliak in *Feudalism*, p. 14, p. 15, p. 65, and in *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 2/35–2/36. On the *Yāsā*, see p. 68 and n. 6 below.

³ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 19. *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, p. 111.

⁴ *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, p. 504, ll. 7–9. It seems that judicial authority was at first vested in the *ḥājjib al-ḥujjāb* exclusively, and that it was only later conferred upon the *ḥājjib* th *ānī* as well: *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 5, ll. 18–21.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 369, ll. 13–15; vii, p. 442, ll. 17–21. *Ḍawʿ*, iii, p. 288, l. 6.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 308, l. 7.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 189, l. 21. For *ḥājjib*, cf. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 567. *La Syrie*, pp. Iviii–ix. *Heraldry*, p. 5; p. 18; p. 58; p. 97, p. 116; p. 135, etc. *Feudalism*, p. 14; p. 15; p. 65.

⁸ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 18; v, p. 455, ll. 10–15. Ibn al-Fur *āt*, ix, pp. 162–3.

⁹ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 5, l. 16. Ibn Iy *ās* (KM), iii, p. 2. l. 15. Toward the close of the Mamluk period, we find a *ra's nawbat* *'uṣāṭ*, an office whose nature is not clear (Ibn Iy *ās*, iv, p. 450, ll. 1–2; p. 481, l. 5).

¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 295, ll. 7–8.

² Ibn Iy *ās* (KM), iii, p. 381, ll. 22–3.

³ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 18. For *ra's nawba*, cf. Quatremère, vol. ii, pt. i, p. 13. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 241; p. 537. *La Syrie*, p. Ivi. *Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 203. *Feudalism*, p. 38. *Heraldry*, p. 69; p. 84, n. 1; p. 91; p. 172, etc. *Glossary to Nujūm*, vol. v, p. xxxvi; vol. vi, p. Ixiv.

⁴ The offices of *wazīr*, *ustāḍ* *ā* *ā*, *muqaddam al-mamā* *ā* *līk* *as-sulṭāniyya*, *kātib al-mamā* *ā* *līk*, and *qāḍī al-ʿaskar* are described here only in general outline since they were originally discussed in other chapters of the writer's work on the Mamluk army.

⁵ *Sulūk*, i, p. 671. *Ḥusn*, ii, p. 168, ll. 1–2. Zetterstéen, p. 97, ll. 1–19.

⁶ *Ḥusn*, ii, p. 169, ll. 9–13.

⁷ *Durar*, ii, p. 252, ll. 11–12.

⁸ For the establishment and functions of the *dīwān al-mufrad* see Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 4 and index; cf. also the office of the *ustād* *ā* *ā* below.

⁹ cf. the office of *ustād* *ā* *ā* below.

¹⁰ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, pp. 222–3.

¹¹ *Zubda*, p. 97, ll. 23–4. *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 801–2. *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 225, 1. 21–226, 1. 7. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 200, ll. 18–20.

¹² cf. references in note 8.

¹ *Zubda*, p. 107, ll. 15–16. *Ṣubbḥ*, iii, p. 457, ll. 2–7.

² Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 300, 1. 7. *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 577, ll. 1–2. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 232, ll. 3–5.

³ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 222.

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 533–4; vii, p. 216, ll. 4–18; p. 520, ll. 14–16; *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 413, ll. 15–16. In connexion with payments to the army the office *naẓīr al-khāṣṣ* should be mentioned. His main duty was the distribution of clothes (*kiswa*) to the army *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 489–490, 491–2).

⁵ *Ṣubbḥ*, iv, p. 21, ll. 4–6. cf. p. 110, n. 6a.

⁶ *Ṣubbḥ*, iv, pp. 16–22. *Ḥuṣn al-Mubāḍara*, ii, p. 113, ll. 19–22. One sometimes encounters the spelling *dawāṭ dāṭ* (Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 140, 1. 17) and a diminutive form *duwayḍāṭ*. In the latter, no diminutive or contemptuous connotation is intended; even the chief *dawāḍār* is called *ad-duwayḍāṭ al-kabīr*, without any belittling implication (Zetterstéen, p. 187, ll. 2–3. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 363, 1. 21. Durar, ii, p. 230, 1. 7; iii, p. 109, 1. 30. *Daw'*, iii, p. 10).

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), iv, p. 571, ll. 17–19.

⁸ For example: Barsbāy (Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 15, ll. 8–27) and Tūmānbāy, the last Mamluk sultan.

⁹ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 739–740.

¹ Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 112, ll. 26–7; (KM), iii, pp. 138–9; p. 191, ll. 12–13; p. 196, ll. 15–18; p. 274, ll. 19–20; p. 400, ll. 3–6; iv, p. 26, ll. 4–5; p. 160, ll. 5–7; p. 191, ll. 12–15; p. 210, ll. 16–20; pp. 261, 1. 21–262, 1. 1; p. 264, ll. 16–17; p. 280, ll. 1–8; p. 298, ll. 7–8; p. 388, ll. 17–19. *Feudalism*, pp. 45–6.

² Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 145, ll. 3–6.

³ Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 436, ll. 8–11. In the last years of the Mamluk period, one finds an office called *dawāḍār sakīn*, with an apparently fairly large number of holders (Ibn Iyās [KM], iii, p. 429, ll. 8–9; iv, p. 62, 1. 10; p. 133, 1. 3; p. 274, 1. 11; p. 304, ll. 5–6; p. 301, 1. 19; p. 395, 1. 19. p. 485, 1. 21). The nature of this office is not clear. For interesting material on the *amīr akhūṭ*, see his letter of appointment in *Ṣubbḥ*, xi, pp. 170–2. *Ta'rīf*, pp. 99–101. On the sultan's stables and the *rikābkhāna*, see *Zubda*, p. 124, ll.

9–13; p. 125; p. 126, ll. 1–8. cf. p. 110, n. 6a.

4 *Ṣubbh*, iv, pp. 18–19, *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, p. 113, ll. 16–17.

5 Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 108, l. 9; (KM) iii, p. 28, l. 22.

6 *Daw'*, vi, p. 236, l. 6. For *amīr akhū*, cf. Quatremère, vol. i, pt. i, p. 160. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 301. *La Syrie*, p. Ivii. *Heraldry*, p. 5; p. 25; p. 130; p. 172.

7 Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 147, l. 9; p. 184, l. 22.

8 *Sulūk*, i, p. 133, l. 4, l. 11. *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 132, l. 18. Ibn Kathīr, vi, p. 255, l. 9.

9 *Ḥusn al-Muḥādḍara*, ii, pp. 111, l. 25–112, l. 1. *Ṣubbh*, iv, p. 20, ll. 5–12.

1 *Sulūk*, i, p. 359; cf. also p. 222, l. 12; p. 134, l. 16. *Nujūm* (C), vii, p. 37, ll. 6–7. For developments and changes in the offices during the Mamluk period, see below.

2 *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 473, ll. 3–10. For additional material on this office, see *Sulūk*, ii, p. 377, l. 4. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 237, l. 18. Ibn al-Furāt, viii, p. 156, l. 23; p. 215, l. 16; ix, p. 43, l. 10; p. 48, l. 4; p. 170, l. 4; p. 406, l. 19. *Durar*, i, p. 387, l. 18; p. 50, ll. 19–20. *Ṣubbh*, iii, p. 522. *Daw'*, iii, p. 273, l. 25. For *jāndār* and *amīr jāndār*, cf. Quatremère, vol. i, pt. i, p. 14. *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 77; p. 78; p. 291; p. 390. *La Syrie*, p. lix; p. c. *Heraldry*, p. 58, p. 183.

3 Zetterstéen, p. 19, l. ll. Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 111, l. 16. *Sulūk*, i, p. 765, l. 9. Ibn al-Furāt, viii, p. 132, ll. 20–1. *Ṣubbh*, xii, p. 453, l. 14.

4 *Ṣubbh*, iv, p. 22; v, p. 456. Additional details in *Ṣubbh*, xii, pp. 431, l. 19–432, l. 16; this is, however, written in flowery style, and the extent of its accuracy is difficult to gauge.

5 *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 29, ll. 17–20; p. 519, ll. 8–23. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 7, l. 22.

6 *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 516, ll. 10–11; p. 519, ll. 8–23. Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 124, l. 19; p. 205, ll. 18–25.

7 Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, p. 329, ll. 1–5; iv, p. 13, ll. 13–16.

8 Ibn Iyāṣ, v, p. 15, ll. 17–18.

9 Ibn al-Furāt, viii, p. 154.

10 Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 5, ll. 18–21; p. 155, ll. 16–17; pp. 365, l. 26–366, l.

3. For additional material on the *naqīb al-jaysh*, see Zetterstéen, p. 1, 1. 2; p. 24, ll. 8–9; p. 43, ll. 23–4; p. 57, 1. 16; pp. 168, 1. 23–169, 1. 1. *Sulūk*, i, p. 800, 1. 4; p. 846, n. 2; p. 850, 1. 3; ii, p. 194, 1. 14; p. 199, 1. 11; p. 455, 1. 12; p. 480, 1. 15. *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 195, 1. 3, 1. 7; p. 443, 1. 5; p. 448, 1. 3; p. 662, ll. 4–7. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 29, ll. 17–20; p. 166, ll. 1–6; p. 516, ll. 10–11; p. 519, 1. 11. Ibn al-Furāt, viii, p. 54; ix, p. 17, 1. 22; p. 80, ll. 10–11; p. 155, ll. 9–11; p. 159, ll. 9–10; p. 336, ll. 2–3; pp. 365, 1. 26–366, 1. 3. *Tibr*, p. 183, 1. 3. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 69, ll. 2–3; p. 23, ll. 6–8; p. 150; p. 166, 1. 5; (KM), iii, p. 50, ll. 4–6; iv, p. 13, ll. 13–16; p. 124, 1. 19; p. 205, ll. 18–21; p. 249, 1. 23; p. 256, 1. 6; p. 289, ll. 14–16; p. 446, ll. 14–15; p. 453, ll. 19–21; v, p. 15, ll. 17–18. Durar, i, p. 81, 1. 4; ii, p. 176, 1. 16; p. 229, 1. 9. *Khīṭat*, i, p. 90, ll. 18–19.

¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 456. cf. also Durar, i, p. 425, 1. 16; ii, p. 197, 1. 20.

² *Manhal*, iii, fol. 169b, ll. 14–15. For *naqīb al-juyūsh*, cf. *La Syrie*, p. lxii. *Heraldry*, p. 50; p. 83; p. 213.

³ Durar, i, pp. 350, 1. 20–351, 1. 1.

⁴ *Sulūk*, ii, p. 377, ll. 1–2.

⁵ Zetterstéen, p. 150, ll. 7–8; p. 178, ll. 7–8; p. 188, ll. 11–12; p. 195, ll. 2–5.

⁶ Zetterstéen, p. 178, ll. 7–8; p. 214, ll. 19–20. *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 161, 1. 20; p. 204, ll. 8–9. *Sulūk*, i, p. 946, 1. 11; ii, p. 165, ll. 1–2; p. 246, 1. 19; p. 353, 1. 17. Durar, i, p. 430, ll. 4–5; p. 498, ll. 2–3; iii, p. 259, ll. 6–7. *Khīṭat*, i, p. 250, 1. 15.

⁷ For a detailed description of this office and its bearer, cf. the author's *L'Esclavage du mamlouk*, pp. 14–15.

⁸ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 218, ll. 10–20. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 113, ll. 7–23. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 291, ll. 3–6; p. 307, ll. 8–11; p. 353, ll. 20–3; p. 413, ll. 6–7; p. 416, ll. 16–19; v, p. 19, ll. 16–18; p. 78, ll. 5–8.

¹ *Khīṭat*, ii, p. 215, ll. 24–6. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 32, ll. 5–6. cf. also *Feudalism*, p. 26, and n. 1.

² Ibn Iyās, v, p. 58, 1. 15; p. 63, ll. 1–4; pp. 199–200; p. 201, 1. 22; p. 205, 1. 10; p. 207, 1. 20; p. 208, 1. 3, 1. 16; p. 217, 1. 4. cf. *C.I.A.*, 'L'Egypte', p. 450. G.Wiet, *Syria*, 1926, p. 155.

³ This description of the *dīwān al-jaysh* is based on Poliak's *Feudalism*, pp. 20–1.

⁴ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, pp. 30–1; p. 33. On the *mutawallī dīwān al-jaysh*, see Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 174, 1. 23; (KM), iii, p. 129, 1. 17. On the *kātib al-jaysh* and the *kuttāb al-jaysh*, see *Sulūk*, ii, p. 433, 1. 13; p. 496, 1.1. Ibn al-Furāt, vii,

p. 158, ll. 11–18. On the *mustawfī al-jaysh* and the office of *istīfā' al-jaysh*, see *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 332, l. 18. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 354, l. 22; iv, p. 149, l. 8; p. 181, ll. 7–8. On *āmīl al-jaysh* see Abū al-Fidā', iv, p. 108, l. 17. For *nāẓir, ṣalīb*, and *dīwān al-jaysh*, cf. *La Syrie*, p. xxxiii; p. Ixxii; p. Ixxvi. *Heraldry*, p. 46; p. 121 f. *Feudalism*, p. 21; p. 30. *C.I.A., L'Égypte*, p. 345. For *mustawfī*, cf. Quatremère, vol. i, pt. i, p. 202.

⁵ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 32.

⁶ *Ṣubḥ*, iv, p. 32. cf. also *Sulūk*, ii, p. 438. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 109, ll. 9–10; p. 313. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 189, ll. 18–19.

¹ For the *muta'mim* *ūn*, cf. Quatremère, vol. i, pt. i, p. 245. *C.I.A., L'Égypte*, pp. 446–8.

² *Ṣubḥ*, xi, p. 96, ll. 5–12; pp. 204–7; xii, pp. 206, l. 17–207, l. 12; pp. 359–361. *Ta'rīf*, pp. 123–4.

³ *Ṣubḥ*, xi, p. 204, ll. 16–17.

⁴ See, for instance, *Sulūk*, ii, p. 391, l. 16. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 533, l. 3; p. 534, l. 12; p. 537, l. 14; p. 544, l. 6; p. 545, ll. 21–2; p. 549, l. 6; vi, p. 29, ll. 4–5; p. 30, ll. 8–9; p. 168, l. 7; p. 191, l. 2; p. 195, ll. 9–10; p. 232, l. 22; p. 341, l. 4; l. 18; p. 378, l. 19; p. 382, ll. 17–18; p. 490, ll. 9–11; vii, p. 545, l. 2. Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 132, l. 6; p. 248, l. 2; p. 249, l. 9; p. 398, l. 15. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, fol. 59b, l. 3. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 79, l. 23; p. 338, l. 2. *Daw'*, vi, p. 202, ll. 15–16. cf. also: *C.I.A., L'Égypte*, p. 221, p. 539.

⁵ Abu al-Fidā', iv, p. 25, l. 25. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 63, l. 4; vi, p. 151, ll. 6–7; p. 205, l. 6; p. 777, l. 14. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 143, ll. 23–4; p. 149, l. 10; iv, p. 209, l. 13. *Daw'*, iii, p. 280, l. 3; vi, p. 201, l. 5; p. 227, l. 28.

⁶ See pp. 63–64 and n. 1 on p. 64.

⁷ *Suluk*, i, p. 405, ll. 8–12.

⁸ *Sulūk*, i, 418, ll. 8–11.

¹ *Sulūk*, i, p. 438, ll. 3–9. *Khīṭaṭ*, ii, p. 301. When the Abbasid Caliph comes to Egypt and asks for Baybars' help, the Mamluk sultan appoints the following office-holders in his service: *khāzindār*, *dawādār*, *usūdār*, *wazīr* (*Sulūk*, i, pp. 452–9).

² *Sulūk*, 699, ll. 4–11.

³ Zetterstéen, p. 24; p. 37; p. 43; p. 57; p. 81; p. 108; p. 130; p. 134.

⁴ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 349, ll. 8–16. See similar list, pp. 367–8.

⁵ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 237; pp. 259–260; pp. 440–1. *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 1–3; pp. 22–4; pp. 343–5; pp. 433–4; p. 544. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 218; p. 386; iv, p. 110; v, pp. 2–3; pp. 90–1.

⁶ *Nujūm* (C), vii, pp. 182–7. *Ḥuṣn al-Mubūdār*, ii, p. 113. The pages from *an-Nujūm az-Zāhira* cited above constitute the most important and most detailed testimony in all the published Mamluk literature on Baybars' role in introducing the laws of the *Yāsās* into the kingdom. According to Ibn Taghrībirdī, *yasaq* is equivalent to *tartīb*. The origin of the word is *si yāsās*, a word composed of a Persian and a Mongolian element: *si*, in Persian 'three', and *yāsās*, in Mongolian '*tartīb*', and together, 'at-*tartīb* ath-thalāth'. This name emerged from Jinkiz Khān's partition of his domains among his three sons, and his designating the *yāsās* as legal foundation for the three kingdoms (*Nujūm* (C), vii, pp. 182, 1. 16–183, 1. 10). It is extremely doubtful whether this is the correct etymology, since Ibn Taghrībirdī himself elsewhere (*Nujūm* (C), vi, pp. 268–9) gives a different explanation of the term, and a third one in the biography of Jinkiz Khān in his *al-Manhal as-Saḥīfī*.

¹ *Nujūm* (C), vii, pp. 183–6. The creation of a new office, enterprise, or institution is referred to in the sources by the verb *istajadda* (Zetterstéen, p. 102, 1. 18; p. 160, ll. 22–3. *Nujūm* (C), vi, p. 20, 1. 14; p. 180, ll. 3–4; vii, p. 133, 1. 11. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 369, ll. 15–20; p. 379, ll. 11–13. *Manhal*, iii, fol. 64b, ll. 14–15. Sulūk, i, p. 269, 1. 6. Ibn al-Furāt, ix, p. 94, 1. 1. Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 206, 1. 4. *Ta'rīf*, p. 190, 1. 5). For the evolution and transformation of diverse Mamluk offices, see also *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 311, ll. 2–3; vi, pp. 26–7; p. 356, ll. 6–12; vii, pp. 441, 1. 8–442, 1. 6; p. 442, ll. 6–10, ll. 12–17; p. 443, ll. 11–12. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 282, ll. 1–2; p. 340, ll. 7–10.

² Zetterstéen, p. 128, ll. 23–4; p. 210, 1. 19. *An-Nahj as-Saḍīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xx, p. 99, 1. 1. Sulūk, ii, p. 485, 1. 12; p. 497, n. 1; p. 522, ll. 12–19. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 47, 1. 7; p. 82, 1. 20; vi, p. 15, 1. 22; vii, p. 104, 1. 18, and notes. *Manhal*, i, fol. 197a, ll. 6–9. *Durar*, i, p. 406, 1. 7; p. 483, ll. 18–19; iv, p. 367, 1. 4. *Subḥ*, iv, p. 54, 1. 16.

³ See the few references pertaining to the Circassian period in note 2 above. cf. also *C.I.A.*, L'Égypte, p. 585. *La Syrie*, p. 54. *Heraldry*, p. 121 and n. 3.

¹ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 221, ll. 7–13; see also p. 191; p. 195; p. 209; p. 218; p. 222; p. 343; p. 364. *Khiṭat*, ii, p. 399, 1. 23.

² *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 221; p. 230; pp. 294–5; p. 299; p. 309, ll. 11–13; p. 324, ll. 6–7; p. 344, 1. 20; p. 367, 1. 19; p. 456; p. 521, 1. 5; p. 546, ll. 18–19; vi, p. 56; p. 201; p. 255; p. 312. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 32a, ll. 13–14.; fol. 77a, ll. 14–18. *Daw'*, ii, p. 313, ll. 15–16. Ibn Taghrībirdī's explanation that *afābak* means 'amir-father' while *atābak* means 'amirmother' is quite incomprehensible (*Manhal*, ii, fol. 42b, ll. 6–14). cf. also *Heraldry*, p. 91; p. 123. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. vii, p. xvi.

³ On the *kharjīya* see Appendix B, p. 83 n. 7.

¹ The difference between 'wul^āt' and 'wul^āt al-aq^ālīm' is not clear.

² *Khiṭat*, ii, p. 217. Through what is clearly an accidental omission, the source mentions the soldiers and commanders of the *ḥalqa* but not the Royal Mamluks and their commanders; we have re-established the omitted words, rendered obvious by the context.

³ *Khiṭat*, ii, p. 218, l. 8.

⁴ *Khiṭat*, i, p. 95, l. 11.

⁵ *Khiṭat*, i, p. 95, l. 12.

¹ *Zubda*, pp. 103, l. 22–106, l. 8.

¹ *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 2nd ed., i, p. 757.

² *Ḥawādīth*, Glossary, art. 'qirnās'.

Popper's definition of the *qarānīs* is as follows: 'Those Mamluks of the sultan who have been long in service and are in line for promotion to the rank of amir'. (*Nuḥūm* (P), vi, Glossary.) The second half of the definition is inaccurate, but this will be discussed below. The first half gives the original meaning of the term *qarānīs* but not the meaning which it later acquired and which, in our view, is much more frequently encountered in the sources. (See immediately below in the text.) In his Glossary *al-Ḥawādīth* (pp. xLix ff.) Popper mentions the later meaning (Li). M. Mostapha who, like von Hammer, writes *qurṣān*, alludes to it also (*Z.D.M.G.*, 1935, p. 221). But no systematic description of the *qarānīs*, based on the bulk of the material supplied by the mamluk sources, has yet been attempted.

³ The plural is much more frequent than the sing. *qirnās*.

⁴ The term *qarānīs* is found, in the published Mamluk sources, only in the Circassian period.

⁵ The writer's elucidation of the term *qarānīs* is based solely on its use in Mamluk sources. Its etymology is unknown to him, and he can express no opinion as to whether the etymology suggested by Popper is accurate.

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¹ *R.E.I.*, 1935, p. 244.

² The term Turks is synonymous here with Mamluks.

³ *M.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4.

¹ *Feudalism*, p. 2. The references on which Poliak bases his description of the *qarānīs* have not been included in the passages quoted, in order to avoid

confusion in the numbering of footnotes. All references of any importance are, however, dealt with below in our critique of his statements.

² *Feudalism*, pp. 28–9.

³ *Zubda*, p. 115, ll. 18–19.

⁴ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 13, ll. 10–20. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 169, ll. 17–20; (KM), iii, p. 120, ll. 11–14; p. 241, ll. 7–10; iv, p. 60, l. 11; p. 107, ll. 11–20; p. 281, l. 9, ll. 12–13; p. 285, ll. 17–20; p. 324, ll. 14–15; p. 358, l. 17; p. 359, ll. 8–10; p. 427, ll. 21–2; p. 428, ll. 14–22; pp. 443, l. 21–444, l. 2; p. 444, ll. 18–20; p. 479, l. 22; v, p. 12, ll. 8–12; p. 23, ll. 7–8, l. 23; p. 28, ll. 23–9; p. 43, ll. 3–6. These are only scattered examples; see references in following notes.

⁵ See, for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 16, ll. 10–11; p. 768, ll. 7–9; vii, p. 39, ll. 15–17. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 175, ll. 10–12. cf. also Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 383, ll. 2–5, with p. 432, l. 5; v, p. 43, ll. 3–4.

⁶ See all notes in which the *qarānīṣ* are mentioned below, as well as n. 4 above.

¹ For *qarānīṣ* as distinct from *julbān*, see *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 768, ll. 7–9; vii, p. 458, ll. 1–2, *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 4–5; pp. 260–1; pp. 334–6. *Tibr*, p. 41, ll. 7–25. Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 231, ll. 12–16; p. 258, ll. 18–21; pp. 256, l. 11–257, l. 2; p. 286, n. 2; iv, p. 285, ll. 17–20; p. 358, ll. 16–23. For *qarānīṣa* as distinct from *julbān* and *sayfīya*, see Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 169, ll. 17–19; p. 120, ll. 11–14; p. 241, ll. 7–10; p. 312, n. 2; iv, pp. 242, l. 18–243, l. 1. See also references in following notes, especially in the section dealing with the injustices suffered by the *qarānīṣa* in campaigns, payments, and allotment of fiefs.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 768, ll. 8–9.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 769, ll. 13–15.

⁴ Ibn Iyās (KM), iii, p. 286, n. 2.

⁵ Ibn Iyās, v, p. 27, ll. 6–7.

⁶ Ibn Iyās, v, p. 43, ll. 3–6.

⁷ The omission of the *sayfīya*'s name in the campaign of Marj Dābiq can be easily explained by the insignificance of this unit. It is hardly ever mentioned in any other campaign (note the interesting exception in connexion with the plague of 903, mentioned above). As for the participation of amirs' mamluks in the campaign of Dābiq, the source mentions them separately and gives the number of mamluks under the command of each important amir. The total of these was 944 (Ibn Iyās, v,

pp. 42–3). See below, p. 77, n. 1, for participation of amirs' mamluks in pay parades.

¹ See below, on the curtailments of the pay of the *qarānīs*. The term *ḥalqa* is no longer frequent in the later Mamluk period, as already mentioned. The amirs' mamluks received their pay from the amirs, not together with the Royal Mamluks and the *awlāḍ an-nāḥi*s; it is, therefore, natural that they are not mentioned in pay parades.

² *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 450; p. 852, ll. 13–16. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 678, ll. 7–15; pp. 681, 1. 22–682, 1. 3; p. 682, ll. 12–14. Ibn Iyās, iii (KM), p. 20, ll. 22–23; p. 21, ll. 1–5, ll. 4–9; p. 31, ll. 13–17, p. 271, ll. 12–14; p. 323, ll. 3–5; iv, p. 22; p. 25, ll. 6–15; pp. 65–66.

³ *Manhal*, ii, fols. 192a, 1. 12—192b, 1. 3.

¹ *Manhal*, viii, fol. 451a, ll. 7–11.

² The same conclusion is to be reached from *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 13–25; cf. especially pp. 13, 1. 10–17, 1. 7. cf. also Popper, Glossary to *Ḥawāḍith*, p. Li.

The splitting up of the *julbān* into factions, one of them allying itself with the *qarānīs*, as happened after the death of al-Ashraf Barsbāy, is a very rare phenomenon in the history of the Mamluk kingdom.

³ Ibn 'Arabshāh, *at-ta'īf al-zāhirī*, *shiyam al-malik az-zāhirī al-qā'im bi-nuḡrat al-haqq Abī Sa'īd Jaqmaq*. Br. Mus. MS., Or. 3026, fol. 116a, ll. 3–10.

⁴ Ibn Zunbul, pp. 13, 1. 24–14, 1. 2.

⁵ *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4.

⁶ *ibid.*

¹ True, Poliak is of the opinion (*R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4) that the unit spoken of by *az-Zāhirī* (*Zubda*, p. 115, ll. 17–20) formed only part of the *qarānīs*. The words of the original, however, do not warrant the conclusion that this was the Mamluk historian's meaning. *Az-Zāhirī* mentions the *qarānīs* once throughout his work, viz. when he describes the general composition of the Mamluk army. It would be quite as justifiable to claim that the other units mentioned by *az-Zāhirī* in the above description constituted part of larger units. There is, incidentally, an obvious contradiction between Poliak's definition of the *qarānīs* in *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4, and that given by the same author in *Feudalism*, p. 2.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 12–18. cf. especially p. 12, ll. 1–3, with pp. 15, ll. 5–8; 16, ll. 10–11; 17, ll. 1–3; and with p. 18, ll. 1–4.

³ Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 324, ll. 14–15.

⁴ Ibn Iyā^ās, iv, p. 383, ll. 2–5.

⁵ Ibn Iyā^ās, iv, p. 448, ll. 4–8; p. 453, ll. 13–19; p. 479, ll. 15–23; p. 480, ll. 10–21; v, p. 23, ll. 1–8; pp. 28, 1. 23–29, 1. 2; p. 45, ll. 15–22.

⁶ Ibn Iyā^ās, v, pp. 28, 1. 23–29, 1. 2.

⁷ Ibn Iyā^ās, iv, p. 480, ll. 10–21.

⁸ *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4.

¹ See references already listed above, and also others below.

² The *wazīr* was responsible, *inter alia*, for the distribution of meat to the Mamluks.

³ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 250, 1. 19–251, 1. 6.

⁴ *Ḥawāḍith*, Glossary, art. *qarānīs*, p. Li. The present writer recognized this distortion before the Glossary of *Ḥawāḍith* was made available to him. In a footnote on the same page of the quoted passage (*Ḥawāḍith*, p. 250), we find that according to another MS. of the above-mentioned source عین is to be inserted between ‘a’*nī*’ and ‘al-julbā^ān’, clearly a distortion of غییر.

¹ See *L’Esclavage du mamelouk*, pp. 31–4.

² *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 588, ll. 1–3; vii, p. 392, ll. 5–13. *Durar*, ii, p. 171, ll. 6–8.

³ *Nujūm* (C), viii, p. 42, 1. 3. Ibn Kathīr, xiv, p. 40, 1. 27. *Sulūk*, i, p. 867, ll. 12–13; ii, p. 19, ll. 4–5; p. 20, 1. 5. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 140, ll. 16–22; p. 300, ll. 9–10; pp. 355, 1. 21–356, 1. 7; p. 613, ll. 4–6; vi, p. 543, ll. 20–1. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 94b, ll. 2–5; fol. 191a, 1. 1; iv, fol. 210b, ll. 1–2. *Ta’rīkh Bayrūt*, p. 54, 1. 1. *Durar*, i, p. 515, ll. 8–11. cf. also Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, under *qadīm hijra*.

⁴ Ibn al-Furā^āt, ix, p. 176, ll. 8–10.

⁵ Zetterstéen, p. 222, ll. 15–17.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 543.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 349, ll. 15–16.

⁸ *Zubdat al-Fikra*, fol. 98b, ll. 7–9.

¹ *Nujūm* (C), ix, p. 264, ll. 3–6. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 140; p. 148, ll. 16–22. *Manhal*, i, fol. 6a, ll. 9–13; fol. 94b, ll. 2–5.

² *Manhal*, v, fol. 50a, 1. 3.

³ *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 300, ll. 9–10; p. 307, 1. 21; vi, p. 40, ll. 11–12. *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 308, ll. 30–1; p. 309, ll. 10–11; p. 310, ll. 28–9.

⁴ *Khiṭaṭ*, ii, p. 200, ll. 3–4; p. 209, ll. 6–7. *Ṣubbḥ*, iv, p. 44, ll. 14–15; p. 54, ll. 18–19. *Ḍaw' aṣ-Ṣubbḥ*, p. 254, ll. 21–2; p. 261, 1. 21.

⁵ Ibn al-Furāṭ, ix, p. 58, ll. 14–15.

⁶ *Tibr*, p. 408, 1. 9.

⁷ *Ṣubbḥ*, xiv, p. 156, ll. 7–8.

⁸ See some of the references given in n. 4 above.

⁹ *Nujūm* (P), v, pp. 355, 1. 21–356, 1. 7.

¹⁰ For additional material on the term *akābir al-umarā'*, see *Sulūk*, i, pp. 761–2; p. 788, 1. 14; ii, p. 45, ll. 20–1; pp. 313–314; p. 523, 1. 3. *Abū al-Fidā'*, iv, p. 94, ll. 25–6. Zetterstéen, p. 52, ll. 12–16; p. 53, 1. 18; p. 147, 1. 5; p. 176, 1. 4; p. 177, ll. 20–1; p. 182, ll. 19–20; p. 213, ll. 21–2; p. 220, 1.

4; p. 224, ll. 7–9. Ibn Kathīr, xiii, p. 293, ll. 5–6. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 208, 1. 20; p. 209, 1. 5; p. 323, ll. 10–12; p. 359, 1. 22; p. 360, 1. 7; p. 413, ll. 1–5; p. 541, 1. 23; vi, p. 33, ll. 6–7; p. 93, ll. 11 ff.; p. 166, 1. 8. *Manhal*, ii, fol.

18b, 1. 18. Ibn al-Furāṭ, vii, p. 96, 1. 22; p. 97, 1. 5, 1. 9; viii, p. 58, ll. 17–18; p. 222, ll. 13–14; ix, p. 277, ll. 4–5. *Ḍaw'*, ii, p. 316, ll. 14–15.

¹ *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4.

² Popper gives, in his critique of Poliak *Ḥawāḍith*, Glossary, p. L), a correct though partial explanation of the misunderstanding which arose in connexion with *Tatar* during the pass-out and liberation parade.

³ The text reads *كنف*, but the correct reading is perhaps *كنف*.

⁴ The correct reading is undoubtedly *خيال*, as in the second copy of the manuscript of *Nujūm*, and not *خير*, as in the first. This can be inferred from the context of the very same line, as well as from the fact that it was customary to give the *kutāb* his horse immediately upon liberation. (See *Esclavage du mamelouk*, p. 17.) The word '*khayr*' is devoid of any meaning in the context.

⁵ *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 509–510.

⁶ The elements of Islam and the arts of war were the two principal subjects taught to the young mamluk in the military school.

⁷ It should be noted that Mamluk sources often speak of *al-umarā'* ^{al-aṣḡhir} as opposed to *al-umarā' al-akbār* or to *al-umarā' al-mashāyikh*. While the latter are generally mamluks of former sultans, the first are mamluks of the ruling sultan, whose careers as amirs are but of recent date. The *umarā'* ^{al-aṣḡhir} are also called *al-umarā'* ^{al-khāṣṣa}, because they were generally chosen from among the ^{khāṣṣa} of the preceding sultan (*Nujūm* (C), vii, pp. 265–7. *Nujūm* (P), v, p. 30, ll. 3–5; vi, pp. 12 ff.; p. 35; p. 144, ll. 7–9; p. 772, l. 4; vii, p. 44, ll. 4–5; p. 235, l. 10. *Manhal*, ii, fol. 9a, l. 18; vii, fol. 35b, ll. 4–5. Abū al-Fidā', IV, p. 11, ll. 4–5. Ibn Kathīr,

xiii, p. 280; p. 290, ll. 3–7. *An-Nahj as-Sadīd* (in *Patrologia Orientalis*), xiv, pp. 466, l. 2–467, l. 1. Zetterstéen, p. 165, ll. 17–18; p. 201, l. 3; p. 203, l.

12. Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 96, ll. 6–17; p. 117, ll. 9–10; pp. 140 ff.; viii, p. 169, ll. 9–10; p. 171, l. 16; ix, p. 404, ll. 11–17. Ibn Iyās, v, p. 126, ll. 1–2. *Khīṭaṭ*, i, p. 91, l. 9; ii, p. 113, l. 1. *Daw'*, vii, p. 150, l. 7). The sources also

speak of *umarā'* ^{khāṣṣa} as opposed to *umarā' kharjīya* or *barrāniya*, and as superior to them in prestige. Much material has been gathered by the writer

in this connexion (see, for example, *Sulūk*, i, p. 686, ll. 7–17 and the note;

ii, p. 313, ll. 9–10. Ibn al-Furāt, vii, p. 207, ll. 5–6; ix, pp. 162, l. 23–163, l. 1; p. 163, l. 6. *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 6–7. *Manhal*, viii, fol. 437b, ll. 7–10.

Khīṭaṭ, ii, p. 200, ll. 16–17; pp. 217–19; p. 305, l. 26. *Ṣubḥ*, iii, p. 376, l.

10; iv, p. 48, l. 9; p. 56, ll. 7–9. cf. Glossary to *Nujūm*, vol. v, pp. xvii–xviii; vol. vi, p. xiii) but, since no conclusions have as yet been reached, treatment of the question has been omitted from this paper.

¹ Al-Maqrīzī estimates that **Tatar** was brought to Egypt in 801, and completed his military schooling and received his liberation certificate in 808, that is, in the days of Sultan Faraj, the son of Barqūq. Ibn Taghrībirdi, on the other hand, claims that **Tatar** was already liberated under Barqūq, viz. in 801 at the latest, Barqūq having died in that year.

² *Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 510–511.

³ *Zubda*, p. 115, ll. 17–20.

⁴ Ibn Iyās, iv, p. 60, ll. 9–13.

⁵ See above, sections on the mamluks of former sultans and on mamluks of the ruling sultan.

¹ After Barsbāy's death, the *qarānīṣ* still appeared as a force of considerable weight in the struggle against the *mushtarawāt*, and were even termed 'notables' (*a'yān*) (*Nujūm* (P), vi, pp. 12 ff. *Manhal*, ii, fols. 112a, 192a, l. 12–192b, l. 3; viii, fol. 451a, ll. 7–11), but from then their resistance grew weaker.

² *Ḥawādith*, p. 627, ll. 6–8. Ibn Iyās, ii, p. 50, ll. 6–18; pp. 60, l. 15–51, l. 27; pp. 67, l. 29–68, l. 1; p. 92, ll. 24–5; pp. 94, l. 29–95, l. 2; p. 195, ll. 19–22; (KM), iii, p. 6, ll. 6–7; p. 9, ll. 14–15; p. 11, l. 5; p. 26, ll. 1–6; p. 152, ll. 17–21; p. 153, ll. 12–16; p. 154, ll. 4–5, ll. 17–20; p. 165, ll. 7–8; p. 161, ll. 20–

3; iv, p. 19, ll. 3–7.

³ Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, p. 92, ll. 4–5; (KM), iii, p. 6, D. 6–7. *Daw'*, iii, p. 207, ll. 6–9. *Durar*, i, p. 477.

⁴ Ibn Iyāṣ, ii, pp. 67, 1. 29–68, 1. 1. *Nujūm* (P), vii, pp. 660, 1. 12–661, 1. 6.

⁵ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 383, ll. 2–5.

⁶ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 700, 9–13.

⁷ *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 677, ll. 7–8; p. 678, ll. 2–5.

¹ Ibn Iyāṣ, v, p. 67, ll. 20–1; p. 68, ll. 2–4; p. 70, ll. 8–10. It is interesting to note that the historian here applies to the *julbān* the words of the *Qur'ān* concerning the hypocrites, *al-munāfiqūn*, at the battle of *Uḥud*. cf. also Ibn Iyāṣ, *ibid.*, p. 124, 1. 8, ll. 13–15; p. 127, ll. 15–16, and Ibn Zunbul, pp. 13, 1. 23–14, 1. 5; pp. 15, 1. 21–16, 1. 11.

² cf., for instance, *Nujūm* (P), vii, p. 14, ll. 1–4, ll. 20–2; p. 411, ll. 5–12. *Ḥawāḍith*, p. 171; p. 553, ll. 10–13. Ibn Iyāṣ, v, p. 22, ll. 10–23; p. 23, ll. 7–8.

³ *Nujūm* (P), vi, p. 641, ll. 2–5. cf. also errata on p. Lii of same volume.

⁴ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 174, 1. 16–175, 1. 2; p. 175, ll. 10–12.

⁵ Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, p. 231, 1. 12.

⁶ Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, p. 131, 1. 12.

⁷ Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, pp. 256, 1. 11–257, 1. 2.

⁸ Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, p. 258, ll. 18–21.

⁹ Ibn Iyāṣ (KM), iii, p. 312, n. 2; p. 313, n. 1. Most of the oppressive measures were, of course, taken against the new *qarāniṣa*, viz. yesterday's *ajlāb*, who had been displaced by the mamluks of the reigning sultan.

¹⁰ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, pp. 242, 1. 18–243, 1. 3.

¹¹ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 285, ll. 17–20.

¹² Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 359, ll. 8–10.

¹³ Ibn Iyāṣ, iv, p. 401, ll. 14–23; p. 404, ll. 11–16.

14Ibn Iy^ās, iv, pp. 430, l. 22–431, l. 17.

15Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 434, ll. 9–14.

¹ Soldiers of the *ṭabāga al-kh^āmisa* were the arquebusiers of the Mamluk army and held a very inferior status.

² Ibn Iy^ās, iv, pp. 443, l. 21–444, l. 3.

³ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 446, ll. 2–4.

⁴ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 448, ll. 4–8.

⁵ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 12, ll. 9–12.

⁶ Ibn Iy^ās, v, p. 61, ll. 8–15.

⁷ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 281, ll. 8–13. It is important to note that it was sometimes required of the *qarānīṣ* to pay the badil, the payment for exemption from military service, in the same manner as the *awl^ād an-n^ās* (Ibn Iy^ās, ii, p. 232, ll. 21–2; (KM), iii, p. 214, ll. 21–2; pp. 256, l. 11–257, l. 2). Such treatment of the *qarānīṣ* is infrequent, it is true, but in connexion with the *jul^ān* it is totally unheard of. On account of their higher age, there were among the *qarānīṣ* a greater proportion of men unfit for military service, and that is probably the reason why some of them were sometimes required to pay a sum of money instead of going forth to battle. This fact in no way contradicts the sources' claim that the military competence of the *qarānīṣ* was higher than that of *julb^ān*.

⁸ From *Manhal*, iii, fol. 186a, ll. 18–23 (more correctly fol. 185b), on which Poliak bases his claim that the *qarānīṣ* had the right of priority to fiefs (Feudalism, p. 29 and n. 1), precisely the opposite is to be inferred. Ibn Taghribirdī does not mention the *qarānīṣ* at all in that passage, but he complains bitterly of the fact that the affairs of the kingdom were turned upside down and its good old usages were totally transformed, as may be seen from the preference of the Circassians over the other races, and of the *ajl^āb* over the veteran mamluks. It was the *ajl^āb* who received the larger fiefs, and it was this granting of precedence to the *ṣaghīr* over the *kabīr* which, in the historian's view, was one of the main causes of the decline of the Mamluk kingdom. (See my 'The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom', *J.A.O.S.*, 1949, p. 140). Poliak calls the *qarānīṣ* 'Caucasian nobility' or 'Caucasian noblemen' (*Feudalism*, p. 2; cf. also p. 29, top, with the references given in n. 1 and n. 2 on the same page).

¹ *Ḥawāḍith*, pp. 334–6.

² Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 207, ll. 11–20.

³ Ibn Iy^ās, iv, p. 358, ll. 16–23. Some of Poliak's secondary conclusions

must also be contested. The arguments he adduces from Amir Khushqadam as-Savfī and from the private soldier Lājīn bear no relation whatever to the *qarānīṣ*. If Khushqadam lacked prestige among the members of his own race in spite of his bravery (*Manhal*, iii, fol. 48a, ll. 9–10), it was probably because he was a *sayfī*. Lājīn was admired by the Circassians, but not for being a *qirnāṣ* (cf. ‘The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom’, *J.A.O.S.*, 1949, pp. 143–4). As for the unpretentious dress worn by Sūdūn ^{as-Zāhiri}, according to the custom of the former *qarānīṣ* (‘al-*ā qā* ‘idat as-salaf min al-*qarānīṣ*’ (*Manhal*, iii, fol. 135b, ll. 9–17), it simply teaches us that ‘predecessor’ or ‘veteran’ is synonymous with ‘*qirnāṣ*’ and that in Ibn Taghrībirdī’s opinion the Mamluks of former times were of modest bearing in comparison to his own contemporaries. The historians of the time clung tenaciously to the view that the Mamluks of bygone days in all respects excelled those of later times. The *qarānīṣa* mentioned by al-Jabartī (i, p. 412, l. 31; ii, p. 150, l. 30) in no way support Poliak’s thesis.

¹ *R.E.I.*, 1935, pp. 243–4.

Saladin and the Assassins

By BERNARD LEWIS

IN the year 577/1181–2, in a letter to the Caliph in Baghdad explaining his activities in Syria, Saladin writes that he is engaged in a struggle for Islam against a three-fold enemy—the infidel Frankish invader, the heretical and murderous Assassins, and the treacherous Zangid rulers of Mosul, whom he accuses of intelligence and even alliance with both Franks and Assassins.¹

The story of Saladin's struggle against the Zangids and then against the Crusaders is well documented and well known. On his dealings with the Assassins, on the other hand, the sources tell us remarkably little, and most of that refers to three episodes, as follows:—

(1) The first Assassin attempt to murder Saladin; Aleppo, Jumādā II, 570/Dec. 1174-Jan. 1175.

Sources: Abū Shāma, I, 239–240 (=De Sacy 358–9); Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 276–8; Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS. fol. 190a (=Blochet iii 563); Ibn Wāsil, MS. 179; Sibṭ, 207; cf. Quatremère 354, Defrémery, 15–16.

The attempt was made during Saladin's siege of Aleppo. The Assassins had managed to smuggle themselves into the camp, but were recognized by Nāṣih ad-Dīn Khumārtakīn, the amir of Abū Qubais, who had had previous dealings with them. Khumārtakīn challenged them, and was killed by them. In the fracas that followed many soldiers were killed, but Saladin suffered no harm. 'Imād ad-Dīn and Ibn Abī Tayy, as quoted by Abū Shāma, say that it was the rulers of Aleppo who, when hard pressed by the besiegers, sought the help of the Assassins and promised them estates and other rewards. Ibn al-Athīr, followed by Kamāl ad-Dīn and Ibn Wāsil,² is more specific, and names Sa'd ad-Dīn Gumushtakīn, the regent of Aleppo, as having sent a messenger to Sinān, the Assassin chief, promising rewards and asking assistance.

(2) The second Assassin attempt to murder Saladin; 'Azāz, 11 Dhu'l-Qa'da 571/22 May 1176.

Sources: Abū Shāma, I, 258 (=De Sacy, 360–5); Bahā' ad-Dīn, iii, 62–3; Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 285 (=Recueil, I, 623–4); Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS. fol. 1926 (=Blochet, iv, 144–5); Sibṭ, 212; Bustā

n, 141³; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 190–1; Michael the Syrian, iii, 366; cf. Quatremère 354, Defrémery, v, 16–19.

(3) Saladin's attack on Masyāf; Muḥarram 572/July 1176.¹

Sources: Abū Shāma, i, 261 (=De Sacy 365–6); Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 289 (= *Recueil*, i, 626); Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS. fol. 193a; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 192–3; Sibṭ, 212; cf. Defrémery, 19–20.

After these two attempts on his life Saladin, thirsty for vengeance, invaded the Assassin territories. He laid siege to Masyāf on 20 Muḥ. 572/30 July 1176.¹ Then, on the mediation of his maternal uncle Shihāb ad-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Takash, governor of Hama and a neighbour of the Assassins, Saladin made a truce with Sinān and withdrew his forces. There is some conflict between the sources on the circumstances of the mediation and the truce. According to 'Imād ad-Dīn, as quoted by Abū Shāma, Saladin wrought havoc and destruction in the Assassin lands. The Assassins wrote to Shihāb ad-Dīn to ask his help as a neighbour. He then interceded with Saladin to spare them, and Saladin, satisfied with his revenge, agreed to withdraw. Ibn Wāṣil follows 'Imād ad-Dīn fairly closely. Much the same story is told by Ibn al-Athīr, who adds the detail—possibly derived from a fuller version of 'Imād ad-Dīn than that cited by Abū Shāma—that Sinān threatened to murder Shihāb ad-Dīn 'and all the people of Saladin 'if he refused to intercede on their behalf. Ibn al-Athīr hints that Saladin's readiness to withdraw was due to the weariness of his troops and their desire to return home to enjoy their booty. Ibn Abī Tayy remarks that the main reason for Saladin's withdrawal was a dangerous Frankish advance in the Biqā'. It was to meet this threat that 'he made terms with Sinān and returned to Damascus'. According to Kamāl ad-Dīn Saladin 'advanced into the country of the Ismā'īlīs and laid siege to them; then he made peace with them through his uncle Maḥmūd ibn Takash and marched with his troops to Egypt...' One of the terms of the truce was the release of the brothers Ibn ad-Dāya, who joined Saladin.¹

Two questions arise from these events: why did Sinān suddenly take the offensive against Saladin in 570/1174–5, and what were the circumstances and the terms of the truce signed between them in 572/1176. Most of the sources, as we have seen, attribute Sinān's first attack to the instigation and bribery of Gumushtakīn. That Sinān acted in concert with Gumushtakīn, or received help from him against an enemy that threatened both of them, is by no means unlikely. But the inducements of Gumushtakīn can hardly have been the primary motive

of Sinān, who was the leader, not of a mere band of cut-throats, but of a religious order with far-reaching objectives of its own.² A more direct reason for Sinān's action may possibly be found in a story told by Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, though not, oddly enough, by the contemporary chroniclers. In 570/1174–5, according to Sibṭ, 10,000 horsemen of the anti-Shi'ite Nubuwayya order of Futuwwa³ from Iraq raided the Ismā'īlī centres in Bāb and Buzā'a, where they slaughtered 13,000 Ismā'īlīs⁴ and carried off much booty and many captives. Profiting from the confusion of the Ismā'īlīs, Saladin sent his army against them, raiding Sarmīn, Ma'arrat Maṣrīn, and Jabal as-Summaq, and killing most of their inhabitants.⁵ The raid of the Nubuwayya is also mentioned independently by Ibn Jubair,⁶ Ibn Shaddād,⁷ and the Ismā'īlī writer Abū Firās,⁸ though none of these makes any reference to Saladin's attack. Sibṭ unfortunately does not say in what month these events took place—the position in which he places his narrative, shortly after the attempt at Aleppo, is of course no guide to the real sequence of events. There is therefore nothing to show whether Saladin's raid on the Assassins took place before or after their attempt to murder him at Aleppo. There is little to choose as regards probability. The attempt took place in Jumādā II, half-way through the Muslim year 570, leaving about as much time before as after. It is possible that Saladin sent his raiders while his army was marching northwards towards Aleppo—it is equally likely that he sent them down from Aleppo, to give encouragement and booty to his troops.

Whether or not the first act of aggression came from Saladin, his activities and policies generally made him a potentially dangerous enemy to the Ismā'īlīs, and would be sufficient to explain their attack on him, even if immediate provocation was lacking.

In 567/1171 Saladin had suppressed the last remnant of the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo, and restored the suzerainty of the Abbasid Caliph. The suppression in itself was of no consequence to the Nizārī Ismā'īlīs, to whom Sinān and his followers belonged. After the murder of Nizār, Musta'ī and his successors were regarded as usurpers by the Nizārīs; the last four Fatimid Caliphs in Cairo were not accepted as Imāms by any part of the Ismā'īlī sect. But the circumstances of Saladin's abolition of the Fatimid Caliphate cannot have failed to mark him down as an enemy of the whole Ismā'īlī, indeed the whole Shi'ite cause. The suppression of Isma'ilism in Egypt; the destruction of the great Fatimid libraries of Ismā'īlī works—many of them common to all branches of the sect; above all, the restoration, after two centuries, of the *Khutba* in the name of the hated Abbāsids, all showed that a new power had arisen who was no longer content to play the political game of his predecessors, but was determined to restore the unity and orthodoxy of Islam, and re-establish the supremacy of the Sunnī

Caliph in Baghdad as head of the Islamic world.¹

In 569/1174 pro-Fatimid elements in Egypt, led by the Yemenite poet ‘Umāra and some others, organized a conspiracy to overthrow Saladin and restore Fatimid rule, and, for this purpose, sought the help of the Crusaders. In a letter to Nūr ad-Dīn, drafted by the Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, Saladin reported on this conspiracy and its suppression, and stated that the conspirators had written to Sinān, arguing that their doctrines were basically the same and their differences trivial, and urging him to attack Saladin.² Sinān owed no allegiance to the Cairo Fatimids, but an appeal to him on their behalf is by no means unlikely. Some half a century previously the Fatimid Caliph Amir had attempted without success to persuade the Syrian Ismā‘īlīs to accept his leadership, and had entered into arguments with them to that end.³ That Sinān, for reasons of his own, agreed to collaborate with the Egyptian conspirators is not impossible, though it is unlikely that he would have continued to act in their interest after the definitive crushing of the plot in Egypt. But the significance of Saladin’s policies would have been brought home to him—the march into Syria and the attack on the Zangid cities showed that the danger was immediate.

And then after three years of conflict, came the truce at Maṣyāf. The sources agree that there was a truce, that Shihāb ad-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Takash acted as go-between, and that Saladin then withdrew. Most of the sources say that the request for terms came from Sinān, though Ibn Abī Tāyy and, more strongly, Kamāl ad-Dīn imply the reverse. The Ismā‘īlī biography of Sinān by Abū Firās gives another, more fanciful version of Saladin’s attack and withdrawal. In this Saladin, terrified by the supernatural antics of Sinān and his henchmen, retreats in disorder, leaving all his arms and equipment behind. Through the mediation of the prince of Hama, here called Taqī ad-Dīn, Sinān grants a safe-conduct to Saladin, who ‘became his friend after having been his enemy’.¹ Abū Firās’s book is full of miracles and marvels, and is obviously legendary. It was written at a time when the Assassins had become respectable members of Syrian society, and were anxious to defend themselves against charges of disloyalty to Islam.² It is therefore natural that Abū Firās should depict his hero as a friend and collaborator of Saladin in the Jihād against the Crusaders and thus rebut the accusation that the Assassins had been traitors to the Muslim cause. Yet with all its absurdities and its fantasies Abū Firās’s narrative of the truce at Maṣyāf obviously rests on a foundation of local historical recollection. In this, as in his other anecdotes, Abū Firās is independent of the Sunnī historians, with whose works he was probably unacquainted. The very confusion of Saladin’s uncle and nephew—Shihāb ad-Dīn and Taqī ad-Dīn—suggests that he was relying on local tradition rather than on the written sources. The same

local recollections underlie some of the stories collected by Kamāl ad-Dīn in his biography of Sinān in the *Bughya*. These describe how Sinān and his emissaries demonstrated their irresistible power, and end with such significant sentences as: 'We returned to Saladin and informed him of what had happened, and thereupon he made peace with Sinān' and 'And thereupon Saladin inclined to make peace with him and to enter into friendly relations with him'.³

Of the terms of the truce we have no certain knowledge. Kamāl ad-Dīn mentions only the release by Sinān of the brothers Ibn ad-Dāya, who joined Saladin, but apparently remained in friendly relations with Sinān⁴—the other sources add nothing to this scrap of information. But this much is clear—that for the next seventeen years, until the death of both Sinān and Saladin, neither of them took any hostile action against the other,¹ and Saladin was left unimpeded to overwhelm first his Muslim and then his Christian enemies. Sinān and his followers still make a few appearances in the general histories, which record the suppression by Sinān of a group of his own extremists in 572/1176,² the murder of Ibn al-'Ajamī in Aleppo in 573/1177,³ Assassin. incendiarism in Aleppo in 575/1179–80, as a reprisal for the seizure of Hajira by al-Malik as-Ṣālih,⁴ and, most striking of all, the murder of the crusading chief Conrad de Montferrat in Tyre in 588/1192.⁵ Only the last of these is attributed to the instigation of Saladin, and then only by Ibn al-Athīr and Abū Firās, both suspect for different reasons; while 'Imād ad-Dīn, on the other hand, points out that Conrad's death came at an inopportune moment for Saladin. But none of these actions was contrary to his ultimate interests, and the first, carried out immediately after the truce, may well have been a direct consequence of it. Four months after the murder of Conrad a truce was signed between Richard Cœur de Lion and Saladin in which, at Saladin's request, the Assassin territories were included.⁶

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Kamāl ad-Dīn, (a) *Zubdat al-Ḥalab fī Ta'rīkh Ḥalab*, MS. Paris, 1666; extracts translated into French by Blochet in *Revue de l'orient latin*, iii and iv, 1895–6; (b) *Bughyat al-Talab fī Ta'rīkh Ḥalab*, extracts in B.Lewis, 'Three Biographies from Kamāl al-Dīn', *Mélanges Fuad Kōprülü*, Ankara, 1953, 325–344.
Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, translated into French by J.B.Chabot, 4 vols. Paris, 1899–1910.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt az-Zamān*, ed. J.R.Jewett, Chicago, 1907, and MS.Istanbul Saray 2907c xiii.

C.Defrémery, 'Nouvelles recherches sur les ismaéliens ou bathiniens de Syrie', *J.A.* 5th series, v, 1855, 5–76.

B.Lewis, 'The Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins', *Speculum*, xxvii, 1952, 475–489.

E.Quatremère, 'Notice historique sur les ismaéliens', *Fundgruben des Orients*, iv, Vienna, 1814, 339–376.

Footnotes

¹ Ab ū Shāma, ii, 23–4 (=Goergens, 27–8). Repeated in Sibṭ, 234. Cf. Defrémery, 29–30.

² Ibn Wāsil otherwise follows fairly closely on ‘Imād ad-Dīn, with some variants. His text begins as follows:—

وارسل سعد الدين كشتكين الى سنان صاحب الاسماعيليه بمصيفات وقلاعها وبقل له امروالا
كثيرة ليقتل السلطان فارسلوا جماعة منهم الى عسكره فمرفهم الامير ناصح الدين غبارتكين
صاحب صهيون وكان مثافراً لهم فقال لهم لاي شيء جئتم وكيف تجاسرتم على الوصول فخرجوه
جراحات متخنة مات منها رحمه الله ...

It will be noted that here Khumārtaḳīn is amīr of Ṣahyūn.

³ The *Bustān* confuses the two attempts.

¹ Precise dates for this and the preceding are given only by ‘Imād ad-Dīn (*apud* Ab ū Shāma) and Ibn Wāsil. De Sacy, following a different text of Ab ū Shāma, says Friday 19th Ramaḍān. According to Ibn Wāsil, Saladin set out from Aleppo on 10th Muḥarram (cf. Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, Cairo, 1934, i, 62).

ورحل [للك الناصر] الى بلد الاسماعيليه وحصرهم ثم صالحهم بواسطة خاله عمود بن 1
تكش وسار بمسأكره الى مصر وكان في شروط الصلح ان يطلق عن الدين جووديكن وشمس الدين
علي بن الداية واخوانه سابق الدين وبدر الدين فساروا اولاد الداية الى الملك الناصر فآكرمهم
وانعم عليهم ...

² Cf. Lewis, ‘Sources’, 489.

³ On the Nubuḡīya see H.Thorning, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des islamischen Vereinswesens*, Türkische Bibliothek, vol. 16, Berlin, 1913, 212–13, and F.Taeschner, ‘Das Futuwwa-Rittertum des islamischen Mittelalters’, in *Beiträge zur Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1944, 352, n. 17, where further references are given.

⁴ Thus the MS. The Jewett version says, absurdly, 13,000 Ismāʿīlī leaders من (أمرام) الاسماعيليه—

⁵ p. 208. MS. fol. 181a. The form تنوية in the Jewett text is an obvious error for نبوية as in the MS.

⁶ pp. 249–250 (translation 259–260). Ibn Jubair, writing in 580 A.H., speaks of these events as having taken place ‘eight years ago’.

وكان بها [بالباب] طائفة كبيرة من الاسماعيليه فاجتمع النبوية وزحفوا الى الباب فاعتصموا في
الناير فاستخرجهم منها بالدخان وقتلوا منهم مقتلة عظيمة ...

⁷ fol. 146.

⁸ Guyard 97 and 149. In this version the Ismā'īlīs are of course victorious.

¹ H.A.R.Gibb, 'The Achievement of Saladin', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, vol. 35, 1952, 44–60. On the humiliation of the Ismā'īlīs at this time see Abū Shāma, I, 197.

² Abū Shāma, i, 221.

³ Cf. S.M.Stern, 'The Epistle of the Fatimid Caliph al-Āmir'. *JRAS.*, 1950, 20–31.

¹ Guyard, 77 ff. and 137 ff.

² Cf. H.Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḥī-d-Dīn Ahmad b. Taimiya*, Cairo, 1939, 124–5, 266–7, for such accusations in Abū Firās's time.

³ Lewis, 'Three Biographies', 344. One of these stories, that of the threatening letter, is well known from Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, Cairo, 1882, ii, 115–6 (=M. de Slane, *Biographical Dictionary*, Paris, 1842–1871, iii, 339–341), cf. Lewis, 'Sources', 487.

⁴ Lewis, 'Three Biographies', 341. Kamāl ad-Dīn quotes a letter of condolence from Sinān to Saḥbiq ad-Dīn 'Ammār ibn ad-Dāya, lord of Shaizar, on the death of his brother Shams ad-Dīn, lord of Qal'at Ja'bar.

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¹ A source quoted by Kamāl ad-Dīn in the *Bughya* (Lewis, 'Three Biographies', 343) mentions a third attempt on Saladin, in Damascus. But this does not appear to be mentioned by the other authorities.

² Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS. fol. 1936 ff. (=Blochet, iv, 147–8); cf. Lewis, 'Three Biographies', 338; Quatremère, 354–5; Defrémery, 8–9.

³ Abū Shāma, i, 274–5; Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 294–5; Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS. fol. 1936 ff. (=Blochet, iv, 148–9); *Bustān*, 142; *Sibt*, 219; Ibn Wāṣil, 200–1, Ibn Shaddād, fol. 128b; cf. Quatremère, 355–6; Defrémery, 20–23.

⁴ Kamāl ad-Dīn, MS., fol. 196; Abū Shāma, ii, 16 (=Goergens, 22); cf. Quatremère, 356–7, Defrémery, 24–5.

⁵ Bahār ad-Dīn 165; Abū Shāma ii, 196 (=Goergens, 185–6); Ibn al-Athīr, xii, 51 (=Recueil ii, 58–9); Bar-Hebraeus, 339; Imād ad-Dīn, *Faṭḥ* 420–2; *Sibt*, 269; Ibn Wāṣil, 396–7; Quatremère, 357; Defrémery, 25–30; Lewis, 'Sources', 487–8.

⁶ Abū Shāma, ii, 203; Defrémery, 29.

THE POSITION AND POWER OF THE MAMLŪK SULTAN

By P.M.HOLT

I could not say much of the *Mamaluks*, of whom I know no author that has written in particular: neither did they deserve that any should. For they were a base sort of people, a *Colluvies* of slaves, the scum of all the East, who, having treacherously destroyed the Jobidae, their Masters, reigned in their stead; and bating that they finished the expulsion of the *Western* Christians out of the *East* (where they barbarously destroyed *Tripoli*, and *Antioch*, and several other Cities) they scarce did anything worthy to be recorded in History.

Humphrey Prideaux (1722)¹

The Mamlŭk state, as it was constituted after the defeat of the Mongols at ‘Ayn Jālŭt (658/1260) and the annexation of Muslim Syria, resembles both territorially and structurally the Ayyŭbid dominions which had preceded it. There were, however, important differences. Under the Ayyubids the territories had been partitioned among members of the ruling clan; at any given time (at least after the death of Saladin) the territorial settlement was unstable, although a series of Ayyŭbid rulers whose power was based in Egypt—first al-‘Ādil Sayf al-Dīn, then al-Kāmil, lastly al-Šāliḥ Ayyŭb—exercised a somewhat precarious paramouncy over their kinsmen in Syria. By contrast the Mamlŭk state was one and indivisible; no part of it (with one or two temporary and insignificant exceptions) was granted away in appanage; no rival ruler succeeded in establishing himself in the territories of the Mamlŭk sultan.

The Mamlŭk dominions are usually termed in the contemporary sources *al-diyār al-Miṣriyya wa’l-mamlālik al-Shāmiyya* ‘the Egyptian territories and the Syrian provinces’, a distinction which may imply a technical difference between the Egyptian and the Syrian constituents of the state, or may be merely an affectation of rhetoric. Throughout the state the sultan’s power was delegated to provincial officials, each of whom bore the title *nā’ib al-saltāna* ‘deputy of the sultanate’, but who were not of equal standing. Highest among them was the vicegerent in

Egypt, followed by the governor of Dainascus, then by him of Aleppo, then of Tripoli, **Ḥamāh**, **Ṣafad**, and al-Karak. All these governors were normally Mamlūk, although. Ayyūbid princes were permitted to linger on at al-Karak and **Ḥimṣ** until 661–2/1263, and even longer at **Ḥamāh**. There in 710/1310, after more than a decade of rule by Mamlūk governors, the sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn granted the province to an Ayyūbid prince, al-Muʿayyad Ismāʿīl, better known as Abū ʿl-Fidāʾ the chronicler. He succeeded in retaining the confidence of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who in 720/1320 granted him the insignia and title of sultan, which in due course were inherited by his son. This signified little: it was a mark of personal favour, not an experiment in indirect rule. In 742/1341, after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death, the son of Abū ʿl-Fidāʾ lost his sultanate and was given a command of a Thousand (the highest military rank) in Damascus, while **Ḥamāh** passed again and permanently under a Mamlūk governor.

The Mamlūk sultan was in an obvious sense the successor to the Ayyūbid rulers of Egypt and Syria. Three of the early Mamlūk sultans, al-Muʿizz Aybak (648–55/1250–7), al-Zāhir Baybars (658–76/1260–77), and al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (678–89/1279–90), whose combined reigns cover 34 of the first 40 years of the regime, had been members of the Mamlūk household of al-Ṣāliḥ the last effective Ayyūbid sultan in Egypt. The Mamlūk rulers necessarily derived from their predecessors concepts of their office, as well as of the administrative structure of the state over which they ruled.

The nature of the Mamlūk sultan's position is indicated by a series of observances at the time of his accession. The beginning of al-Muʿizz Aybak's reign is described by al-Maqrīzī in these words:

‘The amirs and the ^{Bahriyya} assembled for counsel, and they agreed to install the *amīr* ʿIzz al-Dīn [Aybak], the commander of the guard, in the sultanate. They gave him the title of al-Malik al-Muʿizz.... They caused him to ride 011 Saturday at the end of Rabīʿ II. The *amīrs* in turn bore the saddle-cover [*al-ghāshiya*] before him to the Citadel, and they sat at the banquet with him’.²

Ibn Taghrībirdī gives a slightly different series of events:

‘They [sc. the *amīrs*] swore allegiance to him [*bāyaʿūhu*], made him sultan, and seated him upon the bench of kingship [*dast al-mulk*].... The saddlecover was borne before him, and he rode with the insignia of the sultanate. The first who bore the saddle-cover before him was the *amīr* Ḥusām al-Dīn b. Abī ʿAlī, then the great *amīrs* took it in turn, one after another. He

was mentioned in the *khulṭba*, and proclamation of his sultanate was made in Cairo and Old Cairo'.³

Putting these two accounts together, we arrive at some such pattern of events as the following.

(1) The election of the sultan by a group of Mamlūks—this is also mentioned by Ibn Taghrībirdī before the passage translated above.

(2) A series of events at the time of the election, viz.

(a) the assumption by the sultan-elect of a *malik*-title;

(b) the taking of an oath of allegiance (*bay'a*) by the electors;

(c) the enthronement of the sultan.

(3) A state procession, the sultan riding, through the capital, with the saddlecover borne before the sultan by the *amīrs* in turn.

(4) An accession-banquet (*simāt*).

(5) The mention of the sultan's name in the *khulṭba*.

Some, but not necessarily all, of these observances are noted at the inauguration of subsequent sultans down to the last of them, al-Ashraf Ṭūmān Bāy, who was installed when Selim the Grim had already occupied Syria.

Aybak was raised to the sultanate by a group which al-Maqrīzī describes as consisting of 'the *amīrs* and the *Bahriyya* i.e. his *khushdā shiyya* who had been members with him of the household of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb. Election continued to be the most usual title to succession throughout the Mamlūk period, although the procedure was never formalized, nor was the electoral body ever defined—no Golden Bull was ever promulgated in the Mamlūk sultanate. It is therefore not surprising that the power to elect was on occasion arrogated to itself by a victorious faction, and was used to condone usurpation. Thus in 678/1279 Qalāwūn, with the agreement of the *amīrs* and the *khāṣṣakiyya* (i.e. the Mamlūks of the palace) deposed the infant sultan al-ʿĀdil Salāmish b. Baybars, and usurped the throne. In 696/1296 a faction of *amīrs* overthrew al-ʿĀdil Kitbughā (who was himself a usurper), and installed their own leader, Lāchīn. A similar coup had been carried out in 693/1293 against al-Askraf Khalīl b. Qalāwūn, who was murdered while hunting. On that occasion, however, the faction failed to take Cairo, and its leader (and sultan-elect) was himself put to death.

Although the sultanate was usually elective, some of the stronger rulers ensured that their sons should succeed them on the throne. There were two procedures for accomplishing this. The first was the association of the son as joint (and nominal) sultan with his father. So

in 662/126–1 **al-Zāhir** Baybars, apparently on the advice of the *amīrs*, raised his son, al-Saʿīd Baraka Khān, to the sultanate. The same procedure was followed by **al-Manṣūr** Qalāwūn, first with respect to his son **al-Ṣāliḥ** ʿAlī, who predeceased him, then to al-Ashraf Khalīl. The second device for ensuring an hereditary succession was the testamentary nomination of a son by a sultan when dying. Three days before his death in 741/1341, the great sultan **al-Nāṣir** Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, was persuaded by his senior *amīrs* to nominate a son as his successor. His choice fell on Abū Bakr, who was enthroned as al-Malik **al-Manṣūr** on the day of his father's death. It may be noted that several years earlier, in 732/1331, **al-Nāṣir** Muḥammad had convoked the *amīrs*, the judges, and the caliph to recognize another son, ʿAnūk, as his heir, but had changed his mind at the last minute. Such hesitation to inaugurate as son, who might become a rival, is not surprising. Indeed, it seems that al-Ashraf Khalīl's status as joint sultan was technically defective, as his father repeatedly refused to validate the diploma of appointment. The safer procedure of nomination *in articulo mortis* was also utilized by **al-Zāhir** Barqūq, the first of the Circassian line of sultans, in 801/1399. On his deathbed, he convoked the caliph, the judges, the *amīrs*, and the great officers to swear to the succession in turn of his three sons, Faraj, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, and Ibrāhīm.

A cursory glance at the line of Turkish Mamlūk sultans, who reigned from 648/1250 to 784/1382 (with a brief sequel seven years later), would suggest that in this period the hereditary principle was more strongly entrenched than in fact it was. Al-Muʿizz Aybak was succeeded by his son **al-Manṣūr** ʿAlī; **al-Zāhir** Baybars by two sons, al-Saʿīd Baraka Khān and al-ʿĀdil Salāmish; and **al-Manṣūr** Qalāwūn by four generations of his direct descendants. In mere longevity the Qalāwūnid dynasty surpassed its Ayyūbid predecessor. This appearance of dynasticism is, however, specious and misleading. **Al-Manṣūr** ʿAlī b. Aybak was installed as a convenient figurehead—a device which was frequently to be employed in the following two and a half centuries. Al-Saʿīd Baraka Khān was, as we have seen, joint sultan with his father, but his brother and successor, al-ʿĀdil Salāmish, was installed at the behest of Qalāwūn until the latter could usurp the throne. Of the long series of Qalāwūnids, only al-Ashraf Khalīl and **al-Manṣūr** Abū Bakr were designated by their fathers to succeed them; the other sultans of this house were nominees of the great *amīrs* or even of a court faction. The long continuance of the Qalāwūnids is hardly to be explained by any residual loyalty of the Mamluks towards the family, but rather by the convenience of the nominal sultanate as a **façade** for the oligarchy of the *amīrs*.

The appearance of dynasticism in the Turkish Mamlūk period forms a contrast with the line of Circassian Mamlūk sultans who

reigned from 784/1382 to 922/1517. Concerning them, Stanley Lane-Poole remarked in his *Mohammadan dynasties*, ‘As there are seldom more than two kings of a family... a genealogical table is unnecessary’.⁴ His statement is formally correct, but it is unilluminating, since it disregards the fact that in this period the group within which the succession to the sultanate passed was not the blood-family but the household, composed of both the heirs of the body and the Mamluks of the founder. A pedigree of the Circassian sultans constructed on this basis shows, first, that (with the brief and anomalous exception of the sultan-caliph al-Musta‘īn in 815/1412) all the later sultans down to the Ottoman conquest were linked to al-Zāhir Barqūq by natural or Mamlūk affiliation; secondly, that of the seven sons who succeeded their fathers in this period, only one, al-Nāṣir Faraj b. Barqūq, was an effective ruler, while none of them founded Mamlūk households from which later sultans emerged; thirdly, that the household founded by al-Ashraf Qā‘it Bāy was in its turn a nursery of sultans, producing Qā‘it Bāy’s son and his five Mamlūk successors, who reigned until the coming of the Ottomans. Seen in this light, as a synthesis of members by blood and members by Mamlūk recruitment, the succession inaugurated by Barqūq resembles the great neo-Mamlūk households of Ottoman Egypt, in which, however, the natural descendants had a far stronger position *vis-à-vis* the Mamlūks.

Thus in the Mamlūk sultanate the concept of an hereditary monarchy failed to establish itself against a rival view of the state as a crowned republic, an oligarchy of magnates in which the throne would pass by election or usurpation to one of the *amīn*. Yet it should be observed that the competition for the sultanate was not open to all: it is simply not true to say, as does Wiet, ‘C’est un monde bien étrange que ce milieu des Mamlouks, qui, presque tous, croyaient “porter dans leur giberne “le sceptre du sultanat”’.⁵ It was only from among the Royal Mamlūks, and indeed from a small inner circle of these, that the candidates for the sultanate emerged.

To pass now to a consideration of the accession observances. The assumption of a *malik*-title is obviously derived from Ayyūbid usage, which itself had Saljūqid precedents. But there was a significant difference. Among the Ayyūbids, Malik-titles were borne by members of the clan who were not actually rulers, as well as by the sultan and the ruling princes. This custom survived the end of Ayyūbid domination—an Ayyūbid who died in 727/1326–7, and whose highest rank had been that of an *amīr* of a Hundred in Damascus, was styled al-Malik al-Kāmil.⁶ Among the Mamlūks, by contrast, a *malik*-title was hardly ever borne by anyone but the sultan himself. The only exception known to me before the Qalāwūnids is the third son

of al-Zāhir Baybars, Kbaḡir, who never reigned but was styled al-Malik al-Mas'ūd. This was a courtesy-title, bestowed on him in 678/1280 by al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn in respect of his appanage of al-Karak, perhaps because this had been an independent lordship under the Ayyūbids.⁷ Within his own family, Qalāwūn seems to have reverted to the Ayyūbid practice. In his treaty of 684/1285 with Leon III of Lesser Armenia, two sons are associated with him in the preamble, and they both have malik-titles, viz. al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ 'Alī and al-Malik al-Ashraf Khalīl.⁸ It seems, further, that the title of al-Malik al-Nāṣir was conferred at birth on another son, Muḥammad,⁹ the future sultan, who many years later similarly gave the title of al-Malik al-Muzaḥḡar to his own new-born son Ḥājjī.¹⁰ One other anomaly is the style of al-Malik al-Amjad, given by Ibn Taghrībīrdī to Ḥusayn, a son of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad who never reigned.¹¹ Here the title may have been conferred retrospectively, since a son of Ḥusayn did become sultan as al-Ashraf Sha'bān. Apart from these Qalāwūnids, there is one other exception in the Turkish Mamlūk period: Anaṣ, the son of the usurper al-'Ādil Kitbughā, is styled al-Malik al-Mujāḡhid, although he did not come to the throne.¹² The close connexion between accession and the assumption of a malik-title is borne out by the practice of unsuccessful usurpers, such as Sanjar al-Ḥalabī (658/1260) and Sunqur al-Ashqar (678/1279), rebels against al-Zāhir Baybars and al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn respectively, and Baydarā, the killer of al-Ashraf Khalīl (693/1293). All three took malik-titles.¹³

The oath taken by the *amīrs* and others on the accession of a sultan might be either of two kinds: the oath of allegiance to the ruler as sovereign (*bay'a*), or the sworn covenant to support him personally (*ḡalīf*, *ḡulf*). It is perhaps significant that, according to al-Maqrīzī, the oath taken to the puppet-sultan al-Manṣūr 'Alī b. Aybak was of the latter kind.¹⁴ The covenant might indeed be of a mutual character between the new sultan and the *amīrs*. There are two good examples of this, both arising out of a usurpation of the sultanate. The contemporary biographer of Baybars, Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, describes how, when Baybars had killed al-Muzaḡḡar Qutuz and sought recognition as sultan,

'he said to some of the company of *amīrs*, "Take the covenant [*ḡalīf*]". The *al-ābak* said to the sultan, "Most of this company have been retired and have undergone hardship. Only let the sultan covenant with them [*yaḡlīf lahum*] to be as munificent to them as he can, as soon as he can, and after that they will take the covenant [*yaḡlīfūn*] to the sultan"... The sultan took the covenant to them, and after that they took the covenant, and the Mamlūks [*al-nās*] took the covenant until late afternoon'.¹⁵

A second example is taken from the *coup d'état* of 696/1296, when L **ā**chīn ousted his sultan and former colleague, al-‘**Ā**dil Kitbugh**ā**, and usurped the throne. His associates, however, imposed conditions upon him: that he was to be *primus inter pares*, that he was not to act on his sole discretion, and that he was not to give one of his own Mamlūks power over them. Then in the words of the contemporary chronicler, Baybars al-Daw**ā**d**ā**r al-Manṣūrī, ‘L**ā**chīn repeated the covenant [*al-ḥaliḥ*] to them that he would not do so, and thereupon they covenanted with him [*ḥalafū lahu*].’¹⁶

Another contemporary, Abū ‘l-Fid**ā**, gives a very similar, but independent, description of the incident, ending with the words:

‘L**ā**jīn responded to them on this [i.e. the set of terms], and covenanted [*ḥalafa*] with them upon it. Thereupon they covenanted with him and swore allegiance to him as sultan [*ḥalafū lahu wa-b**ā**ya ‘Zūhu bi’-sultāna*].’¹⁷

The distinction and the relation between the two oaths could hardly be shown more clearly.

The ritual act which marked the inauguration of a new sultan was his enthronement. Its importance is indicated in the detailed account which Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir gives of the accession of Baybars, which took place in unusual circumstances, when the Mamlūk army was returning to Egypt after the victory at ‘Ayn Jāiū. After the killing of Qutuz, Baybars and his companions entered the royal pavilion with the *ar**ā**ba*, and a discussion took place. In the end, the company recognized Baybars’s claim to the sultanate, and at that point Baybars took his seat upon the royal cushion. Normally, of course, the enthronement was a formal act in the Citadel of Cairo.

We come now to the state procession of the new sultan, during which he rode through Cairo to the Citadel, accompanied by the *amīrs* (who are often described as going dismounted on this occasion), and preceded by the insignia of the sultanate, among which the saddle-cover (*al-gh**ā**shiya*) is particularly mentioned. In it we have an emblem of sovereignty derived directly from the Ayyūbids and ultimately from Saljūqid usage. Al-Qalqashandī describes the *gh**ā**shiya* as

‘a saddle-cover of leather, decorated with gold, so that the observer would take it to be made entirely of gold. It is borne before him [sc. the sultan] when riding in state processions for parades, festivals, etc. The *rik**ā**bd**ā**riyya* carry it, the one who holds it up in his hands turning it to right and left. It is one of the particular insignia of this kingdom’.¹⁸

Becker, who discussed the *ghāshiya* in a short article over 60 years ago, saw in this an object of religious significance, intended primarily to cover the hands as a sign of submission. It is surely more appropriately regarded as a symbol of authority natural to rulers who originated as horse-riding warriors. If one seeks a Western analogy to the *ghāshiya*, it is not the episcopal glove, as is suggested in Becker's article, but the golden spurs borne before the sovereign in the English order of coronation.¹⁹

Not only the saddle-cover, but also its display in a state procession, had Ayyūbid and even Saljūqid precedents. An instance from the Ayyūbid period was in 589/1193, when al-ʿAdil Sayf al-Dīn, Saladin's brother, installed his nephew, al-ʿAzīz ʿUthmān, as sultan in Egypt, and 'he walked before him with the saddle-cover', as Ibn Taghrībirdī tells us. Again, when al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb was a claimant for the sultanate in 636/1238–9, the saddle-cover was borne before him in Damascus by his cousin.²⁰ The two Ayyūbid puppet-sultans of Ḥamāh, Abū ʿl-Fidāʾ and his son, were by one of the ironies of history accorded the prerogative of the *ghāshiya* by their overlord, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.²¹

As long as there was a caliph in Baghdad, a new sultan was formally confirmed in office by him. At the time of Baybars's accession there was, of course, no caliph, but interesting developments ensued when, a few months later, he received in Cairo a refugee ʿAbbāsīd prince whom, after due formalities, he installed as caliph with the title of al-Mustaṣfir bi'llāh. To him he took the oath of allegiance (*bayʿa*) on 13 Rajab 659/13 June 1261. Al-Mustaṣfir in turn invested the sultan with the rule over the Islamic lands and those which he would conquer from the infidels, i.e. the Mongols and the Crusaders. The territories were specifically named in the diploma of investiture, which was publicly read on 4 Shaʿbān/4 July, as Egypt, Syria, Diyār Bakr, the Ḥijāz, the Yemen, and the lands of the Euphrates, together with any new conquests. A similar procedure was followed at the installation of the second ʿAbbāsīd caliph in Cairo, al-Ḥākim bi-amr Illāh, in Muḥarram 661/November 1262.²² Thereafter the caliph was technically indispensable at every accession to give formal authority to the new sultan. A good description is given by Ibn Taghrībirdī of the procedure at the accession of al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr on 2 Muḥarram 742/18 June 1341:

'The judges went up [sc. to the Citadel] and the Caliph al-Ḥākim bi-amr Illāh Abū ʿl-ʿAbbas Aḥmad took his seat on the third step of the sultan's throne. He wore a green robe, and on his turban was a black covering with stripes of gold. Then the sultan came out into the hall by the secret door, according to custom. The caliph, the judges, and the seated *amīrs* stood up for him,

and he took his seat upon the first step, below the caliph. The caliph stood up and began the *khutba*.

At the conclusion of the *khutba*, the caliph addressed the sultan saying, 'I have delegated to you all the jurisdiction of the Muslims, and invested you with that wherewith I am invested in matters of the Faith'. Ibn Taghrībirdī continues:

'He sat down. Immediately a black robe was brought, and the caliph with his own hand robed the sultan. Then he girt him with an Arab sword, and the judge 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. ^{Faḡlallāh}, the confidential secretary, read the caliph's diploma to the sultan in its entirety. He then presented it to the caliph, who signed it, followed by the signatures of the chief judges as witnesses. The banquet was then spread. They ate, and the court dispersed'.²³

Returning to the delegation of powers by the Caliph al-Mustansir to al-Zāhir Baybars, one must emphasize that the listing of the territories conferred on the sultan, all of which he did not actually possess, was not simply rhetorical hyperbole. Their mention served two purposes, of which the first was to outline and publicize a programme of expansion, particularly into lands under Mongol domination. It is perhaps curious that there is no mention of al-Sawāḥil the coastlands still under the rule of the Latin Kingdom and Antioch-Tripoli—but at that date the Mongols were a far greater danger than the Franks. The second purpose of the list is to represent Baybars as being not merely sultan of Egypt, or even (like his Ayyūbid predecessors) of Egypt and Syria, but as the universal sultan of Islam. This claim may not have been entirely new. The chronicler Ibn al-Dawādārī, writing of events before his own time, and perhaps not writing advisedly, entitles al-Manṣūr 'Alī b. Aybak *sulṭān al-Islām* in 657/1258–9 (i.e. after the extinction of the caliphate in Bagdad), although in the previous year he merely styles him 'the lord of Egypt' (*sāhib Miṣr*). The same author gives the title also to Baybars's immediate predecessor, al-Muẓaffar Qutuz.²⁴

In sum, the accession observances in the early Mamlūk period had two purposes: first, to stress the continuity of the Mamlūk with the Ayyūbid sultanate, and hence to manifest the sultan as the legitimate successor of the Ayyūbids; secondly, in more general and traditional terms, to present the new sultan as the lawful ruler. The element of continuity with the Ayyūbids (and even with the Saljūqids) appears in the sultan's assumption of a *malik*-title, and in his state procession with the saddle-cover. These usages continued with the momentum of established ritual long after the Mamlūk sultanate had become

firmly established and its origin in violent usurpation had lost significance. The administration of the *bay'a* by the caliph, his act of recognition, and the mention of the sultan's name in the *khutba* were traditionally associated with the inauguration of a new Islamic ruler.

A comparison of these observances with the rites which accompanied the accession of a medieval Christian king shows one great difference: there is no parallel in the Mamlūk usages to the administration of unction, which from Carolingian times onwards had bestowed on some European rulers a sacral character. Sacral kingship did not, of course, begin with the anointing of Pippin the Short; his long-haired Merovingian predecessors were descended from a seagod, just as the kings of the West Saxons (and subsequently of the English) sprang from Woden. Such sanctity by blood-descent or by unction could not be acquired by rulers who were *ex hypothesi* slaves by origin and Muslims by religion. Are we then to conclude that there is no trace of sacral kingship in the Mamlūk sultanate? On the contrary, there seems to be an aura of sacredness around certain individual sultans, although this apparently did not extend to their families, nor was it inherent in their office. Some evidence of this can be shown in regard to at least three sultans: al-Muẓaffar Qutuz, al-Zāhir Baybars, and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn.

To begin with Baybars. Ibn al-Zāhir (d. 692/1292–3), whose panegyric of this sultan, *al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī ṣīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, is one of the principal primary sources for the reign, at times suggests that Baybars was the object of a special divine providence. He recounts an adventure of the time when Baybars, not yet sultan, was in the service of al-Mughīth 'Umar, the Ayyūbid lord of al-Karak, and, after defeat in battle, was travelling through the desert with three companions. When Baybars was about to perish of thirst, says the writer, God sent rain—and even a little straw for his horse. After Baybars's usurpation of the throne, the divine assistance was unremitting. In Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's words, 'Since God gave him the kingdom, no one imagined evil against him but God acquainted him with it'.²⁵

Qutuz, in spite of his short reign, so swiftly terminated by Baybars after 'Ayn Jālūt, seems to have impressed his contemporaries as possessing a degree of sanctity. His tomb was a place of pilgrimage until Baybars ordered his exhumation and its demolition.²⁶ A Maghribī diviner, we are told, prognosticated the reign of Qutuz and his defeat of the Mongols nearly 10 years before his accession. In another anecdote, a *khushdāsh* of Qutuz describes how, as a youth, the future sultan was assured by the Prophet in a dream that he would rule Egypt and defeat the Mongols. Ibn al-Dawādārī, who transmits these two stories, gives another version of the episode with the diviner, derived from his own Mamlūk father. In this version, the diviner encounters

three young Mamlūks, Qutuz, Baybars, and Baktū al-Atābakī. He prophesies that the first will rule Egypt and defeat the Mongols, that the second will reign long and slay the first, and that the third will hold a high amīrate, all of which duly came to pass.²⁷

When Ibn al-Dawādārī speaks of the birth of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, the reigning sultan when he wrote, his pages are filled with signs and portents. He tells of a star in the east, a three-tailed comet seen at Mosul in the year of al-Nāṣir's birth, which signified that the child would live thrice thirty years. A holy man saw in a dream the Imām 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, come from the Ḥijāz to restore al-Nāṣir for his third reign, after which the sultan would conquer Baghdad. There is an eschatological flavour about this anecdote; al-Nāṣir seems a Muslim counterpart of the Emperor of the Last Days in medieval Christian millenarianism. Another anecdote (which Ibn al-Dawādārī gives twice in different contexts) tells of a mysterious voice which spoke to Saladin as a youth, foretelling his victories and those of Baybars and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.²⁸ Much of this may have been propaganda or flattery, but it is significant that it took the form it did, suggesting a popular readiness to see a sultan as personally God's chosen and not merely God's delegate.

The primary function of an early Mamlūk sultan was to wage war against external enemies. Just as the accession observances had a twofold derivation, from the traditions of the Ayyūbids (and ultimately of the Saljūqids), and from the older traditions of Islamic sovereignty respectively, so the sultan as warrior can be viewed under a dual aspect. As the leader of a host composed of his comrades (*khushdāshiyya*) and his own Mamlūk household (a host which was perhaps in its structure and loyalties essentially a synthetic tribe), he was a *Heerkönig*, to use an appropriate German term. As a Muslim ruler and the caliph's delegate, he was a *mujāhid*, a fighter in the Holy War, a defender of the Community of Islam, as Baybars is eulogized in the inaugural *khutba* of the Caliph. al-Ḥākim :

'This sultan al-Malik al-Zāhir, the most majestic lord, the wise, the just, the fighter in the Holy War, the guardian of the frontier, the pillar of the world and the Faith, undertook to help the caliphate when there were few to help, and scattered the infidel armies which had penetrated through the land'.²⁹

This role of the sultan as *Heerkönig* and *mujāhid* is very apparent in the first 50 years of the Mamlūk sultanate. After the murder of the last Egyptian Ayyūbid, al-Mu'azzam Tūṭān Shah, when the fight against St. Louis and his Crusaders was still continuing (648/1250), Aybak was installed, first as *atābak al-'asākir* (meaning here commander on

behalf of the queen regnant, Shajar al-Durr), then as sultan. Almost a decade later, when the Mongols were advancing into Ayyūbid Syria (657/1259), Aybak's son, al-Manṣūr 'Alī, was deposed, and Aybak's Mamluk, Qutuz, became sultan. His murder and replacement by Baybars (658/1260) merely substituted one warrior-chief for another. The continuing dangers from the Mongols and the Crusader states prevented the sons of Baybars from retaining the sultanate. Once again a warrior, the atābak Qalāwūn, took the throne (678/1279), and, after a successful fighting career, was succeeded by his son, al-Ashraf Khalīl (689/1290). Unusually, this sultan and son of a sultan was himself a warrior, and brought about the final overthrow of the Crusader states. The threat from the Mongols was passing away at the same period.

Although the early Mamlūk sultans were pre-eminently leaders in war, defending the state (or, as they would have seen it, the Muslim Community) against external enemies, they were also the mainspring of government. These governmental functions grew in importance with the ending of the threat from the Crusaders and the Mongols, and with the evolution of the sultanate itself into an unchallenged, stable, and pacific monarchy—a development which was completed in the long third reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn from 709/1310 to 741/1341. In respect of these functions, the sultan was always potentially, and sometimes actually, a despot with arbitrary discretion, who sought to bring into submission the three categories of his subjects: the Mamlūks themselves (*al-nāṣ*), the sedentary natives (*al-ra'āyā*), and the nomads (*al-'Zurbān*). But although an arbitrary despot, the sultan was not, either in legal theory or administrative practice, an absolute monarch. As a Muslim, he was as much bound by the Holy Law of Islam as any of his Muslim subjects, although the absence of means to compel his submission to the *sharī'a* deprived this concept of effective sanctions. The caliph and the four chief judges, who headed the official administration of the Holy Law, deferred to reason of state and the reality of power by validating actions which they could not oppose and decisions which they could not upset.

The notional omnicompetence and the divine authority of the Holy Law resulted, however, in certain practical limitations on the sultan's functions. He was left formally with no scope in legislation. A similar limitation was, of course, imposed on the Ottoman sultans, who effectively circumvented it by their *qānūns*, which as a systematic corpus of legislation have no equivalent in Mamlūk practice. The Mamlūk sultan's judicial function was of greater significance. The hearing of petitions and consequent redress of grievances, although in form an administrative act, was so institutionalized, and so closely

associated with the prerogative of the ruler, as to result in the creation of what was in effect a royal court of justice with a known and regular procedure. But a comparison with medieval European development is instructive. The personal and arbitrary power of decision retained by the sultan prevented the formation of a body of precedents and case-law. No royal judiciary came into existence: the *qāḍīs* administered only the Holy Law and had no competence in these cases. Admittedly, the sultan did not personally hear and decide every case, but his prerogative powers were delegated, not to a body of legal specialists, but to the great officers of the state and household—the vicegerent in Egypt, the *aiābak*, and the high steward (*ustadār*).³⁰

A continuing practical limitation on the power of the sultan was exercised by the magnates, the great *amīrs*, who might be his *khushdā shiyya*, originating from the same Mamlūk household as he himself, and thus being his peers in status. Between the sultan and this oligarchy of magnates there was almost constant tension. Quiescent, even submissive, when occupied in foreign wars or when dominated by a sultan of strong personality backed by adequate resources, the *amīrs* at other times were quick to display a factious spirit, both against the sultan and among themselves. They derived the means to disobey, to control, even to depose the sultan, in the first place from their own Mamlūk households, the members of which felt loyalty to their *ustādh*, their immediate master, rather than to the sultan. In addition, the tenure by great *amīrs* of provincial governorships in Syria gave them not only very considerable profits of office but territorial power-bases. Even in the early days of the Mamlūk sultanate, while the threat from the Mongols and the Crusaders yet remained, both *al-Zāhir* Baybars and *al-Manṣūr* Qalāwūn were opposed by rebellious governors of Damascus, each of whom was a *khushdāsh* of the sultan against whom he rebelled.

The strength of the magnates and the weakness of the sultan resulted ultimately from the alienation of great sources of revenue in *iqṭāʿ*. Under the early Mamlūk sultans the privy purse received only one-sixth of the landed revenue in cash and kind, the rest being divided between the *amīn* and the *ḥalqa*—old corps d'élite of the Ayyūbids. It was not until 715/1315 that *al-Nāṣir* Muḥammad succeeded in carrying out a cadastral survey (*al-rawk al-Nāṣirī*), in resuming a larger share of the landed revenue for the privy purse, and in carrying out other fiscal reforms which strengthened his position,

In spite of the splendour and luxury that surrounded him, the strict and formal ceremonial of his public appearances, and the pompous ritual of his accession, the sultan occupied a precarious position. The caliph's delegation of authority counted for little in a crisis. When in 709/1310 the usurper *al-Muẓaffar* Baybars was confronted with a general

revolt, and tried to reinforce his authority with a new diploma from the caliph, his act provoked only the jeering comment, ‘Stupid fellow. For God’s sake—who pays any heed to the caliph now?’.³¹ At all times the Royal Mamlūk were the sultan’s main safeguard, but there were limits to their reliability. Those Mamlūks whom a sultan had himself recruited, trained, and manumitted felt loyalty to him as their *ustādh* rather than as their monarch, while no such bond existed between the sultan and the *qarānīs*, the Royal Mamlūks of his predecessors. The *qarānīs* might indeed form a faction hostile to the new sultan. It was out of such a situation that the Mamlūk sultanate itself arose, when in 648/1250 the resentful Bahriyya of al-Ṣāliḥ of Ayyūb conspired to kill his son and successor, al-Mu‘azzam Tūṭān Shah. Furthermore, the recruitment and training of a Mamlūk household was a slow business; hence one reason for the strength of Qalāwūn, who during the long years of his amīrate was able to build up the household that sustained him as sultan. His son, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, probably profited similarly from the long period between his first accession in 693/1293 and the third and final inauguration of his sultanate in 790/1310. Hence on the other hand the weakness of the later Qalāwūnids, who, brought from the harem to the throne, had virtually no Royal Mamlūks of their own recruitment. Moreover, it was not enough for a sultan to have a large Mamlūk household: it was also necessary for him to place his own *amīrs* in the key positions of government. This was a most delicate operation, which taxed to the utmost the capacity and resolution of a sultan. It was an operation carried out with notable success by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad at the start of his third reign.

The Mamlūk sultanate was a complex political and social organization. It had inherent sources of weakness—invariably clearer to later generations than to contemporaries—but it was a remarkably durable structure with a greater and more effective concentration of military and political power than had existed, except briefly and occasionally, under the Ayyūbids. It was not a static but a changing and developing polity. The two and a half centuries of the sultanate may be analysed into several periods which differ in their character, and in which varying historical forces are at work as the institutions and offices of the state and royal household evolve. We have to do, not with ‘a *Colluvies* of slaves’, but with a wealthy, powerful, and sophisticated medieval state.

Footnotes

- ¹ Anon., *The life of the Reverend Humphrey Prideaux, D.D., Dean of Norwich*, London, 1748, 268–9.
- ² Al-Maqlūzī, *al-Sulūk*; I, pt. II, Cairo, 1956, 369.
- ³ Ibn Taghrībīrdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, VII, Cairo, n.d., 4–5.
- ⁴ Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Mohammadan dynasties*, Paris, 1925, 83.
- ⁵ *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte*, II, Le Caire, 1932, 238.
- ⁶ Ibn al-Dawūdī, *Kanz al-durar*, VII, Cairo, 1073, 5; Ulrich Haarmann, *Quellensludien, zur frühen Mamlukenzeit*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970, p. 229, n. 3.
- ⁷ *Nujūm*, VII, 273.
- ⁸ Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf al-ayyām*, Cairo, 1961, 94–5.
- ⁹ *Tashrīj*, 110.
- ¹⁰ *Kanz al-durar*, ix, Cairo, 1960, 126.
- ¹¹ *Nujūm*, XI, 6.
- ¹² *Nujūm*, IX, 261.
- ¹³ *Nujūm*, VII, 104, 294; VIII, 19; cf. *Kanz ul-durar*, VIII, Cairo, 1971, 348.
- ¹⁴ *sulūk*, I, pt. II, *ṭaḥṭaḥ al-ḥaḥ al-ḥaḥ* lahu wa *'ṭaḥṭaḥ al-askar*.
- ¹⁵ S.F.Sadeque, *Baybars the First of Egypt*, Dacca, 1950, 17 (Arabic text).
- ¹⁶ Cited in *Nujūm*, VIII, 99.
- ¹⁷ Ismā'īl Abū 'l-Fidā', *al-Mublaḡat fī akhbār al-bashar*, Cairo, n.d., Iv 34.
- ¹⁸ Al-Qalqashandī, *Subḥ al-a'shā*, Cairo, n.d., IV, 7.

¹⁹ C.H.Becker, 'Le "Ghâshiya" comme emblème de la royauté', *Centenario della nascita di Michele Amari*, Palermo, 1910, 148–51. Cf. [E.] Quatremère, *Histoire des sultans mamelouks de l'Égypte*, I, I, Paris, 1837, p. 3, n. 7.

²⁰ *Nujūm*, vi, 124, 306.

²¹ *Muḥḥasayn*, IV, 87; Quatremère, op. cit., n. 7 at p. 6.

²² Sadeque, *Baybara*, 35–41, 61–3 (Arabic text).

²³ *Nujūm*, x, 4–5.

²⁴ *Kanz al-durar*, VIII, 34, 38, 45.

²⁵ Sadeque, *Baybara*, 9–10, 31 (Arabic text).

²⁶ *Nujūm*, VII, 87.

²⁷ *Kanz al-durar*, VIII, 40–3.

²⁸ *Kanz al-durar*, VIII, 271–6; cf. *ibid.*, VII, 8–9.

²⁹ Sadeque, *Baybars*, 62 (Arabic text),

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³⁰ cf. S.M.Stern, 'Petitions from the Mamlūk period', *BSOAS*, XXIX 2, 1960, 268–75.

³¹ *Nujūm*, VIII, 202.

CASSIODORUS AND RASHĪD AL-DĪN ON BARBARIAN RULE IN ITALY AND PERSIA¹

By D.O.MORGAN

Italy in the late fifth century A.D. and Persia in the mid-thirteenth were lands of ancient and deeply-rooted culture. One had been at the centre of the western Roman Empire; the other had formed a significant part of the society of medieval Islam, and its traditions stretched back further still. Both lands found themselves invaded, conquered, and ruled by wandering ‘barbarians’, Ostrogoths and Mongols respectively, from beyond the then recognized frontiers of ‘civilization’.

Cassiodorus Senator and Rashīd al-Dīn *Faḡl* Allāh were representatives of two long-established administrative traditions. Their governmental skills were not despised by the conquerors: both served under them for many years in high office. Both, too, left behind them copious and varied writings, whose range and character is in some ways curiously similar. This article is concerned with some of these writings. It seeks to study certain aspects of barbarian rule in the light of what Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn have to say, and hopes thereby to bring out both the similarities and the contrasts between the two régimes.

Cassiodorus’s *Variae*² are a collection of official correspondence, as are the *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī*³ the letters of Rashīd al-Dīn. Neither collection can, perhaps, lay claim to the status of an archive, for both are selections—Cassiodorus’s made by himself, Rashīd al-Dīn’s by his secretary, Muḥammad Abarqūhī. But both afford a fascinating insight into the workings of the two central administrations, the nature of the two régimes, and perhaps, too, into the minds and attitudes of their authors.

Nor is this all. Cassiodorus wrote a history of the Goths, in twelve books. Unhappily this is lost, but the substance of it appears to be, to some extent, preserved in the much shorter work of Jordanes.⁴ And the posthumous fame of Rashīd al-Dīn rests chiefly on his ‘vast historical encyclopaedia’, as Barthold called it,⁵ the *Jāmi‘ al-tavārikh*, which includes accounts of the history of large parts of the known world, including Europe, but is principally of value as the most important

single source for the history of the Mongol empire. Most of the work seems to have survived, and all the more significant sections of it have been published.

So, if Cassiodorus may be described as a ‘scholar-bureaucrat’,⁶ the description fits Rashīd al-Dīn no less aptly. Because of their positions in government, and their literary training and inclinations, they are perhaps uniquely wellqualified to help their reader to understand their respective worlds. They show him something of the processes by which barbarian peoples, lacking experience of government in societies based on cities and settled agriculture, were able to achieve their ends through the co-operation of those officials whom, in one sense or another, they had inherited from the régimes they had supplanted.

Cassiodorus’s family was not one of ancient lineage—though he liked to suggest otherwise.⁷ But his immediate ancestors for several generations had served the state in various capacities. His great-grandfather had helped defend the south of Italy against Vandal raids. His grandfather had served on an embassy sent by the emperor Valentinian III to Attila the Hun. And his father had achieved high office, eventually rising to the supreme judicial and administrative position, that of Praetorian Prefect. Cassiodorus Senator himself attracted the attention of the Ostrogothic ruler Theodoric, and became Quaestor ‘the mouthpiece of the Emperor’,⁸ and thus an *illustris*, one of the highest-ranking ministers, while still under 30. Later he progressed to the Mastership of the Offices (head of the civil service) and ultimately, though not until after the death of Theodoric, he became Praetorian Prefect. Cassiodorus retired from public life during the Byzantine reconquest of Italy from the Ostrogoths. He lived on for perhaps another 40 years, dying, we are told, at the age of 95. The scholarly work done and directed by him at his monastery of Vivarium during those years was of the first importance for the subsequent history of European culture, but is not, for the most part, relevant to the theme of this article.

Cassiodorus’s life, then, spanned the period between the ending of the ‘official’ western Roman Empire by barbarian rulers and the return of Italy to Imperial government under Justinian. In 476, Odoacer, a Rugian chief holding command in the Roman army, deposed and pensioned off the last western emperor, Romulus Augustulus, on grounds of superfluity. Historians have differed over the significance, if any, of this event. Cassiodorus himself was in no doubt of its at least symbolic importance.

‘Thus the Western Empire of the Roman race, which
Octavianus Augustus, the first of the Augusti, began to govern

in the seven hundred and ninth year from the founding of the city, perished with this Augustulus in the five hundred and twenty-second year from the beginning of the rule of his predecessors and those before them, and from this time onward kings of the Goths held Rome and Italy.’⁹

Odoacer’s kingdom, though apparently not unsuccessful, was not long to survive. In 488, Theodoric the Ostrogoth obtained permission from the eastern Emperor Zeno to remove himself and his people from the Balkans, to invade Italy and take it from Odoacer. Cassiodorus represents Zeno as being reluctant to deprive himself of Theodoric’s company,¹⁰ though in reality the departure of the Ostrogoths must have been a considerable relief to him. Of the terms on which Zeno authorized the invasion, ‘we have only the vaguest accounts in our authorities’.¹¹ Possibly Zeno was happy to leave the terms vague as the price of ridding the eastern Empire of the Ostrogoths.

After a prolonged struggle, Odoacer was captured, or rather surrendered, and was treacherously put to death in 493. Cassiodorus records this last event without comment.

‘He (Odoacer) sent an embassy and begged for mercy. Theodoric first granted it and afterwards deprived him of his life.’¹²

Theodoric ruled until his death in 526—undeniably a successful and prosperous reign. But the stability of the Ostrogothic kingdom died with him. In 535 the Byzantine army under Belisarius landed. The Gothic Wars began, and the days of Ostrogothic Italy were numbered.

The first Mongol invasion of Persia took place in 1219–23—almost the last phase of Chingiz Khān’s astonishing—and still not satisfactorily explained—career of conquest.¹³ The impression that invasion made on contemporaries is unmistakable. The chronicler Ibn al-Athīr is typical:

‘...a tremendous disaster such as had never happened before, and which struck all the world, though the Muslims in particular. If anyone were to say that at no time since the creation of man by the great God had the world experienced anything like it, he would only be telling the truth.... It may well be that the world from now until its end...will not experience the like of it again, apart perhaps from Gog and Magog’.¹⁴

But no serious attempt seems to have been made to occupy and absorb the whole of Persia into the Mongol empire. Nevertheless, the northern

and eastern parts of the country were conquered, and the province of Khurāsān, in particular, was utterly devastated. The great cities of Khurāsān—Marv, Balkh, Harāt, Nīshāpūr—were destroyed, and their populations put to the sword, almost to the last man.

Thirty years later, as part of a grandiose plan for the further extension of the Mongol empire, Persia was invaded again. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Hülegü, brother of Möngke, Chingiz Khān's third successor as Great Khān. Between 1256 and 1260, Hülegü occupied most of Persia, as well as invading 'Irāq and bringing the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad to a sanguinary end. His progress was finally stopped by dissensions within the Mongol royal house, as well as by successful military resistance on the part of the Mamlūk rulers of Egypt, whose lands remained outside the boundaries of the Mongol empire. But in Persia and 'Irāq, the kingdom of Hülegü and his descendants, known to historians as the Īlkhānate, was established for the next 80 years.

Rashīd al-Dīn was born between the two invasions, about 1247, in Hamadān, in western Persia.¹⁵ Though himself a Muslim, he was of Jewish descent, and may have been converted to Islam as late as the age of 30.¹⁶ He was by training a physician, and it was in this capacity that he first entered the service of the Mongol ruling house of Persia, during the reign of the Īlkhān Abaqa (1265–81). Nothing else is known with certainty of his career until in 1298, in the reign of Ghazan Khān, he became deputy Vazīr. He remained as one of the two chief ministers of the Īlkhānate until the death of Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü, in 1316.

During most of this period, his was the principal influence in government, and he was almost certainly the architect of the administrative reform programme which is associated with the name of Ghazan Khān. After the death of Öljeitü, Rashīd al-Dīn's colleague, Tāj al-Dīn 'Alī Shah, managed to engineer his dismissal and ultimate execution on a charge of poisoning the late monarch.¹⁷

Rashīd al-Dīn himself, then, was not a member of an old-established administrative family. His ancestry is obscure, compared with that of Cassiodorus. Nevertheless, he may be said to have inherited the traditions of pre-Mongol government in Persia, as they had been carried on, with little of a discernible break, by such families as the Juvaynīs. And he founded something of a dynasty: a number of his sons acted as provincial governors during the period of their father's Vazīrate, and one of them, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad, himself became Vazīr some years after the death of Rashīd al-Dīn.

Historians have always been glad to make use of Cassiodorus's writings as historical evidence. Their opinions of the man himself, however, have varied. Cassiodorus's Latin style is so involved and

flowery that he has frequently strained the patience of his readers. Sometimes a scarcely veiled note of exasperation may be detected in discussions of him and of his work. Consequently, there has been a tendency for his personal character to be tarred with the same brush as his prose style. This is perhaps not entirely just—one may note that Cassiodorus's *Institutiones*, for example, are written in much more simple and straightforward language than the *Variae*. The style of the *Variae* was not an inseparable adjunct to their author's character. But Thomas Hodgkin, who undertook the daunting task of rendering the *Variae* into English, remarked of Cassiodorus that 'he was never so happy as when he was wrapping up some commonplace thought in a garment of sonorous but turgid rhetoric'.¹⁸ However, Hodgkin, who could venture the remarkable description of Attila as 'the squalid and unprogressive Turanian',¹⁹ was no doubt as much as anyone else the creature of his time. Arnaldo Momigliano has more recently suggested that, to the generations who have passed through the wars of the twentieth century, the achievement of Cassiodorus has seemed more worthy of respect. 'We, the members of the race of iron, have learnt to appreciate the lesser men—the men who tried to save what could be saved and who did not disdain the task of elementary teaching when elementary teaching was needed'.²⁰

Cassiodorus himself explained his reasons for making and issuing his collection of *Variae*. His friends, he said, 'wanted me to do this that future generations might recognise the painful labours I have undergone for the public good and the hardships of my unbribed conscience'.²¹ It is hard to believe, however, that there was anything painful for Cassiodorus in the composition of the numerous lengthy digressions with which the *Variae* abound. He cannot resist the temptation to show off his esoteric knowledge, particularly on questions of natural history. His account of the elephant is a well-known and characteristic example, as is his description of what is known about the origin of amber, where he concludes

'We have thought it better to point this out to you, lest you should imagine that your supposed secrets have escaped our knowledge'.²²

On occasion, natural history and government business become inextricably intertwined. Writing to the Praetorian Prefect Faustus, Cassiodorus demands

'Why are your ships not spreading their sails to the breeze?
When the south wind is blowing and your oarsmen are urging
on your vessels, has the sucking-fish fastened its bite upon

them through the liquid waves? Or have the shell-fishes of the Indian Sea with similar power stayed your keels with their lips: those creatures whose quiet touch is said to hold back, more than the tumultuous elements can possibly urge forward? ... But no. The sucking-fish of these men is their hindering corruption. The shellfishes that bite them are their avaricious hearts. The torpedo that benumbs them is lying guile. With perverted ingenuity they manufacture delays, that they may seem to have met with a run of ill-luck'.²³

It is a matter of taste whether this kind of rhetoric is found interminable or endearing. But even those who, like the present writer, find Cassiodorus's approach to official correspondence rather attractive, would perhaps have thought differently had they had to tackle the *Variae* without the assistance of Hodgkin's abridged translation.

As for the 'History of the Goths', we again have Cassiodorus's own account of his motives in writing it. This occurs in the *Variae*, as part of a eulogy which Cassiodorus composed on himself (in the name of king Athalaric), to be sent to the Senate on the occasion of Cassiodorus's promotion to the Praetorian Prefecture.

'Not satisfied with extolling living kings, from whom he might hope for a reward, he drew forth the Kings of the Goths from the dust of ages, showing that the Amal family had been royal for seventeen generations, and proved that the origin of the Gothic people belonged to Roman history, adorning the whole subject with the flowers of his learning gathered from wide fields of literature.'²⁴

The 'History of the Goths', then, 'presented the tribe in general, and the family of Theodoric in particular, as co-operative participants in the history of the Mediterranean, from the time of Alexander the Great onwards'²⁵—or even earlier: Cassiodorus will have us believe, by means of the not uncommon identification of 'Getae' with 'Goths', that there were Goths at the siege of Troy.²⁶

It should be added that there are cogent reasons for supposing that the 'History of the Goths' had, in the minds both of Cassiodorus and of his summarizer Jordanes, a more immediate political purpose. Professor Momigliano writes that Jordanes's 'work had a clear political message. It invited the Goths to cease resistance' to the armies of Justinian, 'but also gave encouragement to those who worked in Constantinople for a *modus vivendi* between Goths and Romans'.²⁷ And Momigliano has demonstrated the probability that

here, as elsewhere, Jordanes was merely summarizing the arguments of Cassiodorus himself (on the assumption that Cassiodorus continued to add to and revise his 'History' for many years after he had described his work in Athalaric's letter to the Senate).

Rashīd al-Dīn's great *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh* 'Collection of histories', as it now survives, falls into two parts. The first part, historically the more important, relates the history of the Mongols and their ancestors in central and eastern Asia, the career of Chingiz Khān, and the Mongol conquests. It concludes with a long and extremely valuable account of the history of Mongol Persia up to the death of Ghazan Khān in 1304. All this part of Rashīd al-Dīn's work was commissioned from him by Ghazan Khān himself, and was consequently named the *Tārīkh-i Ghāzānī*. Öljeitü, on his accession, asked Rashīd al-Dīn to write a second part, including histories of all the peoples with whom the Mongols had come into contact. It included histories of pre-Islamic Persia, Muḥammad and the Caliphs, the Oghuz and the Turks, China, India, the Jews, and the Franks. This last section, it has been suggested, 'seems to have been the only attempt made by a medieval Muslim historian at an outline of the history of the Christian West'.²⁸ That this part is historiographically of great interest is undeniable, but in terms of historical information, it is the *Tārīkh-i Ghāzānī* which is irreplaceable.

This part of the book is the principal authority on the Persia of the author's own time. And because of his position as chief minister and official historian, he had access to Mongol records, many of them now lost, which make his book the nearest thing we have to a primary source on large tracts of Mongol history outside Persia itself.

Rashīd al-Dīn was fully aware of the unprecedented nature of his great work. 'Until now (he maintained), there has never been at any time a history which contains narratives and general accounts of the peoples of the various parts of the world, and of the different races of mankind.'²⁹

Nor was he in any doubt of the worthiness of his subject in deserving the attention of the historian.

'What event or occurrence (he asked) has been more notable than the beginning of the government of Chingiz Khān, that it should be considered a new era?'³⁰

He explained the method by which he gathered his information. This consisted in ransacking written sources as far as possible, having Mongol chronicles interpreted to him, and in oral interrogation. This might include both distinguished Mongols—such as Ghazan himself,

who was, or so Rashīd al-Dīn tactfully assures us, a great authority on Mongol tradition—and whatever foreigners could be intercepted as they passed through Persia.³¹

The style of the *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh* could hardly be further removed from that of the *Variae*. Though it is not without its difficulties, the narrative sections at least are written in clear and simple Persian, with no attempt at elaborate frills. This was not customary at the time.

Much more typical, if an extreme example, is the *Tārīkh-i Vassāf*, of which E.G.Browne justly remarked that 'we could forgive the author more readily if his work were less valuable as an original authority on the period of which it treats, but in fact it is as important as it is unreadable'.³² Subsequent Persian historians unfortunately elected to model their work on *Vassāf* rather than on Rashīd al-Dīn.

In view of the immense range of Rashīd al-Dīn's activities as Vazīr—activities fully revealed in his letters, the *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī*—doubt has been cast on the possibility of the whole of the *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh* being completed single-handed by its author. He himself tells us that he did his writing in the time between morning prayer and sunrise. The probability is that, like many another historian busy with other concerns, he employed a large staff of 'research assistants', who did much of the quarrying for material, and perhaps some of the writing too. This may underlie the claim of the contemporary historian Abū 'l-Qāsim Qāshānī to have been the true, unacknowledged and unrewarded author of Rashīd al-Dīn's history.³³

The *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh* has the usual strengths and weaknesses of 'official' history. It benefits through its author's access to sources which would otherwise have been unavailable, but the reader must look elsewhere for direct criticism of the Mongol régime, at least so far as the reign of Ghazan is concerned. On the other hand, there are long and graphic descriptions of the abuses which, we are told, were put right by Ghazan.

In the *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī*, however, Rashīd al-Dīn several times gives vent to what we may suppose to have been his true feelings about the Mongols. For unlike the *Variae*, the *Mukātabāt* are not an exclusively official collection. They certainly include official communications with governors, urban authorities, and so forth, but there are also more personal letters to, for example, the author's sons—and only partly in their capacity as provincial governors—and to a considerable number of Muslim men of religion. The collection includes unexpected items, such as a letter from Rashīd al-Dīn, allegedly written in India, to which, he says, he had travelled at the order of the *Ilkhān*. Nothing is known from any other source of such a journey on the part of Rashīd al-Dīn; and it is such puzzles as this that have caused some to doubt the authenticity of the collection.³⁴ But

if it is a forgery, it is an extraordinarily skilful and unbelievably well-informed one, the purpose of which is by no means readily apparent. The case for accepting the letters' substantial authenticity seems very strong.

The character of the author which emerges from a study of the *Mukātabāt* is by no means an unattractive one. It is true that, if he put his mind to it, he could be as long-winded as, and less diverting than, the author of the *Variae*. It may not be entirely fanciful to imagine his sons groaning in despair when receiving yet another 15-page letter from their distinguished father, packed full of very orthodox, very detailed, and very conventional pieces of advice. But there is another side to the coin. Rashīd al-Dīn's concern with the welfare of the state's subjects, particularly the peasantry, comes out very strongly—an impressive trait which is not negated by the consideration that he evidently regarded just treatment of the peasants as more profitable to the Treasury, in the long run, than ruthless exploitation. His delight in pious benefactions, his extensive building and land reclamation programmes, his concern with the promotion of education and with the maintenance of hospitals, are all amply represented. This is all in addition to the more obvious Vazīr's business—the organization of armies, the determining of rates of taxation, and so forth. Even taking into account the possibility of some degree of judicious editing on the part of Muḥammad Abarqūhī, the picture remains one of a many-sided, generous, cultivated, and benevolent figure—though also ambitious, proud, and perhaps under no illusions regarding his own great abilities. It is his long and, some might say, boastful accounts of his great building projects which single him out most clearly as a man who intended to make his mark on the memory of posterity. He was, indeed, remembered; but he deserved to be.

The most cursory examination of the processes of government illustrated in the works of Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn shows clearly enough that the two barbarian regimes faced, in many respects, similar problems. Some of these will be discussed. But there were, naturally enough, contrasts, and these should be borne in mind when considering the similarities.

There was one quite basic difference. Theodoric is reported to have remarked wryly that 'a poor Roman imitates the Goth, a rich Goth the Roman'.³⁵ The Ostrogoths—this at least is the impression given by Roman writers—wanted nothing better than to be integrated thoroughly into the superior Roman civilization. Thus, 'day after day Cassiodorus tried to give Roman *dignitas* to the orders of his Barbarian masters'. He made 'a sustained effort to present a Barbarian as the embodiment of civilised justice and wisdom'.³⁶ There is no evidence that the Mongols suffered from an inferiority complex. They

considered themselves, their achievements, their ancestors, and their way of life to be immeasurably superior to those of the peoples they had conquered. Even if—especially in China, under the rule of Qubilai and his successors—there are, eventually, signs of an appreciation of civilized life which goes beyond the mere material benefits to be gained from exploitation, the Mongols remained Mongols, and proud of it. If Ghazan Khān and Öljeitü commissioned Rashīd al-Dīn to write their history for them, it was not in order that he should fabricate some connexion between the Mongols and the Persian past, with all its glories, which would make the Mongols respectable. They regarded their own history as a fit subject on its own merits. Indeed, if anything, the Mongol rulers of Persia are likely to have hoped that the writing of the *Jāmi' al-tavārikh* might help to sustain the existence of a distinctive Mongol identity. This would inevitably come under some pressure when, at the time of Ghazan's accession, the Mongols of the *Ilkhānate* were converted to Islam, the religion of the bulk of their Persian subjects. Among the results of this 'Mongol-consciousness' is that it is far easier to find reference to specifically Mongol institutions in Rashīd al-Dīn than to anything very clearly Gothic in Cassiodorus.

This follows, in fact, from an essential difference in the nature of government in the two countries. The rule of the Mongols in Persia was the result of straightforward, bloody, alien conquest. Whatever institutions might survive from the Persian past, whatever native Persians might be prepared to serve the invaders, nothing could disguise the fact that the Mongols held Persia by force and by right of conquest. By contrast, barbarian rule in Italy had an element of consensus built into it. Theodoric deputized, in theory, for a specifically *Roman* emperor in Constantinople. The *Ilkhāns* might recognize the supremacy of the Great Khān in Peking—but he was a fellow-Mongol: indeed, a close relative. Part of the price the barbarian rulers of Italy paid for being accepted as legitimate sovereigns was their association of the Roman senatorial aristocracy with them in government: 'it was from these men that Theodoric received his greatest support and in return they gained security and respect shown by too few emperors. Not since the Principate had the senate been taken into such close partnership in government'.³⁷ Rashīd al-Dīn served the Mongols: Cassiodorus and his peers were partners—if junior partners—of the Ostrogoths. The great men of the senate belonged to families with, in some cases, centuries of aristocratic tradition behind them. There was an administrative tradition, certainly, in Persia, but there had been no hereditary aristocracy at any time since the fall of the Sassanian empire, six centuries before.

The element of consensus was not an innovation of Theodoric's reign: he followed the example set by Odoacer. There is interesting

evidence for the latter's reign arising from recent studies of the Colosseum in Rome. Evidently a focus of loyalty for the Roman aristocracy, it was twice restored by Odoacer. A number of seat-inscriptions survive, bearing the names of senators. These illustrate, it has been suggested, the continued privileged position of the senatorial order, in that they 'continuaient d'avoir droit a des égards apparaissant au grand jour avec l'usage des places d'honneur qui leur étaient réservées dans les lieux de spectacle'.³⁸ More generally, it has been concluded, on the basis of the Colosseum evidence, that Odoacer 'a cherché à se concilier l'aristocratie et à s'appuyer sur elle. La noblesse romaine joue sous son règne un rôle plus important qu'auparavant dans le gouvernement et l'administration, et renforce son emprise sociale'.³⁹

But, if these contrasts are remembered, the similarities are none the less striking. Among these, a major problem inevitably confronting both barbarian governments was that of the reimposition of order. This involved the basic question of landownership as much as anything. The two administrations seem to have arrived at a very similar rule of thumb. Theodoric's edict ran:

'If any Barbarian usurper have taken possession of a Roman farm since the time when we, through God's grace, crossed the streams of the Isonzo, when first the Empire of Italy received us, and if he have no documents of title to show that he is the rightful holder, then let him without delay restore the property to its former owner. But if he shall be found to have entered upon the property before the aforesaid time, since the principle of the thirty years' prescription comes in, we order that the petition of the plaintiff shall be dropped'.⁴⁰

The ancestry of this law presumably derives from the emperor Theodosius II's enactment of 424.⁴¹

Ghazan Khān, 40 years after the establishment of the Ilkhānate, found that a morass of conflicting landownership claims had come into being. He, too, decided that a 30-year limit must be imposed. The authority of Mongol tradition was invoked to support this.

'Before this time, past sultans, and Chingiz Khān, in all their *farmāns* and *yarlıghs* (edicts), made mention that thirty-year old claims should not be listened to.'⁴²

Ghazan Khān's aim was to have this, as was believed, Mongol or Turkish rule⁴³ given an official stamp of approval by an appropriate Islamic authority. He therefore persuaded the *qādī* Fakhr al-Dīn of

Harāṭ to issue a confirmation of the regulation. This, as transcribed by Rashīd al-Dīn, reads in part:

‘I will not transgress or turn away that which is required by the *sharī‘a* of Muḥammad, and I will, to the best of my ability and strength, strive to the utmost limit and extremity in the writing up and investigation of claims and in examining and verifying title deeds and written *shar‘ī* bonds, and I will not hear any claim made after a period of thirty years, in accordance with the conditions which have been mentioned, and I will not pay any attention to it, or grant it validity’.⁴⁴

Qādīs who would not subscribe to this were threatened with dismissal. But whether this regulation in fact derives from the custom of the steppe is not wholly clear. Thirty years is among the limitations on claims to landownership prescribed in Islamic law.⁴⁵

Abuses had grown up, too, in the workings of the administrative machinery of both régimes—notably in the official postal and intelligence systems. There are several letters on this matter in the *Variae*, of which the most interesting is book IV, 47.⁴⁶ Writing to a Gothic officer, Gudisal the Saio, Cassiodorus has two main complaints. The first is that large numbers of people with no right to use the official post, the *Cursus Publicus*, are nevertheless doing so. Even those sent on official business are making their missions an excuse for ‘pleasure-tours at the public expense’. The second complaint is that the post-horses are being more heavily laden than is good for them. This launches Cassiodorus into one of his characteristic illustrations from natural history.

‘Cranes, when they are going to cross the sea, clasp little pebbles with their claws, in order to steady without over-weighting themselves. Why cannot those who are sent on public errands follow so good an example?’

A scale of fines is prescribed for those who transgress these and other regulations. Details are given of who may use the *Cursus Publicus*, and what are the permitted maximum weights for the horses. The fines are to go to those who operate the postal service, and thus, Cassiodorus portentously concludes, ‘the evil will, as we so often see in human affairs, furnish its own remedy’.

The Ostrogothic government had taken over the Roman *Cursus*, whatever its defects, as a going concern. The equivalent official postal system of medieval Islam, the *Barīd*, had, by contrast, long disappeared by the thirteenth century A.D. The Mongols brought their

own system, the *Yām*, to Persia. It owed much to Chinese precedent, as the word *Yām* itself, derived from Chinese, shows.⁴⁷ This serves to emphasize the importance of the Mongols' Chinese background. It is very clear from the basic, if problematical, source on the early history of their empire, the 'Secret history of the Mongols', that in the Mongol mind, Mongolia and China were the countries that really mattered: the rest of the world, even the rest of the Mongols' conquests, are treated vaguely and briefly—evidently of only peripheral interest.

The Mongol horse-post system achieved an unparalleled elaboration throughout the length and breadth of Asia, as Marco Polo's account of it vividly shows.⁴⁸ So far even as China was concerned, the Mongols' system transcended all precedents.⁴⁹ It was instituted by Ögedei, the second Great Khān (reigned 1229–41).⁵⁰ As early as the reign of Möngke (1251–9), there are complaints of abuses in the operation of the system very like those of which Cassiodorus complains. Merchants are illicitly making use of the facilities, and those legitimately travelling on official business are dallying on the way. Möngke attempted to put this right.

'As for the more important *īlchīs* (messengers), they should not make use of more than fourteen *ulāghs* (post-horses); they should proceed from *yām* to *yām* (post-station to post-station) and should enter no village or town in which they have no specific business; and they should take no more provisions than each man can eat.'⁵¹

Presumably Möngke's reforms had some effect, at least for a time. But in Persia the situation had deteriorated again by the time of Ghazan's reign. The depredations of travelling *īlchīs* had once more become a public menace.

'Even if five thousand mounts had been stationed at each *yām*, they would not have been enough for them. Inevitably they took as mounts all the herds of the Mongols that were in the summer and winter pastures. And they made dismount all (persons travelling in) caravans...from the directions of Khitāy and Hindūstān and other quarters far and near...and took their horses, and would leave them on the road, and some in fearful places with their baggage.... Thieves and robbers masqueraded as *īlchīs*, and blocked the road, saying "we are *īlchīs*", and having taken their horses as post-horses, they would suddenly seize them, tie them up, and plunder their baggage. Further, it often happened that one group of *īlchīs* would take the post-horses of another group. Whoever had more weapons

and greater power took the post-horses of the other Whatever they found in the villages they tyrannically seized.’⁵²

All this, needless to say, did not long survive the reforming zeal of Ghazan Khān. Doubtless abuses crept in again before long, but the system was still flourishing under Timur in the early fifteenth century, according to the account of the Castilian ambassador Clavijo.⁵³

No disorders on the Persian scale are even hinted at in the *Variae*. Occasionally, however, there is evidence that things did sometimes go wrong, whatever the benefits of Theodoric’s rule. There are detailed lists of financial and other abuses which need correction in Suavia,⁵⁴ and Spain, then under Theodoric’s supervision.⁵⁵ Merchants in Apulia are granted tax-exemptions for two years, because of damage they have suffered from hostile incursions⁵⁶— perhaps hardly the fault, directly, of the Ostrogothic government. Nor was damage caused by the eruption of Vesuvius, also the occasion of a grant of tax-relief,⁵⁷ to be laid at Theodoric’s door. But one such grant is rather a different matter. Writing to the Praetorian Prefect Faustus, Cassiodorus (in Theodoric’s name) gives these instructions.

‘A wise ruler will always lessen the weight of taxation when his subjects are weighed down by temporary poverty. Therefore let your Magnificence remit to the Provincials of the Cottian Alps the *as publicum* [land tax] for this year, in consideration of their losses by the passage of our army. True, that army went forth with shouts of concord to liberate Gaul. But so a river bursting forth may irrigate and fertilise a whole country, and yet destroy the increase of that particular channel in which its waters run. We have earned new subjects by that campaign: we do not wish them to suffer loss by it. Our own heart whispers to us the request which the subjects dare not utter to their Prince.’⁵⁸

This incident has many echoes in the writings of Rashīd al-Dīn. In a letter to his son, Amīr Maḥmūd, governor of Bam, he reprimands him for oppressing the people placed in his charge, and orders that, consequently:

‘Nothing shall be demanded for a period of three years, by way of *qalān* and *qubchūr*,⁵⁹ extraordinary levies (*tayyarāt*) and impositions (*takfīyāt*), either for the Dīvān of Kirmān or of the Great Urdū (the Court), so that their ruined places and waste lands may again come into a state of populousness and cultivation’.⁶⁰

Then there is the astonishing story, in the *Tārīkh-i Ghāzānī*, of the landlord in the region of Yazd who, in the year 1292, travelled to a large village, Fīrūzābād, which he owned. He hoped to extract from his tenants some part of their harvest.

‘However hard he tried, for three whole days he could not lay his hands on any of the headmen. But seventeen tax-collectors (*muḥaṣṣil*), holders of drafts (*barāṭ*) and assignments (*ḥavālat*) were sitting in the middle of the village. They had strung up with ropes a field-guard (*dashtbān*) and two peasants whom they had seized from the fields and brought to the village. They were beating them, to make them reveal the whereabouts of the others, and to produce some food for them. But it was all a total waste of time. All these tax-collectors and their followers had to have provisions and fodder, wine and beautiful girls. From this it may be deduced what other kinds of tyranny there were.’⁶¹

The impression which Rashīd al-Dīn is at pains to give his reader is one of tyranny, extortion, and incompetent government in the *Ilkhānate*—until the accession of Ghazan Khān, after which auspicious event all wrongs were righted. Arghun Khān (reigned 1284–91), he relates, was impressed by a report from two officials on the possible collection of tax arrears. He therefore

‘...sent them to Baghdad, to collect the arrears and to demand the wealth due to the Treasury. They went there, and by using the bastinado and torture, they collected abundant wealth’.⁶²

Writing generally of the period before Ghazan’s accession, and discussing tax maladministration, Rashīd al-Dīn assures us that

‘In truth, from those provinces not the smallest gold coin ever reached the Treasury, and not one-fifth. was paid of the drafts allocated to individuals on the basic revenue. No one ever saw the *tamghāchī* (in charge of collecting the commercial tax, the *tamghā*). He had usually either fled, or was a prisoner in the hands of the *muḥaṣṣils*, who would beat him’.⁶³

The result of the depredations of *ilchīs*, the high level and totally arbitrary nature of taxation—some taxes being levied, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, not twice yearly, but 20 or 30 times—the decline in public order, and the general incompetence of the administration, was virtual government bankruptcy. This led to such disastrous expedients

as the attempt, under the **Īkhā** Geikhatu (reigned 1291–5), to introduce into Persia paper money, *Chao*, on the Chinese model.⁶⁴ It also inevitably produced a sharp decline in agriculture, the basis of the economy, and ‘a general flight from the land on the part of the peasants’.⁶⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn maintains that nine-tenths of the cultivable land was lying waste.⁶⁶

What was Ghazan’s own attitude? Rashīd al-Dīn seems in two minds over this. Sometimes the first of the line of Muslim **Īkhā**ns is depicted as an ideal Muslim ruler, who ‘took the greatest personal interest in the welfare of the state’,⁶⁷ and who had the interests of his Persian subjects very much at heart. More credible, however, is the speech put into Ghazan’s mouth, as he addresses the Mongol *amīrs*.

‘I am not protecting the Persian peasantry. If it is expedient, then let me pillage them all—there is no one with more power to do so than I. Let us rob them together. But if you expect to collect provisions and food in the future, and demand this, I will be harsh with you. And you must consider what, if you commit extortion against the peasants, take their oxen and seed, and cause their crops to be consumed, you will do in the future. You must think, too, when you beat and torture their wives and children, that just as our wives and children are dear to our hearts, so are theirs to them; they are human beings, just as we are.’⁶⁸

On this evidence, then, Ghazan’s attitude was one of hard-headed and farsighted realism, with a touch of human compassion thrown in.

Nearly half of the section of the *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh* which deals with Ghazan’s reign is concerned with his great programme of administrative reforms. Most important of all, it includes copies of the reforming edicts, the *yarlīghs*, issued by Ghazan. Both Ghazan and his minister, Rashīd al-Dīn, were strong personalities who evidently knew what they wanted to achieve, and, apparently, how to set about it. But whatever the results of the reforms, they did not last. Ghazan himself reigned for only nine years—hardly long enough to repair the ravages of seven decades. Writing in 1340, after the death of Abū Sa‘īd, the last significant **Īkhā**n, the historian and geographer **Ḥamd** Allāh Mustawfī remarked, of the revenue of Persia:

‘It reached the sum of 21,000,000 odd currency dinars (in the reign of Ghazan). At the present time it certainly does not amount to half that sum, for most of the provinces have been thrown into disorder by the usurpation of authority and the coming and going of armies. The people have withheld their

The Persian peasants, then, in the opinion of many of the Mongols, were there simply in order to be exploited as vigorously as possible, for the benefit of their rulers. If Persian administrators such as Rashīd al-Dīn had a part to play, it was in using their skills to produce more revenue. When their usefulness was ended, they would be discarded without a second's thought. Even the more sympathetic approach attributed by Rashīd al-Dīn to Ghazan Khān seems to be grounded very largely in a more than usually rational approach to the same problem of the efficient exploitation of the subject. It is worth looking at the *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī* for what may be Rashīd al-Dīn's own personal views about the impact of Mongol rule on his people. In a letter to Mawānā Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad, concerned with a revised scale of taxation which is to be applied, Rashīd al-Dīn reveals his feelings on the nature of Mongol rule explicitly enough. He speaks of 'the time of the tyrannical Turks' (in this context not to be distinguished from Mongols) 'and the oppressive *bitikchīs*' (Mongol scribal officials).⁷⁰ In a letter, also in the collection, from Mu'īn al-Dīn Paryāna of Rūm, Rashīd al-Dīn's correspondent describes Turkish *amīrs* as 'mere deceivers and accomplices of the Devil'.⁷¹ Other similar remarks are to be found scattered about the *Mukātabāt*. For Rashīd al-Dīn, and other Persians who felt as he did, it was a matter of making the best of an unavoidably bad job, and mitigating the evils of Mongol rule as far as possible, as well as feathering their own nests in the process.

There is little to parallel this in the writings of Cassiodorus. In a letter to Faustus, Theodoric is made to speak thus about Ostrogothic frontier guards:

'Think what a life of hardship the soldier leads in those frontier forts for the general peace, thus, as at the gate of the Province, shutting out the entry of the barbarous nations. He must be ever on the alert who seeks to keep out the Barbarians. For fear alone checks these men, whom honour will not keep back'.⁷²

There is nothing in this to indicate that Theodoric was himself the most successful of the barbarian invaders. Cassiodorus totally identifies the Ostrogothic government with Roman *civilitas*. Similarly, Theodoric's newlyacquired Gaulish subjects are urged, in 510, to 'put off the barbarian; clothe yourselves in the morals of the toga.... Do not dislike the reign of Law because it is new to you, after the aimless seethings of Barbarism'.⁷³ So much for whatever notions of law the barbarian invaders may have brought with them to the Roman Empire.

By contrast, the Mongol laws, the *Yāsā*, ascribed to Chingiz Khān, came with the Mongols to Persia. Though there is much reason for doubting, in the light of the available evidence, that the *Yāsā* was ever reduced to a coherent, written code of laws, Mongol laws and customs long remained important and influential in the *Ilkhānate* and elsewhere.

Cassiodorus's remarks on the 'seethings of Barbarism' imply, too, a notable distinction in his mind—and perhaps also in that of Theodoric—between Ostrogothic Italy, the true heir of the Empire, and the other barbarian kingdoms which had been set up in the former provinces of the western Empire. The identification was not, however, by any means total: not even Cassiodorus could pretend to believe that. King Athalaric, on his accession to the Ostrogothic throne in 526, swore an oath to the citizens of Rome

'...by the Lord's help to observe justice and fair clemency, the nourisher of the nations; that Goths and Romans shall meet with impartial treatment at our hands; and that there shall be no other division between the two nations, except that they undergo the labours of war for the common benefit, while you are increased in numbers by your peaceable inhabitancy of the City of Rome'.⁷⁴

And Athalaric wrote to Gothic settlers in terms reminiscent of Ghazan's common-sense speech to the Mongol *amīrs*.

'If anyone is in need of anything, let him seek to obtain it from the generosity of his Sovereign rather than by the strength of his own right hand, since it is for your advantage that the Romans be at peace, who, in filling our Treasury, at the same time multiply your donatives'.⁷⁵

Further, there are many references to a specifically Gothic officer, the *saio*, to some extent fulfilling functions similar to those of a Mongol *īlchī*, and also to more senior officials such as the *Comes Gothorum*, clearly a necessary figure in a mixed Roman-barbarian society. The formula for his appointment is recorded by Cassiodorus.⁷⁶ Gothic officials seem to have duplicated, in some sense, the regular Roman administration: 'in the provinces Gothic military governors (*comites Gothorum provinciae*) appeared at the side of regular civil Roman governors. In the cities other Ostrogothic counts (*comites Gothorum civitatum*), technically no more than the equal of local Roman officials, limited the legal jurisdiction of the latter and extended their own competence over the supervision of public buildings and roads and even over the collection of taxes'.⁷⁷ These are almost exactly

paralleled by a Mongol official, the *bāsqaq*, who was stationed in occupied territory, and also in tribute-paying areas which retained some degree of local autonomy. He supervised the collection of revenue, and ultimately became in effect a kind of provincial governor. Local revolts were often inaugurated by the murder of the *bāsqaq*.

Much of the evidence so far cited gives an impression of barbarian rule that, particularly in the case of Persia, is far from favourable. There is something to be said on the other side. It is worth pointing out the comparative religious tolerance of both regimes. In Theodoric's case, though an Arian, he refrained from persecuting his Catholic subjects until the very end of his reign, and died before he could do them much harm. The attitude of his government towards the Jews is notable. Giving the Jews of Genoa permission to re-roof their synagogue, Cassiodorus, in Theodoric's name, exclaims: 'Why do you desire what you ought to shun? In truth we give the permission which you craved, but we suitably blame the desire of your wandering minds'—tolerant, if irritable; but Cassiodorus concludes with a remarkable sentence: 'We cannot order a religion, because no one is forced to believe against his will'.⁷⁸ Stern measures were taken against cities where rioting against the Jews took place, as may be seen both in the *Variae* and in other sources.⁷⁹

The Mongols were tolerant of all religions—a tolerance perhaps founded more on indifference than on any particular philosophy of toleration.⁸⁰ In particular, Chingiz Khān insisted that the clergy of all religions should be exempt from taxation. This is echoed, at least as far as Muslim men of religion were concerned, in one of Ghazan Khān's edicts, recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn.

'And since the command of the great *yarlīgh* of Chingiz Khān is this, that *qādīs* and learned men and descendants of 'Alī should not pay *qalān* and *qubchūr*, we have commanded that for this reason they should be exempted, and their tax (*māl*) and *qubchūr* should not be taken; and post-horses and provisions for travellers (*sūsūn*) should not be taken from them. No one should billet himself in their houses, and *ilchīs* should not descend on them.'⁸¹

The conversion of Ghazan to Islam meant that toleration was no longer the automatic right of religions other than Islam: the brief heyday of Jews, Christians, and Buddhists was over. Buddhist temples and—apparently—Zoroastrian fire-temples were destroyed, and Buddhists given the alternatives of accepting Islam or leaving the *Ilkhānate*.⁸² As for the Christians, it is clear from the biography of the

Nestorian Catholicus Mar Yaballaha III⁸³ that their position reverted to that, usual in Islamic societies, of general tolerance as second-class citizens, interspersed with occasional bouts of persecution.

It should also be mentioned that both barbarian governments engaged in extensive programmes of city embellishment and construction. Cassiodorus includes several letters in which he speaks in enthusiastic terms of the embellishment of Rome.⁸⁴ And the building of his great quarter, the *Rab'-i Rashīdī*, in the Mongol capital of Tabriz, was very dear to the heart of Rashīd al-Dīn, as many of his letters show.⁸⁵ There are letters concerned with the building of new canals, named after both Ghazan Khān and Rashīd al-Dīn, together with their associated villages, and plans are included in the letters.⁸⁶

These, then, are some of the aspects of Ostrogothic and Mongol rule illustrated by Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn. To what extent should the picture painted on the strength of such evidence be accepted at its face value? So far as Cassiodorus is concerned, Gibbon at least had no doubt of what were the necessary reservations.

‘The volume of public epistles composed by Cassiodorius in the royal name, is still extant, and has obtained more implicit credit than it seems to deserve. They exhibit the forms, rather than the substance, of his (Theodoric’s) government; and we should vainly search for the pure and spontaneous sentiments of the Barbarian amidst the declamation and learning of a sophist, the wishes of a Roman senator, the precedents of office, and the vague professions which, in every court and on every occasion, compose the language of discreet ministers.’⁸⁷

Thomas Hodgkin expressed a similar opinion when he observed that ‘we are therefore really without a picture of the Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy from the true Ostrogothic point of view’.⁸⁸ More recently, doubts have been expressed by Professor J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, who suggests that ‘the Theodoric we know from the *Variarum* of Cassiodorus and from Ennodius is a ruler of Romans devout in the service of *Romanitas*; the Theodoric his Gothic followers knew was a Germanic war-leader and a very different kind of man’.⁸⁹

It is barbarian government, then, filtered through the mind of a Roman who was determined, before all else, to stress unbroken continuity with the Roman past. It would be enlightening to have some kind of Ostrogothic equivalent to the ‘Secret history of the Mongols’, as a yardstick with which to measure the points of view of outsiders. But no such work exists, nor, perhaps, could be expected to exist.

Nor is acceptance of Rashīd al-Dīn’s view of affairs entirely a straightforward matter. Some of the details in the *Mukātabāt-i Rashīd*

ī strain the reader's credulity. If the foodstuffs mentioned in letter 45 are, as seems to be the case, being sent to Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn of Ardabīl for a single feast, the amounts concerned are almost unbelievably colossal. And, in view of what Rashīd al-Dīn tells us about the general condition of the Mongol administration in Persia, one sometimes wonders what degree of connexion exists between theory and reality—especially when Rashīd al-Dīn sends enormously detailed instructions to some remote part of the kingdom. How much control did Rashīd al-Dīn, or anyone else, have over what in fact went on in the provinces—except sporadically, when troops could be sent to enforce the central government's will? 'The moment control was relaxed, there was a tendency to relapse into the old habits, and thus it was a constant struggle to restrain the officials from committing extortion against those under their power'.⁹⁰ The letters, or many of them, are themselves the record of Rashīd al-Dīn's efforts to keep the local officials in check. We know what orders he sent: what we cannot know is whether their recipients took any notice, and, if not, what was done about it.

There are, similarly, problems in knowing how to assess Rashīd al-Dīn's account of the state of affairs before Ghazan Khān's accession, and the effectiveness of Ghazan's reform programme. The blacker the picture of things before 1295, the greater would appear Ghazan's achievement in putting everything right. Ghazan's achievement is, in effect, that of his chief minister, Rashīd al-Dīn. Certainly, other contemporary writers do not by any means give the prominence to the reforms which is accorded them by Rashīd al-Dīn. When all this is said, however, there is no denying that, subjectively at least, Rashīd al-Dīn's picture of Persia under the early Ilkhāns, immensely detailed and circumstantial as it is, carries a good deal of conviction, and is confirmed in its general outlines by such other sources as the *Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*.

In the light of these considerations, it is worth asking what real degree of administrative continuity is to be found between the Ostrogoths, the Mongols, and their respective predecessors. 'He kept the civil service for the Romans on the same footing as under the emperors', wrote the author known as the Anonymus Valesianus of Theodoric.⁹¹ This was no doubt true to a very large extent: 'Theoderic, and Odoacer before him, inherited the central government of the empire, and Rome itself, with its Senate. While the other barbarian kings improvised central governments of their own making, Odoacer and Theodoric, if only by force of inertia, maintained the ancient offices of the imperial *comitatus* and the praetorian prefecture'.⁹² Some believe, however, that there were fairly considerable changes. The *Variae*, it has been suggested, tends to be misleading. For

example, Cassiodorus's formula for the Mastership of the Offices reveals an ideal conception of the post, rather than reflecting the realities of the day. And even from the evidence provided in the *Variae*, it is possible to see that Gothic *saiones* were taking over some of the functions of the *agentes in rebus*, in the operation of the postal service. So one may conclude, perhaps, that 'while the Roman aristocracy was to be respected, it was on important occasions to be given more of the semblance than the reality of governmental authority'.⁹³

But, with all these qualifications, the administration of Ostrogothic Italy, as far as may be judged, was in its essentials the administration of the late western Roman Empire. Was such continuity also characteristic of Mongol Persia?

Such continuity did indeed exist, and for the same reason as in Italy: inertia. The Mongols certainly tried out their own ideas on exploitation—these have been illustrated above. But the basic administration of the country seems to have continued, staffed by Persian officials, virtually without a break. The Mongols had their own approach to taxation, and in this they contrast with the Ostrogoths. The characteristic Mongol *qubchūr*, at first a tax on pasture or flocks, later a general poll-tax, had to be operated by the Persian officials in addition to the traditional Islamic taxes such as *kharāj*.⁹⁴ The military establishment was Mongol and Turkish, as that of Italy was Gothic. Mongol law coexisted, in ways not easy to elucidate, with Islamic law. Provincial governors were sometimes Mongols, sometimes Persians. Mongol *bāsqāqs* kept an eye on what Persian administrators were doing. Nomadism greatly increased, reducing the amount of cultivated land: this reduced the scope of the central government in extracting revenue from the peasants. But essentially the Persians ran the governmental machine on behalf of their barbarian masters, with interruptions and interference from those masters. The machine continued to work as it had always done: it simply did not work as well as before the arrival of the Mongols. According to Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī's calculations (which, unfortunately, there is no way of checking), under the Saljūq sultan Malik Shah, at the end of the eleventh century, the annual revenue of Persia amounted to 500,000,000 currency dinars. At the time of the accession of Ghazan, it was 17,000,000. As a result of his reforms, it rose to 21,000,000. Whatever we may make of these figures—and it is worth noting how small a rise in revenue is said to have resulted from Ghazan's efforts—the author was clear in his own mind about their implications.

'From the above a comparison may be made between the populousness of the world (in the past) and its ruin (at the

present day). There is no doubt that the destruction which happened on the emergence of the Mongol state and the general massacre which occurred at that time will not be repaired in a thousand years, even if no other calamity occurs; and the world will not return to the condition in which it was before that event.’⁹⁵

However, it is worth adding that the Mongols to some seemed, with all their faults, preferable to the anarchy which ensued after the death of the *Īlkhān* Abū Sa‘īd. The author of the *Tārīkh-i Rūyān*, writing only 25 years later, praised the peace and security of the period of Mongol rule.⁹⁶ He eulogized Abū Sa‘īd—not, in the estimation of most historians, among the more notable of the *Īlkhān*s. Even accepting that there seems to be a widespread human tendency to create non-existent Golden Ages in the past, it nevertheless seems extraordinary that, as early as 1362, the *Īlkhān*ate was beginning to be seen in such a light. Perhaps there is something to be said, after all, for the Islamic political theorists’ tenet that any government, however bad, is better than no government at all. No doubt the Romans of Italy would have agreed, as they watched the armies of Justinian march back and forth for years on end, and as they too, perhaps, looked back with nostalgia to their period of barbarian government.

Footnotes

¹ I am greatly indebted to Professor A.K.S.Lambton, Professor P.R.L.Brown, Mr. R.M. Burrell, Mr. M.A.Cook, and Mr. J.C.Gough, who read and commented on an earlier draft of this paper.

² ed. T.Mommsen, MGH, Auctores Antiquissimi, XII, Berlin, 1894: abridged English translation by T.Hodgkin, *The letters of Cassiodorus*, London, 1886.

³ ed. M.Shafī‘, Lahore, 1947.

⁴ *Getica*, ed. T.Mommsen, MGH, Auctores Antiquissimi, v, Berlin, 1882; English translation by C.C.Mierow, *The Gothic history of Jordanes*, Princeton, 1915.

⁵ *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, London, 1928, 46.

⁶ P.R.L.Brown: *The world of late antiquity*, London, 1971, 128.

⁷ Cassiodorus’s life and works are discussed e.g. by L.W.Jones, in the introduction to his translation of the *Institutiones* (*An introduction to divine and human readings*, New York, 1946, 1–64).

⁸ *ibid.*, 8.

⁹ *Getica*, 243: tr. Mierow, 119.

¹⁰ *Getica*, 290–2: tr. Mierow, 136–6.

¹¹ H.M.Jones, ‘The constitutional position of Odoacer and Theoderic’, *Journal of Roman Studies*, LII, 1962, 126–30. I quote from the reprint in A.H.M.Jones, *The Roman economy*, ed. P.A.Brunton, Oxford, 1974, 367.

¹² *Getica*, 294–5: tr. Mierow, 136.

¹³ For a general account of the Mongol period, see J.J.Saunders: *The history of the Mongol conquests*, London, 1971. On the invasions of Persia, Cambridge History of Iran, v, ed. J.A. Boyle, Cambridge, 1968, ch. iv (J.A.Boyle) and vi (I.P.Petrushevsky).

¹⁴ *Al-Kāmil*, ed. C.J.Toraberg, XII, Leiden, 1853, 234; repr. Beirut, 1966, 358–9. Translation from B.Spuler, *History of the Mongols*, London, 1972,

¹⁵ On Rashīd al-Dīn's life and works, see e.g. J.A.Boyle's introduction to his translation of part of the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, *The successors of Genghis Khan*, New York and London, 1971, 3–13.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 3.

¹⁷ This was not an unusual conclusion for a Vazīr's career in Mongol Persia. The eventual death of Tāj al-Dīn 'Alī Shah, still in office, in his bed, of natural causes, was noted with some surprise. Contemporaries maintained that he was the only Vazīr of the Mongols who had the good fortune to die naturally. See Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī, Tehran, 1339/1960, 616.

¹⁸ T.Hodgkin, *Theodoric the Goth*, London and New York, 1891, 162.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 25.

²⁰ Cassiodorus and Italian culture of his time', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XLI, 1966, 207–45. I cite the reprint in A.Momigliano, *Studies in historiography*, London, 1966, 183.

²¹ P.Llewellyn, *Rome in the dark ages*, London, 1970, 33.

²² *Variae*, v, 2: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 265.

²³ *Variae*, I, 35: tr. Hodgkin, *Theodoric*, 169–70.

²⁴ *Variae*, ix, 25: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 412.

²⁵ Brown, *op. cit.*, 128.

²⁶ *Getica*, 60: tr. Mierow, 67.

²⁷ Momigliano, *art. cit.*, 192–3.

²⁸ B.Lewis, 'The Muslim discovery of Europe', *Islam in history*, London, 1973, 98.

²⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, ed. and tr. E.Quatremère, Paris, 1836, 38.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 60–2.

³¹ It has been inferred, from the remarkably Papacy-centred account of European history to be found in the 'History of the Franks', that Rashīd al-Dīn's Frankish informant was probably a cleric—perhaps a friar. See *Histoire des Francs*, ed. and tr. K.Jahn, Leiden, 1951.

³² *A literary history of Persia*, III, London, 1920, 68.

³³ *Tā'rikh-i Ūljāyī*, ed. M.Hambly, Tehran, 1969, 240.

³⁴ See R.Levy, 'The letters of Rashīd al-Dī ^{Ṣadr al-Dīn} *Ṣadr al-Dīn*', *JRAS*, 1946, 1–2, pp. 74–8.

³⁵ Anonymus Valesianus, in Ammianus Marcellinus, ed. and tr. J.C.Rolfe (Loeb Classical Library), III, London, 1939, 546.

³⁶ Momigliano, art. cit., 190–1.

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³⁷ Llewellyn, op. cit., 31. Cf. C.S.Lewis: 'His (Theodorie's) reign in Italy was not a sheer monstrosity as, say, the rule of Chaka or Dingaan in nineteenth-century England would have been. It was more as if a (popish) highland chieftain (who had acquired a little polish and a taste for claret in the French service) had reigned over the partly Protestant and partly sceptical England of Johnson and Lord Chesterfield'. (*The discarded image*, Cambridge, 1964, 75–6.)

³⁸ A.Chastagnol, *Le sénat romain sous le règne d'Odoacre*, Bonn, 1966, 52. I owe this reference to Professor Brown.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 56.

⁴⁰ *Variae* I, 18: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 154.

⁴¹ B.Nicholas, *An introduction to Roman law*, Oxford, 1962, 122.

⁴² Rashīd al-Dīn, *History of Ghāzān Khān*, ed. K.Jahn, London, 1940, 221–2: *Jāmi' al-tavārikh*, III, ed. A.Alizade, Baku, 1957, 431.

⁴³ Rashīd al-Dīn also ascribes it to the Saljūq sultan Malik Shah.

⁴⁴ ed. Jahn, 225: ed. Alizade, 434.

⁴⁵ J.Schacht, *An introduction to Islamic law*, Oxford, 1964, 138. If in this instance Islamic law owed anything to Roman law, the enactments of Theodoric and Ghazan may possibly have a common ultimate origin. (I am indebted to Mr. Cook for this interesting suggestion.)

⁴⁶ tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 259–60.

⁴⁷ G.Clauson, *An etymological dictionary of pre-thirteenth-century Turkish*, Oxford, 1972, 933.

48 See H.Yule and H.Cordier, *The book of ser Marco Polo*, I, 3rd ed., London, 1903, 433–8.

49 On the Mongol postal system in China, see P.Olbricht, *Das postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft*, Wiesbaden, 1954.

50 *Histoire secrète des Mongols*, ed. L.Ligeti, Budapest, 1971, 257–8.

51 Juvaynī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, III, ed. M.Qazvini, London, 1937, 76–7; tr. J.Ā.Boyle, *The history of the world-conqueror*, II, Manchester, 1958, 599. I have modified the translation slightly.

52 *History of Ghāzān Khān*, 271–2: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 480–1.

53 *An embassy to Tamerlane*, tr. G.Le Strange, London, 1928, 155–7, 177–9.

54 *Variae*, v, 14: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 273–4.

55 *Variae*, v, 39: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 287–8.

56 *Variae*, II, 38: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 191.

57 *Variae*, IV, 50: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 261–2.

58 *Variae*, IV, 36: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 253.

59 See below, p. 319, n. 94.

60 *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī*, 12.

61 *History of Ghāzān Khān*, 251: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 460. See also A.K.S.Lambton, *Landlord and peasant in Persia*, London, 1953, repr. 1969, 83.

62 *Geschichte der ilkhāne Abāgā bis Gaiḥātū*, ed. K.Jahn, 's-Gravenhage, 1957, 68: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 209.

63 *History of Ghāzān Khān*, 246: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 455.

64 See K.Jahn, 'Paper currency in Iran', *Journal of Asian History*, IV, 2, 1970, 101–35.

65 *History of Ghāzān Khān*, 248: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 457.

66 *History of Ghāzān Khān*, 350: *Jāmi‘ al-tavārīkh*, III, 558. See also I.P. Petrushevsky in *Cambridge History of Iran*, v, 491.

67 *History of Ghazn Khān*, 183: *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, III, 392.

68 *History of Ghazn Khān*, 269: *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, III, 478. See also Petrushevsky, op. cit., 494, and 'Rashīd al-Dīn's conception of the state', *Central Asiatic Journal*, xiv, 1–3, 1970, 155.

69 *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, ed. G.Le Strange, London, 1915, 27.

70 *Muktabāt-i Rashīdī*, 33.

71 *ibid.*, 274.

72 *Variae*, II, 5: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 173.

73 *Variae*, III, 17: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 206.

74 *Variae*, VIII, 3: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 349–50.

75 *Variae*, VIII, 26: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 375.

76 *Variae*, VII, 3: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 321–2.

77 W.G.Sinnigen, 'Administrative shifts of competence under Theodoric', *Traditio*, XXI, 1965, 458.

78 *Variae*, II, 27: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 186.

79 See e.g. Anonymus Valesianus, 558–60.

80 The famous debate in which the Franciscan William of Rubruck argued before the Great Khān Möngke against Muslim and Buddhist spokesmen might be held to suggest more than this. See *Sinica Franciscana*, I, ed. A.van den Wyngaert, Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929, 294–7.

81 *History of Ghazn Khān*, 218: *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, III, 427.

82 *History of Ghazn Khān*, 188: *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, III, 396–7.

83 tr. E.A.W.Budge, *The monks of Kublai Khān*, London, 1928. Syriac text ed. P.Bedjān, *Histoire de Mār Jab-aldha, patriarche, et de Rabban Sauma*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1895.

84 e.g. *Variae*, I, 20; IV, 49: tr. Hodgkin, *Letters*, 156; 263.

85 e.g. *Muktabāt-i Rashīdī*, letters 17, 32, 51.

86 *ibid.*, letters 38, 39.

⁸⁷ *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xxxix.

⁸⁸ *Italy and her invaders*, III, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1896, 247.

⁸⁹ *Early Germanic kingship in England and on the continent*, Oxford, 1971, 9.

⁹⁰ Lambton, op. cit., 92.

⁹¹ op. cit., 544.

⁹² Jones, op. cit., 373.

⁹³ Sinnigen, art. cit., 466.

⁹⁴ On Mongol taxation in Persia, see J. Masson Smith, 'Mongol and nomadic taxation', *HJAS*, xxx, 1970, 46–85, and the references contained therein, and A.K.S. Lambton, article *kharāj*, *EI*, 2nd ed. (forthcoming).

⁹⁵ *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, 27.

⁹⁶ *Awlīyā Allāh Amulī, Tarīkh-i Rūyān*, ed. M. Sutūda, Tehran, 1348/1969, 178–80.

THE TREATIES OF THE EARLY MAMLUK SULTANS WITH THE FRANKISH STATES

By P.M.HOLT

Arabic sources have preserved the texts of seven treaties concluded in the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century between the Mamlūk sultans al-Zāhir Baybars and al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn on the one hand, and various authorities in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and in Antioch-Tripoli on the other. Four are given by the Egyptian chancery clerk al-Qalqashandī in his encyclopaedic compilation, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*. This was completed in 814/1412, over 120 years after the extinction of the Frankish states, but the treaties were transcribed (as al-Qalqashandī tells us) from an earlier work by a clerk in Qalāwūn's chancery, Muḥammad b.al-Mukarram. Two of Qalāwūn's other treaties are found in his biography, written by the contemporary chancery clerk, Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir (d. 692/1292). Yet another of Qalāwūn's treaties was preserved by the contemporary chronicler, Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 725/1325).¹

The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first, to indicate the status of these treaties in Islamic law; secondly, to present some information from contemporary Arabic sources on the procedure followed in their negotiation, drafting and ratification; thirdly, to consider some aspects of their form and contents; and finally, to illustrate the circumstances in which they might be abrogated.

The distinction made in Islamic international law between two necessarily and perpetually hostile domains, *Dār al-Islām* and *Dār al-ḥarb*, was no longer very appropriate to the situation in the later thirteenth century, when a web of commercial and political relations linked the Muslim and Christian powers around the Mediterranean, but at least in form it had to be respected. Hence these treaties fall into the category of truce (*hudna*), concluded only for a limited period, of which the permissible length was a subject discussed by jurists, and al-Qalqashandī introduces his texts with a summary of legal opinions on this point. Two positions are stated. If the Muslims are strong, a truce should not last for more than four months, or in any case one year. If the Muslims are weak and in fear (i.e. under duress), a truce for ten years may be concluded.² It is some indication of the gap at this period

between legal doctrines and practical politics that these treaties with the Frankish states are all specified as of ten years' duration, although it is absurd to think of those Turkish warrior-kings Baybars and Qalāwūn negotiating out of weakness and fear with the authorities at Acre or the Lady Margaret of Tyre.

The actual situation is made very clear by the procedure followed in the negotiation of the truces. The initiative was invariably taken by the Frankish party, whose ambassadors waited on the sultan for the start of negotiations. For example, early in Baybars's reign (in 659/1261), the sultan brought his army into Syria. This action provoked an immediate response from the Latin kingdom. In his laudatory biography of Baybars, Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir describes the episode as follows:

When he [i.e. the sultan] reached Damascus, an envoy arrived from Acre to ask for a safe conduct for the ambassadors despatched by all the military orders. He wrote instructing the governor of Banyās to enable them to proceed. So the leading men of the Franks arrived and requested peace. The sultan demurred, and made a number of demands on them. When they refused, the sultan upbraided and slighted them. The army had already set out from the direction of Ba'albakk to raid their territory, and they asked for its recall. There happened to be a dearth in Syria, and imports on a large scale could only come through the Frankish territories, so peace was concluded on the basis existing at the end of the reign of al-Nāṣir [i.e. al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo and Damascus until 658/1260], with provision for the release of captives taken between the end of the said reign and the time of the truce. Ambassadors went with them to obtain their ratification. A truce was likewise concluded with the lord of Jaffa and the ruler of Beirut on the basis of al-Nāṣir's truce at the end of his reign. The roads became safe and imports abounded.³

In a note appended to his transcription of the texts, al-Qalqashandī throws an interesting light on the way in which the provisions were actually formulated. He writes:

They are in common language and inelegantly arranged; their like would not be drawn up by any clerk with the least skill in drafting.... Perhaps the reason was that in those days the Franks were neighbours to the Muslims in Syria, and terms of agreement would be reached by the two parties clause by clause. Then a clerk from each of the two parties, the Muslims and the Franks, would set it down in common, inelegant words

for reasons of speed until they concluded the terms of agreement down to the last clauses of the truce. Then the clerk of the Muslim king would write it according to the tenor of the draft, to match what the Frankish clerk had written. If the sultan's clerk were to make any emendation in it, in the arrangement, the improvement of the words and the eloquence of the composition, this would have departed from what the Frankish clerk had previously agreed to, and thereupon they would disown it, believing that it was not what had been agreed, owing to their lack of Arabic. So the clerk had to keep to what the two clerks had agreed to in the draft.⁴

What perhaps al-Qalqashandī did not realize was that by the late thirteenth century there had developed a good deal of common form in the treaties made between Franks, whether of Syria-Palestine or the Italian republics, and eastern Mediterranean rulers, whether Ayyubids, Mamlūks, Seljuks of Rūm or Byzantines.

Although a truce was negotiated and drafted at the sultan's court, whether at Cairo or in the field, a copy being filed in the sultan's chancery, it had also to be ratified (as the passage quoted from Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir has indicated) by the oaths of the two parties. The Frankish ratification was obtained by an embassy sent by the sultan. On such occasions there were two ambassadors, one a senior Mamlūk *amīr*, the other a high chancery official. We see the procedure in 682/1283, when a delegation from Acre, consisting of two Templars, two Hospitallers and two representatives of the Latin kingdom negotiated a truce in Cairo. Having sworn to the truce, Qalāwūn then sent his own embassy consisting of his chamberlain and a judge, to obtain an oath of ratification from the Franks.⁵ In this instance we are fortunate in having not only the text of the truce but also the oaths of ratification. Qalāwūn's oath begins with a ninefold invocation of the name of God, and undertakes to respect the duration and terms of the truce, under the sanction of making thirty pilgrimages to Mecca. The Frankish oath begins with a long and elaborate invocation, confirms the duration and terms of the truce, and provides as its sanction thirty pilgrimages to Jerusalem and the release of a thousand Muslim captives.⁶

An insight into the hazards of negotiation is thrown by Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's nephew, Shāfi' b. 'Alī, himself a chancery clerk, in his account of the truce with Tripoli in 669/1271, where he describes an incident told him by his uncle in these words:

Al-Malik al-Zāhir [Baybars] laid siege to it [i.e. Tripoli], and ambassadors went to and fro between him and its lord in search

of peace. When agreement was reached, the *Amīr Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy* the *atābak* together with the high official *Muḥyī al-Dīn* ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir went to Tripoli for the conclusion of the truce on the terms laid down. Al-Malik al-Zāhir resolved to disguise himself and go in behind the *atābak* like a sword-bearer, in order to have a look at the fortress. When they attended the court of the prince and the matter was settled, *Muḥyī al-Dīn* began to write in these words, ‘Truce is established between the Sultan al-Malik al-Zāhir and His Highness the chief’. When he saw it, the prince said, ‘Who is the chief?’ He said, ‘You are’. He said, ‘I am a prince’. He said, ‘No. The prince is al-Malik al-Zāhir, for “the prince” means the lord of Jerusalem, Alexandretta and Antioch, and these belong to our lord the Sultan al-Malik al-Zāhir. He was annoyed about this, which embarrassed him, and his anger appeared. Al-Malik al-Zāhir reckoned it as clerks’ pettifogging, and gave him [i.e. the *atābak*] a gentle kick, which was however sufficient for the purpose. The *atābak* turned and said, ‘You are right, *Muḥyī al-Dīn*. This name belongs to the sultan, and he has granted it to this person as he has granted him his fortress, his lands and his subjects. I will go surety for him in this matter’. Thereupon he wrote ‘...and the prince’.⁷

Shāfi’ then goes on to describe the negotiations in Damascus with Qalāwūn for a renewal of the truce in 680/1281, when a major difficulty arose.

When the prince's ambassadors presented themselves before our lord the sultan, the Master **Fath** al-Dīn, the head of chancery, was present and I with him. The sultan proceeded to ask the ambassadors in Turkish why they had come. The [Frankish] minister, Ghurāb, got up. He was a pettifogging, cunning, artful fellow. He answered our lord the sultan's question in this way, 'Bohemond, the friend of his government, the ally of the glorious sultan, asks the glorious sultan to continue the friendship which was between him and al-Malik al-Zāhir according to his truce'. Our lord the sultan replied, 'Where is the money you have brought? What territory will you give me?' This Ghurāb exercised his skill as an ambassador until he had softened the disposition of our lord the sultan by his pleasant manner and his agreeable phraseology.... He was bidden to be seated, and he produced the truce of al-Malik al-Zāhir with his signmanual, and we for our part presented the copy filed with us. From this it was evident what al-Malik al-Zāhir had authorized and what he had withheld. A comparison was made letter by letter, and their agreement obliged one to say that comparison showed its correctness, until, when we came to the town of 'Arqā, which is one of the best and most profitable of their lands, the Master **Fath** al-Dīn, the head of chancery, said to him, 'However, minister, the terms of the truce do not apply to this place 'Arqā'.

Shāfi' explains the reason for the exclusion of 'Arqā:

Al-Malik al-Zāhir had made a truce with them. [i.e. the Franks of Tripoli] on condition that they supplied thousands of gold pieces and thousands of Muslim captives. The *Amīr* Sayf al-Dīn Balabān the *dawādār* went to take the gold and receive the captives. He stayed six months with them, while they deceived and tricked him, putting him off with hindrances as is their custom—may God Almighty curse them. So the *Amīr* Sayf al-Dīn moved about until he came as a fugitive to al-Malik al-Zāhir, and al-Malik al-Zāhir confiscated this place 'Arqā from the beginning of the truce until his death.

Confronted with the exclusion of 'Arqā from the truce, Ghurāb began to argue a case, claiming that the delay in fulfilling the terms of the agreement resulted from the need to collect the promised tribute and to

assemble the captives. On being asked by **Fath** al-Dīn why nothing had still been done in the second, third and fourth years, he shifted his grounds and undertook the delivery of the tribute and the captives, but went on:

‘We wish for your decree that an account should be made of what al-Malik al-Zāhir seized from this place ‘Arqā over a period of ten years.’ This was an indication that they would be in credit, not in deficit. The head of chancery was disturbed, and asked the sultan what to do. He drew his sword on him, and was about to have his head.

Shāfi‘ then describes his own part in the proceedings:

I said (and the most senior of the *amīrs* of the council, the *Amīr* ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Taybars al-Wazīrī, heard me), ‘Are we in a court for giving judgment to one another, allotting shares or administering the law to one another? There is an answer to what he says’. He said to me, ‘And what is the answer?’ I said, ‘If our lord the sultan commands, I will answer him and argue with him’. On being commanded, I said to him, ‘Ghurāb, al-Malik al-Zāhir confiscated this place ‘Arqā only to annoy you, not to do you a kindness by taking the tribute in instalments. The labourers, the seeds and the peasantry in this settlement came from him, not from you; through his officers, not through your officers. Its land is possessed by the sword—nay indeed, everything is, for the truce has been invalidated by your breaches of the terms. In taking a part, he let you keep the rest. You have compared the party in breach with the party in good standing, as if it had been the comparison of two parties in breach’. I burst out against him like the outburst of a flood. The unbeliever was bewildered, and agreed without dissembling. The truce was established on these terms. Our lord the sultan ordered the *Amīr* Sayf al-Dīn Balabān al-Rūmī the *dawādār* to go and receive the prince’s oath and take the tribute, and I was to go with him.⁸

Although as this incident shows, the scales were weighted against the Frankish ambassadors in negotiations, the truces themselves were in form bilateral treaties as between equal parties, and they follow a regular pattern of preamble, provisions and concluding formulae. Al Qalqashandī groups the instruments he presents according to the opening words of their preambles, and the truces with the Frankish states are characterized by the formula *Istaqarrat al-hudna bayn fulān*

wa-fulān, 'Truce is established between A and B'. The titles of the two parties are given, the sultan's heir being associated with him as joint ruler in some of the treaties; then follows the duration and date of commencement of the truce. The ten-year period is sometimes elaborated (as in Qalāwūn's truce of 682/1283 with Acre) to 'ten whole years, ten months, ten days and ten hours', while the date is invariably specified according to both the *Hijrī* and Seleucid eras. The use of the latter (designated in the treaties as the era of Alexander, son of Philip the Greek) suggests that the clerks employed on the Frankish side were Orthodox Christians or Jews. The territories of the parties to the truce are then usually detailed. In discussing Qalāwūn's treaty with Acre, Joshua Prawer sees an ironic contrast between the immense sweep of the sultan's dominions and the poor remains of the Latin kingdom.⁹ The irony is there, but it may be an unintentional consequence of the myopic legalism of the drafters of the truce.

The provisions which form the body of the truces naturally vary in the different instruments, some of which (e.g. that concluded between Qalāwūn and Bohemond VII of Tripoli in 680/1281) are very local in their scope. Several of the provisions, however, recur in over half of the truces. These have the object of securing the sultan's territories and, conversely, of putting the Frankish party at a military disadvantage. The danger of a crusade still haunted the imagination of Muslim rulers, and the denial of assistance to the sultan's enemies is several times required. The most detailed stipulation occurs in the treaty with Acre:

If one of the Frankish kings of the sea or others should move by sea with the intention of coming to harm our lord the sultan, or to harm his son, in the lands to which this truce applies, the *bailli* of the kingdom and the grand masters are bound to inform our lord the sultan of their movement two months before they arrive in the lands. If they arrive after the lapse of two months, the *bailli* of the kingdom in Acre and the grand masters shall be exempt from responsibility under oath in regard to this clause.

If the Mongols or another enemy move by land, whichever of the parties has first notice shall inform the other.¹⁰

Another common provision forbade the construction or reconstruction of fortifications, as in Qalāwūn's treaty of 684/1285 with the Lady Margaret of Tyre:

The lady Dame Margaret, the lady of Tyre, shall build no new castle, nor renew the wall, nor dig a new trench, nor renew any fortification for defence or offence.¹¹

An interdiction is laid in some treaties on trade in ‘forbidden goods’ (*almamnū ‘āṭ*), i.e. military equipment. Finally there is sometimes provision for the safety of the naval vessels of the two parties.

Another group of provisions is concerned with the security and policing of the borders between Islamic and Frankish territory. By the late thirteenth century the situation on the frontiers had been complicated by the retrocession of former Frankish districts to the sultan, and by the creation (often as a preliminary to retrocession) of condominiums (*munāṣṣafāt*), i.e. districts of which the revenue, and presumably the administration, were shared between the two parties. In six out of the seven treaties here considered are clauses dealing with procedure in the case of homicide or robbery, and it seems likely that they cover not merely individual crimes but also border raids from one side or the other. From a collation of the different treaties, it appears that a fairly elaborate system had developed. The simplest case was when the killer was taken. Here the truce with the Lady Margaret of Tyre is the most specific:

Wh anyone of either party is killed, and the killer is found; if he is a Muslim, the delegates of our lord the sultan (God grant him victory) shall judge him in accordance with the pure administrative law [*al-siyāsa*] of the august sultanate. If he is a Christian of the people of Tyre, the lady Dame Margaret, the lady of Tyre, shall judge him. Each party in the presence of a delegate of the other party shall proceed to judgment in accordance with the laws of the two parties. That shall be the procedure in regard to all who trespass, damage or commit murder. The delegates of our lord the sultan shall be charged with the punishment of a Muslim, and the delegates of the lady, the lady of Tyre, shall be charged with the punishment of a Christian.¹²

Similarly, when a stolen article or booty could be found, it was to be restored, or compensation paid.

Difficulty arose when a killer absconded, or stolen goods were concealed. The procedure in such an event is laid down in similar terms in five of the treaties. Forty days of grace (*muhla*) were allowed for the investigation of the matter. After this, if no discovery had been made, the administrator of the locality¹³ against which the accusation lay, and three other persons chosen by the accuser were put on oath to

say what they knew, or to clear themselves. If they refused to swear, the accuser's sworn assertion of the value of the missing goods was accepted. Compensation for a homicide was usually made by the release of a captive of equal standing with the slain man: 'a knight for a knight, a Turcopole for a Turcopole, a merchant for a merchant, a foot-soldier for a foot-soldier, and a peasant for a peasant'.¹⁴

The treaty with Tyre (684/1285), however, lays down a tariff of bloodmoney (*diya*), levied from the villages where the killing occurred:

The blood-money for a knight of either party shall be 1,100 Tyrian dirhams, for a Turcopole 200 dirhams, for a peasant 100 dinars [*sic*]; the blood-money for a merchant shall be according to his nation, origin and standing. It shall be taken from the people of the villages in which that person was killed as being their fine and a collective punishment.¹⁵

There are some variations in two of the treaties. Baybars's first treaty with the Hospitallers (665/1267), in dealing with the possessions of al-Manṣūr Muḥammad, the Ayyubid lord of Ḥamāh, and those of the Assassins, fixes the period of grace at fifteen days, after which, if booty is not returned (there is no mention of homicide) the accused only is put on oath. His second treaty with the Hospitallers (669/1271), dealing with the condominium in the territory of al-Marqab, allots twenty days of grace for investigation. Then, if the culprit is not discovered, 'the *ru'asā'* of the locality of the highway robbery, taking of booty or homicide...shall detain in place of the killer or the thief the nearest of the neighbours to the highwayman or the killer'.¹⁶ If the culprit absconds, and is not brought in within twenty days, a fine of 1,000 Tyrian dinars, divided between the co-domini, is laid upon the nearest neighbours. Qalāwūn's treaty with Acre provides that, if justice is denied by the local administrator, the accuser might petition the authorities on both sides. If after forty days the administrator had not rendered justice, the ruler who appointed him was to put him to death and confiscate his chattels.

Another problem of the borders arose from the presence of Muslim fugitives in Frankish territories and *vice versa*, a situation rendered more delicate when a fugitive professed conversion. Here the stipulations vary. Two of the treaties, Baybars's second with the Hospitallers and Qalāwūn's with the Lady Margaret of Tyre, are uncompromising: fugitives must be sent back with all they brought with them. In Baybars's earlier treaty with the Hospitallers and Qalāwūn's with Acre, there is greater discrimination. Chattels brought by a fugitive are in any event to be returned, but the fugitive himself (in

Baybars's treaty) is to have the option of returning or staying. This is presumably if he is a freeman, since the clause continues:

If a slave [*'abd*] flees and abandons his religion, his price shall be returned; if he keeps his religion, he shall be returned.¹⁷

The treaty with Acre specifically extends this condition to all fugitives from both sides. A later clause lays down the procedure to be followed when a fugitive is suspected of not having restored all the chattels he brought with him. A unique clause (which cannot be wholly harmonized with the provision mentioned above) debars peasants from the rights of fugitives:

Proclamation shall be made in the Islamic lands and the Frankish lands included in this truce that anyone who was a peasant in the lands of the Muslims, were he Muslim or Christian, shall return to the lands of the Muslims; likewise anyone who was a peasant of the lands of the Franks, were he Muslim or Christian, his domicile being recognized by both parties. Anyone who fails to return after the proclamation shall be expelled by either side. The peasants of the lands of the Muslims shall not be enabled to reside in the lands of the Franks to which this truce applies, nor the peasants of the lands of the Franks to reside in the lands of the Muslims to which this truce applies. The return of a peasant from the one party to the other party shall be under a safe conduct.¹⁸

The security of travellers is the subject of clauses in several truces and here there are echoes of the terminology of treaties in European languages.¹⁹ The treaty with the Lady Isabel of Beirut, for example, contains the following:

All those passing from and to these territories shall be safe and secure in respect of themselves, their chattels and their wares from the Lady [Isabel] and her servants.²⁰

One may compare the phraseology of the capitulations granted by the Ayyubid Sultan al-*Ādil Abū Bakr* to the Venetians in 1238:

...et hebeant fidantiam in personis et habere et in mercimoniis, que veuiunt cum eis, venientes, permanentes et revertentes...²¹

The treaty of 669/1271 details the arrangements for the convoy of merchants between the sultan's territories and the Hospitallers' lands around Margat:

Travelling merchants and those going to and fro with goods

from the territories of the Muslims and Christians shall proceed on leaving the ports defined above under escort of the two parties without [payment of] duty. Nothing shall be accepted by the escort in regard to their persons until it has brought them out and delivered them to the land-boundaries of al-Marqab safely and securely under guard of both parties.

When merchants arrive from the kingdom of the sultan at the territory and ports of al-Marqab, both parties are to organize the escort with patrols of the village headmen [*ru'asā'*] guarding the roads both on leaving and entering, so that they may come to the territory of al-Marqab and the ports of al-Marqab defined above safe and sound in respect of themselves and their chattels under escort of both parties, as we have set forth.²²

It is not possible, in fact, to draw a hard and fast line between political treaties, such as these truces ostensibly are, and commercial treaties, such as were concluded with Venice, Genoa and Aragon.²³ Four of them have clauses concerning dues on merchants, three of them forbidding the imposition of any new duty. The truce with Acre provides for the safe keeping of the chattels of Muslim merchants dying in Frankish territory and *vice versa*. These are common form in the commercial treaties of the period. A final subject of commercial rather than political importance is action in regard to wreckage, flotsam and jetsam, which is dealt with in four truces. A succinct example occurs in the treaty with the Lady Margaret of Tyre:

When a ship of either party is wrecked, if it belongs to a Muslim, it shall be delivered to him, if he is found; and to the delegates of our lord the sultan, if he is lost. If it belongs to a Christian from the territory of our lord the sultan (great be his victory), the procedure shall be as in the case of a Muslim. If he is of the people of Tyre, from the subjects of the lady, the lady of Tyre, the chattels shall be delivered to him, and to her administration [*dīwān*] if he is lost.²⁴

The continuing validity of the truce throughout the period specified is guaranteed in six of the seven treaties here under consideration. The death or removal of one of the parties was not to annul the truce, and other possible pretexts for annulment are sometimes excluded. The lapse of the truce was to be followed (according to some texts) by forty days of grace to give people time to return to their homelands. Nothing could seem more assured and explicit than this, but the evidence of the Arabic writers suggests that these undertakings were

little more than formalities. For instance, Baybars's treaty of 665/1267 with the Hospitallers contains a specific provision against abrogation before the end of its prescribed period, yet Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir twice states explicitly that 'it was stipulated that the sultan might abrogate it at will'.²⁵

One may appropriately end with one particular and final example of abrogation: that by Qalāwūn in 689/1290 of the treaty he had concluded with the Latin kingdom. Shāfi' b. 'Alī, who had himself drafted the treaty, tells the story both in his biography of Baybars and in that of Qalāwūn. The two accounts are substantially the same; the version in the biography of Qalāwūn is as follows:

Our lord the sultan suddenly learnt that the Franks in Acre had acted arbitrarily towards a number of Muslim merchants and others there, and had killed them, esteeming them lightly in spite of their number. Thereupon our lord the sultan commanded and wrote to them, and reminded them [saying], 'Know that this breaks the covenant and casts out friendship'.

A letter arrived from their chief men saying, 'This happened only because the Franks and Muslims were gathered in a tavern, and drunkenness caused them to quarrel. We have arrested a number of the Franks who were in the tavern, and hanged them'. An answer was returned to this effect, 'You have rightly said that you hanged them—but they were Muslims. We are coming to you by the will of God Most High, so prepare a hospitable reception'.

Then our lord the sultan summoned the magnates of his council, and discussed with them a campaign against that people because of this disturbance... The magnates objected on the grounds of the truce, which was secured by oaths and was equivalent to a guarantee of safety. It implied a covenant, and the keeping of a covenant is a religious obligation.

Then our lord the sultan indicated to the head of his writing-office, **Fath** al-Dīn, that he should go over the truce. Perhaps he would succeed in finding some reason for attacking that people, and there might be suggested by it and by what had occurred the means of obtaining his wish concerning them... I had drafted their truce and had a copy of it. So we met together, I and his father, the *Ṣadr Muḥyi* al-Dīn, and Le himself. I read the truce from beginning to end several times. The *Ṣadr Muḥyi* al-Dīn was convinced that it offered no scope or ground for abrogation either explicit or implicit. He turned to me and said, 'What do you say?' I said, 'We serve the purpose of our lord

the sultan. If he wishes to abrogate it, there is scope for requiring its abrogation. If it is not his purpose to abrogate it, its text does not require its abrogation'...So I said, 'Let our lord consider this clause of the truce, viz. "Provided that the merchants, the ambassadors and those going to and fro shall be safe and protected by the two parties in travelling, residing, going and coming". This is the text of the clause contained in the treaty'.

So I said to him, 'Those to whom this applies were merchants, and the provision of the truce has been broken through the neglect of their case, unless there is some information [?] from a Muslim delegate appointed to adjudge pleas'. He said, Letters have arrived from the delegates that the matter was not as they asserted, and that those hanged were Muslims'. So I said, 'The truce has been abrogated in this stipulation'.²⁶

Thus was set in motion the mobilization of the Mamluk forces which, in the following year, after Qalāwūn's death, were to accomplish the capture of Acre and the extinction of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.

Footnotes

¹ The treaties referred to are the following:

(a) Baybars and the Hospitallers: 4 Ramaḍān 665/29 May 1267. Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, Cairo n.d., xiv, 31–9.

(b) Baybars and the Lady Isabel of Beirut: 6 Ramaḍān 667/9 May 1269. *Ṣubḥ*, XIV, 39–42.

(c) Baybars and the Hospitallers: 1 Ramaḍān 669/13 April 1271. *Ṣubḥ*, XIV, 42–51.

(d) Qalāwūn and Bohemond VII of Tripoli: 17 Rabī' 1680/6 July 1281. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, excerpted in al-Maqrīzī, *Kiṭāb al-sulūk* (ed. M.M.Ziada), r/3, Cairo, 1970, 975–7. Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rikh*, excerpted in Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf al-ayyām* (ed. Murād Kāmil), Cairo, 1961, 210–11.

(e) Qalāwūn and the Templars: 5 Muḥarram 681/16 April 1282. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf*, 20–2. Arabic text and French translation in E.Quatremère, *Histoire des sultans mamlouks*, Paris, 1837–45, I/1, 177–8, 221–3. English translation (through Italian) in Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab historians of the Crusades*, London, 1969, 323–6.

(f) Qalāwūn and the authorities in Acre: 5 Rabī' I 682/3 June 1283. *Ṣubḥ*, XIV, 51–63. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf*, 34–43. Quatrain Zurayq (ed.), *Ta'rikh Ibn al-Furāt*, VII, Beirut, 1942, 262–70. Quatremère, *Histoire*, I/1, 179–85, 224–30. Gabrieli, *Arab historians*, 326–31.

(g) Qalāwūn and the Lady Margaret of Tyre: 14 Jumādā I 684/18 July 1285. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf*, 103–10. Quatremère, *Histoire*, I/1, 172–6, 212–21.

2 *Ṣubḥ*, XIV, 8.

³ Ibn 'Abd al-Rawḍ al-Zāhir, al-Zāhir (ed. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Riyāḍ al-Khuwayṭir 1396/ 1976, 118. The lord of Jaffa and the ruler of Beirut were respectively John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa (1250–66) and his namesake the lord of Beirut (1247–84).

4 *Ṣubḥ*, xiv, 70–1.

5 *Tashrīf*, 34, 43.

6 *Ṣubḥ*, XIII, 311–14.

⁷ Shāfi' b. 'Alī, *al-Faḍl al-ma'thūr min sīrat al-sulṭān al-Malik al-Manṣūr*, Bodleian MS Marsh 424, fols. 106b–107b. Shāfi' gives another account of the incident in *Husn al-manāqib al-sirriyya al-muntaza'a min al-sīra al-Zāhiriyya* (ed. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Khuwayṭir), *al-Riyāḍ* 1396/ 1976, 127–8.

8 *al-Faql al-ma'th ūr*, fols. 107b–109a; *Husn al-man āqib*, 132–4.

9 J.Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (second ed.), Paris, 1975, II, 523.

10 *Subh*, xiv, 60; *Tashrīf*, 43.

11 *Tashrīf*, 109.

12 *Tashrīf*, 108.

13 The Arabic is *wā lī tilka al-wī ā ya/-jiha, wā lī al-mak ā n*. *Wā lī* is probably here synonymous with *ra'is*; cf. below (p. 73), where the *ru'as ā* of the locality act in the event of robbery or homicide. Clauses in Baybars's first treaty with the Hospitallers dealing with procedure in cases of missing property are introduced with the phrase 'the discharge [*īlāq*] of the *ru'as ā*'. The term *ra'is* (in the form *rays*) was specifically used of a village headman in the Latin kingdom; cf. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The feudal nobility of the kingdom of Jerusalem 1174–1277*, [London, 1973], 47–9.

14 *Subh*, XIV, 57.

15 *Tashrīf*, 108.

16 *Subh*, XIV, 48.

17 *Subh*, XIV, 38.

18 *Subh*, XIV, 61. This clause is not given in *Tashrīf*.

19 Such clauses derive their validity from the Islamic legal concept of *am ā n* (safe-conduct), which was sometimes embodied in specific instruments: of. J.Wansbrough, 'The safe-conduct in Muslim chancery practice', *BSOAS*, XXXIV/1, 1971, 20–35.

20 *Subh*, XIV, 41.

21 G.L.F.Tafel and G.M.Thomas (ed.), *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, III, Vienna, 1857, 336.

22 *Subh*, XIV, 47.

23 Specimens of the decrees of Maml ū k sultans, which were the instruments embodying the final results of commercial negotiations, have been published and examined by J.Wansbrough, 'A Maml ū k commercial treaty concluded with the Republic of Florence 894/1489', in S.M. Stern (ed.), *Documents from Islamic chanceries*, Oxford [1965], 39–79; *idem*, 'Venice and Florence in the Mamluk commercial privileges', *BSOAS*,

²⁴ *Tashrīf*, 108.

²⁵ Ibn ‘Abd *Rawḍ*, *al-Zāhir*, 266, 283.

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²⁶ Shāfi‘ b. ‘Alī, *al-Faḍl al-ma‘thūr*, ff. 127a-128b; *Ḥusn al-manāqib*, 138–40.

THE MONGOL EMPIRE: A REVIEW ARTICLE

By D.O.MORGAN

The publication of a new history of medieval Central Asia,¹ over half of which is concerned with the empire of the Chingizid Mongols, provides an opportunity for a survey of a number of books on that subject that have appeared during the past decade. Professor Kwanten's book is, more or less avowedly, an attempt to replace René Grousset's *L'empire des steppes* as the standard introduction to Central Asian history. I begin, then, with the English translation of Grousset's celebrated book.²

Denis Sinor rightly remarked of *L'empire des steppes*, which was first published in 1939, that 'no other work encompasses as accurately as much of the multifaceted history of Central Eurasia'³—a judgement which, I fear, must still stand, regrettable though that may be after forty further years of scholarship. It is still, perhaps, best read in Grousset's elegant and lucid French, though history teachers will hardly waste their time in telling their students so. Grousset's weakness was that he knew, apparently, no Oriental languages, and so was entirely dependent on translations and secondary works—and, as Sinor interestingly brings out, on the close interrogation of those, notably Paul Pelliot, who did know the sources in the original tongues. Still, though it is to some extent, therefore, a tertiary work, *L'empire des steppes* remains to this day a far from negligible introduction to its subject.

But forty years is a long time (though Barthold's *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion* has lasted even longer), and the Mongols have never been short of authors fascinated by the extraordinary phenomenon of their conquests. In 1969 appeared E.D. Phillips's *The Mongols*,⁴ a well-informed and nicely illustrated book by a classicist interested in the history of nomadism. But this is a very short book which because of the pressure of material tends to degenerate into a catalogue of khans and battles. Much more important was the publication in 1971 of *The history of the Mongol conquests*, by J.J. Saunders. This excellent book must surely now be the first general work to recommend to anyone interested in the empire of Chingiz Khān and his successors. Like Grousset's book, it is a work of synthesis, based on Saunders's extremely wide reading in translated sources (of

which much more was available to him than to Grousset) and the secondary literature. It is a book not without minor slips (most of them pointed out by Professor Beckingham in *BSOAS*, XXXV, 2, 1972, 392–3), but as a whole it is an impressive achievement, strong on the pre-Chingizid historical background, and never falling into the sort of bare narrative trap that ensnared Phillips. And it has most useful and detailed notes, as well as an admirable annotated bibliography.

Despite the great merits of Saunders's book, Peter Brent's *The Mongol empire* (London, 1976), should not be passed over without mention. Mr. Brent is a professional writer rather than a historian, let alone a specialist in the history of Central Asia. His book is aimed at the interested general reader (it is devoid of notes and bibliographical references, but is profusely illustrated), and is a well-written narrative history. The author is clearly well informed, and makes remarkably few factual mistakes—fewer than the more learned Saunders, to say nothing of Kwanten. His judgements are usually sound and reliable. I very much enjoyed reading the book, which for a moment brought back the astonishment and interest aroused by the first book that, as a schoolboy, I ever read on the Mongols. Mr. Brent deserves a wide sale for this excellent piece of popularization.

It is instructive to turn from Brent to a more recent book on one aspect of the Mongol conquests, Gabriel Ronay's *The Tartar khan's Englishman* (London, 1978). This is an attempt to reconstruct the career of an anonymous Englishman in Mongol service whom the author believes himself to have discovered.⁵ The 'hard' evidence, such as it is, consists of a letter preserved in the *Chronica majora* of Matthew Paris, the thirteenth-century chronicler of St. Albans. This recounts the capture of the Englishman during the latter stages of the Mongol invasion of eastern Europe in 1242, and his subsequent rather meagre confession of his nefarious activities. It is certainly an intriguing incident, but on to it Ronay builds an astonishing structure of nonsense: which he is able to do largely, so far as I can see, because of his apparent total lack of understanding of the nature of historical evidence.

The reader is given clearly to know what to expect when in its (I fear implausible) attempt to identify the Englishman, the book commences with an account of the troubles of King John's reign, culled with extraordinary gullibility from the chronicle of Roger of Wendover (cf. Professor W.L. Warren's remarks on Roger's 'garbled inaccuracy and palpable implausibility', *King John*, London, 1961, 16). To this are added details of yet greater improbability from Matthew Paris: Ronay even believes his story ('there is little reason to question its veracity', p. 28) of John's alleged plan to take England over to Islam! (On this, see Warren, *op. cit.*, 14–15. Ronay might

perhaps have heeded A.L.Smith's caveat that Matthew Paris's evidence 'has to be very carefully scrutinized, for it ranges in value from first-hand, priceless testimony to the most extravagant and worthless gossip', *Church and state in the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1913, 170.)

As for the rest, the book is a work of imaginative fiction dressed up as history, in which groundless suppositions on one page have mysteriously become proven facts on the next. Can the author really have intended it to be taken seriously? A few further details must serve to characterize the book and the nature of its author's scholarship:

p. 2: 'The freshly turned-up documents...make fascinating reading, even in the cumbrous medieval script'. The principal document is Paris's chronicle, and in particular the letter of Yvo of Narbonne printed as an appendix to Ronay's book. The 'cumbrous medieval script' he has in mind here, though unacknowledged, turns out to be J.A.Giles's English translation of Paris, published in 1852–4. (Compare Ronay, pp. 228–34 with Giles, vol. I, pp. 467–73. All translations, says Ronay,' appear here, unless otherwise stated, in the author's translations'.)

p. 113: a most eccentric derivation is confidently offered for 'Genghis'—a name the meaning of which continues to puzzle Mongolists. Ronay's (unacknowledged) source seems to be Gibbon (*Decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ed. Bury, VII, p. 3, n. 4)—perhaps not the most up to date or reliable guide to questions of Mongolian etymology. p. 136: 'In this first ever translation into English of this important document (Güyük's letter to Pope Innocent IV) I used the Persian, French and German versions of the missing original text'. This is both misleading and ignorant. The French and German versions (presumably those of Pelliot and Spuler) are translations of the Persian, which is the only 'original' text we have. English translations of this have appeared in C.Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol mission*, 1955; I.de Rachewiltz, *Papal envoys to the great khans*, 1971; and B.Spuler (ed.), *History of the Mongols*, 1972.

This is merely a small selection from mountains of pretentious foolishness. *The Tartar khan's Englishman* is popular historical writing at its worst.

What a relief it is, then, to welcome James Chambers's *The Devil's horsemen* (London, 1979), an account of the Mongol invasion of Europe set against its Asiatic background. This fills very competently a major gap in the English historiography of the subject. (The only previous substantial study appeared in German in 1893.) It may be that historians of eastern Europe will have complaints to make; and on the Islamic side there are a few slips (e.g. on p. 42 a pre-Wittek view of Ottoman origins—but even Saunders has this). But this is not a

specialist piece of original research, and should not be criticized as though it had such pretensions. The author writes that 'I have simply attempted to tell the story of an extraordinary campaign, outline its causes and far-reaching consequences and place it in its historical perspective' (p. xi). In this aim his readable but serious book has entirely succeeded. But then, unlike Ronay, Chambers has done his homework; and unlike him, he knows what the writing of history is about.

So far I have been discussing books which fall at one end or the other of the critical spectrum. They have been either rather good, like Saunders or Chambers, or worthless, like Ronay. The work to which I must now pay some more detailed attention, Kwanten's *Imperial nomads*, disconcertingly refuses to be so characterized. It is a curate's egg of a book: parts are distinctly interesting, but other parts are quite surprisingly bad. The book comes to us, as I have said, in the hope of becoming a standard work. It is written by an associate professor at a distinguished American university. It is replete with scholarly apparatus. So one must measure it by a different yardstick from that appropriate in other cases.

Let me first say something about the merits of *Imperial nomads*. Its principal strength is a linguistic one: the author knows Chinese. Most recent writers on the Mongol Empire have either not known Oriental languages at all, or, like the late Professor Boyle⁶ or Professor Spuler,⁷ have approached the Mongols through the medium, in the first instance, of the Middle Eastern sources. Now while I am not persuaded by the author's belief that Chinese is the most necessary language for the study of the Mongol Empire—the priority of Persian seems to me undeniable—it is undoubtedly very useful, in principle, to have a history of the Empire from the pen of a scholar well-grounded in the Chinese sources. And so the reader (like myself) who knows his way a little about the Persian sources, but knows no Chinese, can learn much of interest from *Imperial nomads*. Whether what he learns is always accurate is not so easy to say; as we shall see, the author's treatment of affairs in the western half of the Empire does not inspire confidence. But still, the use and citation of Chinese sources is a strength, and those who concern themselves with the Middle East, or with Mongol-European relations, do sometimes need to be reminded of the first place accorded to China in the Mongol world view. This book will at least do that for them.

It is not only China that gets a fair—perhaps slightly more than a fair—crack of the whip. Much of Kwanten's own research has been on the history of Tibet: so here, too, interesting information is provided and a better balance achieved.

But that, I am afraid, is about it. It has to be said that, essentially,

Imperial nomads is both a naïve and an unreliable book. So far as the naïvety is concerned, we must look at the author's stated aims. 'The present volume,' he writes, 'presents a more objective approach to the subject and provides a new interpretation that rejects pure chance as a causative historical factor.' 'By training, as well as inclination, I belong to the French historiographical school commonly known as the *Annales* School' (p. xiv). Now apart from the rejection of chance—i.e., presumably, a deterministic framework of some sort is to be imposed on the evidence—it is not easy to see quite what this *Annales-ism* consists in, except perhaps (a fair enough point) the emphasis Kwanten places on a continuous political tradition of a sort on the steppe. For the rest, however, we are treated to the following sorts of assertions, none of them exactly shattering as new insights: 'An empire's history...does not consist solely of politics and conquests... To survive past its formative period, an empire needs structures of some kind in almost all aspects of its internal functioning' (p. 187); 'The study of many factors—political, economic and social among them—thus leads to the interpretation of an area's development over a fairly long duration' (p. 286); 'Until the twentieth century...no economic theory was available to the Central Asian nomads'; 'An examination of the history of the Central Asian steppe empires, following the methodology of the *Annales* school, shows that for several centuries Central Asia exerted a major influence on the historical development of the sedentary states' (p. 288).

I submit, then, that despite Kwanten's ostentatious wielding of the mighty name of *Annales*, this is not in fact a revolutionary book. It is essentially the mixture as before: most of it is politics and war, with chunks of culture, trade and administration thrown in. Were it not for the author's professed allegiance, no one would dream of thinking this book a product of the same stable as, say, Braudel's *The Mediterranean*.

Still, this would not in itself invalidate what the book has to tell us. It is the unreliability of its information that does that. This may be classed under two heads: gaps in the author's knowledge of certain areas, and his provision of actual misinformation. A few examples should suffice to illustrate these.

Kwanten's bibliography and notes are remarkable for the items they do not contain: Saunders, for example, is conspicuous by his absence. Now in a wide-ranging book such as this is, references and perhaps even, to some extent, the author's own reading are bound to be selective. Yet it is odd that Kwanten's discussion of the reasons for the Mongol withdrawal from eastern Europe in 1242 (p. 135) contains no reference to Sinor's well-known and persuasive arguments—the more so since Kwanten acknowledges the influence and help of Sinor.

Likewise his remark (p. 205) that the Mongols ‘conquered the Middle East more by chance than by plan’, though it might be right, ought to be qualified by Lattimore’s theory of ‘the geography of Chingis Khān’ (*Geographical Journal*, March 1963). These may be minor points. Other deficiencies are more serious. Such bald statements as that ‘the records of the Il-khans...barely mention the Yüan’ (p. 225); ‘the Islamic world did not have as strong a historiographical tradition as the Sinitic world’; or that ‘the ruling houses and the entire population... [of the Middle East] were Islamic’ (p. 204), can only be founded on, at best, a liking for misleading over-simplification; but it may be feared that this will not prevent them from finding their way into a *tümen* or two of undergraduate essays over the years.

Inadequate knowledge must presumably be the explanation of the author’s belief in a ‘scholarly neglect of the western part of the Mongol empire’ (p. 204). He asserts that ‘the situation (i.e. the social and administrative structure) in the Il-khanid domain has not yet been subjected to a serious critical examination’ (p. 191). This gives very short shrift to the labours of the likes of Aubin, Ayalon, Boyle, Lambton, Petrushevsky, Smith and Spuler, some of whom appear in the bibliography, but from the study of whose works Kwanten seems to have benefited little. No one who supposes Islam to have been ‘a single, homogeneous, structured religion’ (p. 219), and that this was the only religion that confronted the Mongols in the Middle East, can have read very deeply into the subject. Nor can an author who suggests that ‘the historical sources do not deal with the empire as a whole’, and that ‘most of the material dealing with the Mongols is written in Chinese’ (p. 225) know much about Juwaynī, Rashīd al-Dīn or Waṣṣāf (the last-named being notable for his complete absence from the book).

More serious still are the astonishing number of simple errors and misleading statements of supposed fact: ‘Even though agriculture was one of the prime sources of revenue, the Il-khans, in sharp contrast to the Yüan, never expressed any interest in it’ (p. 213)—so much for Ghazan Khān; the Mongols’ destroyed the town of Balkh so thoroughly that the city of the same name in modern Afghanistan is not located on or near the ruins of the old city; in fact, the location of the old city is not precisely known’ (p. 120)—one can only guess that Kwanten has confused the site of Balkh, and the modern village of that name on the site, with the nearby city of Mazār-i Sharīf; the second conflict (with the Ong Khān)...occurred shortly after...the 1206 quriltai’ (p. julbān,9 by which time the Ong Khān had been dead for years; and perhaps most serious of all in its possible implications, the execution of the Ilkhānid wazīr Sa’d al-Dawla is dated after, rather than before, the death of Arghun (p. 163). This is a tiny point in itself,

but when Kwanten's reference is checked, it is found (*a*) to be to a Persian source, Rashīd al-Dīn, in the original (Kwanten disclaims knowledge of Persian); (*b*) to be to the wrong page; and (*c*) when the right page is looked up, the execution indeed turns out to have occurred five days before Arghun's death—as reference to any standard secondary source would have established. The question this little incident leaves in the mind, when one is already ceasing to rely on Kwanten's facts, is how many other errors of this kind could be tracked down by checking all his references: worse, how many there may be lurking in the apparently authoritative eastern Asiatic sections of the book, for the checking of which such readers as myself do not have the necessary linguistic competence.

One could go on carping. The book is replete with disagreeable jargon; the bibliography is full of small mistakes (Drake for Darke, Nitti for Hitti, etc.); transliterations from the Islamic languages, at least, are well described in Kwanten's own criticism of those in *The empire of the steppes* as 'totally arbitrary': Ayn Jalat, Rahbad al-Shams, wasir, Ummayyads, Sa'ud al-Daula, Jahan-Guzha, Jami'ut al-tawārikh, Sarbardars. But enough is enough.

It all seems a great pity, and a missed opportunity. It would have been a pleasure to be able to have said that here, at last, is an accurate, authoritative history of Central Asia which one can recommend without reservation. But the most that can in fact be said is that *Imperial nomads* will repay attention for its eastern Asiatic material and for some useful emphases, mixed in with a mass of misinformation and unsubstantiated judgements. For the broad sweep of Central Asian history, the reader will still have to go first to Grousset, or to Gavin Hambly's *Central Asia*; and for the Mongols, to Saunders.

This survey inevitably provokes one or two general reflections on the writing of the history of such subjects as the Mongol Empire. First, and perhaps most banal, what a prodigious amount of work remains to be done. Such is the orientalist's customary ritual incantation against the writing of works of synthesis—it is premature: we must wait for the monographs. This is not the view I would wish to put forward. It does seem to me that there is sufficient material, either sources in translation or secondary literature of worth, to make some kind of synthesis perfectly feasible—something that has not been true until comparatively recently. Saunders, more than anyone else I have discussed here, proved that this is so: he knew his limitations, and those of the material available, and made no exaggerated claims. Similarly both. Brent and Chambers show that good popular history can be written about the Mongols.

It is Kwanten's book, though, that casts the problems into the

sharpest relief. Here is an attempt, albeit an unsuccessful as well as a pretentious one, to write a general survey to the highest scholarly standards; not for Kwanten the modest aims of a Saunders or a Chambers. Why does it fail? In part the faults were avoidable: these, I hope, have been sufficiently indicated. But there are two difficulties which face anyone who contemplates a task similar to Kwanten's. One is the problem of languages. As Saunders put it, 'in bulk, the original sources are not unmanageable, but they are extant in so many languages that only a linguistic prodigy could claim a mastery of them all'.⁸ Pelliot was such a prodigy, and there are said still to be one or two, though not, so far as I know, on this side of the Atlantic. Most of those who elect to study the Mongol Empire must choose their end of Asia, west or east, and learn the languages accordingly. For the other end, we depend on translations: and for myself, the mistranslations I have stumbled on when looking at published versions of Persian texts make me wonder into what traps I may be falling when I rely on translations from Chinese and Mongolian.

Still, one can usually call on specialist assistance. What is less easy is to ensure the soundness of one's judgement when dealing with the end of Asia and of the Mongol Empire with which one is not so familiar. Kwanten shows only too clearly that a knowledge (which I presume him to have) of how eastern Asiatic government and society worked is no guarantee of any sureness of touch when dealing with the Middle East. And as any orientalist will tell you, there is no short cut! I can only, then, express the hope that historians will not allow these difficulties to deter them from writing about the Mongol Empire: in particular, a new study of the life and career of Chingiz Khān himself is an obvious need. *The Tartar khan's Englishman* and *Imperial nomads* can at least serve, in their different ways, as object lessons in how not to go about it.

Footnotes

¹ Luc Kwanten, *Imperial nomads: a history of central Asia 500–1500*, XV, 352 pp., 10 plates. Leicester: Leicester University Press (1979). £13.

² *The empire of the steppes*, tr. N.Walford, New Brunswick, 1970.

³ Introduction to Grousset, *Conqueror of the world*, Edinburgh and London, 1967, XIV.

⁴ Published in the *Ancient peoples and places* series, London.

⁵ For earlier discussion of the Englishman, see e.g. Henry Kingsley, *Tales of old travel*, London, 1869. Since then he has often been mentioned, e.g. by Brent, by Saunders in his article on ‘Matthew Paris and the Mongols’, in T.A.Sandquist and M.R.Powicke (ed.), *Essays in Medieval history presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, Toronto, 1969, 116–32, and by Chambers in the book discussed below.

⁶ See, e.g., his articles collected as *The Mongol world empire 1206–1370*, London, 1977.

⁷ As illustrated, e.g., in the useful collection of texts he edited as *History of the Mongols*, referred to above.

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⁸ *The history of the Mongol conquests*, 1.

SALADIN AND HIS ADMIRERS: A BIOGRAPHICAL REASSESSMENT¹

By P.M.HOLT

‘The life and achievements of Saladin constitute one of the great moments in the history of the crusades. In literature he appears most frequently as a conquering hero, who fought his enemies victoriously and in the end beat them to a standstill. But a closer examination of his actual life reveals him not only as a conqueror, but as a man who struggled with enemies of his own side who finally joined him and fought along with him under his sole command. From this angle we see him as a man who fought for his ideals, and fought, not victoriously, but in a measure that fell short of his hopes and ambitions.’²

These opening words of Sir Hamilton Gibb’s biography of Saladin are the latest, and perhaps the last, expression of a tradition in the European historiography of the Crusades which has been influential at least since the publication in 1898 of Stanley Lane-Poole’s *Saladin and the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem*. The origin of this tradition may indeed go even further back to Sir Walter Scott’s *Talisman*, which Gibb himself, we are told, gave ‘to students as a work of art from which they could learn much about Islamic history.’³

This view of Saladin is, however, confronted with the difficulty that from the beginning of his independent reign in 570/1174 until his death, in 589/1193, Saladin spent twelve years mainly in fighting the Zangids, the family and partisans of his former lord, Nūr al-Dīn, and five years only in the Holy War against the Latin kingdom and the Third Crusade. Any judgement of his career and character must depend largely on the view taken of those first twelve years. Gibb saw Saladin as inspired throughout by the resolve to wage the Holy War against the Franks, and indeed as having wider aims, ‘to restore and revive the political fabric of Islam as a single united empire, not under his own rule, but by restoring the rule of the revealed law under the

direction of the Abbasid Caliphate.⁴ This teleological interpretation of Saladin's career rests upon contemporary Arabic sources, in which already by the time of his death a legend of his achievements was coming into existence. Since these sources are only briefly discussed in the work under review (pp. 2–3), a fuller examination is perhaps justifiable.

Saladin's two contemporary biographers were Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād and 'Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī. Ibn Shaddād's work, *al-Nawādir al-Sultāniyya wa'l-mahāsīn al-Yūsufiyya*, was published in Europe with a Latin translation by the Dutch orientalist, Albert Schultens, as early as 1732. It was thus a prime influence in forming the view of Saladin held by European historians. It was used by Gibbon, who calls the author Bohadin, and eighty years later, when William Stubbs wrote his introduction to *Itinerarium Regis Ricardi*, Bohadin was still the principal, and almost the sole, Arabic source available to him. Al-Isfahānī wrote a seven-volume chronicle of Saladin's life and times, entitled *al-Barq al-Shāmī*. Only two complete volumes are now extant, but excerpts from the others survive, and an abridgement by al-Bundārī, *Sanā al-barq al-Shāmī*, has recently been published in full. He also wrote an account of the last glorious phase of Saladin's career from 583/1187 to his death, entitled *al-Fath al-Qussī fi'l-fath al-Qudsī*.

These may appear to be impeccable sources, since both men belonged to the inner circle of Saladin's court officials, Ibn Shaddād having been his army-judge and al-Isfahānī his secretary. Such in fact was Gibb's view. But some caution is necessary. These after all were royal biographies, written by courtiers about their master. *Al-Fath* was certainly completed within a few months of Saladin's death, and D.S. Richards has shown that much of it was 'already available in some form during Saladin's lifetime' as 'the work was probably intended for presentation to Saladin.'⁵ *Al-Nawādir*, which Richards has shown to be partly dependent on *al-Fath*, was perhaps completed as early as 1198, and certainly not later than 1216, i.e. at a time when Saladin's Ayyubid kinsmen were the unquestioned rulers of Egypt and Muslim Syria. Writing on medieval European historiography, Beryl Smalley has remarked that,

Royal biographies have one feature in common: they are propaganda pieces. The writers' purposes and techniques varied, but they had all to find a mould which would contain the unruly facts. The prince had to be presented as his biographer wished to show him to his readers or hearers.⁶

This was also true of Ibn Shaddād and al-Isfahānī. There is a further consideration. Both of them had gone over to Saladin's service from

the Zangids. Al-Isfahānī, who had been Nūr al-Dīn's secretary, had joined Saladin in the year after his master's death. Ibn Shaddād's home was at Mosul, and he negotiated with Saladin on behalf of its Zangid ruler in 581/1186. It was not until two years later that he entered Saladin's service. Both men may have sought to justify their shift of allegiance by exalting Saladin's character and achievements. One must also bear in mind that Ibn Shaddād could write from personal knowledge only of the last years when Saladin was engaged in the critical struggle with the Franks.

About the same time as these works by Saladin's partisans, there appeared a work by the historian Ibn al-Athīr (555–630/1160–1233), who spent most of his life in Mosul, and who gives the Zangid view of events. His dynastic history of the Zangids, *al-Bāhir fī ta'rīkh al-ābakat al-Mawṣilī*, completed in 607/1211, appears to be a counterblast to the writings of Saladin's admirers. Although the title refers specifically to the *atabegs* of Mosul, Ibn al-Athīr's patrons, much space is devoted to Nūr al-Dīn, who ruled only in Syria but was undoubtedly the most distinguished member of the family. In his introductory remarks, Ibn al-Athīr emphasizes the role of the Zangids as champions in the Holy War. His long and detailed eulogy of Nūr al-Dīn appears in some respects to retort to statements made by Ibn Shaddād about Saladin.

Thus within about twenty years of Saladin's death, there came into existence two rival presentations of the twelfth-century rulers of Muslim Syria, glorifying the exploits of the Zangids and Saladin respectively. These two historiographies were reconciled by Abū Shāma (559–665/1203–68), who passed almost his whole life in Damascus. The title of his work, *Kitāb al-raḥḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn al-Nūriyya wa'l-Ṣalāhiyya* ('The book of the two gardens concerning the two regimes of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin'), announces its eirenic purpose. It was completed in 651/1253 in changed circumstances from those which the earlier writers had known. The Ayyubids had lost Egypt to the Mamlūks. St. Louis, defeated in Egypt, was at Acre, restoring the defences of the Latin kingdom. To the Mamlūks and to their opponent, the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, he was a desirable ally, and both offered him the retrocession of the territories taken by Saladin. Although the negotiations ended inconclusively, it must have seemed to Abū Shāma, a pious scholar, unpractised in politics, as if Saladin's work was about to be undone by his successors. It is not surprising that he drew from history a lesson for the rulers of his own time, which he sought to convey in this combined history of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin.

In this way, sixty years after Saladin's death, the creation of his legend was completed. Saladin, the usurper of the patrimony of the Zangids, is shown as their successor in a divinely appointed mission.

The contests for supremacy in Syria between Muslim and Muslim, as well as between Muslim and Frank, are seen in retrospect, as if the reconquest of Jerusalem at the end had been Saladin's intention from the beginning. It is an interpretation of twelfth-century Syrian history which has dominated later writing, but in essence it is *Heilsgeschichte*, the salvation of the Islamic community in the latter days as the *Hijra* of the Prophet saved it at its beginning, as *al-Isfahānī* implies in *al-Fath*.⁷

A reassessment of Saladin and his achievements by Andrew S.Ehrenkreutz appeared almost simultaneously with Gibb's biography. In his introduction, Ehrenkreutz reviewed previous presentations of Saladin, and in the body of the work he drew on his specialist knowledge of the economic history of the period to draw attention to aspects of the reign which the political historians had tended to ignore. His final judgements is severe:

Most of Saladin's significant historical accomplishments should be attributed to his military and governmental experience, to his ruthless persecution and execution of political opponents and dissenters, to his vindictive belligerence and calculated opportunism, and to his readiness to compromise religious ideals to political expediency.

...Rather than the alleged attractiveness of his romantic personality, it was the potent spell of his tendentious biographers which has clouded the perceptions of most modern writers retelling the story of the great sultan.⁸

The revision of the historical role of Saladin and the reassessment of his personal qualities is carried a stage further by the work under review, which surveys the whole of his life in the context of his period. To quote the Foreword:

The object of this work is to re-examine and, where possible, to add to evidence for the career of Saladin in order to strengthen the frame of reference into which the judgements and conclusions of his modern biographers can be fitted.

It is an important biography in two respects. In the first place, it gives a very detailed narrative of Saladin's career, which is a most useful assemblage of political and military data. In the second place, it draws on two sources which have not been exploited by previous writers.

One of these is al-Bundārī's abridgement of *al-Barq al-Shāmī*, mentioned above. The published edition by Fathiyya al-Nabarāwī⁹ was not available to the authors, who used her Cambridge Ph.D. thesis and a partial edition by R. Şeşen, published in 1971. The second new source, which, has played a large part in forming the author's view of Saladin

and his policies, is the corpus of letters from Saladin's court, which to some extent supply the lack of a true archive. They are thus described:

In the main, these are attributed to Saladin's administrator, the **Qādī** al-Fāḍil, and they comprise both personal letters sent by al-Fāḍil himself and others drafted for Saladin. Some are quoted by the narrative historians or are found in other works; twenty-six are included, complete or in part, in a Cairo edition, but a large number are still unedited. This collection is supplemented by a manuscript of letters wrongly attributed to 'Imād al-Dīn and by the writings of another of Saladin's contemporaries, the North African al-Wahrānī. The scope of their material is, of course, limited and they cannot compensate entirely for the dearth of official documents, but in addition to the details that they provide, many show the construction that Saladin himself wished to have placed on his actions, while others supply this with an unofficial commentary.¹⁰

The authors have also drawn on Western and Byzantine sources for the period, e.g. William of Tyre and Nicetas Choniates. Previous writers, approaching the subject from an orientalist background, have tended to neglect this valuable range of materials. One may note in passing that the significant study by Hannes Möhring, *Saladin und der Dritte Kreuzzug*, Wiesbaden, 1980, which draws extensively on medieval European, Byzantine and Arabic sources, although listed in the bibliography, was published after the completion of this work.

The Saladin who emerges from these pages is no longer the confident and dedicated champion of Islam, even if he is not the anti-hero, disastrous to Egypt, depicted by Ehrenkreutz. The precarious nature of his position appears constantly. The *jihād* was a means of legitimating his authority (cf. pp. 88–9, 97), as also was his marriage to 'Ismat al-Dīn Khātūn (p. 110). As the daughter of Mu'īn al-Dīn Önör and widow of Nūr al-Dīn, she provided him with a double personal link with the rulers who preceded him. Ironically, at the time of this marriage in 1176, al-Šālih Ismā'īl, her son by Nūr al-Dīn, still reigned in Aleppo, and was the figurehead of Zangid resistance to Saladin's usurpation. An interesting paragraph (pp. 152–3) stimulates reflection as to the nature of Saladin's rule—'the question of whether Saladin was, or had become, primarily a war-band leader or whether he should be thought of as a territorial ruler.' His situation was not unlike that of the Norman and early Angevin monarchs, ruling two distinct territories with a 'peripatetic administrative nucleus.' His relation to the administration is summarized (pp. 366–7) as 'an inherited bureaucracy within whose framework operated a system of

patronage with Saladin at its head. It was patronage, rather than formal administration, that appears to have occupied his own time'. The ambiguity of his policy as the self-appointed champion of Islam is brought out at various points in his career: thus in 1182, after the death of al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl:

The policy of Ayyubid expansionism that had been blocked by the peace treaty of 1176 was about to be renewed. Saladin was laying claim not only to Aleppo, but to any other town whose troops could be shown to be needed for the Holy War. This could not be accepted either by Izz al-Dīn in Mosul or by Zangī in Aleppo and Saladin's sincerity in turning his back on the Franks to fight his fellow-Muslims was bound to be called in question.¹¹

The nemesis of Saladin's policy is thus characterized:

As his letters show, however, he was finding that the logical end to the cycle of expansion, where power depended on conquests, attracting recruits to be paid for by further conquests, was a power monopoly coterminous with the frontiers of Islam.¹²

Another passage, referring to the situation in 1188, but applicable to the whole of Saladin's reign, examines another reason for his precarious position:

A factor that had to be taken into account was the loose structure of his army. His allies had no reason to give him whole-hearted support. For his own emirs and professional soldiers he and his family were merely successful members of their own class; his dynasty was bolstered by no divine right of kings and the religious sanction it had claimed had been denied it by Baghdad. During the period of its expansion it had been profitable to join his side, but profit and numbers were inextricably linked. If his military accounts began to show a loss, his numbers could be expected to diminish and his dynasty in its turn could be threatened by other Muslim expansionists.¹³

The authors have provided a detailed, considered and perceptive account of Saladin, setting his acts and policies firmly in their proper context—the complex and unstable political and military condition of the Near East in the late twelfth century, a condition in which the Frankish states were one, but not the sole, factor. The amount of detail

and the numerous characters who make their appearance do not conduce to an easy narrative, and in one or two respects the authors might have helped the reader more. Although the month and even the day in which events occurred are usually given, it is often necessary to range over quite a number of pages to ascertain the year. A running date-heading (as in Lane-Poole's book) may be old-fashioned but it is of much assistance in following a full chronological narrative, and still more for purposes of reference. The provision of the *Hijrī* equivalents to Christian dates would have facilitated reference to Arabic sources. On the other hand, to give the equivalent in kilometres to every distance in miles is hardly necessary. The present reviewer finds the system of abbreviations used in the notes bewildering and tiresome, and it is curious that the bibliography, while separately listing Arabic primary sources does not distinguish original Western (and Byzantine) sources from modern works. The eight maps provided are useful, although the Dongola shown on Map 6 is New Dongola (al-'Urḍī), which developed in the nineteenth century, not the medieval town (Dunqula al-'Ajūz), which lies about ninety miles further up the Nile and on the right bank. Plans of the site of the battle of Ḥaṭṭīn and of medieval Jerusalem and Acre would have been helpful. These, however, are criticisms of ancillary details, and in no way detract from the value and importance of this long awaited work.

Footnotes

¹ Malcolm Cameron Lyons and D.E.P.Jackson, *Saladin: the politics of the Holy War*. (University of Cambridge Oriental Publications.) viii, 456 pp. Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1982. £25.

² Hamilton [A. R.] Gibb, *The life of Saladin*, Oxford, 1973, 1.

³ Albert Hourani, 'H.A.R.Gibb: the vocation of an orientalist', *Europe and the Middle East*, [London, 1980], at p. 106.

⁴ H.A.R.Gibb, 'The achievement of Saladin', *Studies on the civilisation of Islam*, Boston, [1962], at p. 100.

⁵ D.S.Richards, 'A consideration of the sources for the life of Saladin', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, xxv, 1, 1980, at p. 61.

⁶ Beryl Smalley, *Historians in the Middle Ages*, London, [1974], 67.

⁷ 'Or j' ai adopté, pour départ de ma chronologie, une seconde hégire qui atteste que le terme de la première sera marqué par la résurrection et que sa promesse est la vraie, celle qu'on ne réfute pas, celle qui est évidente, celle qu'on ne fausse pas. Cette hégire, c'est l'émigration de l'Islam vers Jérusalem. Son acteur est le sultan **Ṣalāḥ** ad-Dīn Abū l-Muẓaffar Yūsuf b Ayyūb.'
'Imād ad-Dīn al-Isfahānī, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, tr. Henri Massé, Paris, 1972, 6.

⁸ Andrew S.Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, Albany, N.Y., 1972, 238.

⁹ **Faṭḥiyya** al-Nabarrāwī, *Sanā al-barq al-Shāmī*, Cairo, 1979.

¹⁰ Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, 1–2.

¹¹ Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, 172.

¹² Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, 201.

¹³ Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, 286.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE OF CAIRO

By P.M.HOLT

The re-establishment of the 'Abbāsid caliphate in Cairo after its overthrow on the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 656/1258 was, as is well known, accomplished by the Mamlūk sultan, al-Zāhir Baybars, who installed successively two refugee 'Abbāsids as caliphs in his capital. What is perhaps not always realized is that the two pretenders did not appear in turn and out of the blue at the beginning of Baybars's reign, and that the sultan's reasons for installing the first, al-Mustansir, were not identical with his reasons for installing the second, al-Ḥākim. In certain respects the official account by Baybars's court biographer, Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, needs to be supplemented and corrected.¹

Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan, the future al-Ḥākim, had had the more interesting career before becoming caliph.² His genealogical claim to the caliphate was not strong: he was a descendant in the fourth generation of the Caliph al-Mustarshid (512–29/1118–35). When Baghdad fell, he absconded, and sought refuge for a time with the tribe of Khafāja. Subsequently he made his way to Syria, where he enjoyed the protection of 'Isa b. Muḥannā, the powerful chief of Āl Faḍl. Relations with al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, the Ayyubid lord of Aleppo and Damascus, came to nothing with Hülegü's invasion of Syria, but after the Mongol defeat at 'Ayn Jālūt (25 Ramaḍān 658/3 September 1260), 'Isā b. Muḥannā brought him to the notice of al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz, the Mamlūk sultan, who promised to restore him, and apparently performed the *bay'a* to him by deputy. But the sultanate quickly passed to Baybars by regicide and usurpation, and the pretender's hopes were again disappointed. Baybars installed as caliph the alternative candidate, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, the son, brother and uncle respectively of the last three caliphs of Baghdad.³ He, with other 'Abbāsids who had been held in custody by al-Musta'ṣim, was set free by the Mongols. He too sought refuge among the Arab tribesmen, but appears to have done nothing in particular until Baybars heard of him, welcomed him to Cairo, and made him caliph.

Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan, finding himself thus anticipated, fled to Aleppo, where a Mamlūk war-lord, Āqūsh al-Barlī, was trying to carve out a kingdom for himself. Al-Barlī performed the *bay'a* to him, and gave him a force of Turcomans, with which he set out for Ḥarrān and the

Euphrates. He had already made a successful raid in this region with the Arabs of **Āl Faḍl** in the previous year. However, at **Āna** he met his kinsman and rival, the Caliph **al-Mustanṣir**, who had been despatched by Baybars with an expeditionary force against Baghdad. The two continued their advance until in a battle with the Mongols in **Muḥarram** 660/November 1261, **al-Mustanṣir** disappeared from history. **Al-Ḥākim** survived to make his way to Cairo and the caliphate.

What were Baybars's reasons for recognizing **al-Mustanṣir** as caliph? One was undoubtedly a desire to legitimate his power. He was not only personally a usurper, having obtained the throne by the killing of his predecessor **Quṭuz** but the Mamlūk sultanate itself had supplanted the Ayyubids. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's biography bears witness to Baybars's sensitivity in this respect, since it is careful to present him in a threefold guise as the true successor to the Ayyubids, the *Heerkönig* of his Turkish Mamlūk comrades, and the paragon of Muslim rulers. The desire for legitimacy may account for the speed with which the restoration of the caliphate was carried out. Baybars received **al-Mustanṣir** in Cairo on 9 Rajab 659/9 June 1261. Four days later, his credentials were publicly attested; Baybars performed the *bay'a* to him, and in return was invested with the universal sultanate. On 17 Rajab/17 June, the new caliph pronounced the *khuṭba* in the Citadel mosque, and on 4 Sha'bān/4 July there was an impressive public ceremony when the sultan was robed in the black livery of the 'Abbāsids and a diploma conferring plenary power on him was read. In the following month, another 'Abbāsīd court usage was revived when the caliph invested Baybars with the *futuwwa* in the presence of witnesses.

A further purpose may, however, be seen in the installation of **al-Mustanṣir** as caliph. His arrival in Cairo occurred at a time when although the Mongol conquests had been halted, the frontier between Mamlūk Syria and the **Ilkhānate** was not yet stabilized. Two Mongol invasions of Syria had been defeated, at 'Ayn Jālūt and again near **Hims** in **Muḥarram** 659/December 1260. There was hostility, which was to culminate in warfare, between Hülegü and Berke Khān of the Golden Horde. In the circumstances, an offensive against the Ilkhanate seemed feasible. Baybars had agents ready to his hand in the three sons of Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', the late *atabeg* of Mosul, who had died as Hülegü's vassal. **Al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl**, who hoped to obtain Mosul itself, came in to Baybars in Sha'bān 659/July 1261; his two brothers were the claimants respectively to the Jazīra and **Sinjār**. The caliph with his appeal to the tribal Arabs of *bādiyat al-Shām* usefully complemented this arsenal of potential client-rulers in al-'Irāq, and the four men set out on their doomed enterprise with the consequences for **al-Mustanṣir** which have been described. So ended the first 'Abbāsīd caliphate of Cairo. It had lasted less than six months. Baybars, perhaps

in self-justification, boasted to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir that he had spent no less than 1,060,000 dinars on the caliph and the princes of Mosul. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s nephew, Shāfi’ b. ‘Alī, writing with the hindsight of a later generation, expresses his surprise that Baybars should believe that the numerous and victorious Mongol armies could be effectively opposed by so small a force.⁴ But there is no need to suspect bad faith in Baybars: the political situation in 659/1261 made the enterprise seem by no means a forlorn hope.

The circumstances of al-Ḥākim’s elevation to the caliphate differed considerably from those which had attended al-Mustanṣir. Having escaped from the battle which saw the end of his kinsman, he again took refuge with ‘Isā b. Muḥannā. He got in touch with Baybars, and made his way to Cairo, where he arrived in Rabī‘ II 660/March 1262. Unlike his predecessor, he was not hurried into public recognition as caliph; his installation did not take place until 2 Muḥarram 661/16 November 1262. The reasons for this delay may have been partly personal, partly due to changes in the political situation. Personally, al-Ḥākim was clearly a more considerable figure than al-Mustanṣir. He had already twice been recognized as caliph—but by two of Baybars’s defeated rivals, Qutuz and al-Barī, and was thus to some extent a potential focus of opposition. Baybars’s haste to install al-Mustanṣir may indeed have been due partly to a desire to anticipate the arrival of this second and less attractive claimant. Al-Ḥākim had gained military experience and some success in his earlier adventures, and he had a powerful friend who could provide him with a fighting force in ‘Isā b. Muḥannā. As far as the political situation was concerned, Baybars had no further need of caliphal legitimation, and it is noticeable that he received no new diploma promulgated in al-Ḥākim’s name. Only on the day after his installation did the caliph pronounce a *khutba* praising the sultan, and urging the people to obedience and the Holy War. Furthermore, it was now clear that there could be no hope of establishing a client-caliph in Baghdad. Mosul had fallen to the Mongols, and al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl had been put to death in the summer of 1262. There was thus no military role for al-Ḥākim to play, and from Baybars’s point of view it was undesirable that he should enjoy much publicity. Whereas al-Mustanṣir had been furnished with a caliphal household and a private army, al-Ḥākim was given a residence in a tower of the Citadel, and provided with tutors to improve his religious education.

In one important matter, however, al-Ḥākim was required to fulfil a political function, although as a puppet only. The rift between the two western Mongol rulers, Hülegü and Berke, offered considerable advantages to Baybars, who by establishing an alliance with Berke could ease the pressure on his Syrian frontier. Furthermore, since the territory of the Golden Horde was at this time the principal recruiting-

ground for Mamlūk, an understanding with its ruler was greatly in Baybars's interest. He was not slow to open diplomatic relations with Berke. In 660/1261–2, he had written to the khān, urging him to the Holy War against the infidel Hülegü, who for the sake of his Christian wife was favouring the Christians. Then in Muḥarram 661/November–December 1262, he sent ambassadors to Berke, from whom in turn he received an embassy in Rajab 661/May 1263. The diplomatic situation was nevertheless one of some delicacy. Berke was after all a descendant of Chingiz Khān in the eldest line; Baybars, however extensive his dominions and great his power, was a self-made ruler of unknown parentage. It was here that the caliph, the Prophet's cousin, could usefully serve as a mouthpiece in communicating with the convert to Islam. The formal entente was conveniently supplemented by the brotherhood of the *futuwwa*, here playing a part very like that of the orders of chivalry in the West. Baybars had been initiated by al-Mustanşir, as has been mentioned. On 3 Ramaḍān 661/11 July 1263, through the agency of one of his magnates, he invested al-Ḥākim, who on the following night, and by the same agent (not a member of his own entourage) invested Berke's ambassadors. On the previous Friday, they had heard the caliph pronounce in the *khutba* the name of their master after that of Baybars. They had an audience of the caliph, in which he conveyed appropriate sentiments to Berke, and urged him to the Holy War. It was the start of a collaboration which survived Berke's death and the succession of a non-Muslim in 664/1266.⁵

Al-Ḥākim reigned (but did not rule) for forty years until his death in 701/1301, and was the progenitor of a dynasty of caliphs which finally vanished only after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt.⁶ The unbroken succession, as well as the long reigns of several individual caliphs, indicates that they stood apart from the turbulent factional politics of the Mamlūk sultanate, and passed their days in retired obscurity and impotence. The caliph's principal functions were ceremonial, and in one respect at least his role grew in importance some decades after the restoration of the caliphate, namely in legitimating by his presence, and sometimes by his word and act, the accession of a new sultan. The necessity for such symbolic and public legitimation seems to have been a consequence of the installation of sultans by rival factions of magnates from the late seventh/ thirteenth century onwards.

Perhaps the first instance of the caliph's presence at the accession of a sultan occurred in 698/1299, when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was brought back from exile and reinstated as nominal sultan—he was then about 14 years of age.⁷ On this occasion, the sultan was enthroned in the presence of the Caliph al-Ḥākim and the chief judges, who do not seem, however, to have played an active part in the proceedings. Ten years later, when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was again in exile, and the throne was taken

by al-Muẓaffar Baybars, the usurper sought to secure his position (which he had accepted with reluctance) by obtaining a diploma from the Caliph al-Mustakfī I, conferring plenary powers on him. When after the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad at the end of his third reign in 741/1341, twelve of his descendants were set up and cast down by Mamlūk factions in the space of forty years, the participation of the caliph in the installation of the sultan is almost invariably noted by the chroniclers. On some occasions at least an elaborate ceremony was staged, as on the accession of al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's son and first successor.⁸

This nominal sanction by the caliph of the newly installed sultan did nothing in reality to secure the latter's position or that of the faction which sponsored him. Al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr reigned less than two months before he was deposed. The usage, however, continued, not only under the later Qalāwīnids but also during the Circassian succession in the ninth/fifteenth century, when the sultanate passed by usurpation to a series of war-lords. The accession of the last Mamlūk sultan, al-Ashraf Ṭūmānbāy, in 922/1516 came at a time when the traditional observances were particularly hard to carry out. The reigning caliph, al-Mutawakkil III, had accompanied Sultān Qānṣawh al-Ghawri to Syria, and was a prisoner in the hands of the Ottomans. Fortunately he had left as his deputy in Cairo his father, al-Mustamsik, who had abdicated in 914/1508. The delegation of powers to the deputy caliph was attested, and for the last time an 'Abbāsīd formally confirmed the authority of a Mamlūk sultan. The manner in which this was done was a significant indication of the change over two and a half centuries in the respective positions of caliph and sultan. When al-Mustanṣir was installed in 659/1261, Baybars performed the *bay'a* to him as the head of the Muslim community. In 922/1516 by contrast, as on some (perhaps all) previous occasions since at least the accession of al-Nāṣir Aḥmad in 742/1342, the roles were reversed, and the caliph performed the *bay'a* to the sultan.⁹ Khalīl al-Zāhirī, writing in the reign of Sultān Jaqmaq (842–57/1438–53), propounded a new constitutional theory in the light of these developments. In his account of the sultanate, he writes as follows:

Elsewhere Khalīl al-Zāhirī bears witness to the degradation of the caliph from his once unique and supreme position in the *Umma*. In his chapter on the caliphate, he begins by describing the caliph and his functions in traditional terms as God's representative on earth, the divinely-appointed ruler, whose commission alone creates a legitimate sultan. Then in his last few lines on the subject, he descends to the

practical realities of the contemporary caliphate:

His appointment is to concern himself with scholarship and to have a library. If the sultan travels on some business, he is to accompany him for the benefit of the Muslims. He has numerous sources of revenue for his expenses, and fine dwellings.¹¹

At best the caliph was a nominal head of the Religious Institution, but without any jurisdiction. Towards the end of the Mamlūk sultanate, he is most frequently mentioned as accompanying the four chief judges when they went up to the Citadel at each new moon to congratulate the sultan.

The few interventions of the caliph in Mamlūk politics were usually both involuntary and unprofitable. One such incident was in connexion with the usurpation of al-Muẓaffar Baybars, referred to earlier. Not only did the sultan obtain a diploma on his enthronement in 708/1309, as we have seen, but a few months later, when the revolt which was to restore al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was making headway, al-Mustakfī I furnished Baybars with a second instrument, confirming his authority as against the hereditary claim of his opponent, the son of Qalāwūn. The essential passage is:

I have shown you my pleasure with the slave of God Most High, al-Malik al-Muẓaffar Rukn al-Dīn, as my deputy in the kingship of the Egyptian territories and the Syrian lands. I have set him in place of myself because of his religion, his competence, his ability and his favour to the Muslims. I deposed his predecessor after learning of his abdication from the kingship. I deemed this to be my function, and the four judges gave their judgments therein. And know (may God have mercy upon you) that kingship is childless [*al-mulk ‘aqīm*], and does not pass by inheritance to anyone from predecessor to successor or in order of seniority. I have besought the choice of God Most High, and appointed al-Malik al-Muẓaffar as governor over you.

Whosoever obeys him, obeys me; and whosoever disobeys him, disobeys me; and whosoever disobeys me, disobeys Abu’l-Qāsim my cousin (the blessing of God be upon him and peace).¹²

When Baybars sent a report of the promulgation of this diploma to his son-in-law, Burulghī al-Ashrafī, whose troops were deserting *en masse* to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the *amīr*’s comment to the messenger was

disconcertingly realistic: ‘Stupid fellow! For God’s sake—nobody takes any notice of the caliph!’ Unfortunately for al-Mustakfī, notice of him was taken by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. When the sultan was enthroned for the third time on 2 Shawwāl 709/5 March 1310, the caliph attended in accordance with precedent, and approached al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to greet him. The sultan addressed him with heavy irony: ‘Why are you here to greet a rebel? Was I a rebel? Is Baybars a scion of the ‘Abbāsids?’ The caliph’s countenance fell, and he spoke not a word.¹³ The consequences of his support of Baybars were indeed unpropitious for him: he never regained the sultan’s favour, was twice incarcerated, and died an exile in Qūs in 740/1339.

In the following century, the caliphate and the sultanate were briefly combined in the person of al-Musta‘īn, the great-grandson of al-Mustakfī I. It was an episode which demonstrated the political impotence and insignificance of the caliph, who served as a puppet in the hands of the Mamlūk magnates.¹⁴ The occasion was the failure of Barqūq’s attempt to establish an hereditary sultanate. His son, al-Nāṣir Faraj, succeeded him in 801/1399 at the age of ten, was deposed in 808/1405, restored a few weeks later, and finally clashed with the great Syrian *amīrs* headed by Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfīzī. An expedition which he led against them was defeated on 13 Muḥar-ram 815/25 April 1412, and the caliph, who had accompanied him, fell into the hands of the rebels. They decided to set up al-Musta‘īn as sultan to enable them to overthrow Faraj, who was besieged in Damascus. Al-Musta‘īn, who was both fearful and reluctant, was tricked into accepting the sultanate. Faraj surrendered on 11 Ṣafar May. He was tried by a commission of *amīrs*, jurists and ‘ulamā’, and sentenced to death. There was deep division over the propriety of this, since Faraj had surrendered on terms, but the caliph-sultan had used his influence with the judges and jurists against his deposed predecessor.

On 2 Rabī‘ 11/12 July, al-Musta‘īn entered Cairo in the company of Shaykh, who henceforth dominated him. The caliph-sultan’s attempts to acquire real power and even public recognition were frustrated. On 8 Rabī‘ 11/18 July, he invested Shaykh as *atābak al-‘asākīr* in Egypt, and formally conferred plenary powers on him. Shaykh was in fact determined to obtain the sultanate. His chief opponent, Nawrūz, was safely absent as governor-general of Syria. Al-Musta‘īn’s situation is pathetically described by Ibn Taghrībirdī:

The caliph became homesick for his kinsmen in the vast palaces of the Citadel; he was uneasy at the lack of visitors. In vain he regretted the position into which he had entered. To speak of his regret would not bring *amīrs* or anyone else to his aid, so he kept silence about his distress.¹⁵

He was not to occupy the position for much longer. On 16 Jumādā II/1/24 August, his diploma conferring plenary powers on Shaykh was published, and the *arābak* began to behave like a sultan. Three weeks later, on 8 Jumādā II/15 September, the last obstacle was removed from Shaykh's path when the death of his only serious rival in Cairo, Baktamur Jilliḡ, enabled him to canvass the support of the other *amīrs* for his own accession. He was installed by acclamation on 1 Sha'bān/6 November, and al-Musta'in resigned the sultanate as he had accepted it six months before—reluctantly and under compulsion. His remaining career was one of humiliation. In 816/1414, he was deposed from the caliphate in favour of his brother, al-Mu'taḡid II. He was held in the Citadel until 819/1417, when he was sent as a prisoner (with the three sons of Faraj) to Alexandria. There he died of plague in 833/1430. He was less than 40 years old.

The legend that the Caliph al-Mutawakkil III formally transferred the caliphate to Selim the Grim on the overthrow of the Mamlūk sultanate has long been recognized as a fabrication. One small scrap of contemporary evidence of its fictional nature has not perhaps been generally noted. The Syrian chronicler, Ibn Ṭulūn (880–953/1473–1546) introduces each year in his annals *Mufaḡḡahat al-khillān* with the name of the reigning caliph, and he continues this practice over the period of the Ottoman conquest down to 926/1519–20, where the fragment breaks off. At the opening of A.H. 924, Ibn Ṭulūn, after mentioning 'the Caliph, Commander of the Faithful, al-Mutawakkil 'al 'ilāh', adds 'and he has been sent under escort from Egypt to Istanbul by sea'. In A.H. 926, he adds 'and he is dwelling in Istanbul'.¹⁶ Thus not only is there no mention of a transfer of the caliphate, but also Ibn Ṭulūn (and doubtless others) saw no break in al-Mutawakkil's reign when power passed from Ṭūmānbāy to Selim.

Nevertheless with the caliph a state prisoner in Istanbul, the 'Abbāsids quickly passed into obscurity. They left, however, one or two traces in later history. In his necrology for 1220/1805–6, al-Jabarti notices perhaps the last notable descendant of the caliphs, 'Uthmān Efendi b. Sa'd al-'Abbāsī al-Anṣārī, who had had a lucrative career as a financial official in Egypt.¹⁷ Less historically verifiable is the traditional claim of the Ja'aliyyūn, one of the great tribal groups in the northern Sudan, to be 'Abbāsids.¹⁸ The claim may be no more than an attempt to acquire an illustrious ancestry, like that which linked the royal house of Wessex with the biblical patriarchs through Sceaḡ, son of Noah, who was born in the Ark. Or it may have had political implications, since the Funj overlords of the Ja'aliyyūn in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries claimed to be Umayyads. Yet the genealogy may preserve a remote historical memory of the coming to

Nubia after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt of refugees from the caliph's entourage.

Footnotes

¹ Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-zāhir sīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir* (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Khuwaytir), *al-Riyād* [1396/1976], 99–112, 141–8.

² Al-Safadi, *al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, vi (ed. Sven Dederling), Wiesbaden, 1972, 317–18 (no. 2819).

³ Al-Safadi, *Wāfī*, VII (ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās), Wiesbaden, 1969, 384–6 (no. 3378).

⁴ Shāfi’ b. ‘Alī, *Ḥusn al-manāqib al-sirriyya al-muntaza’a min al-sīra al-Zāhiriyya* (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khuwaytir), [*al-Riyād*, 1396/1976], 46.

⁵ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *Rawḍ*, 173–4.

⁶ For a valuable study of the dynasty, see J.-C. Garcin, ‘Histoire, opposition politique et piétisme traditionaliste dans le Ḥusn al-mubādarat de Suyūti’, *Annales Islamologiques*, VII., 1967, 33–90.

⁷ Garcin, ‘Histoire’, p. 55, n. 1, states that ‘L’investiture accordée par le calife au sultan est notée par Maqrīzī à partir de Malik ‘Adil Katbugha en 694’.

⁸ Ibn Taghrībīrdi, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira* (Cairo edn.), x, 4–5; tr. P.M. Holt, ‘The position and power of the Mamlūk sultan’, *BSOAS*, XXXVIII, 2, 1975, 244.

⁹ e.g. on the accession of al-Nāṣir Ahmad; *ba’ya’ahu al-khalīfa bi’l-saltana* (Ibn Taghrībīrdi, *Nujūm*, x, 60); al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājjī (783/1381): *fa-ba’ya’ahu al-khalīfa wa-ba’lafa lahu al-umarā’* (*Nujūm*, XI, 207); al-Manṣūr Ḥājjī (791/1389): *wa-qad ḥaḍara al-khalifa wa’l-quḍā’ wa-ba’ya’u hu bi’l-saltana* (*Nujūm*, XI, 319); al-Ṣāliḥ Muḥammad (824/1421): *fa-lamma’ ra’ahu al-khalīfa gāma lahu wa-ajlasahu bi-jānibihi wa-ba’ya’ahu bi’l-saltana* (*Nujūm*, xiv, 211); Muḥammad b. Qāyitba’ya

(901/1496): *fa-ba’ya’ahu al-khalīfa bi’l-saltana* (Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i’ al-zuhūr*, III, 324); al-Zāhir Qāṣawh (904/1498): *fa-ba’ya’ahu al-khalīfa bi’l-saltana* (*Badā’i’*, III, 405); al-Ashraf Tūmānbāy (922/1516): *fa-ba’ya’a al-sultān amīr al-mu’minīn Ya’qūb niyābatan ‘an waladihi Muḥammad al-Mutawakkil* (*Badā’i’*, v, 105), tr. Gaston Wiet, *Journal d’un bourgeois du Caire*, II [Paris], 1960, 96, ‘Le sultan reçut donc le serment de l’émir des croyants Ya’qūb, mandaté par son fils Mutawakkil’. It should be noted, however, that on the accession of the Caliphs al-Mustakfī II (845/1441) and al-Qā’im

(855/1450), Ibn Taghrībirdi says *kānat mubāya'at al-khalīfa [fulān] bi'l-khilāfa* (*Nujūm*, xv, 349, 432) without specifying who performed the bay'a to the caliph on these occasions.

¹⁰ Khalīl b. Shāhīn *al-Zāhiri*, *Zubdat kashf al-mamālik* (ed. Paul Ravaisse), Paris, 1894, 54.

¹¹ Khalīl *al-Zāhiri*, *Zubdat*, 90.

¹² Ibn Taghrībirdi, *Nujūm*, VIII, 263.

¹³ Ibn Taghrībirdi, *Nujūm*, IX, 8.

¹⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdi, *Nujūm*, XIII, 189–208.

¹⁵ Ibn Taghrībirdi, *Nujūm*, XIII, 204.

¹⁶ Ibn Tūlūn, *Mujākahat al-khillān* (ed. Mohamed Mostafa), II, Cairo, 1964, 78, 90. The corresponding passage for A.H. 925 is lost.

¹⁷ 'Abd al-Rahmān *al-Jabarti*, 'Ajā'ib al-āthār, III, 355–6.

¹⁸ Various references in the genealogies (none ancient) translated in H.A. MacMichael, *A history of the Arabs in the Sudan*, Cambridge, 1922, ii.

The text of a genealogy compiled in 1361/1942, 'Abdallāh Muḥammad *al-Khabir*, *Hādha jamī' nasab al-J'aliyyīn al-musamīn ā bil-sūr al-ḥaşin*, has recently been published by 'Abdallāh 'Alī Ibrāhīm of the Institute of African and Asian Studies, Khartoum [n.d.]. See also P.M. Holt, 'The genealogy of a Sudanese holy family', *BSOAS*, XLIV, 2, 1981, 262–72.

THE ‘GREAT YĀSĀ OF CHINGIZ KHĀN’ AND MONGOL LAW IN THE ĪLKHANĀTE

By D.O.MORGAN

One of the odder features of the Persian sources on the history of the Mongol period is the vagueness and comparative rarity of references to the ‘Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān’. This struck me with renewed force after reading Professor David Ayalon’s articles on the Yāsā in *Studia Islamica*.¹ My suspicions about the whole matter having thus been aroused, it seemed to me that it might be an interesting exercise to look again at the origin and nature of the Yāsā before trying to estimate how Mongol law worked in the Īlkhānate. And so, as I hope to show in this paper, it proved.

I

Let me first of all outline the view that is usually taken of the *Yāsā*. At some time during his reign, and probably at the *quriltai* of 1206, Chingiz Khān promulgated a code of laws which were to be binding on his people and their descendants for ever. This was a codification of the ancestral traditions, customs, laws and ideas of the Mongols, to which Chingiz Khān added further laws of his own devising. Copies of this great code, the *Yāsā*, were kept in the treasuries of the Mongol princes for consultation as need arose. No complete copy has survived, but it is possible to assemble ‘fragments’ of the code from various sources, and by careful study of these fragments the general pattern of the *Yāsā* can be recovered.

There are, then, three essential elements in this reconstruction: Chingiz Khān laid down a coherent code, this was done at the *quriltai* of 1206, and the code may be reconstituted from surviving fragments. So far as I have been able to discover, these three elements seem first to have been brought together by Petis de la Croix, in his *Histoire du grand Gengkizcan*, published in 1710, with an English translation following in 1722.² Pétis de la Croix’s sixth chapter is entitled ‘The Description of the General Diet of the Moguls, called in their Language *Couriltay*. The Establishment of the *Yassa*, that is to say, the Mogul Laws. Temugin changes his Name for that of Genghizcan’.³ After giving an account of the *quirltai*, which he dates in 1205, the author continues:

When he had thanked them all (i.e. those present at the *quriltai*) for the Marks of Love and Respect they show’d him, being sensible that the chief Duty of a Prince is to establish good Laws, he declared to them that he thought to add to the antient Laws some new ones which he desired, and commanded that they would observe.⁴

There follows a list of 22 provisions of the *Yāsā*, derived in the main, apparently, from the Tīmūrid historian Mīrkhwān, with additions from the accounts of European travellers and other sources.

Petis de la Croix’s view thereafter determined the pattern of all subsequent discussions of the *Yāsā*, and achieved classical

formulation in V.A. Riasanovsky's *Fundamental principles of Mongol law*.⁵ It remained more or less unquestioned until Ayalon's articles began to appear in 1971.

The sources for the alleged promulgation of the *Yāsā* at the *quriltai* of 1206 are in effect two: the anonymous *Secret History of the Mongols* and the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn. According to the *Secret History*, the most nearly contemporary authority, on the occasion of the *quriltai* Chingiz Khān entrusted the supervision of certain important matters to his adopted brother, Shigi-Qutuqu:

'Divide up all the *subject* people and apportion them to *Our* mother, to Us, to *Our* younger brothers and sons according to the name of the people,

Splitting up those that live in felt-walled tents,

Separating those that live in dwellings with wooden doors.

Let no one disobey your word!'

Further, he entrusted Shigi-qutuqu with *the power of* judgement over all and said to him, 'Of the entire people

Chastising the robber,

Checking the liar,

execute those who deserve death, punish those who deserve punishment. Furthermore, writing in a blue (-script) register *all* decisions about the distribution and about the judicial matters of the entire population, make it into a book (i.e. permanent record). Until the offspring of *my* offspring, let no one change any of the blue writing that Shigi-qutuqu, after deciding in accordance with me, shall make into a book with white paper. Anyone who changes it shall be guilty'.⁶

What are we to make of this account, which even Ayalon regards as a description of the institution of the *Yāsā*? The first thing to notice, I suggest, is that nowhere in the passage is the term *yāsā* used to describe what Chingiz Khān has instituted. Indeed, although the term is found a number of times in the *Secret History*, it generally seems to mean 'order' or 'command'. It never refers to a legal code of any kind. A characteristic example occurs four years before the *quriltai*:

Chinggis-qahan engaged these Tatar *tribes* in battle at Dalan-nemürges... Before fighting, Chinggis-qahan gave this order

Jasaq to all: 'If we conquer the enemy, we shall not stop to plunder...'.⁷

Secondly, if we for the moment suspend our commitment to an 'institution of the Great *Yāsā*', what we find here, on further

examination, is something quite different. By 1206 Chingiz Khān had reached a pinnacle of success. He was distributing rewards (*soyurqal*) to his faithful followers. Shigi-Qutuqu's reward included the privilege of keeping the population registers that recorded the distribution of subject peoples among the royal family, and the exercise of judicial functions. Both the details of the population distribution and Shigi-Qutuqu's judicial decisions were, apparently, to be recorded by him in a 'blue book' (*kökö debter*).⁸ Such decisions were to be regarded as unalterable. But there is absolutely no indication that Chingiz Khān himself, or Shigi-Qutuqu as his newly appointed chief judge, was to lay down a general legal code. At most, Shigi-Qutuqu was authorized to begin the establishment of a kind of case law, a body of written legal precedents. I shall return later to the possible implications of this.

It seems to me, then, that we must conclude that the *Secret History of the Mongols* is innocent of any information whatever on the establishment of a 'Great Yāsā' at the *quriltai* of 1206 or at any other time.

Turning now to the evidence to be found in the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, the standard discussion of it in Riasanovsky's book may be quoted:

Rashid-Ed-Din wrote that after his victory over Wang Khān (1206), Jenghiz Khān 'convoked a great assembly and in gratitude for his great success ordered wise and strong yassaks and happily ascended the throne of the Khans' ...In another passage of his work, Rashid-Ed-Din spoke more definitely 'When the year of the hare came, which fell on the 614th year of Zul-ka'da (*sic*) (1218?) Jenghiz Khān convoked an assembly, organised the Kurultai, *laid the foundation of the yassak which had been composed of innovations and ancient rules*, and undertook a military expedition in the country of the Khorezmshah' ...It is evident that, in the second case, reference was made to the law, or more exactly Code of Laws compiled from ancient provisions and innovations introduced by Jenghiz Khan and approved by the Kurultai. It is possible that the resolution to issue a code of Laws was first adopted in 1206, and that its fundamental rules were confirmed by the Kurultai in 1218 A.D.⁹

The first of Riasanovsky's quotations is misdated, and should refer to the year 599/1202–3. It has no connexion with the *quriltai* of 1206. Rashīd al-Dīn's account of that event occurs later, and contains no reference of any kind to the Yāsā. In any case, the 1202–3 reference speaks of yāsās (*yāsāq-hā*), not of 'the Yāsā'. We clearly have here one of the many instances of yāsā as 'decree'.¹⁰

Riasanovsky's second quotation, concerning a *quriltai* in 1218–19, might be translated as follows:

He held a *quriltai* among them; he laid afresh the foundation of the practices (*āyīn*) and customs (*yūsūn*) of the *Yāsā*.¹¹

I regret to say, since I would prefer a tidy solution to the problem, that there is no escaping the fact that some kind of legal code is apparently implied here. Still, it is odd that the incident is not reflected in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, if this was indeed an event of major importance in the Mongol Empire's evolution. It is even more puzzling that, both on this occasion and elsewhere in the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, Rashīd al-Dīn's references to the *Yāsā* are so exceedingly brief and uninformative. Now Rashīd al-Dīn is known to have had unrivalled access to early Mongolian sources on the career of Chingiz Khān. It would hardly seem that he deduced from them that the *Yāsā* was a matter of any great importance. He never gives any kind of list of its contents, whereas he includes a long chapter giving an account of Chingiz Khān's *biligs*, or maxims. Ayalon remarks that 'it is...very unfortunate that Rashīd al-Dīn has so little to tell us about the *Yāsā*'s contents'.¹² Not so much unfortunate, I submit, as distinctly suspicious. If the greatest of all Mongol-period chroniclers thought the *Yāsā* hardly worthy of comment, one may very well begin to wonder whether modern historians may not, to say the least, have markedly overstated its significance. But whatever we may make of Rashīd al-Dīn's evidence, it is perhaps worth emphasizing at least that he does not connect the *Yāsā* with the *quriltai* of 1206.

II

So much for the sources on the origin of the *Yāsā*. I would like now to turn to the question of its contents. Here I must refer again to the first of Ayalon's articles. The main authorities that historians have used for the assembling of 'fragments' of the *Yāsā* are Maqrīzī, al-'Umarī, Bar Hebraeus and Juwaynī. Ayalon demonstrated the 'inescapable elimination' of Maqrīzī's supposed informant, Ibn al-Burhān, who was believed to have seen a copy of the *Yāsā* in Baghdad and to have reported its contents to Maqrīzī. He then went on to show—quite conclusively, it seems to me—that Maqrīzī derived his information without acknowledgement from al-'Umarī, and al-'Umarī and Bar Hebraeus theirs, with acknowledgement, from Juwaynī. Ayalon has thus drastically cleared the ground. Only one significant source, Juwaynī, remains for the contents of the *Yāsā*, and the total abandonment of the time-hallowed procedure of painstakingly assembling and classifying 'fragments' from other sources is indicated.

We must therefore give some attention to what Juwaynī has to say. The second chapter of his history is entitled: 'Of the regulations (*qaw'id*) which Chingiz Khān framed and the *yāsās* which he promulgated after his rise to power'. It is a chapter by no means lacking in perplexing features. The section in which Juwaynī allegedly describes the 'institution of the *Yāsā*' deserves to be quoted at some length:

As his judgement demanded, he laid down a canon (*qānūn*) for every matter and a regulation (*dastūr*) for every affair; while for every crime he fixed a penalty. And since the Tatar peoples had no script of their own, he gave orders that Mongol children should learn writing from the Uighurs; and that these *yāsās* and decrees (*ahkām*) should be written down on rolls. These rolls are called the Great Book of *Yāsās* (*yāsā-nāma-i buzurg*) and are kept in the treasury of the chief princes.

Whenever a *khān* ascends the throne, or a great army is mobilized, or the princes assemble and begin (to consult together) concerning affairs of state and the administration thereof, they produce these rolls and base their actions thereon; and proceed with the disposition of armies and the destruction

of provinces and cities after that pattern.

At the time of the first beginnings of his dominion, when the Mongol tribes were united to him, he abolished reprehensible customs (*rusūm*) which had been practised by those peoples and had enjoyed recognition amongst them; and he laid down such usages as are praiseworthy from the point of view of reason.¹³

We may notice in passing that, like the other relevant sources, Juwaynī does not associate the *Yāsā* with the *quriltai* of 1206—indeed, he offers no precise date.

Juwaynī's account is set in the context of a chapter in which he discusses Mongol practices with respect to religious toleration, hunting as a training for warfare, the organization of the army, official communications (the *yām* system), and taxation of the conquered territories. I would argue that it is this context that explains and makes sense of the chapter's *yāsā* references. The *yāsā* part of the chapter, it seems to me, amounts to a discussion of the promulgation by Chingiz Khān of precepts of various kinds, and the writing down and preservation of those precepts for future consultation. If the chapter is treated as a whole it is a doubtful proposition that what Juwaynī tells us about Chingiz Khān's *yāsās* should be forced into a pre-cast framework labelled 'Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān'.

What, then, was it that was written down on those rolls in the treasury? Apparently it was such precepts as might assist in the planning of 'the disposition of armies and the destruction of cities'. The manner in which such actions were to be taken was, it would seem, prescribed by the all-conquering Chingiz Khān. This is not at all the kind of thing that usually tends to characterize the lists of 'fragments' of the *Yāsā* of which Ayalon is so justly scornful—prohibitions of sorcery and adultery, of the Muslim way of slaughtering animals, of washing in running water—the sort of ancestral custom that Chingiz Khān's son Chaghatai defended and enforced so vigorously. No, it is far more likely to be the kind of thing to which, as we have seen, Juwaynī devotes the bulk of his chapter: the hunt; the army; the *yām* system.

In his discussion of the sources for the *Yāsā*'s contents, Ayalon—having dismissed Maqrīzī, al-'Umārī and Bar Hebraeus with ignominy—turns his attention to the only remaining source, Juwaynī. Nor does the unfortunate Juwaynī escape unscathed. He is described as 'a very biased and partisan source'¹⁴—not only because of his 'nauseating' 'servile flattery' of the Mongols as a whole, but more particularly because he was biased in favour of one branch of the Mongol royal house, the descendants of Tolui. Ayalon goes on to cast aspersions on

Juwaynī's competence as a historian. He complains that Juwaynī continually wanders from the point in his chapter on the *Yāsā*, discoursing on a variety of important but irrelevant matters, when he ought to have been discussing the legal code:

The three major sections of the chapter on the *Yāsā*, which occupy its greater part, namely, the organisation of the army, of hunting and of the horse-post could easily be taken out of that chapter and form a separate entity with no reference to any kind of law... The fact that according to the title, the chapter deals with 'The Laws Chingiz Khān framed and the *Yāsās* which he promulgated', cannot serve at all as a guarantee that al-Juwaynī would literally adhere to it.¹⁵

This criticism appears to me to be entirely misconceived. Juwaynī says that his chapter will contain Chingiz Khān's regulations (Ayalon follows Boyle's misleading 'laws' for *qawā'id*) and decrees, or orders (*yāsā-hā*). This is precisely what it does contain. Juwaynī never promises to give an account of the 'Great Yāsā', and he is hardly to be blamed because we may consider that that is what he ought to have been doing. Juwaynī's use of the term *yāsā*, and even of the phrase *yāsā-nāma-i buzurg*, does not on the whole suggest that he was thinking in terms of a formal code of comprehensive legal enactments. We may notice, for example, the explanatory couplings of words: *qawā'id wa yāsā-hā* surely, therefore, 'regulations' rather than 'laws'; *aḥkām wa yāsā-hā*, 'commands' or 'decrees'. A few lines before Juwaynī's supposed account of the institution of the *Yāsā* he uses a similar phrase: 'In accordance with the *yāsā* and *ḥukm* which he imposed, he utterly destroyed...' ¹⁶ The phrase reads *yāsā wa ḥukmī*. The use of the final *ī* on *ḥukm* precludes any possibility of it being a proper noun: the same must therefore surely apply to the other half of the doublet, hence 'a *yāsā*', a decree, rather than 'the *Yāsā*'.

Consequently it is my view that a more generous attitude towards Juwaynī than Ayalon will allow is entirely consistent with the evidence. It is perhaps possible that Juwaynī was indeed attempting to provide an account of the institution of a legal code—an attempt largely vitiated by a frequent and inexplicable wandering from the point, as Ayalon suggests. But it is not very likely. We may more plausibly believe that Juwaynī did in fact know what he was about. He was concerned with a wide range of Chingiz Khān's regulations and *yāsās*, some at least of which were written down for the future guidance of the Mongol princes. Especially important were those *yāsās* that dealt with great affairs of state and with military matters. In short, Juwaynī's chapter, usually regarded as an essential foundation for the study of the Great *Yāsā*, is nothing of the sort. It is an account of some of Chingiz Khān's *yāsās*, certainly, but not of the Great *Yāsā* at all. Ayalon has done away with all the sources on the Great *Yāsā*'s contents with the exception of Juwaynī. It is my contention that, so far as information on the Great *Yāsā*'s contents is concerned, the next step is to discard Juwaynī's chapter too.

III

If such an interpretation of the evidence is allowed, two questions immediately present themselves: did the Great *Yāsā* exist at all? And if it did, was it written down, its contents known and enforced?

It is reasonably clear that a *Yāsā* in the sense of a binding legal code was at least later believed to have existed, and was attributed to Chingiz Khān. There seems to have been very little unanimity, however, over what it contained. Juwaynī sometimes gives *yāsā* the sense of the ‘fundamental law’ of the Mongols, without specific reference to Chingiz Khān as its author—or even as being in opposition to an individual *yāsā* of his: ‘By the *yāsā* and custom (*āyīn*) of the Mongols the father’s place passes to the youngest son by the chief wife. Such was Ulugh-Noyan (i.e. Tolui), but it was Chingiz Khān’s *yāsā* that Ögedei should be *Khān*’.¹⁷ Juwaynī never uses the term ‘Great *Yāsā*’ (*yāsā-yi buzurg*), though al-‘Umarī, who derived his information from Juwaynī, does on one occasion use the phrase *al-yāsā al-kabīra*.¹⁸

Some evidence in the *Ta’rīkh-i Waṣṣāf* tends to support the interpretation of Juwaynī that I have proposed. *Waṣṣāf* writes that the Great Khān Qubilai issued an edict (*yarlīgh*) at the beginning of his reign, ‘for the renewing of commands (*aḥkām*) and the strengthening of the *yāsā-nāma* of Chingiz Khān, containing the customs (*marāsim*) of conquest and rule’.¹⁹ It may be that *Waṣṣāf*, the avowed continuator of Juwaynī, understood his predecessor better than later historians have contrived to do.

Earlier than this, in the reign of Hülegü or Abaqa, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, writing of various financial immunities, had added that ‘the *yāsā-yi buzurg* of Chingiz Khān is similar, and they hold this to be laid down, so that the property (*māl*) of men should not decrease’.²⁰ *Yāsā-yi buzurg* is a rare phrase—it occurs only very occasionally in the *Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh*—but there are enough instances of its use to testify to the fact that there was a belief in the existence of such a thing. This, however, is not the same as to say that the Great *Yāsā* did in fact exist, in the sense of being written down, its contents generally and indisputably known: though people certainly thought, or said, that they knew what was in it.

There is a possible interpretation that seems to me to fit the facts,

such as they are, fairly convincingly. This is that, if we concede that belief in the existence of the code presupposes—even creates—the existence of something, that that something was not written down in a coherent form at all. It may well have been no more than the recollection of those of Chingiz Khān's utterances, or alleged utterances, that were more or less legislative in character: utterances to which he or his descendants attributed binding force.

The only real alternative is that proposed by Ayalon: that the code, if written down, may for some reason not have been available for inspection, possibly because it was regarded as sacred or taboo. A parallel case would be that of Rashīd al-Dīn's use of the Mongol chronicle *Altan Debter*, now lost. As a non-Mongol he was denied direct access to the text, and had to use Mongol intermediaries. But as Hambis's comparison of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Altan Debter* material with the Chinese version of it showed,²¹ this process did not prevent Rashīd al-Dīn from obtaining a perfectly accurate idea of the *Altan Debter*'s contents. Similarly, then, there seems no reason why he or Juwaynī could not have secured reliable and comprehensive information about the contents of a 'taboo' Great Yāsā, had they so wished.

But there does not appear to be much evidence, in fact, to support the 'taboo' hypothesis—perhaps only Juwaynī's account of the taking out of the rolls on great occasions. It would seem in any case a singularly bizarre way of treating a series of legal enactments, if the Mongols expected anyone to obey them. However, we must certainly believe one or the other: either the Yāsā did not exist as a written code, or it was unavailable to those who were supposed to conform to it. How else are we to account for the fog of vagueness and uncertainty which appears to engulf all the contemporary writers when they come to speak about the Yāsā? If high officials in the Mongol administration like Juwaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn could not, or did not bother, to gain access to the text—although they were concerned to write lengthy histories of the rise and development of the Mongol empire—what chance had anyone else? Are we not justified in deducing not only that knowledge of the Yāsā was vaguely and uncertainly diffused, but also that it was not in reality an institution of any great practical importance? There is other evidence to point us in this direction. Ayalon discusses the discrepancies in the application of the Yāsā's alleged prohibition of the Muslim method of animal slaughter. This is hard to account for if the Yāsā was embodied in a written document, but it is much less of a problem if it was not. In the second instalment of his article,²² Ayalon has a long discussion of what he (perhaps rightly) sees as Juwaynī's biased presentation of how the Yāsā was faithfully observed by the ultimately victorious descendants of Tolui. Ayalon's interpretation of this is easier to

believe if a widespread vagueness about the *Yāsā* and its contents prevailed. The other side of the dynastic coin is represented by the claim of the Central Asian Mongol prince Qaidu, who according to Waṣṣāf argued (in his own interest) that ‘in the *yāsā-nāma* of Chingiz Khān’ it is ordained that the Great Khān must be a member of the family of Ögedei²³—so excluding the descendants of Tolui. It was evidently possible to argue a case on either side from the supposed contents of the *Yāsā*. Whatever allowances are made for the deficiencies of the sources, it is hard to believe that if the Great *Yāsā* was indeed a legal code, the contents of which were clear, published, generally known and generally enforced within the Mongol Empire, one would not be able to find much more evidence of it, and have much less scope for this kind of discussion. I propose the following hypothesis: there was probably believed to be a ‘Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’, derived in part from Chingiz himself and perhaps in part from earlier Mongol custom. But this was not written down in any coherent form, and it was therefore possible to attribute to it a wide variety of provisions, as was thought necessary or desirable. In practice it may very well have been a gradually evolving body of custom, not only beginning before the time of Chingiz Khān but continuing after him. This certainly seems to be the implication to be drawn from the references in Chinese sources collected by Professor Cleaves.²⁴ In these the ‘Great *Yāsā*’ is frequently ascribed to Ögedei rather than to Chingiz Khān.

What role in all this are we to grant to Chaghatai, Chingiz Khān’s second son who is usually regarded as the stern upholder and custodian of the *Yāsā*? Juwaynī²⁵ tells us that Chaghatai was chosen by his father to administer and enforce *yāsā wa siyāsāt*: not ‘the Great *Yāsā*’ or ‘*Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’. Later Juwaynī relates how Chaghatai’s retainers were constrained to behave themselves well because of their fear of *his* (Chaghatai’s) *yāsā wa siyāsāt*.²⁶ And in one of Juwaynī’s anecdotes about the benevolence of Ögedei, Ögedei is represented as calling the *yāsā* which Chaghatai wishes to enforce (on not washing in running water) *our yāsā* and command (*yāsā wa ḥukm-i mā*).²⁷ While it is interesting to note that Rashīd al-Dīn, in his version of the same anecdote, changes this phrase to ‘the Great *Yāsā*’ (*yāsā-yi buzurg*),²⁸ I would take the general tenor of the references to Chaghatai to indicate that he was regarded as the guardian and expositor of the—probably un written—Mongol customary law rather than of any ‘Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’.

IV

What, then, may we say about the operation of the *Yāsā* in the *Ilkhānate*? The term *yāsā* is not infrequently to be found in the sources for the history of the Mongols in Persia, but more often than not its use can be plausibly explained as requiring the sense of ‘decree’ or of ‘punishment’. The phrase *bi-yāsā rasānīdan* is the most common verb for ‘to put to death’. The sources contain numerous mentions of *yāsā*, but there are very few indisputable cases of ‘the *Yāsā*’. For example, *Wassāf* records that revolt broke out against the *Ilkhān* Geikhatu because ‘he altered (*digar kard*) the *yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’.²⁹ Is this the Great *Yāsā*, or does it refer to a specific decree? *Jūzjānī* makes my point for me quite explicitly:

To these *ahkām* (he is referring to Chingiz Khān’s prohibitions of telling lies, committing adultery, washing in running water and so forth) they have given the name *yāsā*, that is *ḥukm wa farmān* (translated into) the Mongol language.³⁰

So these, from the perspective of the Delhi Sultanate in 1260, were individual decrees, not part of a comprehensive legal code. And *Juwaynī* writes that the Great Khān Güyük

made a *yāsā* that just as Qā’ān (Ögedei), at the time of his accession, had upheld the *yāsās* of his father (Chingiz Khān) and no change or alteration occurred in the commands (*ahkām*) of those (*yāsās*), so too the *yāsās* and commands (*ahkām*) of his own father should be immune from the contingencies of redundancy and deficiency, and free from the corruption of alteration.³¹

This is a significant passage. As in the Chinese texts referred to above, the *yāsās* of Chingiz Khān and Ögedei are tacitly equated; and they are given the sense of individual decrees or commands. All may be described as *ahkām* or *farmān-hā*.

One might suppose that the Mongol *Yāsā* or *yāsās* would come under some pressure during the reign of Ghazan, when the Mongols in Persia went over to Islam and began increasingly to identify with their

Persian subjects. This was certainly the view of al-‘Umarī, who contrasted the observance of the *Yāsā*, still strong, according to his information, in the Chaghatai Khanate and in China, with its decline in Persia and in the lands of the Golden Horde, which had both been converted to Islam.³² Ghazan himself is alleged by Rashīd al-Dīn to have been a fervent exponent of *yāsā* and *yūsūn* in his younger days. It is interesting, therefore, to note that in his *yarlīgh* granting *iqṭāʿ*s to the Mongol troops Ghazan begins by praising Chingiz Khān’s *yāsā*—whatever he may have understood by that—in the warmest terms, declaring that because of it the Mongols had been able to conquer the world.³³ Certainly in this context Ghazan, or at least Rashīd al-Dīn, seems to be expressing a belief in the existence and efficacy of a ‘*yāsā* of Chingiz Khān’ of some sort, though the phrase *yāsā-yi buzurg* is not used. However, it looks to me very much as though this lavish praise of the *yāsā* is designed to act as a smokescreen device, to divert attention from the otherwise painfully obvious fact that Ghazan’s *yarlīgh* is about to erode some *yāsā* or other attributed to Chingiz Khān. That there was opposition to such erosions is vividly illustrated by a curious anecdote in Qāshānī’s *Ta’rīkh-i Ūlajāytū*. He gives a long account of disputes at Ōljeitū’s court between Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs. At the conclusion of the argument, he writes,

Qutlugh-Shāh Noyan said to the other *noyans*: ‘What is this that we have done, abandoning the new *yāsā* and *yūsūn* of Chingiz Khān, and taking up the ancient religion of the Arabs, which is divided into seventy-odd parts? The choice of either of these two rites (*madhhab*) would be a disgrace and a dishonourable act, since in the one, marriage with a daughter is permitted, and in the other, relations with one’s mother or sister. We seek refuge in God from both of them! Let us return to the *yāsā* and *yūsūn* of Chingiz Khān’.³⁴

Two things, I suggest, may reasonably be deduced from this story. First, there was still a considerable amount of feeling for the traditional Mongol way of doing things, at least among some of the Mongol *amīrs*; and secondly, that if Qutlugh-Shāh was at all typical, the Mongols had not as yet acquired a very profound knowledge or understanding of the tenets of Islam.

A similar reaction against Islamisation is ascribed to the Īlkhān Abū Saʿīd’s ephemeral successor Arpa Ke’ūn:

When he ascended the throne...he used the Mongol *yāsā* and *siyāsāt* and did not pay attention to the *yarlīgh* of Sultan Khudābanda (Ōljeitū) and Abū Saʿīd which was presented to

V

I conclude, then, that there are difficulties, possibly insuperable difficulties, in establishing the nature and contents of the Mongol *Yāsā*, its association with Chingiz Khān himself, or even whether it ever existed as a written, coherent, enforceable code of laws. All I have been able to offer so far is a hypothesis that, I hope, conforms more closely than the conventional view to such evidence as we have.

But the concept, at least, of the *Yāsā* seems long to have remained a real one in the minds certainly of western historians but also—so far as it is possible to judge—in the minds of the men of the later Mongol period and after. Maḥmūd Āmulī, writing during Öljeitü's reign, tells us that Chingiz Khān's precepts (*waṣāyā*), maxims (*bīṭik-hā*) and *yāsās* were collected into a book (*kirāb*).³⁶ And Ibn Baṭṭūṭa maintains that

Tankīz (Chingiz) had compiled a book on his laws, which is called by them (i.e. the Central Asian Mongols) the *Yasāq*, and they hold that if any (of the princes) contravenes the laws contained in this book his deposition is obligatory... If their sultan should have changed any one of those laws their chiefs will rise up before him and say to him, 'You have changed this and changed that, and you have acted in such-and-such a manner and it is now obligatory to depose you'.³⁷

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa goes on to relate that the Chaghatai sultan Tarmashīn was indeed deposed for infringing a *Yāsā* regulation about the holding of an annual feast.

So the founder of the dynasty, it came to be felt, had created an institution which should be respected and taken into account, even if its precise provisions were so vaguely known or impractical of execution as to present few obstacles to their evasion. The *Yāsā* remained, apparently, in the Mongol consciousness as a symbol of the Shamanist, primitive, simple and perhaps (to some) 'purer' past, which had gradually been eroded by conquest and world-empire. If the 'Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān' did not exist, it was evidently necessary to invent it.

VI

So far in this paper I have attempted what is very largely a destructive—though to my mind a necessary—exercise. In conclusion I propose to offer some tentative suggestions on the other side: that is to say, what judicial machinery I think *may* in reality have existed.

For this purpose we must abandon the word *yāsā* and look instead at *yārghū*—a very common term in the Persian sources, used in a variety of senses for some kind of court or investigation. There are nearly forty such references, for example, in the section of the *Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh* which deals with the Mongols in Persia. Most of them are rather brief, and tell us little about precisely what was going on.

According to Rashīd al-Dīn, *yārghūs* were held by the *Ilkhāns*—often with the use of torture—in order to investigate the cases of fallen ministers or other enemies of the ruler such as alleged conspirators.³⁸

There were also courts of enquiry, as into the defeat of Qutlugh-Shāh and *Chūbān at Marj al-Suffār* in 1303, of which a record (*yārghū-nāma*) was kept;³⁹ and into who was to blame for reverses suffered during Öljeitü’s campaign in *Gīlān*, as *Ḥāfiẓ Abrū* records.⁴⁰ Juwaynī refers only occasionally to *yārghūs*, always with reference to the investigation of plots or of complaints against officials.⁴¹ Such *yārghūs* as these appear to have been *ad hoc* courts convened to deal with specific cases—a phrase frequently used by Rashīd al-Dīn is ‘they held a *yārghū* for (i.e. to deal with) him’ (*ū-rā yārghū dāshand*).⁴² And these cases usually involve Mongols or are concerned with Mongol state affairs.

In the *Ta’rīkh-i shāhī*, an anonymous history of the Qara-Khitais of Kirmān written before the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, we have more detailed accounts of what went on in early *Ilkhānid* times when a local *yārghū* was held. On one occasion a court of enquiry was convened jointly by the deputies (*nā‘ib*) of the Qara-Khitai princess Terken Khatun and the local *bāsqāqs* (representatives in this subject kingdom of the *Ilkhānid* government). This was to investigate complaints by certain dissident persons against Terken. The *bāsqāqs* and *yārghūchīs* had the complainers tied up naked for several days and interrogated, ‘as was the Mongol custom’.⁴³

We are told at greater length about a dispute between Terken Khatun and the people of Shabānkāra concerning the rightful

ownership of Sirjān. After much argument, in 663/1264–5 the Īlkhān Abaqa sent representatives to Sirjān who were to hand it over to Terken's deputies and to hold a land yārgū (yārgū-yi amlāk) to examine the documents and title deeds of both parties. A principle of division was arrived at,⁴⁴ but the dispute crops up again later,⁴⁵ when we are told that a further yārgū-yi amlāk was held—in the convening of which, interestingly, *qādis* were prominent. The yārgū was presided over by an *amīr-i yārgū*.

These detailed accounts are of great interest, but it is difficult to be sure how far they reflect the practice of the central Īlkhānid government, and how far what was peculiar to the subject kingdom of the Qara-Khitai in Kirmān.

There is evidence of a very specific kind of yārgū, however, in the invaluable second volume of Muḥammad Hindūshāh Nakhjavānī's *Dastūr al-kātib*, which contains a long section describing the functions of the *amīr* of the yārgū.⁴⁶ The *Dastūr al-kātib* provides information on aspects of Persian administration at the very end of the Īlkhānid period, and it is hence dubiously appropriate to read back from it to the conditions of a century or more earlier. But as it happens there is an intriguing and perhaps significant correlation between the operations of the *Dastūr al-kātib*'s yārgū and what I have already argued that we can deduce about the activities of Shigi-Qutuqu in the judicial capacity to which he was appointed by Chingiz Khān at the *quriltai* of 1206.

To recapitulate; Shigi-Qutuqu was to judge certain criminal cases on an *ad hoc* basis; and he was to supervise the distribution of subject peoples. All this was to be recorded in a 'blue book'. The word used for 'case', however one should translate it, is *jarqu*.⁴⁷

In his *History of the tribes*, Rashīd al-Dīn gives an account of the career of Shigi-Qutuqu who, it may be remembered, was a Tatar orphan who became an adopted brother of Chingiz Khān; he is therefore included in the section on the Tatars. Rashīd al-Dīn says this of him:

He conducted courts of enquiry justly (yārgū-hā bi-rāstī *pursīdī*), and he was solicitous and helpful to many criminals and caused his words to be repeated, lest (they) should confess out of terror and fear; and he said, 'Do not be afraid, but speak the truth'. And in the discussions of the yārgūchīs it became well-known that from that time to this, in the province of Mughūlistān and those regions, the foundations of the yārgū's are laid on the regulations (*qawā'id*) which he established and followed.⁴⁸

The point worth noticing here is that there is, as usual, no sign of a *yā* *sā*, Great or otherwise—if anything, judges (*yā* *arghū* *chīs*) follow the case-law precedents (written or orally transmitted?) of Shigi-Qutuqu, not the enactments of Chingiz Khān.

Turning now to the *Dastūr al-kātib*'s evidence, what do we find? The passage under consideration is not devoid of difficulties and contradictions, but it is, I think, possible to extract from it a number of revealing points.

According to the writer, the Mongols had caused the decrees (*ahkām*) of the *yā* *arghū* to be laid down as a canon of justice (*qānūn-i rāsī*)⁴⁹ or alternatively as a *qānūn* called *yā* *arghū-nāma*.⁵⁰ This was apparently to regulate solely cases in dispute between Mongols,⁵¹ and this system was regarded as their equivalent of the *Sharī'a*.⁵² The requisite qualifications for the *amīr* of the *yā* *arghū* were that he should be knowledgeable concerning the customs (*rusūm*) and regulations (*qawā'id*) of the Mongol sultans and *amīrs*, and their *yāsā*s and *tūras*.⁵³ He should settle cases in accordance with the *qūlātghū būik* of Chingiz Khān,⁵⁴ with (according to some manuscripts) the decrees (*ahkām*) of Qa'an (i.e. Ögedei) thrown in,⁵⁵ or in accordance with the *qānūn-i yāsā wa yāsāq* of Chingiz Khān.⁵⁶ the *qānūn* of the *yā* *arghū* and the regulation (*qā'ida*) of the *yāsāq*;⁵⁷ sometimes with justice and equity ('*adl, ma'dalat, insāf, rāsī*') added;⁵⁸ and he was to follow the example of the great *yā* *arghū* *chīs*.⁵⁹ The *amīr* of the *yā* *arghū* was to give the successful disputant a *yā* *arghū-nāma* as a record to produce in the case of further argument⁶⁰—this *yā* *arghū-nāma* apparently being different from the more general record already referred to. The *amīr-i yā* *arghū* and the scribe who had written out the *yā* *arghū-nāma* were to be paid a fee for their services.⁶¹

I suggest as a possibility, therefore, that what we have here is an echo of the functions which, according to the *Secret history*, were delegated to ShigiQutuqu by Chingiz Khān at the *quriltai* of 1206. *Yā* *arghūs* at least of this type in Mongol Persia were tribunals for dealing with disputes between Mongols, and their decisions were recorded in writing. Further, there was apparently some body of previous practices or decisions available to the judge for consultation. The cases that such *yā* *arghū* *chīs* heard might well have included the same kind of disputes as those that Shigi-Qutuqu was instructed to deal with, recording his binding decisions as he went. And as Rashīd al-Dīn's evidence suggests, Shigi-Qutuqu's practices were regarded as a model for later judges to follow. Could registers of decisions and proceedings (*yā* *arghū-nāma*) on disputes between Mongols have been kept from the time of Shigi-Qutuqu's appointment in 1206 until the writing of the *Dastūr al-kātib*, well over a hundred years later? We do not know, though something of the sort might be the reality behind later notions of a

written ‘Great *Yāsā*’. But at least it is one plausible way of explaining in part how a Mongol judicial ‘system’ may have worked. And it does have the virtue of avoiding resort to the desperate expedient of a fixed ‘Great *Yāsā*’ of Chingiz Khān’ laid down in 1206.⁶²

Footnotes

¹ D.Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān: a reexamination', A. *Studia Islamica*, 33, 1971, 97–140; B, 34, 1971, 151–80; C(1), 36, 1972, 113–58; C(2), 38, 1973, 107–56. (Hereafter Ayalon.)

² Paris, 1710. English translation as *The history of Genghizcan the Great*, London, 1722. I quote from the translation.

³ *ibid.*, 78.

⁴ *ibid.*, 79.

⁵ Tientsin, 1937. See also C.Alinge, *Mongolische Gesetze*, Leipzig, 1934; G.Vernadsky, 'The scope and contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, III, 1938, 337–60; *idem*, 'Juwaini's version of Chingis Khan's Yasa', *Annales de l'Institut Kondakov*, XI, 1939, 33–45; *idem*, *The Mongols and Russia*, New Haven and London, 1953, 99–110; M.Haider, 'The Mongol traditions and their survival in Central Asia (XIV–XV centuries)', *Central Asiatic Journal*, XXVIII/1–2, 1984, 57–79.

P.Ratchnevsky, 'Die Yasa Jasaq Činggiskhans und ihre Problematik', *Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients 5: Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischer Völker*, Berlin, 1974, 471–87, is an interesting discussion of the problems. See also his *Činggis-khan sein Leben und Wirken*, Wiesbaden, 1983, 164–72.

⁶ L.Ligeti, ed., *Histoire secrète des Mongols*, Budapest, 1971, 173–4. Translation from I. de Rachewiltz, 'The Secret History of the Mongols', *Papers in Far Eastern History*, 21, March 1980, 27. For another translation see F.W.Cleaves. *The Secret History of the Mongols*, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, 143–4.

⁷ Tr. de Rachewiltz, *PFEH*, 13, March 1976, 46–7; ed. Ligeti, 109; tr. Cleaves, 81.

⁸ On the 'blue book' see P.Pelliot, 'Notes sur le "Turkestan" de M.W.Barthold', and 'Les kökō-dābtār et les hou-k'eu ts'ing-ts'eu', *T'oung Pao*, 27, 1930, 38–42 and 195–8. Pelliot does not suggest a link between the incident of 1206 and the Yāsā.

⁹ op. 9 27 Riasanovsky's italics.

¹⁰ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Sbornik letopisei*, ed. and tr. I.N.Berezin, *Trudy vostochnago otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkheologicheskago*

Obshchestva, XIII and xv, 1868–88. The text only is cited. (Hereafter Berezin). XIII, 238–9.

¹¹ Berezin xv 65.

¹² Ayalon, A, 139.

¹³ Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, ed. M.M.Qazwini, 3 vols, Leiden and London, 1912, 1916, 1937 (hereafter Juwaynī), I, 17–18; tr. J.A.Boyle, *The history of the world conqueror*, 2 vols, Manchester, 1958 (hereafter Boyle), I, 25. I have made a number of changes in Boyle's translation of this passage.

¹⁴ Ayalon, A, 133.

¹⁵ Ayalon, A, 134–5.

¹⁶ Juwaynī, I, 17; Boyle, I, 24.

¹⁷ Juwaynī, III, 3; Boyle, II, 549.

¹⁸ K.Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, Wiesbaden, 1968, text, 8, tr., 95.

¹⁹ ed. M. M. Isfahāni, Bombay, 1852–3, 17.

²⁰ Majmū'a-i rasā'il-i khwāja Naṣīr ed. M. Radjawi, Tehran, 1957, 31. See V.Minorsky, 'Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī on finance', in his *Iranica*, Tehran, 1964, 70.

²¹ P.Pelliot and L.Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan*, I, Leiden, 1951, introduction.

²² Ayalon, B.

²³ Waṣṣāf, 66.

²⁴ F.W.Cleaves, 'The "fifteen 'palace poems"' by Literatur Chiu-ssu', *HJAS*, xx, 1957, p. 428, n. 10; pp. 429–33, nn. 14–15. I owe this reference to the late Professor Joseph Fletcher. The remarks on the *Yā'ā* in P.Ch'en, *Chinese legal tradition under the Mongols: the code of 1291 as reconstructed*, Princeton, 1979, esp. 4–8, while accepting the authority of Riasanovsky and being 'pre-Ayalon' on the *Yā'ā*'s contents, do not seem to show that the evidence of the Chinese sources is irreconcilable with the arguments advanced in this paper. Indeed, it has been said that the Mongol Yüan dynasty was unique in Chinese history in that it did not have a formal penal code. It is even suggested that the notion of such codes was meaningless to the Mongols, and that they preferred to rule through individual regulations and legislation in China. See J.D.Langlois, Jr., in Langlois, ed., *China under Mongol rule*, Princeton, 1981, p. 10, n. 20, citing Uematsu Tadashi.

²⁵ Juwaynī, I, 29; Boyle, I, 40.

²⁶ Juwaynī, I, 227; Boyle, I, 272.

²⁷ Juwaynī, I, 162; Boyle, I, 206.

²⁸ *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, II/1, ed. A.A.Alizade, Moscow, 1980, 183–6; tr. J.A.Boyle, *The successors of Genghis Khan*, New York and London, 1971, 77.

²⁹ *Wassāf*, 284.

³⁰ *Tabaqāt-i Nāṣiri*, ed. 'A. Ḥabibi, 2 vols, 2nd ed., Kabul, 1342–3/1964–5, II, 152; tr. H.G. Raverty, *Tabaqāt-i Nāṣiri*, 2 vols, London, 1881, II, 1108.

³¹ Juwaynī, I, 211; Boyle, I, 256. I have altered the translation.

³² Lech, op. cit., text, 41, tr., 118–19.

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³³ *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, III, ed. A.A.Alizade, Baku, 1957 (hereafter Alizade), 511.

³⁴ ed. M.Hambly, Tehran, 1969, 98, with additional word (omitted from the edition) from the unique MS, Aya Sofya 3019, f. 178a.

³⁵ Abū Bakr al-Qutbī al-Ahrī, *Ta'rīkh-i Shaikh Uwais*, ed. and tr. J.B.van Loon, The Hague, 1954, text, 158, tr., 59.

³⁶ ^{Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd} *Amulī, Naḥḥ* 'is al-funūn, ed. A.Sha'rānī et al., 3 vols, Tehran, 1377–9/1957–60, II, 250.

³⁷ *The travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, tr. H.A. R.Gibb, in, Cambridge, Hakluyt Society, 1971, 560–1.

³⁸ Alizade, 171–2, 199, 202, 205, 226, 305, 313, 317, 327, 343, 363.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 359.

⁴⁰ *Dhayl-i jamī' al-tawārīkh*, ed. K.Bayānī, 2nd ed., Tehran, 1350/1972–3, 76.

⁴¹ Juwaynī, I, 36; II, 233–6; III, 48, 52.

⁴² e.g. Alizade, 202, 204, 313.

⁴³ ed. M.B. *astānī-Pārizī*, Tehran, 2535/1976–7, 156.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 192.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 275–6.

⁴⁶ ed. A.A. Alizade, Moscow, 1976 (hereafter *Dastūr*), 29–35. Parts of this material, without any precise identification, were quoted by Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, 41–2.

⁴⁷ See above, n. 6. The word also occurs elsewhere in the *Secret History*, ed. Ligeti, 202. This adds little except the information that Shigi-Qutuqu might have assistants in hearing *jargus*.

⁴⁸ *Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh*, I/1, ed. A. Romaskevich, L. Khetagurov and A.A. Alizade, Moscow, 1965, 180.

⁴⁹ *Dastūr*, 30.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 32.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, 31, 32, 33.

⁵² *ibid.*, 30, 32. An interesting later parallel is found in a document from the *Ṣafavīd* shrine at Ardabīl, dating from 793/1390–1. In this it is claimed that a horse was made off with in accordance, not with the shar‘ of Muḥammad, but with the *yarghū* (not *yāsā*) of Chingiz Khān. (Document no. 282: unpublished. I am indebted to Mr. A.H. Morton for the loan of his transcript of the document.)

⁵³ *Dastūr*, 30. *Tūra* is a synonym for *yāsā*.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 31. As was remarked above, a large selection of Chingiz Khān’s *biligs* (*bilik*) is preserved by Rashīd al-Dīn. See Berezin, xv, 178 ff. On how these were taken down and recorded, see Boyle in *The successors of Genghis Khan*, 13.

⁵⁵ *Dastūr*, p. 33, n. 11.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 31.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 35.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 31, 33, 34.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 31.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 31.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 32, 34, 35.

⁶² A remote ancestor of this article formed part of an unpublished doctoral thesis, the research for which was supervised by Professor A.K.S.Lambton.

THE ʾILKHĀN Aḥmad's EMBASSIES TO QALĀWŪN: TWO CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS

By P.M.HOLT

With the accession of Tegüder, alias Aḥmad, on the death of his brother Abaqa in 681/1282, the ʾIlkhānate was for the first time ruled by a Muslim. Consequently the possibility appeared of the establishment of peaceful relations with the rival Mamlūk sultanate under al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (*regn.* 678–89/ 1279–90). Two successive embassies were in fact sent to the sultan during Aḥmad's short reign, and accounts of these as seen in Mamlūk court circles are extant in the writings of two contemporaries. The first appears in the largely unpublished biography of Qalāwūn, *al-Faḍl al-ma'thūr min sīrat al-Malik al-Manṣūr* by Shāfi' b. 'Alī (649–730/1252–1330),¹ and the second in the published but incomplete biography, *Tashrīf al-ayyām wa'l-uṣūr fī sīrat al-Malik al-Manṣūr* by the maternal uncle of Shāfi' b. 'Alī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir (620–92/1223–92).² Both writers served in the chancery of the sultan in Cairo.

The account of the Mongol embassies in *al-Faḍl al-ma'thūr* forms a continuous portion of the text (ff. 64b–80b),³ composed in rhymed prose, and written with the clear purpose of glorifying Qalāwūn and his achievements, while denigrating the Mongols. The section is headed 'An account of what befell our lord the sultan and had befallen no other ruler, i.e. the submission of the Mongols and their ruler's request for peace'. It opens with a description of the courage and hardiness of the Mongol hordes, and their extensive conquests since their appearance in A.H. 614 (1217–18)—one of the very few dates provided by this author. The Mamlūk victory at 'Ayn Jālūt is described as having been achieved by Qutuz under the inspiration of Qalāwūn, who then goes on to clear Syria of the Mongols. Baybars is not presented as the victor of 'Ayn Jālūt but mentioned only in passing in connexion with later campaigns. This is a reversal of the role usually ascribed to him, but it must be remembered that the primary source for the received version of events is Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's own court biography of Baybars, not an independent authority.

Shāfi' then passes (f. 66b) to the main subject of the section. He states that Aḥmad on his accession was converted to Islam by a

certain Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān of Mosul, who advised him to make peace with the sultan for the sake of the remnant of the Mongol army (f. 67a). **Aḥmad** thereupon proclaimed Islam throughout his dominions, and sent an embassy with a letter to Qalāwūn. The ambassadors are named as the Imām **Qutb** al-Dīn (the judge of Kayseri) and the Amīr Shams al-Dīn b. al-Taytī al-Āmidī. **Shāfi’** speaks disparagingly of the Persianized Arabic of **Aḥmad**’s letter, drafted by one Jamāl al-Dīn b. ‘Isā, but gives its text (ff. 67a–70b). In the letter, dated mid-Jumādā 1 681/mid-August 1282, **Aḥmad** speaks of himself as a convert in youth to Islam. On his accession, he says, he convoked a *quriltai* of his kinsmen, commanders and notables, who wished unanimously to carry out Abaqa’s command to resumé the war against the Mamlūk sultanate. Fortified by the advice of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān, **Aḥmad** decided to seek peace with Qalāwūn. He announces his establishment of Islam and the *Shari’a*, his restoration of *waqfs*, his encouragement of the Pilgrimage, and his opening of the roads for the free passage of merchants. Even a spy disguised as a dervish, who had been arrested by military patrol, had been sent back, although previously he would have been put to death **Aḥmad** protests that such espionage is no longer necessary. The ambassadors were strictly escorted while passing through Mamlūk territory, and were received by the sultan in state (f. 71). The audience was at nighttime by the light of many candles. Qalāwūn sat on his throne, surrounded by his Mamlūks in golden robes. When the ambassadors entered, they were dumbfounded. The sultan sent for the head of his chancery, **Fath** al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (the son of **Muḥyi** al-Dīn), who appeared and stood before him—although this deference was not required by his office. At the sultan’s command, he took his seat on Qalāwūn’s right in accordance with precedent, and asked the ambassadors their business in Turkish through an interpreter. **Qutb** al-Dīn (here styled al-Shirāzī) said he had an oral message and a letter. The sultan ordered him to give the letter and repeat the message to **Fath** al-Dīn, who was skilled in correspondence. The ambassador demurred as his instructions were to give the message to the sultan personally, but his objections were overborne. The next morning, **Fath** al-Dīn read the **Ilkhān**’s letter to his senior colleagues in the chancery, and told them all to draft an answer (f. 72a). They all held back except his father **Muḥyi** al-Dīn, who composed an answer but did not put it in writing as it did not win general agreement. Then comes a characteristic touch. by **Shāfi’**. Although he was not himself present at the meeting, he produced a draft which was well received, and a final answer was put together from this and a draft of **Fath** al-Dīn’s. Here as on other occasions, **Shāfi’** presents himself as the man with the bright conclusive idea.⁴ The text of the letter, dated 1 Rama- dān 681/3 December 1282, then

follows (ff. 72a–77a).⁵ After receiving gifts from the sultan, the ambassadors returned to the *īlkhān* to report the greatness and magnificence of *Qalāwūn*.

The sultan's letter to the *īlkhān* was in measured terms. *Aḥmad's* profession of faith is welcomed but *Qalāwūn* points out that his own conversion to Islam was earlier, and counters *Aḥmad's* allusion to succession by familial right (*Qalāwūn* himself being a usurper) by the assertion that God has given the inheritance to the one He has chosen. He notes that *Aḥmad* has overruled the wishes of the *quriltai* and preferred a peaceful policy; had he done otherwise, his attack would have turned against him. In response to *Aḥmad's* grant of free passage to travellers, *Qalāwūn* has issued similar orders to his governors in *al-Rahba*, Aleppo, *al-Bīra* and 'Ayn^ā*ab*, but he insists that the disguising of spies as dervishes was a practice initiated by the *īlkhāns*. He goes on to answer the oral communications of the ambassadors. To *Aḥmad's* assurance that he has no territorial ambitions, and that an immediate agreement on the *status quo* might be concluded, the sultan replies somewhat evasively. *Aḥmad* says that there is no further need for warfare against the Muslims; *Qalāwūn* draws his attention to the atrocities committed in Anatolia, a dependency of the *īlkhānate*, by his uncle *Qongqurtai*. Finally, *Aḥmad* suggests that if hostilities are to continue, they should select a place for an ultimate trial by combat—a proposal which *Qalāwūn* dismisses out of hand.⁶

For the second embassy to the sultan, *Aḥmad* sent the shaykh who had been the instrument of his conversion. Shaykh 'Abd *al-Rahmān* travelled with a great retinue and a parasol (described by *Shāfi'* as 'a dome of hide') was borne over his head. He was instructed to conclude peace with *Qalāwūn*. The sultan was informed by his agents of every stage in the ambassador's progress (f. 77b). Orders were sent to a senior *amīr*, *Jamāl al-Dīn Aqūsh al-Fārisī* (the name suggests that he was linguistically qualified for the duty) to meet the ambassador at *al-Bīra*, the *Mamlūk* frontier-post on the Euphrates, and to forbid the use of the parasol, which was one of the sultan's insignia. Shaykh 'Abd *al-Rahmān* deferred to the sultan's command, and made his way to Aleppo, where the governor, *Shams al-Dīn Qarāsunqūr al-Manṣūri*, had made preparations for his reception. He and his retinue were held incommunicado, while the governor sent a report of their numbers to the sultan. *Shāfi'* was surprised to note that the list included four dervishes for chanting and religious music. On consulting his senior *amīrs* and advisers, the sultan decided to meet the ambassador—a decision which received divine approval. A rhetorical account follows of the joyous entry of the sultan into Damascus (ff. 77b–78b).

Qalāwūn took up his residence in the citadel, and sent for the

ambassador and his retinue from Aleppo. They were allowed to rest for three days, then summoned to an audience. Like the previous ambassadors, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was confronted with the sultan enthroned among his magnificently robed Mamlūks. He himself was dressed as a dervish, and was accompanied by the Atabeg (not here explained) and Shams al-Dīn b. al-Taytī. He was of a light complexion, and his speech was confused (f. 79a). The reverse of this folio, which is defaced, describes the offering of a sealed box as a gift to the sultan. When opened, it disclosed a steel pen-box ornamented with gold and silver (?), allegedly the work of the shaykh himself. The sultan received it with disdain, and handed it over at once to his head of chancery. He listened to the ambassador’s message, and dismissed him. Then came the report of Aḥmad’s death, brought by carrier-pigeon. The sultan sent for the ambassador, and told him the news. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān fell down in a swoon, and died a few days later. Shams al-Dīn b. al-Taytī was taken to imprisonment in the Citadel of Cairo, and the rest of the company were allowed to return home. Qalāwūn then sent spies and informers to watch developments after Aḥmad’s death (ff. 79a–80b).

The account by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir in *Tashrīf al-ayyām* is more prosaic, factual and detailed. It is not presented as a single episode but the data are distributed among several annals. The introductory passage (pp. 2–4) is headed ‘An account of the perdition of Abaghā [sic] and the passing of the kingdom to Takudār called Aḥmad’. It gives the date of Abaqa’s death. mid-Ḥijja 680/2 March 1282), and mentions portents of the event. Like Shāfi‘, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir asserts that the Mongols professed Islam and made an approach to Qalāwūn as a stratagem in view of their weakness in face of the Muslims. The text is given of a letter sent by Aḥmad to Baghdad in which he announces his conversion to Islam and the restoration of the *waqfs* (pp. 4–5).

The account of the first embassy follows (pp. 5–16). The ambassadors are named as the chief judge Qutb al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Shīr āzī (who is here designated the judge of Sivas), the Amīr Bahā’ al-Dīn (atabeg of the Seljuk Sulṭān Mas‘ūd of Rūm) and the Amīr Shams al-Dīn b. al-Ṣāhib, who is described as one of the intimate entourage (*aḥad al-khawāṣṣ*) of the lord of Mārdīn. This last is, of course, the Shams al-Dīn b. al-Taytī al-Āmidī of Shāfi‘, and he is identified by al-Maqrīzī (*Sulūk*, I/3, 723) as being the *wazīr* of Māridīn. Their journey from al-Bīra to Aleppo (where they arrived on 21 Jumādā II 681/26 September 1282), Damascus and Cairo is described much as in the first account. As regards their audience with Qalāwūn, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir is brief in the extreme: he merely says that they made obeisance, and delivered their letter and oral messages. The text of Aḥmad’s letter

and Qalāwūn's reply are given. These show some few variants from the version given by Shāfi' but nothing of substance. On their return journey, the ambassadors reached Aleppo on 6 Shawwāl 681/7 Jan. 1283. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir like Shāfi' emphasizes the measures taken to prevent the Mongol ambassadors having any contact with the sultan's subjects.

Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's account of the second embassy is broken up among four separate passages. He first (p. 44) briefly announces the arrival at Damascus on Tuesday, 2 ^{Hijja} 682/21 February 1284, of the ambassadors, whom he names as Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān and Ṣ.m.dāghū—a name which does not appear in Shāfi' b. 'Alī's account. In the second passage (pp. 48–50), he represents 'Abd al-Raḥmān as advising Aḥmad to profess Islam as a trick, so that he would have no trouble from Qalāwūn while he settled accounts with Arghun and his other kinsmen. 'Abd al-Raḥmān is said to have been a Mamlūk by origin. He is represented as having acquired ascendancy over Aḥmad and the Mongols by his charismatic powers, which he expected to be equally effective in Qalāwūn's territories. His journey, retinue and reception at the frontier by Aqūsh al-Fārisī are described much as by Shāfi' but specific dates are given for his arrival at Māridīn (4 Rabī' II 682/2 July 1283) and at Aleppo (26 Shawwāl 682/17 Jan. 1284). In contrast to Shāfi', Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir says that the ambassadors were sent on to Damascus before Qalāwūn's arrival there.

Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's third passage (pp. 61–66) summarizes developments in the Ilkhānate ending in the overthrow of Aḥmad and the accession of Arghun. It tells how Qalāwūn received a despatch in cipher from his chief spy reporting on events, and gives its contents.

The fourth passage (pp. 68–9) completes the story. The news of Aḥmad's death reached Qalāwūn at Gaza, when he was on his way to Syria. He entered Damascus on 2 Jumādā II 683/16 Aug. 1284, but instead of a rhetorical description of the event such as Shāfi' provides, Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir merely remarks, 'The people displayed their customary joy at his arrival'. 'Abd al-Raḥmān and Ṣ.m.dāghū, having been held incommunicado, did not receive letters telling of Aḥmad's death. They were summoned to an audience with the sultan, and forcibly compelled to kiss the ground before him. They delivered the Ilkhā's letter, and (apparently after leaving the sultan's presence) were told of their master's death. At a further audience, 'Abd al-Raḥmān presented his gift, which Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir simply says was accepted. The story ends very differently from that told by Shāfi': we are informed that the ambassadors continued to be generously entertained and kindly treated.

The account concludes with the text of Aḥmad's second letter to Qalāwūn (not given by Shāfi'), which is dated early Rabī' I 683/

May-June 1283 (pp. 69–71). It is in fact the credentials of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān as ambassador. In the preamble **Aḥmad** professes his desire to promote the well-being and peace of mankind, especially the Muslims. He describes his sending of an embassy to the chiefs of the Golden Horde, the regent Nogai and the khān Töde Möngke, deploring the decline of the Mongol empire through its divisions, and urging a return to the precepts of Jochi Khān, i.e. the restoration of good mutual relations. Having received a favourable reply, **Aḥmad** now sends Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān at Qalāwūn’s request (as he asserts), giving him full powers to negotiate a treaty. In the circumstances there was, of course, no answer to this letter.

The two accounts contain a number of mutually incompatible details, which are not easily reconciled or explained, but the more sober narrative of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir is probably the more reliable. Apart from these discrepancies, both agree in illustrating the attitude of the Mamlūk sultan and his servants towards the **Ilkhānate** in the late seventh/thirteenth. century. The Mongols are viewed with extreme mistrust: **Aḥmad**’s conversion (which appears to be dated by both *after* his accession) and his attempt to establish friendly relations are presented as due to military and political calculation and lacking in personal conviction and sincerity. The Mongol ambassadors are escorted through Mamlūk territory in the medieval equivalent of a sealed train, and then held without communication with either the sultan’s subjects or the **Ilkhānate**. Their audiences with Qalāwūn are set-pieces of stage-management, designed to impress the ambassadors with the superior magnificence of the Mamlūk sultan and his court. Yet behind this apparently confident presentation of events, one can detect traces of the old fear of the Mongols as the uncouth but all-conquering barbarians who destroyed the heartlands of *dār al-Islām*. This is the note struck by the opening words of Shāfi‘ b. ‘Alī (f. 65a):

Well known are the great power of this enemy and his ease in coming and going, his great numbers and his high resolution in spite of his miserable equipment, his audacity and firmness, his fortitude and capacity to withstand even freezing conditions, his contentment with clothes that do not cover his nakedness, with food that does not sustain his strength, with drink that does not quench his burning thirst.... The summer does not repel them with its heat, nor the cold with its chill, nor an enemy with his numbers.

The lasting fear of the Mongols by the Mamlūk sultans and their subjects is openly expressed by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir when, after describing the defeat of **Aḥmad** by Arghun (p. 63), he concludes:

God willing, may they [*sc.* the Mongols] ever continue at odds with one of them killing another until God has purged the earth of them. May God cause every enemy of our lord the sultan to perish, and make His name blessed everywhere.

Footnotes

¹ Bodleian, MS Marsh 424. A portion was published with translation by Axel Moberg, 'Regie-rungspromemoria eines ägyptischen Sultans', *Festschrift Eduard Sachau*, Berlin, 1915, 406–21.

² ed. Mur^ād K^āmil, [Cairo, 1961].

³ *sic* in MS, where two successive folios are numbered 39.

⁴ Sh^āfi' modestly describes how he clinched negotiations with Tripoli in 669/1271 and discovered a *casus belli* with Acre in 689/1290; cf. P.M.Holt, 'The treaties of the early Maml^ūk sultans with the Frankish states', *BSOAS*, XLII, 1, 1980, at pp. 70–1, 76; idem. 'Some observations on Sh^āfi' b. 'Alī's biography of Baybars', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, xxix, 1, 1984, at pp. 127–9.

⁵ The letter and Qal^āw^ūn's reply were printed from the then unpublished MS of *Tashrīf al-ayy^ām* with a French translation by E.Quatremère, *Histoire des sultans mamlouks de l'Égypte*, Paris, 1845, II, 158–66, 185–201.

⁶ By a curious coincidence, a similar proposal was made in the same year (1282) by Charles of Anjou to Peter of Aragon, when disputing over Sicily; cf. Steven Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers*, Cambridge, 1958, 236.

THE CRUSADES OF 1239–41 AND THEIR AFTERMATH

By PETER JACKSON

The period of the crusades of Theobald of Navarre and Richard of Cornwall is a critical one in the history of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. As a result of truces made by the crusaders with neighbouring Muslim princes the kingdom came to embrace, albeit briefly, an area more extensive than it had covered at any time since the losses inflicted by Saladin following his victory at **Ḥattīn** in 1187. And yet this triumph was but the prelude to an engagement at La Forbie (al-Ḥarbiyya) in October 1244, which was as grave a catastrophe as **Ḥattīn** and from which the kingdom never recovered. Here the Frankish army was decimated by the Egyptians and their Khwarizmian allies, a new and brutal element in the politics of southern Syria; and most of the newly regained territory was lost within the next three years. In this paper I propose to examine the events of the years 1239–44, with a view to re-evaluating the military and diplomatic achievements of the crusades and to placing the disaster at La Forbie more securely in context.¹

I

Thirteenth-century Latin Syria produced no chronicler comparable in authority and depth with the great twelfth-century ecclesiastic and statesman William of Tyre; and the modern-day historian who laments this dearth will be moved to do so not least when studying the history of the kingdom of Jerusalem during and immediately after the crusades of Theobald and Richard. Of the two continuations of William of Tyre's work which cover the expeditions themselves, the *Estoire de Eracles* surveys them at some length and the so-called 'Rothelin' continuation provides a still longer and more detailed account, especially of Theobald's crusade. Yet neither, as we shall see below, supplies the complete picture of all the negotiations in which the Western leaders were involved. For the period, moreover, from Richard's departure in May 1241 down to La Forbie they are still less satisfactory. The *Eracles* furnishes only the most severely condensed account of these years, containing in any case remarkably little on external relations, and 'Rothelin' none whatsoever.²

The Islamic sources are scarcely more illuminating. Medieval Muslim chroniclers are notoriously indifferent to events within the Frankish world,³ and the two principal authorities contemporary with the period 1239–44 are no exception. It comes as a greater surprise to discover that they fail to do justice even to the complexities of the Islamic scene. The **Sibt** Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1257) and Ibn **Wāṣil** (d. 1298)—the one the author of a universal chronicle, the other the historian of the Ayyubid dynasty in particular—exhibit two major defects. The first is that neither writer provides much indication on precisely which territories were under the rule of a particular Muslim prince at any given time—a question of crucial importance in view of the sizeable territorial concessions obtained by the Franks during the two crusades. It is only from the topographical-historical work of Ibn Shaddād (d. 1285)⁴ that we discover which territories were in the possession neither of al-Šāliḥ Ayyūb, sultan of Egypt (1240–49), nor of his bitter rival al-Šāliḥ Ismāʿīl, prince of Damascus (1239–45), but of a third prince, al-Nāṣir Dāʾūd, who ruled southern Palestine from Kerak down to 1249 and whose relations with the Franks, as we shall see, were the most problematical. The second defect is the way in which the two authors tend to neglect events on the Syrian-Egyptian frontier. Even though the **Sibt** was in Cairo from 639/1241–42 and on at least one


over foreign policy within the Frankish camp, and he is the only Eastern writer to refer specifically to the Emperor Frederick II's embassies to Cairo in 1241 and 1243.¹² This interest is shared by his fellow-Christian, Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. c. 1273), the last authority requiring mention at this juncture. It is only these two writers who tell us of the important role played in Muslim-Frankish relations by the renegade Ayyubid prince al-Jawwād Yūnus and thus show that the choices facing the Franks were far more complex than has generally been believed.

II


In the secondary literature, the verdict on Theobald of Navarre's crusade has been overwhelmingly unsympathetic. To a certain extent it has suffered through comparison with the crusade of Frederick II eleven years earlier. By exploiting the rivalry among the Ayyubid princes with consummate skill, Frederick—so runs the view—had secured remarkable gains for the kingdom of Jerusalem.¹³ Theobald and his colleagues allegedly lacked the ability to execute a coup of similar proportions.¹⁴ They have further been contrasted unfavourably with the emperor's brother-in-law, Richard of Cornwall, whose expedition followed immediately on Theobald's departure from Syria and whose treaty with Egypt is seen as completing the task the king of Navarre had left half-finished:¹⁵ with Richard's treaty, it is claimed, the work of Frederick II at last began to bear fruit.¹⁶ It is but a short step from here to regarding the Syrian Franks who overturned the Egyptian alliance after the earl of Cornwall's departure as responsible for the disaster of 1244.¹⁷ Underlying these verdicts is the assumption that Frederick's pro-Egyptian policy, as expressed in his own treaty with Ayyūb's father, **Sulṭān** al-Kāmil, in 1229 and in Richard's agreement with Ayyūb in 1241, was in the Latin Kingdom's best interests.¹⁸ This is in fact a highly dubious proposition. Among the criticisms levelled by contemporaries at the emperor's Egyptian treaty, of which some admittedly smack of bitter prejudice, one in particular appears well grounded. It was that Frederick had chosen to treat with al-Kāmil, who at the time controlled only a small part of southern Palestine, and had failed to secure an agreement also with al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd, then prince of Damascus and the legal ruler of the territory ceded to the kingdom.¹⁹ This objection had been vindicated by events following the emperor's departure, for al-Kāmil had proceeded to recognize al-Nāṣir's authority in the regions adjoining the newly surrendered territory, thus effectively abdicating responsibility for the observance of the treaty by establishing a hostile prince in the vicinity of the Franks.²⁰ There are sound reasons for believing, in fact, that the emperor's primary concern in 1229 had been not the strategic interests of the kingdom of Jerusalem but the commercial advantage of his kingdom of Sicily, from which he was to maintain relations with the Egyptian court right down to his death in 1250.²¹

Moreover, one sometimes detects the view that there are bizarre

features of Theobald's crusade which can be put down to nothing more than the leader's personal inadequacy. No amount of casuistry on my part here will obscure the fact that Theobald had displayed little judgement or consistency back home in France; that at a critical juncture he proved incapable of exercising discipline over his subordinates, with the direct result that around a third of the crusading knights were annihilated or taken prisoner in an Egyptian ambush at Gaza on 13 November 1239;²² and that by the time of his precipitate departure from Syria his credit with the Franks as a whole was minimal. It might at least be pointed out in his defence that Theobald was accompanied to the Holy Land by a number of French magnates with whom he had been at war as recently as the early 1230s. Even though an attempt had been made to reconcile the various parties in the intervening period, Duke Hugh of Burgundy had been Theobald's



MAP 1: Syria and Jazīra



MAP 2: *Palestine*

rival for the leadership of the crusade;²³ and the resulting tensions may well have played a part in vitiating the morale of the crusading army. The question is certainly worthy of investigation, though considerations of space preclude it in this paper. What I do want to demonstrate initially is that on two counts Theobald has been criticized unjustly. In the first place, the strategy adopted at the council of war preceding the advance towards Gaza has been seen as combining two distinct and mutually exclusive courses of action.²⁴ And secondly, it has been assumed that the Gaza operations represent the sum of Theobald's military activity in Syria.²⁵

The diplomatic situation within the Islamic world when Theobald disembarked on 1 September 1239 would have baffled greater men than the king of Navarre. Soon after annexing Damascus **Sultān** al-Kāmil had died in March 1238, and his empire had rapidly disintegrated. Initially the sovereignty of the new sultan of Egypt, his younger son al-ʿĀdil II, was recognized also in Damascus, where a military junta had set up as governor a minor prince of the blood named al-Jawwād Yūnus. Al-Jawwād's increasingly obvious aspirations towards independence, however, shortly provoked measures by al-ʿĀdil to assert direct control over the city; whereupon al-Jawwād ingeniously placed himself beyond the scope of reprisal by exchanging Damascus for certain of the Jaziran territories of al-Kāmil's elder son al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb at the beginning of 1239. Ayyūb aimed at nothing less than supplanting his brother in Cairo, and in the early spring advanced at the head of a large army as far as Nablus,

where he awaited some move by disaffected Egyptian grandees that would put al-‘Ādil at the mercy of an invading force. Nablus actually belonged to their cousin, al- Nāṣir Dā‘ūd, who had himself ruled Damascus from 1227 to 1229; he had left his dominions around mid-May to visit al-‘Ādil in Cairo and was to return to his capital, Kerak, only in September.²⁶ To his rear, on the other hand, Ayyūb’s position was less secure. At Ba‘labakk his uncle, al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl, who had in turn briefly held Damascus in 1237, prevaricated over the despatch of auxiliaries to Nablus and was in fact secretly conspiring with al-Mujāhid Shīrkūh of Ḥims to seize Damascus in Ayyūb’s absence. Ayyūb’s only reliable ally was al- Muẓaffar Maḥmūd of Ḥamāh.²⁷

The choice of Muslim princes to attack (of whom one enjoyed a somewhat tenuous authority over Damascus and three others all harboured designs upon it) was therefore highly embarrassing; and it is to Theobald’s credit that he did not simply rush headlong into conflict with Ayyūb himself at Nablus or with his advance forces, which had just occupied Gaza,²⁸ but instead waited upon events.

His two month delay before embarking on campaign occasioned comment by Painter,²⁹ though it is worth noting that the Fifth Crusade had been guilty of precisely the same delay following its appearance in Syria in the autumn of 1217.³⁰ And as I shall show below, there is strong evidence that Theobald spent these weeks not in luxurious idleness at Acre but in negotiations at Tripoli with al-Muẓaffar of Ḥamāh. It is possible that he had good reason for not attacking Ayyūb in particular. Western sources speak of a Muslim penetration of Jerusalem which has been confused with the later assault by al-Nāṣir but which is dated by the annals of Melk in the first days of June 1239.³¹ This can only refer to the operations of Ayyūb’s forces, which are known to have overrun the region around the Holy City at this very time.³² The Dunstable annals allege that the attackers retired when ‘imperial envoys’ offered a renewal of ‘the truce’,³³ suggesting that Ayyūb may have been glad to reach some temporary agreement with the Franks that represented an extension of his father’s treaty with Frederick.

The plan adopted at the beginning of November by the crusading leaders and their local Frankish allies was first to fortify Ascalon and then to attack Damascus.³⁴ As a strategy that would alienate two Muslim rulers—the sultan in Cairo as well as the prince of Damascus—and drive them to sink their own differences, this has been seen as the height of folly and explicable only by the need to compromise between two rival camps, a pro-Damascene party headed by the Templars and a pro-Egyptian lobby under the Hospitallers.³⁵ As Bulst pointed out, however, there is no evidence at all that the two orders did differ over foreign policy at this stage,³⁶ and a far more probable

explanation lies to hand. The council of war met when dramatic changes had just taken place in Muslim Syria. Late in September Ismā'īl and al-Mujāhid suddenly appeared before Damascus and stormed the city, leaving Ayyūb without a capital and inducing the majority of his commanders and their forces to desert him and return home to Damascus in order to ensure the safety of their families. And on 21 October Ayyūb himself was taken into custody by al-Nāṣir and imprisoned at Kerak.³⁷ The Franks cannot have failed to recognize the significance of these events. In place of Ayyūb, who had been committed to hostilities with the Egyptian sultan, the prince of Damascus was now Ismā'īl, who at once inserted al-'Ādil's name in the Friday prayers (*khutba*) and exhibited every intention of being a dutiful subordinate.³⁸ With Ayyūb's downfall and the establishment of a new regime at Damascus there was no question of Frankish military activity causing a *rapprochement*, since good relations between Cairo and Damascus had already been restored. The Franks were now confronted, moreover, with the danger of encirclement. On learning of the fall of Damascus, Ayyūb's advance squadrons at Gaza had dispersed,³⁹ and there was nothing to prevent al-'Ādil's own troops under Rukn al-Dīn al-Hayjāwī, who had been despatched to guard the Egyptian frontier early in October,⁴⁰ from occupying the region. The Frankish decision to fortify Ascalon can therefore be seen as a response to Ayyūb's sudden eclipse and as an essential precaution against any advance by Egyptian forces into Palestine.

There is no evidence that Theobald or the local Franks envisaged a war against Egypt when they moved south in November 1239,⁴¹ and the Gaza *débâcle* was brought about simply through the foolhardiness of his subordinates Henry of Bar and Amaury of Montfort, who sought to emulate a successful raid by Peter Mauclerc of Brittany a few days before. The original goal of their *chevauchée* was apparently to drive off herds of livestock known to be pasturing in the vicinity of Gaza,⁴² and this may well explain why the various local nobles who accompanied the two counts abandoned them when it became obvious they would have to fight the Egyptian army.⁴³ Right up until the late spring of 1240 Theobald and the Syrian Franks, for all that they had initially planned to attack Damascus, in practice followed a strategy that was essentially defensive. Gaza only intensified the need to act with caution, since from this point onwards the fate of the Frankish prisoners held in Egypt was a new factor to be considered in deciding policy. Moreover, the Franks lacked allies: they had as yet no understanding with any individual Muslim prince, and the powers ranged against them were for the most part united. This is surely one reason why they failed to take immediate reprisals against al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd when he captured Jerusalem and destroyed the Tower of David in

December 1239-January 1240.⁴⁴ He was not acting merely on his own account but was at the head of a section of the Egyptian army,⁴⁵ so that any move against him might have endangered in turn the lives of the Frankish captives. It is significant that Theobald, whose sole activity during the six months or so following the battle appears to have been obscure parleys with Muslim princes that were widely resented among the Western troops,⁴⁶ acted with some energy once Muslim unity was broken and he had acquired an ally.

It was no fault of the king of Navarre's that his first endeavours to secure an understanding with a Muslim ruler had come to nothing. The only Syrian Frankish *source* to refer to his contacts with al-Muẓaffar Ḥamāh, of the *Estoire de Eracles*, places them by implication after the Gaza campaign,⁴⁷ and hence secondary authorities have tended to locate these negotiations in the spring of 1240. But rumours of al-Muẓaffar's imminent conversion had been current even before the crusade set foot in Syria and are mentioned in an optimistic letter sent to the West by Armand of Pierregort, Master of the Temple, apparently in the summer of 1239.⁴⁸ The precise circumstances in which these reports had gained currency emerge from Ibn Wāṣil. Hearing that Ismā'īl and al-Mujāhid of Ḥims had designs on Damascus, al-Muẓaffar decided to send troops under Sayf al-Dīn 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī al-Hadhbānī to safeguard the city on Ayyūb's behalf. To conceal his aim, however, he had recourse to an extraordinary stratagem. Sayf al-Dīn was to pretend to quarrel with al-Muẓaffar on the grounds that the prince planned to surrender Ḥamāh to the Franks, and was to leave with his troops as if in umbrage. Al-Muẓaffar went so far as to admit a body of Franks into the citadel of Ḥamāh in order to lend credibility to the idea. Unfortunately, the rumours were believed by his subjects and caused a panic. A sizeable exodus from Ḥamāh occurred, seriously reducing al-Muẓaffar's capacity to influence events for some time to come.

Ironically, Sayf al-Dīn and his companions never reached Damascus, being detained by al-Mujāhid and incarcerated at Ḥims.⁴⁹

All this clearly occurred immediately prior to the fall of Damascus, probably late in September, and that Theobald's negotiations with al-Muẓaffar were taking place early in the autumn is confirmed by a number of details in Western sources. The *Eracles* tells us that one of the crusading leaders, Count John of Mâcon, died at Tripoli during, or possibly after, the abortive negotiations; and yet the 'Rothelin' continuation specifically mentions that he was already dead at the time of the council of war preceding the Gaza disaster.⁵⁰ Count John is in fact commemorated by the abbey of Saint-Yved at Braine on 3 November.⁵¹ And it is significant that both the count's death and the collapse of the discussions with al-Muẓaffar are placed under the year 1239 and, apparently, before Gaza by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, who

also names two other crusaders, Anselm of Trainel and Robert of Courtenay, who died around the same time: the *obits* of the two nobles are elsewhere assigned to the first days of October.⁵² None of this evidence, of course, excludes the possibility that al-Muẓaffar may have continued to figure as a potential ally for some months afterwards. The *Eracles* links his overtures to the Franks with the threat to Ḥamāh from the regent of Aleppo,⁵³ with whom al-Muẓaffar made peace ‘ostensibly’, according to Ibn Wāṣil, around February or March 1240.⁵⁴ Even then al-Muẓaffar was engaged in another subterfuge, endeavouring to dupe al-‘Ādil, and Ayyūb’s other enemies, into believing that he had accepted the status quo and had abandoned his friend.⁵⁵

The failure to secure an accommodation with Ḥamāh was a bitter disappointment; but in the spring of 1240 the diplomatic situation in Muslim Syria changed once again, and this time in the Franks’ favour. Al-Nāṣir had already antagonized the sultan by his refusal to hand over Ayyūb, who was far too valuable a pawn; now, on 21 April, he released his prisoner and undertook to assist him in his conquest of Egypt in return for concessions which included the promise of a joint expedition to put al-Nāṣir himself back in power in Damascus as Ayyūb’s subordinate.⁵⁶ This not unnaturally caused consternation among Ayyūb’s enemies, and al-‘Ādil, Ismā‘īl and al-Manṣūr Ibrāhīm, who had succeeded his father al-Mujāhid as prince of Ḥimṣ in February, all prepared for war, the two Syrian rulers advancing with their troops as far as al-Fawwār in the Sawād, east of the Yarmuk river.⁵⁷ The extent of Ismā‘īl’s alarm may be gauged from the alacrity with which he entered into correspondence with the Franks. He is usually assumed to have contacted Theobald at Sephoria (al-Ṣaffūriyya), after news had reached him of the triumphal entry of Ayyūb and al-Nāṣir into Cairo in June.⁵⁸ But it is evident from a phrase in the *Siyar* that Ismā‘īl was already allied with the Franks prior to this, when the fate of Ayyūb’s bid for power hung very much in the balance;⁵⁹ while we learn from the Master of the Temple that the first Damascene overture reached the Franks when they were still encamped in the ‘Sablou’ outside Acre.⁶⁰

The Frankish-Damascene treaty was finalized during the summer,⁶¹ and we shall consider its terms below. What needs to be stressed at this juncture is that Theobald wasted no time in putting the alliance to good use. In July 1240 al-Nāṣir returned from Cairo to Kerak for the second time, to find his territories under steady attack. The Franks had raided the Jordan valley (al-Ghawr) and Nablus; they had again advanced to Gaza and begun work at last on the fortification of Ascalon; and they had temporarily reoccupied Jerusalem, where Theobald himself now made the pilgrimage at the head of an impressive force.⁶² These almost totally neglected operations

constitute the high-water mark, as it were, of the king of Navarre's crusade and demonstrate his readiness to adapt to changing circumstances in Muslim Syria.

III

The territorial clauses of the Damascene agreement have occasioned no little uncertainty and debate among present-day scholars.⁶³ But they fall into two clear categories. Firstly, Ismā'īl was surrendering important territories in his own possession: the Muslim-held regions of the Sidon lordship, Toron (Tibnīn) and Châteauneuf (Hūnīn), all of which had been ceded by al-Kāmil to Frederick II in 1229 but to which the Franks had been unable, apparently, to make good their claim;⁶⁴ Tiberias (Ṭabariyya); the ruins of Safed (Ṣafad); and, most importantly, the fortress of Beaufort (Shaqīf Arnūn), which was intact.⁶⁵ And secondly, he was recognizing the right of the kingdom of Jerusalem to all its erstwhile possessions west of the Jordan held at the time of their conquest by Saladin in 1187.⁶⁶ Much of the land in this broader category actually belonged to al-Nāṣir: Nablus, for example, Gaza, Jericho and the Holy City itself.⁶⁷ But, as we saw above, the Damascene alliance provided the Franks with the opportunity of recovering it by force. If the agreement represented an offensive alliance against al-Nāṣir, however, it also entailed a defensive alliance against Ayyūb, which in Ismā'īl's eyes was surely its *raison d'être*. The Franks were to encamp at Gaza in order to prevent the Egyptian army from entering Syria; the two parties were to defend each other's territories against Ayyūb, and neither was to make peace with him without the other.⁶⁸ Later Muslim sources also inform us that the Franks were permitted to visit Damascus and buy arms.⁶⁹

These concessions were to cause Ismā'īl considerable embarrassment. Not merely did they provoke the wrath of certain religious leaders in Damascus, notably the chief preacher (*khaṭīb*) Ibn 'Abd al-Salām al-Sulamī, whom Ismā'īl first put under house-arrest and later exiled; they also met with obstruction on the part of his military subordinates. The commandant and garrison of Beaufort refused to surrender the fortress, necessitating an expedition by Ismā'īl in person in August or September to reduce it and fulfil his undertakings to the Franks.⁷⁰ The protracted siege would have left him little time for the joint expedition with the Franks into southern Palestine which is usually placed during the latter stages of Theobald's crusade. Our sole authority for it is the *Estoire de Eracles*, which includes al-Manṣūr of Ḥimṣ among those present.⁷¹ None of the Arabic sources, however, refers to such military collaboration, except

possibly against al-Nāṣir's town of Nablus;⁷² and during the summer of 1240, at least, al-Manṣūr had good reasons for remaining in northern Syria. His principality of Ḥimṣ had twice been raided by the Khwarizmians in recent months,⁷³ and by the early autumn they gravely threatened neighbouring Aleppo, whose army suffered a crushing defeat on 2 November. Significantly, Arabic writers depict al-Manṣūr as participating in campaigns against Egypt only after his fierce struggle with the Khwarizmians as commander of the Aleppan army in the Jazīra, culminating in his victory near Edessa in May 1241.⁷⁴ In all probability, therefore, the *Eracles* has conflated the events of 1240 with those of the summer of 1241, when Ismā'īl and al-Manṣūr, as we shall see, did attempt an invasion of Egypt in conjunction with the Franks.⁷⁵ As far as 1240 is concerned, we can be certain only that Ismā'īl, in addition to reducing Beaufort, gave hostages to the Franks as an earnest of his good faith.⁷⁶

In any case the Frankish-Damascene alliance swiftly foundered. According to a well-informed Aleppan chronicler, when al-Manṣūr learned of the Khwarizmian crisis early in November 1240 he had been about to raid Frankish territory, at the head not merely of his own troops but also of a detachment of the Damascene army.⁷⁷ Which Frankish territory—Antioch, Tripoli or the kingdom itself—is not stated. Possibly there is some connexion here with the rumour, noticed by Matthew Paris, that before the year was out Ismā'īl had lost confidence in the Franks and had contravened the truce by reaching a settlement with their mutual enemies.⁷⁸ This phase of events, which coincides with Theobald's precipitate departure from Syria and the first few weeks of Richard of Cornwall's crusade, is perhaps the most obscure in the entire period under review. Ismā'īl may well have had misgivings at the failure of the Hospitallers to adhere to the truce;⁷⁹ he is still more likely to have been discouraged by Theobald's sudden withdrawal in mid-September; but it appears that the root cause of the breakdown of the alliance was the capitulation of al-Nāṣir.

For the author of the 'Rothelin' continuation, al-Nāṣir had participated in the confederacy against Ayyūb from the outset.⁸⁰ This is misleading, since the remaining evidence demonstrates that the prince of Kerak made peace with the allies only at the very end of the summer. According to Richard of Cornwall, whose letter is reproduced by Matthew Paris in the *Chronica Majora*, Theobald had made a truce with al-Nāṣir but had left Syria before it was finalized.⁸¹ Matthew's own statements elsewhere suggest that one of the objects of these negotiations was the release of some of the Gaza captives, allegedly in al-Nāṣir's possession; and modern writers have accordingly questioned the very authenticity of the truce.⁸² It is corroborated, however, by the Arabic sources. The author of the *Siyar* tells us that

during their subsequent negotiations with the Egyptian **Sulṭān** Ayyūb the Franks demanded that he recognize the territorial concessions they had received from al-Nāṣir.⁸³ Ibn Shaddād, moreover, refers to a treaty between al-Nāṣir, Ismāʿīl, al-Manṣūr and the Franks in 638 A.H. (began 23 July 1240) whereby he surrendered Jerusalem, and Ibn al-Dawādārī dates the arrival of this news in Cairo in the early autumn of 1240.⁸⁴ There is consequently no doubt whatsoever that Theobald did reach an agreement with the prince of Kerak, who was quite simply engaged in a desperate attempt to survive since he had returned from Egypt diplomatically isolated. Once in power Ayyūb had reneged on promises extracted from him under duress, and al-Nāṣir's hopes of recovering his Damascene patrimony were frustrated yet again.⁸⁵ After an ineffectual gesture of assistance to the mutinous garrison of Beaufort,⁸⁶ he appears to have bowed to necessity. He had, after all, little reason to persist in his friendship with Ayyūb and every incentive to seek an accommodation with his enemies in Syria.

One of the problems we face in trying to evaluate Theobald's crusade is the tendency of the Frankish sources to muddle his diplomatic activity and so minimize his achievement. His unpopularity at the time of his departure has traditionally been linked with an Egyptian truce which the *Eracles* ascribes to him, and 'Rothelin' even credits him with the release of all the Gaza captives, which is known to have been the work of Richard of Cornwall.⁸⁷ Yet it is noteworthy that neither writer mentions Theobald's dealings with al-Nāṣir and that Matthew Paris, conversely, fails to associate him with any Egyptian truce. There is thus a strong probability that the truce with al-Nāṣir—which, as we shall see below, was not without its controversial features—rapidly became confused in the chroniclers' memory with the even less satisfactory treaty with Cairo in February-March 1241. The *Siyar* alleges that prior to that treaty the Franks had repeatedly sent envoys to Ayyūb seeking peace.⁸⁸ If, as is possible, these approaches were initiated by Theobald, he was doubtless simply using his alliance with Ismāʿīl to put pressure on Ayyūb to release his Frankish prisoners and was by no means necessarily aiming at a settlement which would contravene the defensive agreement with Damascus. This must unfortunately remain a matter of conjecture; but it is at least preferable to a view which ascribes to Theobald a total of three mutually contradictory truces before he left Syria. Not even someone who had earned the king of Navarre's reputation could have been so stupid.

More insidious than the confusion in the Syrian Frankish accounts is the deliberate misrepresentation in Richard of Cornwall's letter. The earl makes no mention of the military operations which had brought al-Nāṣir to negotiate in the first place (nor, for that matter, does he once

refer to the Damascene alliance), and gives us to understand that the French crusading leaders had opened negotiations with Kerak merely in order to be seen to have done something.⁸⁹ It is true that the terms of the proposed truce with al-Nāṣir were problematical for the Franks. Ismāʿīl restored to him, albeit reluctantly, the town of Nablus, until 1187 part of the Latin Kingdom;⁹⁰ and, according to the version which reached Cairo at least, Jerusalem was not surrendered outright but was to be shared with the Muslims.⁹¹ The agreement was therefore open to one of the very objections that had been levelled at Frederick II's treaty with al-Kāmil in 1229.⁹² Yet if Theobald's truce with al-Nāṣir was not ideal, it was far from being, as Richard of Cornwall described it, 'of little consequence'.⁹³ On the contrary, it rounded off the territorial concessions won from Ismāʿīl and thereby represented a considerable advance on the emperor's work. For whereas Frederick's treaty—as we saw earlier—had been made with al-Kāmil alone and had little effect in many areas where the sultan's authority was minimal,⁹⁴ Theobald had contrived a settlement with both the princes who currently occupied the former territories of the kingdom.

It was his misfortune that al-Nāṣir's entry into the alliance served to generate dissension over its character. According to the 'Rothelin' continuation, the Damascene envoys began to press for an invasion of Egypt, to which Theobald, despite the favourable response among the local Franks, was unwilling to commit himself.⁹⁵ Ismāʿīl was doubtless encouraged to plan an invasion not only by the capitulation of al-Nāṣir but by reports that important elements within Egypt desired him as sultan in preference to Ayyūb.⁹⁶ For the Western knights, however, the prospect of an offensive threw into relief the plight of their comrades who had been held captive in Egypt since the battle of Gaza and whose lives an invasion would jeopardize in a way the defensive alliance had not done; and it seems to have been around this time that rumours spread concerning their harsh treatment.⁹⁷

Paradoxically, therefore, Ismāʿīl may well have played into the hands of those who wanted a truce with the new Egyptian sultan. The aspirations of this party, which included the Hospitallers, the duke of Burgundy and Walter of Brienne, received a further boost when al-Nāṣir declined to negotiate a fresh truce with Richard of Cornwall.⁹⁸ His reasons are not known. Most probably the security of his new found friendship with Damascus and Ḥimṣ removed the necessity for further dealings with the Franks, for whom al-Nāṣir, as a self-conscious though by no means consistent advocate of the *jihād*,⁹⁹ could only afford to evince disfavour.

Richard's arrival at Acre on 8 October 1240 had in fact tipped the scales on the side of a Frankish settlement with Ayyūb. According to the earl's letter, the initiative in the ensuing negotiations came from

the sultan, who sent a high-ranking envoy to meet him at Jaffa.¹⁰⁰ This was apparently Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Shaykh, the brother of Frederick II's great friend Fakhr al-Dīn, whom the *Siyar* names as Ayyūb's representative.¹⁰¹ The sultan was doubtless only too eager for a truce, since the coalition against him included the greater part of Muslim Syria (Aleppo, whose regent Ismā'īl had been endeavouring to win over as early as July-August 1240, apparently joined the alliance around the end of the year¹⁰²) and it was vital at least to detach the Franks. But the most powerful force working towards a Frankish-Egyptian settlement was surely the emperor, who was now in a better position than at any time since 1229 to influence events. Richard had taken good care on his journey overland through France and the kingdom of Arles to remain in touch with his imperial brother-in-law,¹⁰³ and Frederick's own words a few years later indicate that the earl came out to Syria as his accredited representative.¹⁰⁴ It appears that Richard fostered the impression for as long as possible that he was reluctant to commit himself to either the pro-Damascene or the pro-Egyptian party, and he induced the former to co-operate in the refortification of Ascalon, which was hardly incongruous with the terms of the Damascene alliance.¹⁰⁵ We know, nevertheless, from his own correspondence that he had agreed on the advisability of a truce with Cairo as early as November.¹⁰⁶

Regrettably, no text of the treaty between Richard and Ayyūb has come down to us. Yet it seems clear that the only concrete gain it afforded the Franks was the release of the knights captured at Gaza. The earl gives prominence in his letter to a long list of places now allegedly surrendered by the Egyptians.¹⁰⁷ Many of these often hopelessly corrupted names apparently denote villages in the environs of Jerusalem and Bethlehem;¹⁰⁸ the list of more important places furnished by the *Siyar*, however, is broadly in agreement.¹⁰⁹ But it must be emphasized that these territorial clauses have been misunderstood in two vital respects. Professor Jean Richard, for example, sees the 1241 agreement as entailing 'no merely formal cession' and assumes that it was by virtue of this agreement that the Franks were able at last to reoccupy the areas listed by the earl, such as Tiberias.¹¹⁰ But Ayyūb at this time controlled not a single region of Syria or Palestine—even Gaza was to be retaken by an Egyptian force only in May 1241.¹¹¹ In sharp contrast with Ismā'īl, therefore, the sultan was yielding territory that was currently not in his own gift. The Sidon region, Beaufort, Châteauneuf, Toron, Tiberias and Safed had all been included, as we have seen, in the Frankish-Damascene treaty. Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Bayt Jibrīn (Beth Gibelin) and Kawkab (Belvoir), on the other hand, lay within al-Nāṣir's principality. Of these, the Holy City had certainly been one of the places named in al-Nāṣir's

truce with Theobald; and after the departure of Richard, who may have made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem,¹¹² we find the prince of Kerak back in possession in May.¹¹³ Accordingly, the 1241 treaty merely recognized the Franks' rule over territories which they had acquired from Ayyūb's enemies—though by virtue of truces that were no longer operative. Moreover, far from constituting, as has been alleged, an *extension* of the Damascene concessions,¹¹⁴ the territories listed in Richard's agreement with Ayyūb actually fell short of them. Where Ismā'īl had theoretically acknowledged the pre-1187 boundaries of the Latin Kingdom (though excluding Kerak and Montréal), Ayyūb, according to the *Siyar*, expressly reserved for himself three areas of considerable strategic value: namely, Nablus, al-Khalīl (Hebron) and the city (though not the hinterland) of Gaza.¹¹⁵ When reading the earl of Cornwall's triumphant announcement of his 'acquisitions' to his English friends, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the political realities in the Near East were being discounted in favour of a policy already determined hundreds of miles away in Western Europe,

And yet there was a still more powerful objection to the 1241 treaty with Egypt. As Saladin's victorious career in the 1180s had shown only too clearly, it was crucial for the survival of Latin Syria that the Muslim territories should not be concentrated in the hands of one prince. For this reason, if for no other, Theobald would have been justified in resisting the pressure to aid Ismā'īl in the conquest of Egypt. Equally, however, the duke of Burgundy and the Hospitallers were misguided in their championship of Richard of Cornwall's agreement with Ayyūb. In 1243 Armand of Pierregort was to write to the West complaining that the sultan sought peace with the Franks merely in order to proceed with the reduction of Ismā'īl and al-Nāṣir.¹¹⁶ He could have voiced the same opinion, and doubtless did, two years earlier. The terms of the respective treaties highlight the difference between the two rival princes. For Ismā'īl Frankish military assistance was a vital necessity, if only to keep Ayyūb's forces out of Syria; hence the relatively high price he was prepared to pay for it. Ayyūb, on the other hand, was satisfied merely with the Franks' benevolent neutrality, which would secure his flank while he turned against his Muslim enemies.

IV

He began with al-Nāṣir. In the late spring of 1241 an Egyptian army under Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Shaykh and Qarāsūnqūr al-Sāqī was sent into Palestine by way of Gaza with instructions to occupy Nablus. The Egyptians were surprised by al-Nāṣir's forces under al-Jawwād (see below) in the hills west of Jerusalem and, in spite of their superior numbers, routed with heavy losses; Kamāl al-Dīn was taken prisoner. A few weeks later, however, the prince of Kerak made peace with Ayyūb, and the Egyptian general was released.¹¹⁷ Why al-Nāṣir chose to abandon the anti-Egyptian alliance at this stage, we are not told; but one reason is possibly to be found in an incident reported by Ibn Shaddād. He tells us that the Muslim slaves employed in the reconstruction of the Templar fortress at Safed planned a mutiny and sent secretly to al-Nāṣir's lieutenant at 'Ajlūn, who requested instructions from his master. Al-Nāṣir at once notified Ismā'īl, who proceeded to betray the conspiracy to the Templars: the slaves were rounded up and massacred.¹¹⁸ Most probably al-Nāṣir had intended the Muslim princes to benefit from the mutiny and Ismā'īl's reaction was profoundly disappointing; nor could the prince of Kerak be seen to countenance the wholesale slaughter of fellow-Muslims. Whatever the place of these events in al-Nāṣir's policy, the reconciliation was a piece of good fortune for Ayyūb, whose plans to expand into Syria had suffered a humiliating reverse. For he himself now had to face an offensive from Damascus, which would have succeeded, according to the *Siyar*, had not the sultan and al-Nāṣir been at peace.¹¹⁹

Ismā'īl appears to have been encouraged once more to attempt an invasion of Egypt by reports of Ayyūb's notoriously uneasy relations with his *amīrs*.¹²⁰ In the early summer, accompanied by al-Manṣūr, by Aybeg al-Mu'azzamī, lord of Ṣarkhad, and by a contingent from Aleppo, he advanced through al-Nāṣir's territories, defeating the prince himself at Ḥisbān in the Bilqā and a further detachment of his at Nablus. Then the allies were joined by a Frankish army and encamped at Gaza, which had been abandoned by the Egyptian frontier forces.¹²¹ We learn from al-Nuwayrī that around this time Ismā'īl and the Franks also reoccupied Jerusalem, where the unfortunate jurist al-Sulamī, who had taken up residence there after his banishment from Damascus, once again suffered a temporary imprisonment.¹²² What happened next is uncertain. Later sources speak of an engagement in which large

numbers of the Syrian troops deserted to Ayyūb's army and the Franks were consequently defeated, an episode usually placed by modern writers in 1240.¹²³ The author of the *Siyar*, on the other hand, who refers cryptically at a later juncture to the Franks' desertion by Ismā'īl and their defeat by Ayyūb, says in his account of the campaign itself merely that the Syrians retreated.¹²⁴ As they moved back through al-Nāṣir's dominions, his forces fell upon Aybeg al-Mu'azzamī's contingent at al-Fawwār on 22 August 1241 and routed him with the loss of his heavy baggage.¹²⁵

This reverse brought the Franks in turn to heel, and the Templars sent envoys to Cairo to sue for peace on the basis of the existing territorial dispositions.¹²⁶ We are not told whether Ayyūb at this point granted the terms they sought, but subsequent events make it unlikely. Peace with Egypt was rendered more imperative by the departure of the remnants of Theobald's and Richard's crusades at the end of the summer. The earl himself had embarked for Italy on 3 May, but Matthew Paris indicates that a great many crusaders left Syria at the autumn passage.¹²⁷ The withdrawal of these troops represented a serious reduction in Frankish manpower and obliged the local Franks to fall back from Jaffa, where the Christian army had taken up position following Richard's departure, to Acre: such, at any rate, is the testimony of the *Eracles*, which makes no mention of the military setback in the summer.¹²⁸ But the Franks were not to remain inactive for long. Their return to a forward policy seems to have been closely connected with the arrival at Acre of the Ayyubid prince al-Jawwād, whom we encountered earlier as prince of Damascus in 1238–39.¹²⁹

Dislodged from his new principality in the Jazīra, al-Jawwād had returned to southern Syria in the spring of 1241 with the aim of entering Ayyūb's service and, under his aegis, of recovering Damascus.¹³⁰ On the advance of Kamāl al-Dīn, however, he had taken fright and joined al-Nāṣir, who had put him in command of the small force which defeated the Egyptians. But the two princes shortly quarrelled, and at the end of June 1241 al-Nāṣir arrested al-Jawwād and sent him off under escort to Baghdad. *En route* al-Jawwād escaped and made for Damascus, where he attached himself to Ismā'īl.¹³¹ It seems that Ismā'īl decided to use al-Jawwād in an attempt to retrieve his Frankish alliance following the disaster in the summer and the Templars' entry into negotiations with Cairo, for Ibn al-ʿAmīd says specifically that the prince was sent off to Acre to woo the Master of the Temple.¹³² 'Li Johet', who was born of a Frankish mother, used to speak of the Franks as his brothers and was extremely popular with them.¹³³ But he was to prove a dangerous choice for such a mission. Initially he served Ismā'īl well, accompanying the Franks on an expedition to Gaza, where they looted whatever they could lay hands

on and then withdrew before al-Nāṣir arrived with his forces to reoccupy the area.¹³⁴ Soon afterwards the Franks left al-Jawwād at Caesarea and fell back on Acre:¹³⁵ the reason is not given in the Arabic sources, but their withdrawal seems to have been linked with the outbreak of disturbances within Acre itself. The imperial *bailli* Filangieri chose this moment to arrive secretly from Tyre and endeavour to seize the city on Frederick's behalf; and we know from the Frankish account of this episode that prior to their hurried return to Acre the Templars and the army of the kingdom, under Odo of Montbéliard, had been stationed at Caesarea.¹³⁶

Ayyūb was quick to seize his opportunity. Al-Jawwād was won over—chiefly, it appears, by the guarantee of an Egyptian expedition to instal him in Damascus in Ismā'īl's place—and was authorized to offer the Franks on the sultan's behalf whatever territorial concessions they desired. The prince in turn prevailed upon the Templar Master and other Frankish leaders to swear to an alliance with Ayyūb.¹³⁷ This represented a considerable triumph for the sultan, who for the first time, it must be stressed, was at peace with both parties among the Franks and had thus shattered the links between Acre and his hated rival at Damascus. He now went on to despatch to Syria in March-April 1242 a force of three thousand horse under Rukn al-Dīn al-Hayjāwī, the victor of 1239. Al-Hayjāwī's task, prior to the Damascus expedition, was ostensibly to reconcile al-Jawwād with the sultan's ally al-Nāṣir;¹³⁸ but in fact Ayyūb had no intention of honouring his undertaking to al-Jawwād. Very soon al-Hayjāwī, who had joined the prince at Jaffa, received instructions from Cairo to arrest him and send him in chains to Egypt. Al-Hayjāwī duly prepared the way by inducing al-Jawwād to accompany him to Gaza. But here the prince himself received orders from Ayyūb to arrest al-Hayjāwī; whereupon each of the two men revealed his instructions to his companion and decided, not surprisingly, to abandon the sultan's service. Al-Jawwād rejoined the Franks at Acre; al-Hayjāwī fled to Damascus, while those of Ayyūb's troops who did not follow him retired in confusion from Gaza to Egypt.¹³⁹ The Templars now appear to have aligned themselves once more with Damascus. They were not averse to depicting the retreat of the Egyptian forces as a great Frankish triumph and sent inflated reports to the West, where Matthew Paris commented acidly on the nature of their 'victory'.¹⁴⁰

With the Egyptian withdrawal, the Franks were free to continue their attacks on al-Nāṣir. A series of raids from Bethlehem, among other places, was checked only when al-Nāṣir in person advanced on Bethlehem, slaughtered its Frankish and other Christian inhabitants, and carried off their children into captivity. Shortly afterwards he massacred a convoy of pilgrims on their way back from Jerusalem to

Acre and plundered their possessions.¹⁴¹ Not until the early autumn do the Franks appear to have taken their revenge. Then, on 30 October 1242, they fell upon Nablus. The sack of the city, in which the congregational mosque was razed and even the native Christian population, according to the *Siyar*, perished alongside the Muslims, lasted for three days, after which the marauders retired to their own territory—presumably to Jaffa, which had been their base on this occasion.¹⁴² Ayyūb was roused to assist his ally al-Nāṣir, though ineffectively as it turned out. A force of two thousand horse under Shams al-Dīn Sirāṣunqur was sent to Gaza to rendezvous with the Egyptian frontier detachments and with al-Nāṣir himself, and together they invested Jaffa. But the Franks were well prepared, and after the siege had dragged on for some time Ayyūb sent orders to Sirāṣunqur to withdraw. Al-Nāṣir had no choice but to retire to Kerak, and the remaining Egyptian forces fell back on Gaza.¹⁴³ Al-Nāṣir's angry letter to Ibn 'Abd al-Salām al-Sulamī, by this time chief *qāḍī* of Egypt, in which he described the Frankish outrages and complained of the small support he had received from Ayyūb, has survived among his correspondence.¹⁴⁴

During the past eighteen months the sultan had made a poor showing. He had repeatedly prepared expeditions to enforce his sovereignty in Syria, and on each occasion they had either failed to leave Egyptian territory or had issued in disaster. The fiasco of Kamāl al-Dīn's campaign in May-June 1241, when Ayyūb's troops had been defeated by an army they outnumbered ten to one,¹⁴⁵ had been followed around the beginning of 1242 by preparations for another expedition, which was abandoned for reasons unspecified.¹⁴⁶ Then had occurred al-Hayjāwī's advance to Jaffa and the humiliation of his defection to Ismā'īl. The sultan seems to have relinquished yet another attempt to move against Damascus in the later summer of 1242:¹⁴⁷ on this occasion the reason was in all likelihood the death at Gaza, on 12 August, of Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Shaykh, who is known to have been in command of the invasion force.¹⁴⁸ If we are to believe a letter dated most probably in June or July of this year and addressed to the amīr of al-Gharb in the Lebanon, instructing him to make ready to link up with the Egyptian forces, Ayyūb may have intended to accompany this expedition in person.¹⁴⁹ Its abandonment represents the end of the sultan's efforts to mount a campaign against his enemies in Syria while relying principally on the Egyptian army. During the winter and spring of 1242–43 he engaged the Franks in fresh negotiations which lasted for six months or more but which fell through as a result of his unwillingness to offer sufficient concessions.¹⁵⁰ Nor was Ayyūb's standing redeemed by successes elsewhere. In March or April 1242 his troops had finally been expelled

from Mecca by the ruler of the Yemen, a humiliation the sultan was never able to avenge.¹⁵¹ The sole triumph registered by the Egyptian forces, in fact, during the three years preceding La Forbie was a minor victory over a Frankish naval attack on al-Warrāda and Qatya, east of the Nile delta, in May 1243.¹⁵²

In the late spring of 1243 Ismāʿīl headed his second campaign to attempt the conquest of Egypt. Accompanied by al-Manṣūr of Ḥimṣ and joined en route by a Frankish army, he advanced to Gaza, which had been abandoned once more by the Egyptians.¹⁵³ This time the allies had reached an understanding with al-Nāṣir. Disheartened, evidently, by the lack of support he had received from the sultan, he now invested the Egyptian-held fortress of al-Shawbak (Montréal) and was within an ace of taking it when the news of his allies' sudden retreat from Gaza compelled him to retire himself to Kerak.¹⁵⁴ Ismāʿīl's campaign, like its predecessors, had accomplished nothing of worth. The *Annales de Terre Sainte* remark irritably that he deceived his Frankish confederates and neglected to swear a truce with them;¹⁵⁵ and the only result of the expedition was the elimination of al-Jawwād, to which this may be a veiled reference. The fullest account is given by Ibn al-ʿAmīd, who says that Ismāʿīl wrote to al-Jawwād reproaching him for his comparatively lengthy stay among the Franks and inviting him to his own encampment. The prince complied but subsequently, when the terms of the new Frankish-Damascene truce were being formulated, wrote to the Franks warning them against Ismāʿīl. The letter fell into Ismāʿīl's hands, and al-Jawwād was arrested and sent under guard to Damascus.¹⁵⁶ Here he died mysteriously in March or April 1244. According to al-Khazrajī, he fell ill and died a natural death; but the remaining sources all repeat the rumour that Ismāʿīl had him strangled.¹⁵⁷ So ended the career of 'this turbulent and bungling prince', as Blochet called him.¹⁵⁸ An intriguer to the very last, he had even hatched a conspiracy with Nāṣir al-Dīn Yaghmūr, the officer whom Ismāʿīl had detailed to arrest him and who was consequently thrown into gaol at the same time.¹⁵⁹ The extent of the Franks' complicity in al-Jawwād's fate is difficult to assess. A later source alleges that Ismāʿīl had bribed them to surrender their ally,¹⁶⁰ but this is not corroborated elsewhere: the Sibī and Ibn al-ʿAmīd, in fact, both depict the Franks as concerned about al-Jawwād's disappearance and anxious to have him back.¹⁶¹ Certainly they had better cause than anyone else to miss al-Jawwād, whose attachment to them appears to have been the only constant element in a series of highly volatile allegiances; and his removal from the Frankish camp must have been a source of relief not merely to Ismāʿīl but to Ayyūb also. It may even have been one factor underlying an extraordinary reversal of alliances which was briefly in prospect in the early autumn.

The principal factor, however, was almost certainly the developments in the north, where the Mongols had at last made a decisive thrust westwards into the dominions of the Seljūk sultan of Rūm. In the first months of 1243, alarmed by the Mongol capture of Erzerum, the Seljūk sultan Kaykhusrau II had persuaded the warring rulers of Aleppo, Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn, together with the Khwarizmian bands operating in the Jazīra, to compose their differences and ally with him against the newcomers.¹⁶² But in June he and an auxiliary force from Aleppo suffered a crushing defeat by the Mongol general Baiju at Kōsedagh, and a number of important fortresses, including Sivas and Kayseri, were to fall over the next few months.¹⁶³ Ismā‘īl, who had caused the Friday prayers at Damascus to be recited in Kaykhusrau’s name since May 1241,¹⁶⁴ was hardly impervious to these events, which very probably occasioned his withdrawal from the Egyptian frontier. Whether the ensuing negotiations were initiated by him or by Ayyūb, we are not told; but on 11 September 1243¹⁶⁵ he replaced Kaykhusrau’s name in the *khuṭba* by that of Ayyūb, releasing also the sultan’s son al-Mughīth Maḥmūd from the Damascene prison where he had been held since Ismā‘īl’s seizure of the city four years previously and preparing to send him back to his father. For his part the sultan now at last recognized his rival’s authority in Damascus. Ayyūb’s suzerainty was similarly acknowledged by al-Manṣūr of Ḥims and by the ruler of Aleppo, so that the coalition against him was now dissolved. In its place emerged a new alliance aimed at the elimination of al-Nāṣir, whose lands were to be divided between Egypt and Damascus. Ismā‘īl at once set about realizing this arrangement by sending al-Manṣūr at the head of a Damascene army to besiege al-Nāṣir’s fortress of ‘Ajlūn in the Ḥawrān.¹⁶⁶ He proved to have acted with undue haste. For the settlement was suddenly wrecked by the discovery that Ayyūb had written secretly to the Khwarizmians urging them to invade Syria and assuring them that he intended his alliance with Ismā‘īl to last only until his son was safely on his way to Cairo. Ismā‘īl thereupon returned al-Mughīth to his cell, repudiated Ayyūb’s overlordship, and set about reviving the coalition, to which al-Nāṣir also acceded once the Damascene army had raised the siege of ‘Ajlūn.¹⁶⁷ During the following months the Syrian princes negotiated a new truce with Acre, whereby the concessions made in previous agreements were confirmed (with the exception of Nablus and the Jordan valley) and Jerusalem was for the first time surrendered to the Franks in its entirety.¹⁶⁸ When Ibn Wāṣil passed through Palestine around May 1244, he witnessed the allies’ preparations for yet another expedition to invade Egypt, with a division of Ismā‘īl’s army in position at Gaza, near the Franks, and al-Nāṣir encamped to the west of the Holy City.¹⁶⁹

At first sight it appears puzzling that the Syrian Ayyubids should have planned to invade Egypt when they must have known that a Khwarizmian invasion was imminent. But given the notorious unreliability of these freebooters, who had served many masters over the past ten years, there was no reason to suppose that they would necessarily leave their present field of operations in the Jazīra and re-enter Ayyūb's service. He had abandoned them there in January 1239 upon coming south to take over Damascus,¹⁷⁰ and for a time they had admittedly continued to regard him as their paymaster: when in the autumn of that year he took Ayyūb into custody, al-Nāṣir felt obliged to write to the Khwarizmians explaining that he had acted only for Ayyūb's own good and distracting them with the recommendation that they attack Aleppo and Ḥimṣ.¹⁷¹ During the next three years they were available to the highest bidder, latterly the prince of Mayyāfariqīn, with whom they suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of al-Manṣūr of Ḥimṣ and the army of Aleppo in August 1242. Then followed the general reconciliation in the north at the instance of the sultan of Rūm.¹⁷² Kaykhusrau's defeat in June 1243 by the Mongols, who had driven the Khwarizmians from their homeland and with whom they doubtless had no desire ever to cross swords again, decisively altered their situation; and the sources implicitly link their return to Ayyūb's service with this latest Mongol thrust westwards. About this very time Ayyūb's ally al-Muẓaffar of Ḥamāh despatched an embassy to the Caliph and to a number of Jazīran princes, among them the Khwarizmian leader Berke Khān. Ibn Wāṣil, who was a member of this mission, tells us that the Khwarizmians were once more professing an allegiance to Ayyūb and that the party discussed with Berke how his forces might render the sultan assistance.¹⁷³ It was perhaps not long after this exchange that Ayyūb himself wrote to the Khwarizmians with a specific proposal: they were to rendezvous with his own troops in the Jordan valley in preparation for an assault on Damascus, bringing with them also a Kurdish group, the Qaymariyya, who were moving south from Aleppo to Ḥamāh and had likewise entered his service.¹⁷⁴ It seems, nevertheless, that they eventually set out in May or June 1244 primarily because the Mongols had just launched a campaign against Aleppo and were hard on their heels.¹⁷⁵

Most probably, therefore, the suddenness of the Khwarizmian descent on Syria took Ayyūb's enemies by surprise. Sweeping down through the territories of Aleppo and Ḥimṣ, they divided their forces, one half, which included the Qaymariyya, taking the Biqā' route and ravaging the county of Tripoli, while the other half under Berke Khān himself made for Damascus and its fertile plain, the Ghūṭa. Ismā'īl sent a force to intercept the first group, but it was surrounded and practically annihilated at 'Ayn al-Jarr, south of Ba'labakk.

Accompanied by Ayyūb's former general, the renegade al-Hayjāwī, he moved out of Damascus to meet the second Khwarizmian army; but on discovering the size of the enemy they retreated hurriedly into the city.¹⁷⁶ In Palestine the news of the Khwarizmian advance caused panic. Ismā'īl's troops at Gaza withdrew towards Damascus, while al-Nāṣir fled from the neighbourhood of Jerusalem to the safety of Kerak, leaving the Franks to resist the invaders unaided.¹⁷⁷ With the final emergence of a coalition against Ayyūb which included the Franks and the whole of Muslim Syria except Ḥamāh, together with the longdelayed advent of the Khwarizmians, the forces had taken shape that were to join battle at La Forbie on 17 October; and we must now consider the nature of the choice confronting the Franks up to this point.

V

It would be a mistake to assume that the Franks could afford to trust the Syrian princes who had persistently sought their alliance. In the first place, Ismāʿīl and al-Manṣūr, for all their hostility to the sultan, were at no time impervious to developments further north, in Anatolia and the Jazīra, which might well distract them from commitments on the Egyptian frontier: a case in point is probably the abandonment of the 1243 campaign, as we saw above.¹⁷⁸ Ismāʿīl himself, moreover, was far from being a dependable ally. His readiness to jettison his confederates emerges clearly from the short-lived recognition of Ayyūb's suzerainty and the alliance against al-Nāṣir in the late summer of that year. Certainly, in assisting Ismāʿīl in his campaigns the Templars were taking a grave risk that was by no means offset by his promises of a share of Egypt once it was conquered,¹⁷⁹ for there was no guarantee that he would not subsequently turn against the Latin Kingdom—and with more formidable resources at his disposal than Ayyūb had possessed. In contrast to al-Manṣūr, moreover, who could be described to Joinville a few years later as 'one of the best knights that ever was among the infidels',¹⁸⁰ Ismāʿīl personally seems to have held little appeal for the Franks.¹⁸¹ That they had reservations about the Damascene connexion right down to La Forbie is evident from Muslim accounts. When their allies broke under the Egyptian-Khwarizmian attack, says Ibn Wāṣil, the Franks rounded in exasperation and cut down the Syrian troops as they fled.¹⁸² Following on three abortive attempts to invade Egypt, it must have seemed the last in a whole series of betrayals.¹⁸³ But some of the Franks' suspicions were almost certainly baseless. In their letters to the West after the Khwarizmian sack of Jerusalem, they were to complain of the tardiness of their Muslim allies in answering their urgent requests for help.¹⁸⁴ Yet this was to ignore the fact that the Syrian Ayyubids, as we have seen, were the first to bear the brunt of the Khwarizmian onslaught. Nor were the Khwarizmians the only menace to be considered at this juncture, for a Mongol division under the general Yasa'ur had advanced to the outskirts of Aleppo in the early summer and had sent to Damascus and Ḥims demanding submission. Along with the ruler of Aleppo, Ismāʿīl and al-Manṣūr appear to have bribed the Mongols to withdraw; and by August 1244 Yasa'ur's troops were encamped well to the north-east, in the plain of Mūsh.¹⁸⁵ But like

Bohemond V of Antioch, who had similarly received an ultimatum from the Mongols, the Muslim princes doubtless hesitated to come to the aid of the Latin Kingdom out of fear that they would return.¹⁸⁶ Had al-Manṣūr and the Damascene army reached Acre a few weeks earlier than the end of September to reinforce the Franks,¹⁸⁷ the allies might possibly have forestalled a junction between the Khwarizmians and Ayyūb's own forces. But we need not suspect them of deliberately holding back in order that the Franks might somehow be weakened: the Mongols were a force nobody could afford to treat lightly.

But whatever the flaws of the Damascene alliance, the Franks had still less to hope for from Ayyūb. Much of the criticism of Frankish foreign policy by modern writers rests ultimately on the Emperor Frederick's denunciations in the wake of La Forbie. His principal charge—that by joining an overwhelming coalition against Ayyūb the Syrian Franks had driven him to summon the Khwarizmians to his assistance¹⁸⁸—has already been refuted in part by Marie-Luise Bulst, who pointed to the long-standing ties between the sultan and his auxiliaries.¹⁸⁹ Still stronger evidence of the groundlessness of Frederick's allegations is provided by the diplomatic manoeuvres we have noticed here. The sultan had no intention of tolerating the status quo in Syria and never lost his determination to recover Damascus. We have seen how he repeatedly planned invasions of Syria in 1241 and 1242; how he treacherously endeavoured to remove the Franks' friend al-Jawwād; and how eventually he attempted to throw Ismā'īl and al-Manṣūr off their guard with a spurious peace settlement at the very time he was negotiating for Khwarizmiian assistance. He was later to disclaim responsibility for the Khwarizmians' outrages in Jerusalem;¹⁹⁰ but there is no doubt whatever that he had invited them in to attack his enemies. His sole preoccupation at the time had been to deny the newcomers entry into Egypt.¹⁹¹

To what extent the two rival factions among the Franks were in any case influenced by the respective characters of the Muslim princes they favoured, it is difficult to say. In all likelihood, their foreign policies were further affected by the way in which they perceived their own local territorial interests. We cannot view the Templars, for example, as anti-Egyptian at any price. If their negotiations with Ayyūb in the late summer of 1241 were forced on them by the collapse of Ismā'īl's invasion plans, they were still prepared to treat with Cairo from a position of relative strength, through al-Jawwād, in the following spring, when a short-lived truce did result, and yet again in the winter of 1242–43. It seems they were averse not to an agreement with the sultan *per se* but to the inadequate terms he offered. The evidence strongly suggests that the stumbling-block was the city of Gaza, which had been a Templar possession until 1187. It was

excluded, as we noticed, from the territories listed in Richard of Cornwall's truce with Ayyūb and, together with Hebron and Nablus, was among the localities whose surrender Ayyūb refused to countenance in 1242–43, thereby putting an end to negotiations with the Temple and driving the order to align itself definitively with his enemies. Significantly, Gaza—alone of these three territories—was in fact surrendered according to the acceptable terms which the Templars went on to obtain from Ismāʿīl and al-Nāṣir.¹⁹² As for the Hospital- lers, their objections to the Damascene alliance are unclear and cannot be explained simply on the grounds of the order's recent *rapprochement* with Frederick II.¹⁹³ The Hospitallers may have been closely involved in Theobald's negotiations in 1239 with Ayyūb's faithful ally al-Muẓaffar of Ḥamāh, who had been tributary to the Hospital for some years,¹⁹⁴ and perhaps did not see their interests as served by the subsequent alliance with al-Muẓaffar's enemies at Aleppo and Ḥimṣ; their Master was certainly at war with Aleppo in 1242.¹⁹⁵ On a wider scale, the aims and interests of the Temple and the Hospital may have diverged sharply as regards northern Syria, where the Templars had suffered a serious reverse at Trapesac (Darbsāḳ) in 1237 and were possibly discouraged from future *chevauchées*, finding the south more attractive with the disintegration of al-Kāmil's empire after 1238.¹⁹⁶ More than this we cannot deduce from the available sources. No satisfactory explanation, again, has been offered for the Hospitallers' readiness to fight alongside the Templars and their Syrian allies at La Forbie. They may simply have rallied to the defence of the kingdom against the Khwarizmians, who were a menace when viewed from any standpoint; or they may have been as shocked by Ayyūb's duplicity in 1243 as were his fellow-Muslims; or, finally, it is conceivable that they had been given some inducement to bring them into the

Damascene camp, since Ibn Wāṣil expressly mentions their fortress of Kawkab (Belvoir) among the places guaranteed to the Franks by Ismāʿīl and al-Nāṣir in the final truce.¹⁹⁷

The unprecedentedly fluid situation in the years following al-Kāmil's death may have appeared to furnish the Franks with undreamed-of opportunities for expansion by diplomatic bargaining and military collaboration. But, apart from the maverick element in the person of al-Jawwād, it yielded no sure ally. Nor did it necessarily produce all—or even any—of the territory specified in truces. This is most strikingly obvious when we focus on the role of al-Nāṣir, who currently held much of the land, including Nablus, Gaza and the Holy City itself, on which the Franks had designs. The consequences of this highly inconvenient circumstance can be seen to have nullified more than one truce prior to 1243–44. In order to accommodate al-Nāṣir in the alliance of 1240, the pro-Damascene party had to envisage the

surrender of Nablus and the sharing of Jerusalem. Again, as a means of securing territory in southern Palestine at al-Nāṣir's expense, the alliance of Richard of Cornwall and the Hospitallers with Egypt in 1241 might subsequently have borne fruit; but its value was somewhat diminished when Ayyūb was defeated by al-Nāṣir and made peace with him within a few months. And soon after this al-Nāṣir's hostility in turn contributed to the ruin of the attempted invasion of Egypt by the rival party and its Damascene allies. When Armand of Pierregort later claimed that his order had been continually at war with al-Nāṣir,¹⁹⁸ he exaggerated. The statement nevertheless implies a recognition that the prince of Kerak was a major obstacle to any territorial settlement in Palestine. On balance he seems to have preferred to ally with Ayyūb, who on his deathbed in 1250 was to exonerate al-Nāṣir for having been led astray by Ismāʿīl and al-Jawwād.¹⁹⁹ Al-Nāṣir in fact committed himself irrevocably to the sultan's enemies—as also to an agreement granting the Franks full and exclusive possession of Jerusalem—only when the exposure of Ayyūb's treachery and the prospect of the Khwarizmian invasion left him no choice.²⁰⁰ Until that point he, more than anyone else, had been responsible for the constantly shifting diplomatic balance. All the Franks could hope to do was to meet this fluid situation with some measure of flexibility. What evidence we have suggests that the Templars displayed more of that flexibility than their opponents in their readiness to seek the best deal they could. It was their tragedy that there was no deal to be had.

Footnotes

¹ Two studies devoted specifically to these crusades are Reinhold Röhricht, '[Die] Kreuzzüge [des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis nach dem heiligen Lande]', *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte*, XXVI, 1886, 67–102; and Sidney Painter, 'The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, 1239–1241', in *The later crusades 1189–1311*, ed. R.L.Wolff and H.W.Hazard (*A history of the crusades*, II), 2nd edition (Madison, Wisconsin, 1969), 463–85. For the years 1241–44, see Marie-Luise Bulst(-Thiele), '[Zur Geschichte der] Ritterorden [und des Königreichs Jerusalem im 13. Jahrhundert his zur Schlacht bei La Forbie am 17. Okt. 1244]', *Deutsches Archiv*, XXII, 1966, 197–226.

² '[L'Estoire de] Eracles [Empereur et la Conquete de la Terre d'Outremer]', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades.] Historiens Occidentaux* (Paris, 1844–95), II, 413–22, 427–31. '[Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de] Rothelin', *ibid.*, 526–56, 561–6. The version of the *Eracles* is reproduced, with some additional details, in '[Les] Gestes [des Chiprois]', *RHC Documents Arméniens* (Paris, 1869–1906), II, 725–8.

³ Bernard Lewis, 'Ifranj', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (Leiden and London, 1954–), III, 1045.

⁴ Ibn Shaddād's *al-A'laq al-khaṣṣa fi dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa'l-Jazīra* is available in a number of partial editions, notably those of Sāmī Dahhān, *L[iban,] J[ordanie,] P[alestine: Topographie historique d'Ibn Šaddād]* (Damascus, 1963), and of Yahyā 'Abbāra (Damascus, 1978). The latter text, which covers the Jazīra, is still incomplete, and so it will be necessary on occasions to refer to the Bodleian Library MS Marsh 333.

⁵ Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān fī ta'rīkh al-a'yān*, facsimile ed. J.R.Jewett (Chicago, 1907), 481–3; repr. (with different pagination) by Dairatu'l-Ma'aref-il-Osmania Press (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1951–52), *Mir'āt al-zamān*, VIII/2, 727–9 (references will be given in both editions). The erroneous year 636 found in the text is corrected by later authors, beginning with the redaction of the Sibṭ's work by his pupil al-Yūnīnī (d. 1326): Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, İstanbul, MS III Ahmet 2907 C, XIII, fo. 375r.

⁶ Ibn Wāṣil, *Muḥarrij al-kur'ūb fī akhbār bani Ayyūb*, ed. G.Shayyāl *et al.* (Cairo, 1953–), v, 333–4.

⁷ All three of these Egyptian writers include scattered details which are

derived neither from the **Sibī** nor from Ibn **Wāṣil** but in all probability from some thirteenth-century chronicler similarly based in Egypt. The style and chronological precision of these extracts suggests that the original source may have been Ibn Muyassar (d. 1278), of whose work an earlier portion has survived in a MS copied by al-Maqrīzī himself and who was used by al-Nuwayrī at least for the twelfth century: see Claude Cahen, 'Ibn Muyassar', *EI*, new ed., 111, 894. Other later sources include al-Khazraǵī (late thirteenth century), whose work is largely derived from the **Sibī** but contains some additional material; **Qirṭāy** al-'Izzī al-Khazraǵī (fl. c. 1330); Ibn al-Dawādārī (fl. c. 1334); al-Dhahabī (d. 1348); and Ibn al-Furā (d. 1405), whose *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk* is partially available as *Ayyubids, / Mamlukes and / Crusaders*, ed. and tr. U. and M.C. Lyons with historical introduction and notes by J.S.C. Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 1971). The oft-quoted Abū 'l-Fidā (d. 1332) for this period merely abridges Ibn **Wāṣil**. We are fortunate, finally, in possessing a selection from the correspondence of al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd, [*al-Fawā'id al-jaliyya fi'l-fara'id al-Nāṣiriyya*], made by one of his sons, and a biography of the prince in al-Yūnīnī's continuation (*dhayl*) of the *Mir'āt*. On all these Islamic sources, see Cahen, [*La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche*] (Paris, 1940), ch. ii, *passim*. I am most grateful to the librarians of the Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden, and of the Gotha Forschungsbibliothek for supplying me with microfilms of the works of al-Nuwayrī and **Qirṭāy** respectively, and to Professor Malcolm Lyons for lending me his microfilm of the Vatican MS of Ibn al-Furā.

⁸ B[ibliothèque] N[ationale], Paris, MS arabe 302, fos. 155v-223r. See *Catalogue des manuscrits arabes, Ire partie: manuscrits chrétiens*, ed. G. Troupeau (Paris, 1972-74), I, 265-6. The author was formerly believed to be Severus (Sāwīrūs) b. al-Muqaffā', who is now known to have lived in the tenth century and to have composed only the earlier biographies: G. Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur* (Vatican City, 1944-53), II, 301-6.

⁹ *H[istory of the] P[at]riarchs of the] E[gyptian] C[hurch]*, iv/2, ed. and tr. A. Khater and O.H.E. Khs-Burmester (Cairo, 1974). E. Renaudot, *Historia Patriarcharum Alexandrinorum* (Paris, 1713), had simply abridged this work, and the only author to publish extracts prior to this was Michele Amari, *B[iblioteca] A[rabo-]S[icula]* (Leipzig, 1857), 322-6; *op. cit.* *Versione Italiana* (Turin and Rome, 1880-89), I, 518-23.

¹⁰ Edgar Blochet, 'Histoire d'Égypte d'al-Makrizī', *R[evue de l'O]rient L[atin]*, x (1903-4), 248-351, *passim*.

¹¹ R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: the Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (New York, 1977), 271-2: the *Siyar* does not appear to have been used at all. See also Sir Hamilton Gibb, 'The Ayyūbids', in Wolff and Hazard, II, 707-8, who suggests that Ayyūb's military activities were confined to the Yemen.

¹² *HPEC*, IV/2, text 114-15, 145, tr. 235-6, 294, for the embassies; text

¹³ T.C. Van Cleve, 'The crusade of Frederick II', in Wolff and Hazard, n, 461.

¹⁴ Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, tr. G. Nahon (2nd ed., Paris, 1975), II, 270; cf. also pp. 225, 265, where the absence of anyone gifted with the emperor's political acumen is noticed. Jean Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, tr. J. Shirley (Amsterdam, 1979), 323.

¹⁵ Painter, 484–5.

¹⁶ Prawer, II, 287.

¹⁷ Richard, 334. See also Prawer, II, 306.

¹⁸ Painter, 484–5.

¹⁹ *H[istoria] D[iplomatica] F[riderici] S[ecundi]*, ed. J.L.A. Huillard-Bréholles (Paris, 1852–61), III, 87, 108, 137; see also p. 106 for the despatch of envoys to **al-Nāṣir** in 1229, and n. 64 *infra*.

²⁰ This important point is well made—for the first time, so far as I am aware—by K.R. Giles, 'The Treaty of Jaffa, 18 February 1229: a reassessment', Keele University B.A. dissertation (1982), 55.

²¹ On these contacts, see Blochet, 'Les relations diplomatiques des Hohenstaufen avec les sultans d'Égypte', *Revue Historique*, LXXX, 1902, 51–64. Frederick was expecting an embassy from Cairo in October 1239: *HDFS*, v/1, 433. For commercial relations, see W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, tr. Furcy Raynaud (Leipzig, 1885–6), I, 406–9; Subhi Y. Labib, *Handels-geschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517)* (Wiesbaden, 1965), 31, 33. Of the primary sources reporting subsequent commercial agreements explicitly based on that of 1229, see especially Ibn 'Abd **al-Zāhir** (d. 1292), *Tashrīf al-ayyām wa'l-'uṣūr* fī sīrat al-malik **al-Manṣūr**, ed. Murād Kāmil (Cairo, 1961), 156; tr. Amari, *BAS Vers. Ital.*, III, 548–51.

²² For this episode, see René Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1934–6), III, 379–83; Prawer, II, 272–4; also Painter, 474–7, who seems, however, to underestimate the losses suffered at Gaza. The counts of Bar and Montfort were accompanied by 400 knights: 'Annales monasterii de Theokesberia', *A[nnales] M[onastici]*, ed. H.R. Luard (London, 1864–69. Rolls Series), I, 114; cf. also 'Eracles', 414 ('Gestes', 725); 'Rothelin', 539, gives 670. Al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, Leiden MS Or. 21, 325, and al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-ma'rifaṭ duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziāda, I/2 (Cairo, 1936), 292, tr. R.J.C. Broadhurst, *A history of the Ayyūbid sultans of Egypt* (Boston, Mass., 1980), 251, give the captives as 80 knights and 250 foot and the slain as 1,800; *HPEC*, IV/2, text 96, tr. 197, 15 knights and 500 foot captured and twice as many (*ʿardāfahum*) slain. The total number of Western knights on

Theobald's expedition seems to have been about 1,000–1,500: see Reinhold Röhricht, *G[eschichte des] K[önigreichs] J[erusalem 1099–1291]* (Innsbruck, 1898), p. 839 and n. 2, for references.

²³ Philip Mouskès, *Chronique rimée*, ed. Baron F.A. F.T.de Reiffenberg (Brussels, 1836–8), II, 661 (verses 30,401–4). For the in-fighting among the French magnates during the minority of St. Louis, see Elie Berger, *Histoire de Blanche de Castille reine de France* (Paris, 1895), ch. iv, In 1236 Theobald himself had revolted against the Crown and come to an understanding with certain of his former enemies, such as Peter Mauclerc of Brittany; but they had then left him in the lurch: *ibid.*, 245–53.

²⁴ Grousset, m, 377–8; hence Richard, 323. Painter, 473. J.S.C.Riley-Smith, *[The] Knights of St. John [in Jerusalem and Cyprus c. 1050–1310]* (London, 1967), 176. Prawer, 11, 270–1, and his 'Military orders and crusader politics in the second half of the XIIIth century', in *Die Geistlichen Ritterorden Europas*, ed. J.Fleckenstein and M.Hellmann (Sigmaringen, 1980), 221. M.L.Bulst-Thiele, *[Sacrae Domus Militiae Templi Hierosolymitani] Magistri[. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Templerordens 1118/19–1314]* (Göttingen, 1974), 199.

²⁵ Pamter, 463. Only Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, tr. J.Gillingham (Oxford, 1972), 248, hints otherwise. For a military reverse which has been traditionally placed during Theobald's crusade but which really belongs to 1241, *vide infra*, p. 49.

²⁶ For his arrival in Cairo, see *HPEC*, IV/2, text 91, tr. 188:19 Bashans 955 Era of Martyrs/8 Shawwā 636 A.H./14 May 1239. Al-Nuwayrī, 324, gives the date of his departure for Kerak as 5 Šafar 637/6 September 1239, whereas al-Maqrīzī, 1/2, 284 (tr. Broadhurst, 245), has *mid-Šafar*.

²⁷ For a detailed survey of these events, see Humphreys, 239–56; more briefly in Prawer, II, 263–4. For the relationships of the various Ayyubid princes, see the genealogical table at p. 34.

²⁸ Ibn Wāṣil, v, 215–16, 230.

²⁹ Painter, 473–4.

³⁰ Oliver of Paderborn, *Historia Damiatina*, ed. H.Hoogeweg, *Die Schriften des Kölner Domscholasters.... Oliverus* (Tübingen, 1894), 163–4.

³¹ 'Annales Mellicenses. Continuatio Lambacensis', *M[onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica.] Scriptores*, ed. G.H.Pertz et al. (Hanover etc., 1826–1934), ix, 559, wrongly stating that the Tower of David was taken: cf. 'Annales Sancti Rudberti Salisburgensis', *ibid.*, 787 ('preter turrim Davit, quam milites imperatoris defendunt'), and 'Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia', *AM* III, 150. 'Rothelin', 529–30, clearly confuses this episode with al-Nāṣir's attack, while placing it immediately prior to the Gaza campaign. Painter, 472–3 and n. 13, recognized that there were two distinct assaults on the Holy City; Prawer, II, p. 278, n. 35, reached a similar

conclusion, though by dint of misreading ‘pseudo-Yāfī’ (actually the fifteenth-century chronicler al-‘Aynī).

32 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 215. Ibn al-‘Amīd, *Kitāb al-majmū‘ al-mubārak*, ed. Cl.Cahen, ‘La “Chronique des Ayyoubides” d’al-Makīn b. al-‘Amīd’, *Bulletin d’Études O[rientales de l’Institut Français de Damas]*, xv, 1955–7, 147. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 283 (tr. Brpadhurst, 244). The dates coincide almost exactly, since the news of Ayyūb’s arrival at Jinīn (Gérin) reached Cairo on 20 Shawwāl 636/ 26 May 1239: al-Nuwayrī, 323.

33 ‘Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia’, 150.

34 ‘Rothelin’, 531–2. ‘Eracles’, 414 (hence ‘Gestes’, 725), mentions only Ascalon; but cf. the anonymous letter summarized in Matthew Paris, *Chronica M[ajora]*, ed. H.R.Luard (London, 1872–83. Rolls Series), IV, 25 (‘Damascus non capitur, ut dictum est prius...’).

35 Prawer, II, 271–2.

36 Bulst(-Thiele), ‘Ritterorden’, 204–11; and *pace* Mary N.Hardwicke, ‘The Crusader States, 1192–1243’, in Wolff and Hazard, II, 552. Prawer, ‘Military orders and crusader politics’, 221, demurs, however.

37 For these events, see Humphreys, 257–61. The date of Ayyūb’s capture is given by Ibn Khallikān, as quoted in Röhrich, *GKJ*, 846 and n. 4, and in W.B.Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907, repr. Beirut, 1969), p. 316, n. 5.

38 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 220. Al-Nuwayrī, 331. Ibn al-‘Adīm (d. 1262), *Zubdat al-halab min ta’rīkh Ḥalab*, ed. Sāmī Dahhān (Damascus, 1951–68), 111, 246; tr. E.Bloch, ‘L’histoire d’Alep, de Kamāl-ad-dīn’, *ROL*, v, 1897, 107. Humphreys, 255, 257–8. Prawer, II, 264 (though at p. 271 he assumes that al-‘Ādil and Ismā‘īl were rivals).

39 Wāṣil, v, 238.

40 *HPEC*, IV/2, text 95, tr. 195. Ibn Wāṣil, v, 267. For the date of his departure for Gaza, around the time of al-‘Ādil’s return to Cairo on 17 Rabī‘ I 637/17 October 1239, see al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 289 (tr. Broadhurst, 250).

41 *Pace* Richard, 323, who states that the Syrian barons ‘wanted to go and attack Egypt on her own ground’.

42 ‘Rothelin’, 541; and see also 540, where quite clearly a mere raid is in question (‘il iroient jusques a Gadrez et lendemain revendroient en l’ost a Escalonne’).

43 Rumours which reached both the West and Egypt accused the local Franks of abandoning their Western *confrères*: ‘Rothelin’, 549; *HPEC*, IV/2, text 96, tr. 197 (cf. also Prawer, II, p. 275, n. 29). But we know that

the duke of Burgundy was among the deserters:’ *Rothelin*’, 543–4; CM, IV, 25. For a list of local barons who avoided battle, see ‘*Gestes*’, 726.

44 For the dates, see Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 225; hence Ibn al-Furān, *AMC*, 1(text), 76, II, (tr.), 62 (and n. 3 at p. 203). Richard, 323, incorrectly places al-Nāṣir’s campaign in September 1239.

45 Al-Nuwayrī, 325. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 291 (tr. Broadhurst, 251). Ibn Wāṣil, v, 259, indicates that al-Nāṣir had the Friday prayers read in al-‘Ādil’s name right down until April 1240. Prawer, II, 278, is therefore surely wrong to suggest that his seizure of the Holy City was an act of defiance towards the sultan.

46 ‘*Rothelin*’, 550. The reconstruction of the ruined Templar fortress at Safed was contemplated, but not actually begun, at this time: *De constructione castrī Saphet. Construction et fonctions d’un château fort franc en Terre Sainte*, ed. R.C.B.Huygens (Amsterdam, 1981), 34–5.

47 ‘*Eracles*’, 415–16 (hence ‘*Gestes*’, 726–7).

48 Armand of Pierregort to Walter of Avesnes, in Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, ‘*Chronica*’, *MGH Scriptores*, XXIII, 945: the tense shows that the crusade had not yet arrived (‘in iocundo cruce signatorum adventu... subiciet’). Röhrich, ‘*Kreuzzüge*’, 99, dated this letter in the winter of 1238–39, which is probably too early; Bulst-Thiele, *Magistri*, 210, in the spring of 1240, which is certainly too late. For the form of the Master’s *cognomen*, see *ibid.*, 189.

49 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 222–8, 239; hence al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 285–7 (tr. Broadhurst, 247–8). This episode is briefly and inaccurately summarized by Humphreys, 256–7, and more exactly by Emmanuel Sivan, *L’Islam et la croisade* (Paris, 1968), 153.

50 ‘*Rothelin*’, 531. ‘*Eracles*’, 416 (‘*Gestes*’, 727). The contradiction was noticed by Röhrich, *GKJ*, p. 845, n. 2.

51 B.N.MS lat. 5479, p. 136. The printed version of this text unaccountably reads ‘*Moiason*.’ for ‘*Matiscon*.’: ‘*Obituaire de l’abbaye de Saint-Yved de Braine*’, ed. Emile Brouette, *Analecta Premonstratensia*, xxxiv, 1958, 319. The correct reading had been given long ago by André Du Chesne, *Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Dreux* (Paris, 1631), preuves, 258.

52 Alberic, 946. For these *obits*, see *Obituaires de la province de Sens*, ed. A.Molinier *et al.* (Paris, 1902–23), I/1, 511 (2 Oct.), and III, 107 (5 Oct.), for Robert; IV, 424 (1 Oct.), for Anselm.

53 ‘*Eracles*’, 416; hence ‘*Gestes*’, 727. For the siege of Ḥamāh by Aleppan troops in 635–6 A.H./ 1238–9, see Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Zubda*, III, 238, 244 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, v, 100–101, 104–5); Ibn Wāṣil, v, 182, 198.

54 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 257 (*zāhīran*): soon after the death of al-Muʿīn al-Ḥimṣī, which occurred on 20 Rajab 637 A.H./15 February 1240 (Sibt, 484/732).

55 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 252. Humphreys, 262.

56 Humphreys, 262–3. The date of Ayyūb's release is supplied, again, by Ibn Khallikān: Röhrich, *GKJ*, 847 and n. 2; Stevenson, p. 316, n. 5.

57 Sibt, 482/728; for al-Mujāhid's death, *vide supra*, n. 54. Ibn Wāṣil, v, 259–60.

58 The suggestion in 'Eracles', 416, 419 ('Gestes', 727), and in 'Rothelin', 552.

59 *HPEC*, IV/2, text 104 (tr. 214), speaking of Ayyūb's movements following his release by al-Nāṣir but prior to al-ʿAdil's deposition: *wa-min wara'ihī l-l-Ifranj wa-ma'ahum ṣāhib Dimashq* ('and to his rear were the Franks and with them the ruler of Damascus'; my translation).

60 Armand of Pierregort to Robert de Sandford, preceptor of the Temple in England, in *CM*, IV, 64 ('cum jacuisset [*sc.* Christianus exercitus] diu in sabulo'). Theobald appears to have been in Acre in April and May 1240: H.d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne* (Paris, 1859–69), IV, 315–16, note b, 321, note b. Al-Khazrajī names Ismāʿīl's envoy to the Franks as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī: *Ta'rīkh dawlat al-Akrād wa'l-Atrak*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, MS Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 695, fo. 150v.

61 Early in 638 A.H. (began 23 July 1240): Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 134, 155, 159; Sibt, 485/732, also implies the outset of the year. *CM*, IV, 65, says that the messenger bearing the news of the treaty passed Richard of Cornwall on his way out to Syria, thus suggesting a date in July–August for the agreement.

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62 The only source to list all these operations is *HPEC*, IV/2, text 105, tr. 217. For Ascalon, see also 'Rothelin', 553, and cf. Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 262. For Jerusalem, see 'Rothelin', 554. For Nablus, see al-Nuwayrī, 332, who additionally supplies the date of al-Nāṣir's return from Cairo, Dhū'l-Hijja 637 A.H.; al-Maqrīzī, 1/2, 299 (tr. Broadhurst, 258); cf. also Ibn Shaddād, as quoted n. 72 *infra*.

63 Painter, 479. Prawer, II, 279 and n. 38. Humphreys, n. 49 at p. 457. See also Stevenson, p. 318, n. 1.

64 For Toron in the 1229 treaty, see Richard, 234, and Prawer, II, 199; for other fortresses in the north, see *Chronique d'Ernoult et de Bernard Le Trésorier*, ed. Comte L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 464, and 'Eracles',

375, variant readings. Ibn Shaddād's account of Toron makes no mention of 1229 but says expressly that Isma'īl handed it over to 'Sīr Filī', i.e. Philip of Montfort, in 638 A.H./ 1240(-1): *LJP*, 153 (omitted by Ibn al-Furāt, *AMC*, I, 123; H, 97).

⁶⁵ The fullest list is to be gleaned from Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 100 (Sidon), 134 (Tiberias), 147 (Safed), 153 (Toron and Châteauneuf, 155 (Beaufort), 159 (Sha'if Tīr ūn/' Cavea de Tyron'); hence Ibn al-Furāt, *AMC*, I, 55–6, 81, 112, 123, 138; II, 46, 66, 88, 97, 109. For a slightly different list, see Ibn al-'Amīd, 153; Safed, Beaufort, Tiberias, the Jabal 'Āmīla (northern Galilee) and half of Sidon. He is followed by al-Nuwayrī, 334; by Ibn Duqmāq, *Nuzhat al-qarn fī ta'rīkh al-Islām*, B.N.MS arabe 1597, fo. 49r; and by al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 303 (Broadhurst, 262, wrongly applies the 'half' to Tiberias as well). Ibn Wāsil, v, 302 (*sub anno* 639 A.H.), and Abū Shāma (d. 1268), *al-Dhayl 'ala'l-Rawdatayn*, ed. M.Z. al-Kawtharī, *Tarājim rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis wa'l-sābi'* (Cairo, 1947), 170, name only Beaufort and Safed, as does the *Sībī*, 485/732, 493/745 (*sub anno* 642 A.H.: *vide infra*, n. 70). 'Rothelin', 552, mentions Beaufort alone.

⁶⁶ 'Eracles', 418; hence 'Gestes', 727. Armand of Pierregort, in *CM*, IV, 65; see also Paris's *H[istoria] A[n]glorum*, ed. Sir Frederick Madden (London, 1866–9. Rolls Series), II, 440–1; *Annals of Southwark*, Bodleian Library MS Rawlinson B 177, fo. 224r. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', ed. R.Röhrich and G.Raynaud, *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, II, 1884, documents, 440, version B ('et toute la terre de Jerusalem'), although both recensions also specify Safed and Beaufort. See finally 'Chronicon S.Medardi Suessionensis', *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum*, new ed., Et.Baluze *et al.* (Paris, 1723), II, 491 ('omnis terra quam Christiani tenebant tempore perditionis', except Kerak and Montreal; and see next note).

⁶⁷ Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 225,234 (Jerusalem), 246 (Nablus), 265 (Gaza, which had been restored to him by al-'Adil after the Egyptian victory in Nov. 1239). Nablus, Gaza and Jericho (in al-Nāṣir's Jordan valley territory) are all specified in 'Chronicon S.Medardi', loc. cit.

⁶⁸ 'Eracles', 418; 'Gestes', 727. *CM*, IV, 65; *HA*, II, 441; *Annals of Southwark*, fo. 224r.

⁶⁹ Al-Nuwayrī, 334; cf. al-Subkī (d. 1370), *Ṭabaqāt al-shāfi'iyyat al-kubrā*, ed. M. Aḥmad al-Qādirī al-Ḥasanī 1906), v, 100 (biography of al-Sulamī), here following either al-Nuwayrī or a common source. Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 49r. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 304 (tr. Broadhurst, 262–3).

⁷⁰ Humphreys, 266–7. Sivan, 150–1. Prawer, II, 280. For Beaufort, see 'Rothelin', 552–3. *Sībī*, 493/745, refers to this episode in the context of the later alliance of 642 A.H./1244, and is followed by Ibn al-Furāt, Vatican MS ar. 726, fo. 41v. But cf. Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 155–6; al-Khazrajī, fos. 150v–1r; Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 48v, with the date Rabī' I 638 A.H (began 20 September 1240) for the arrival of the news in Egypt.

⁷¹ ‘Eracles’, 419 (‘Gestes’, 727). For the data in the Islamic sources which have been taken to apply to this supposed campaign, *vide infra*, nn. 75, 123.

⁷² Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 246, says that Ismā‘īl seized Nablus during al-Nāṣir’s absence in Egypt; cf. n. 62 *supra*.

⁷³ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 88, tr. 182 (1239); text 96, tr. 198 (early 1240).

⁷⁴ On these campaigns, see Humphreys, 269–71.

⁷⁵ *vide infra*, p. 49. It was in this campaign that the Franks were let down by their Syrian allies. Secondary authorities placing it in 1240 include Röhrich, ‘Kreuzzüge’, 80, and *GKJ*, 848; Grousset, III, 389; and Prawer, II, 281.

⁷⁶ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 105, tr. 217.

⁷⁷ Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Zubda*, III, 253 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, VI, 1898, 6); hence Ibn Wāṣil, v, 286.

⁷⁸ *CM*, IV, 79. The ‘Rooh’ with whom he is alleged to have made the truce can only be Rukn al-Dīn al-Hayjāwī, the Egyptian general and victor of Gaza; but he was then in temporary eclipse, having been arrested by Ayyūb early in June 1240 and sent to Cairo: al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 299 (tr. Broadhurst, 259). In any case, Ismā‘īl’s truce was made ‘cum quodam potente sibi consanguineo’, which hardly fits al-Hayjāwī. Röhrich, *GKJ*, p. 840, n. 3, was therefore right to see al-Nāṣir here.

⁷⁹ ‘Eracles’, 419 (‘Gestes’, 727).

⁸⁰ ‘Rothelin’, 552.

⁸¹ Richard of Cornwall to Baldwin de Redvers, earl of Devon, *et al.*, in *CM*, IV, 140. There is a further echo of the truce in Alberic, 949, though he seems to confuse al-Nāṣir with Ismā‘īl: ‘Treuge...dicuntur esse ad soldanum de Damasco seu Nascere...secundum compositionem regis Navarre...’. It is noteworthy, however, that he has referred to al-Nāṣir as sultan of Damascus on a previous occasion (p. 948).

⁸² *F[lores] H[istoriarum]*, ed. H.R. Luard (London, 1890. Rolls Series), II, 242–3. Cf. Röhrich, ‘Kreuzzüge’, pp. 81, n. 7, 85, and *GKJ*, p. 849, n. 6; Bulst(-Thiele), ‘Ritterorden’, 203, and *Magistri*, p. 202, n. 66. Prawer, H, 279, is unclear on al-Nāṣir’s stance, owing to a confusion with the campaign of the summer of 1241 (*vide infra*, p. 48).

⁸³ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 107 (tr. 221): ‘alā’ibqā’i’l-bilādī’llatī a’āhuma’l-malik al-Nāṣir bin al-Mu’azzam iyyāhā bi-aydihim.

⁸⁴ Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 234. Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi‘ al-*

ghurar, ed. S. ‘A^{sh}ū^r, *Die Chronik des Ibn ad-Dawādī*, VII, *Der Bericht über die Ayyubiden* (Cairo, 1972), 344–5: the month Rabī’ II 638

A.H. (began 20 Oct. 1240) is surely too late, and *al-ā^{kh}ir* is probably an error for *al-awwal*, as frequently happens. Rabī’ I began 20 September. Ibn Wā^{si}l, v, 278, and al-Maqrī^zī, I/2, 302 (tr. Broadhurst, 261), report al-Nā^ṣir’s alliance with Ismā[‘]īl and al-Man^ṣūr but omit the Franks.

⁸⁵ Humphreys, 265.

⁸⁶ Ibn Shaddā^d, *LJP*, 156.

⁸⁷ ‘Rothelin’, 554–5. ‘Eracles’, 419 (‘Gestes’, 727). On this complex question, see Stevenson, p. 319, n.2.

⁸⁸ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 107 (tr. 221): *rusul al-Ifranj taraddadat il^ā mawlanā’l-Sulṭān*. This was prior to the despatch of Kamāl al-Dīn to the Franks, on which *vide infra*, p. 46. But it should be noted that the last event mentioned (tr. 220) is the establishment of the Palace of Justice, which is dated by al-Maqrī^zī, I/2, 306–7 (tr. Broadhurst, 265), in Rabī’ II/October–November 1240.

⁸⁹ *CM*, IV, 140 (‘ut aliquid fecisse viderentur’); cf. also *FH*, II, 243.

⁹⁰ Ibn Shaddā^d, *LJP*, 246.

⁹¹ Ibn al-Dawādī, VII, 345: *yakūnd’l-Quds baynahum munāṣafa*. Armand of Pierregot dated the exclusively Christian occupation of Jerusalem from 1243; *CM*, IV, 290. Ibn Shaddā^d, *LJP*, 234, is therefore apparently in error in dating the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants in 638 A.H./1240.

⁹² *HDFS*, III, 88–9, 108, 148. Richard, 234–5. Prawer, II, 199, 201.

⁹³ *CM*, IV, 140 (‘licet parum attineret’).

⁹⁴ *vide supra*, pp. 36, 42 and n. 64.

⁹⁵ ‘Rothelin’, 553, erroneously including the Hospitallers among those who urged an invasion.

⁹⁶ Ibn Wā^{si}l, v, 263–4.

⁹⁷ *CM*, IV, 78–9; *HA*, II, 443; *FH*, II, 242.

⁹⁸ *CM*, IV, 140–1.

⁹⁹ See Sivan, 140–1.

¹⁰⁰ *CM*, IV, 141 (‘quidam magnus potens valde ex parte Soldani Babiloniae’); cf. also *FH*, II, 452.

¹⁰¹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 107, tr. 221. On Kamāl al-Dīn and his family, see Hans L. Gottschalk, 'Awlad al-Shaykh', *EI* (new ed.), I, 765–6; more fully, 'Die Aulad Saif al-Sayyid (Banu Hamawiya) *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, LIII, 1956, 57–87.

¹⁰² The regent apparently joined the coalition in return for further Damascene aid against the Khwarizmians in Jumādā II 638 A.H. (began 18 Dec. 1240): Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubda*, III, 254 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, VI, 7); Ibn Wāṣil, v, 288; cf. also Gibb, 'The Ayyūbids', p. 708, n. 17. Ibn Wāṣil, v, 300, indicates that Aleppo had joined by the beginning of 639 A.H. For Ismāʿīl's earlier attempts, see Ibn al-ʿAdīm, m, 247–8 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, VI, 1–2); hence Ibn Wāṣil, v, 268–9.

¹⁰³ *CM*, IV, 47. 'Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia', 152, where we read that the earl lingered in French territory 'donec imperatori consuleret'.

¹⁰⁴ *HDFS*, VI/1, 239: 'R[icardo] comite Cornubie...in ultramarinis partibus vices agente nostras...'

¹⁰⁵ 'Eracles', 421 ('Gestes', 728): 'il ne vost faire ne l'un ne l'autre.' This may possibly be the significance of the statement by Gervase of Canterbury's continuator that the earl reconciled the Temple and the Hospital: *The historical works of Gervase of Canterbury*, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1879–80. Rolls Series), II, 179.

¹⁰⁶ *CM*, IV, 141; and for the date of his despatching envoys to Cairo, see p. 143. 'Rothelin', 556, is closer to the truth than the *Eracles* in recognizing Richard's early commitment to peace with Ayyūb, though the question is complicated by the assumption of both chronicles that such a peace had already been effected by Theobald (*supra*, pp. 44–5).

¹⁰⁷ *CM*, IV, 141–3.

¹⁰⁸ e.g., 'Bersamul'=Nebi Samwil, a few miles north of Jerusalem, on which see Guy Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), 433; 'Kocabi'=Deir el-kobebe, S.W. of Beth Gibelin, on which see Gustav Beyer, 'Die Kreuzfahrergebiete von Jerusalem und S. Abraham (Hebron)', *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*, LXV, 1942, 184.

¹⁰⁹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 107, tr. 221–2.

¹¹⁰ Richard, 326.

¹¹¹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 110, tr. 227. For this campaign, *vide infra*, p. 48. Stevenson, p. 320, n. 2, suggested that Ayyūb still disposed of the revenues of Gaza at this time; but cf. Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 265.

¹¹² 'Rothelin', 556; this is not mentioned, however, in Richard's letter. John of Columna alleges that one of the clauses in the treaty secured safe-conduct to Jerusalem for the crusaders: 'E Mari Historiarum', *Recueil des Historiens*

¹¹³ **Sibt**, 487/736: it was from here that he despatched al-Jawwād against the Egyptian army (*vide infra*, p. 50). The history of Jerusalem during the previous months is confused. Prawer, II, 278, believes that Jerusalem had been reoccupied by the Egyptians following its capture by al-Nāṣir in the winter of 1239–40; cf. also p. 282. But Ibn Wāṣil, v, 259, shows that it was still in al-Nāṣir's hands in April 1240; see also Humphreys, 263. Stevenson, 320, ignores al-Nāṣir, assuming that all the places listed were in Ismā'īl's possession.

¹¹⁴ Richard, 325. Sir Steven Runciman, *A history of the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1951–54), III, 218. Bulst-Thiele, *Magistri*, 202. Painter, p. 479, n. 20, assumed that the Damascene and Egyptian treaties conveyed identical territories.

¹¹⁵ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 107, tr. 222.

¹¹⁶ Armand of Pierregort to Robert de Sandford, in *CM*, IV, 289. For the date of this letter, *vide infra*, n. 168.

¹¹⁷ The fullest account is in *HPEC*, IV/2, text 110–11, tr. 227–30, where the battle is located at Ra's al-ʿaqaba, on the road from Jerusalem to Bayt Nūba. Only al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 305 (tr. Broadhurst, 264), supplies the precise date of the campaign, Dhu'l-Qa'da 638 A.H. (began 14 May 1241). **Sibt**, 487/736–7, is briefer, locating the battle at Bayt Furayk, east of Nablus; cf. also p. 489/739. Both he and Ibn Wāṣil, v, 300–1 (followed by Ibn al-Dawādārī, VII, 347, and Ibn al-Furāt, Vatican MS, fos. 2v–3v), incorrectly date it 639 A.H. (began 12 July). At a later juncture al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 309 (tr. Broadhurst, 267), gives a second account, derived from Ibn Wāṣil and so *sub anno* 639. On the basis of these confused data Stevenson, p. 321, n. 1, was misled into identifying the campaign with that of 1242 (*vide infra*, p. 51).

¹¹⁸ *LJP*, 148; hence Ibn al-Furāt, *AMC*, I, 112–13, II, 88–9. Since al-Nāṣir and Ismā'īl must have been allies at this time, the incident may safely be dated between December 1240, when the first stone was laid at Safed (Richard, 326), and the beginning of the summer, when al-Nāṣir made peace with Ayyūb: he did not ally with Ismā'īl again until the late spring of 1243 (*infra*, p. 53).

¹¹⁹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 112 (tr. 231 incorret): *fa-tawaffaqat al-ḥarakat illā an mawlānā l-Sultān ʿallāḥa ma'a l-malik al-Nāṣir*.

¹²⁰ Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 153, ll 9–11; though the latter section of the passage belongs not to 1241 but to the 1243 campaign (*vide infra*, n. 156). Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 303 (tr. Broadhurst, 262). For the fullest account of Ayyūb's dealings with his grandees, see Ibn Wāṣil, v, 274–6; cf. also Humphreys, 264, 268.

¹²¹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 111, tr. 230, omitting the force from Aleppo and mentioning the Nablus clash. Ibn al-‘Amīd, p. 153, ll. 11–15, followed by Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 46v, and al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 304 (tr. Broadhurst, 263). includes the Aleppo contingent and describes the engagement at Ḥisbān alone; cf. preceding note.

¹²² Al-Nuwayrī, 341. Al-Subkī, v, 101; briefer version in Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 1449), *Raf‘ al-‘ir ‘an quḍāh Miṣr*, ed. Ḥamīd ‘Abd al-Majīd *et al.*, revised by Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī (Cairo, 1957–61), II, 351.

¹²³ Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 49v. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 305 (tr. Broadhurst, 264). Stevenson, p. 320, n. 3, expressed doubts as to the reliability of this account, as does Bulst-Thiele, *Magistri*, p. 204, n. 71, but they assume that these events belong to 1240. Both Ibn Duqmāq and al-Maqrīzī, however, specify that the Frankish prisoners taken in the encounter were employed by Ayyūb on his new colleges’ between the two palaces’ (*madāris bayn al-qarayn*), on which work began only in 639 A.H.: Ibn al-Dawādārī, VII, 347; Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 53r; al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 308 (tr. Broadhurst, 266); cf. also *HPEC*, IV/2, text 119, tr. 246 (near the end of 639/late spring 1242).

¹²⁴ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 112, tr. 231. The later reference is at text 113 (tr. 234 slightly misleading): *lamma ā ā ū khidhlānahum wa-intiḡār ṣāhib Miṣr ‘alayhim* ‘when they beheld their abandonment and the victory of the ruler of Egypt over them’.

¹²⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 309 (tr. Broadhurst, 267–8), alone supplies the date, 12 Al-Kutubī, 639 A.H., along with the other details. *HPEC*, IV/2, text 113, tr. 233, says merely that al-Nāṣir defeated the Syrian forces; the news seems to have reached Egypt at the very beginning of 957 E.M./September 1241.

¹²⁶ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 113 (tr. 233–4 again confused): *wa-hum rusul al-Dī wiyya wa-illā ‘l-mugharrab* [?] *aṣḥāb ‘Asqalān wa-ghayrahum min akbar al-Faranj kānū*, [so MS arabe 302—printed text has *kānū* in error] *ṣulḥan mā‘a mawlānā ‘l-Sultān wa-hā ‘ulā ‘i’ lladhīna kānū mā‘a ṣāhib Dimashq* ‘they were the envoys of the Templars—not of the Westerners who controlled Ascalon and of the others among the Frankish grandees who were at peace with our master the Sultan—and it was these who were allied with the ruler of Damascus’.

¹²⁷ *CM*, IV, 167; *ibid.*, 144, for Richard’s departure. The crusading leaders who left at this time included the duke of Burgundy and the count of Nevers: for a list, see P.Jackson, ‘The end of Hohenstaufen rule in Syria’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, LIX, 1986, 32–33.

¹²⁸ ‘Eracles’, 422. The passage may nevertheless contain a blurred reference to Ismā‘īl’s expedition: ‘Et ous que li oz des Crestiens aloit, li sodans di Domas o tout sōn ost estoit toz jorz herbergez pres d’eaus.’ Cf. also ‘Gestes’, 728; and for the probable conflation of the events of 124–41 in the Frankish tradition, *supra*, p. 43.

¹²⁹ *vide supra*, p. 37. The chequered career of this prince is here tentatively reconstructed. Humphreys, 271–2 and n. 58 at p. 458, abandons the attempt to make sense of the conflicting details in the sources.

¹³⁰ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 106, 110, tr. 219–20, 227. Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 10–18. Ibn Wāsil, v, 281–2, 296–7. Sibī, 487/736. For al-Jawwād’s career in the Jazīra, see Ibn Shaddād, ed. ‘Abdāra, 203–6; summary in Cahen, ‘La “Djazīra” au milieu du treizième siècle, d’après ‘Izz ad-dīn Ibn Chaddād’, *Revue des Études Islamiques*, VII, 1934, 118–9.

¹³¹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 110–11, tr. 228–30. Sibī, 487/736–7. Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 18–21 (hence Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 45v), omitting all mention of the battle. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 303 (tr. Broadhurst, 261), furnishes the date of al-Jawwād’s arrest, 18 Dhu’l-Hijja 638 A.H./30 June 1241; more details, greatly confused, at p. 305 (tr. Broadhurst, 264).

¹³² Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 21–4 (Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 45v). *HPEC*, IV/2, text 111, tr. 230, includes him among the princes who accompanied Ismāʿīl on his Egyptian campaign; see text p. 115, tr. p. 238, for his joining the Franks around October (last datable events mentioned are a solar eclipse on 6 October 1241 and the arrival of Frederick’s envoys in Egypt for the winter)

¹³³ Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 24–5: *wa-kāna yaqūlu innaʾl-Farajī ikhwatun lahu li-anna ummahu khatānat Faranjīyyatun wa-lihā dhāmā līlayhi maylan kathīran*. Al-Dhahabī confirms that his mother was a Frank: *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi MS Ayasofya 3013, fo. 12r.

¹³⁴ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 115, tr. 238.

¹³⁵ Ibn Duqmāq, fos. 45v–46r. Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, l. 24, says only that the Franks and al-Jawwād encamped at Caesarea (Qaysariyya), and it seems that Ibn Duqmāq has preserved a fuller version copied from their common source. Neither mentions the raid on Gaza, for which see *HPEC*, IV/2, text 115, tr. 238.

¹³⁶ ‘Gestes’, 729–30.

¹³⁷ Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 25–8. Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 46r, gives a slightly different account and does not mention that a treaty was actually sworn. The proposal to restore Damascus to al-Jawwād may be inferred from *HPEC*, IV/2, text 117, tr. 242.

¹³⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 310 (tr. Broadhurst, 268), who alone gives the date, Ramaḍān 639 A.H. (began 5 March 1242). Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 152, ll. 28–9. *HPEC*, IV/2, text 117, tr. 241–2.

¹³⁹ Ibn Duqmāq, fos. 46r–v, provides the fullest account: the parallel passage in Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 152–3, omits Ayyūb’s secret instructions to al-Jawwād and consequently presents a *non sequitur*. *HPEC*, IV/2, text 118,

tr. 242–3, gives no reason for the fears of the two men. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 310 (tr. Broadhurst, 268), furnishes the date of al-Hayj **āwīs** flight, 15 Dhu'l-Qa'da 639 A.H./17 May 1242, but erroneously makes him leave from Cairo rather than Gaza.

¹⁴⁰ CM, IV, 197: 'Templarii...plus miraculose quam humana fortitudine inopinabili victoria gloriose triumpharunt.' This comment has been taken to refer to the sack of Nablus and its aftermath (*vide infra*, p. 52), e.g. by Röhrich, *GKJ*, p. 854 and n. 4; Grousset, m, p. 397, n. 1, and Runciman, m, p. 220, n. 1. But Paris introduces it in the context of the late spring or early summer of 1242. Stevenson, p. 321, n. 1, rightly connected it with events in May, but on the basis of confused data in al-Maqrīzī which really apply to the battle of May 1241 (*supra*, n. 117). The vague reference in Philip Mouskès, *Chronique rimée*, ed. Baron F.A. F.T. de Reiffenberg (Brussels, 1836–38), II, 683, can probably also be linked with these events.

¹⁴¹ HPEC, IV/2, text 118, tr. 243.

¹⁴² *ibid.*, text 131, tr. 268–9. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 310–11 (tr. Broadhurst, 269), is briefer but supplies the date, 4 Jum **ādā** I 640 A.H. There is another account in the commentary on al-Nāṣir's correspondence: *Faw **ā**'id*, Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi MS Ayasofya 4823, fos. 46v–47v; summarized in the obituary of al-Nāṣir in al-Y **ū** n n ī, *al-Dhayl* 'al **ā** Mir' **ā** t al-zam **ā** n, ed. Dairatu'l-Ma' aref-il-Osmania Press (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1954–61), I, 157. The raid on Qalansuwwa, a dependency of Nablus, mentioned by the **Sibt**, 492/743, may have been part of this campaign; if so, al-Jaww **ād** was present.

¹⁴³ HPEC, IV/2, text 131–2, tr. 269. It seems that a garbled account of this episode is preserved in 'Annales de Terre Sainte', A, 440, and B, 440–1, though both versions include al-Nāṣir on the Franks' side at a time when he is known to have been bitterly hostile to them: this misled Gibb, 'The Aiy **ū** bids', 709. But the correct wording has been retained in the Castilian version, ed. A.Sánchez Candeira, 'Las cruzadas en la historiografía española de la época. Traducción castellana de una redacción desconocida de los "Anales de Tierra Santa"', *Hispania*, xx, 1960, 358 (I am indebted to Dr. Peter Edbury for bringing this article to my attention): 'fueron los Templeros...e Malech Joet a Escalon, e Le Naser e la hueste de Babillonna asalieron la casa del Temple...'. Bulst(-Thiele), 'Ritterorden', 213, and *Magistri*, p. 204, n. 71, was rightly suspicious of the Old French recensions at this point, but her conclusion that the 'Annales' muddle the events of different years is groundless.

¹⁴⁴ *Faw **ā**'id*, fos. 47v–49r; summary in al-Y **ū** n n ī, I, 157–9. See Sivan, 140. For al-Sulamī's arrival in Egypt and appointment first as *khaṭīb* (10 Rabī' II 639 A.H./18 October 1241) and then as *qāḍī* Dhu'l-Hijja 1242), see al-Nuwayrī, 341–3; al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 308 (tr. Broadhurst, 266–7).

¹⁴⁵ So according to HPEC, IV/2, text 111, tr. 229:300 under al-Jaww **ād** as against 3,000 Egyptian troops; cf. also text p. 110, tr. pp. 227–8. But al-Khazrajī, fo. 151 v, gives 700 and 2,000 respectively.

¹⁴⁶ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 115, tr. 238: its abandonment is followed immediately by the news of the raid on Gaza (*supra*, p. 50 and n. 134).

¹⁴⁷ **Sibt**, 488/738, indicating a date very early in 640 A.H. (began 1 July 1242). *HPEC*, IV/2, text 120, tr. 247–8, speaks of preparations at this juncture for an expedition into Syria, but for the purpose of meeting an envoy of the Caliph. Cf., however, al-Dhahabī, as quoted in next note.

¹⁴⁸ Al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rīkh al-Islām*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi MS Ayasofya 3012, fos. 215v, 254v; cf. also his *Duwal al-Islām*, tr. Arlette Nègre (Damascus, 1979), 244. For the date of Kamāl al-Dīn's death, 13 **Şafar** 640 A.H., see Abū Shāma, 172; **Sibt**, 489/739, gives simply the month. Ibn Wāsil, v, 301, followed by Ibn al-Furāt, Vatican MS, fos. 3r–v, states misleadingly that he had died shortly (*bi-qalīl*) after his release by al-Nāṣir (*supra*, p. 48). He is possibly the source of al-Maqrīzī's incorrect date **Şafar** 639 A.H. in *al-Mawāzī' wa'l-i'tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭa' wa'l-āthār* (Būlāq, 1853–4), II, 34.

¹⁴⁹ Šāliḥ b. Yahyā, *T'arīkh Bayrūt*, ed. F. Hours and K. S. Salibi (Beirut, 1969), 49–50. The letter is dated 6 **Dhu'l-Hijja** in an unspecified year: it can belong only to the period 637–9 A.H., however, since the recipient, Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥajjī, was killed on 6 Rabī II 640 A.H./3 October 1242, and of the three years 639 (when the corresponding Julian date was 8 June 1242) is the most likely. See further Salibi, *Maronite historians of mediaeval Lebanon* (Beirut, 1959), 205–6.

¹⁵⁰ Armand of Pierregort to Robert de Sandford, in *CM*, IV, 289 (for the date of this letter, *vide infra*, n. 168): Ayyūb opened negotiations 'post mala quae a nobis recepit [*sc.* Soldanus] et Nasserus', i.e. following the sack of Nablus and the abortive siege of Jaffa.

¹⁵¹ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 117, tr. 242. Al-Maqrīzī, I/2, 310, 312–13 (tr. Broadhurst, 268, 270–1), and *The pearl-strings: a history of the Resūliyy Dynasty of Yemen*, tr. J. W. Redhouse and ed. E. G. Browne *et al.* (Leiden and London, 1906–8), I, 109, both give **Ramaḍān** 639 A.H.

¹⁵² *HPEC*, IV/2, text 141–2, tr. 288.

¹⁵³ *ibid.*, text 142, tr. 289: the date of Ismā'īl's advance may be inferred from the events that immediately follow, dated Ba'ūna 959 E.M./June 1243.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, text 142, 145, tr. 289, 294–5. Ibn Wāsil, v, 323, lists al-Nāṣir among Ayyūb's enemies at the outset of 641 A.H. (began 21 June 1243), but makes no mention of these campaigns.

¹⁵⁵ 'Annales de Terre Sainte', B, 441: '...et li sires de Damas vint as Moulines de Turs pour affremer la triue o nos gens; mais il les engana et n'en fist point'; Sánchez Candeira, 358–9. Bulst, 'Ritterorden', p. 213, n. 51,

assumes that this entry has been misplaced from 1240 or 1241. For ‘Les Moulins des Turs’, on the lower ‘Awjā river, see Gustav Beyer, ‘Die Kreuzfahrergebiete Südwestpalästinas’, *Beiträge zur biblischen Landes- und Altertumskunde*, LXVIII, 1946–51, 179–80 (and map, p. 188).

¹⁵⁶ Ibn al-‘Amīd, p. 153, ll. 15–20; Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 46v. Both authors record these events *sub anno* 638 A.H./124(0-)1, although the former adds that some of them occurred after that date. Cf. *supra*, n. 120, for the probable conflation of two distinct campaigns. The auxiliaries from Aleppo must surely belong to the 1241 expedition, since in June 1243 Aleppo was too absorbed with the

Mongols to concern herself with Egypt and had just sent a force to assist the Seljūk Sultan against them: Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Zubda*, III, 268 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, vi, 19); Ibn Wāṣil, v, 314. *HPEC*, IV/2, text 145, tr. 295, reports the news of al-Jawwād’s arrest and of the retreat of Ismā‘īl and al-Manṣūr towards Damascus: MS arabe 302 breaks off at this juncture.

¹⁵⁷ Al-Khazrajī, fo. 152r. Ibn Wāṣil, v, 297. *Sibt*, 492/743–4, with the date, Shawwād 641 A.H. Ibn al-‘Amīd, p. 153, ll. 20–21; Ibn Duqmāq, fo. 46v. For al-Jawwād’s epitaph in the Ṣālihiyya at Damascus, see *Repertoire chronologique d’épigraphie arabe*, XI, ed. J.Sauvaget *et al.* (Cairo, 1941–42), 117 (no. 4176).

¹⁵⁸ *ROL*, x, p. 339, n. 3.

¹⁵⁹ *Sibt*, 492/743–4.

¹⁶⁰ Bodleian Library MS Pococke 324, fo. 138r: *wa-baddala mālan lil-Faranj wa-tasallama’l-Jawwād minhum*. This MS has been identified—though not with total certainty—with an abridgement of the *Zubdat al-fikra* of Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 1325).

¹⁶¹ *Sibt*, 492/743. Ibn al-‘Amīd, p. 153, l. 21.

¹⁶² Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Zubda*, m, 267–8 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, vi, 19): between Jumād II and Shawwād 640 A.H./December 1242 and April 1243. Cf. also Ibn Wāṣil, v, 314.

¹⁶³ See Cl. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, tr. J.Jones-Williams (London, 1968), 137–8. Gibb, ‘The Aiyūbids’, 708.

¹⁶⁴ Al-Maqrizi, I/2, 308 (tr. Broadhurst, 266): 11 Dhu’l-Qa‘da 638 A.H./24 May 1241.

¹⁶⁵ Abū Shāma, 173:24 Rabī‘ I 641 A.H./Al-Maqrizī, I/2, 310 (tr. Broadhurst, 269), erroneously places this event under Rabī‘ I 640.

¹⁶⁶ Al-Dhababī alone names al-Manṣūr as commander of the Damascene army at the siege: *Ta’rīkh al-Islām*, MS Ayasofya 3012, fo. 254v, margin; cf. also

Duwal al-Islām, tr. Nègre, 246. Ibn Wāsil, v, 328, 331, refers to the siege only briefly.

¹⁶⁷ For all these events, see Humphreys, 272–4; Prawer, II, 307. The main source is Ibn Wāsil, v, 327–32.

¹⁶⁸ Armand of Pierregort to Robert de Sandford, in *CM*, IV, 289–90. Pace Röhrich, ‘Kreuzzüge’, 100, and *GKJ*, p. 860 and n. 1, and Prawer, II, p. 307, n. 41, this letter appears to have reached England in the first months of 1244; it states, moreover, that Jerusalem has not been in exclusively Christian hands for 56 years, and hence clearly belongs to 1243, most probably to the late autumn or early winter. An alternative possibility is that the truce referred to is the one formulated with Ismāʿīl during the abortive campaign of June 1243. We should in any case expect the territorial clauses in the two truces to be identical. This letter specifies that Hebron, Nablus and Beisan were to remain in Muslim hands, whereas ‘Annales de Terre Sainte’, B, 441, and ‘Gestes’, 740, both referring to the 1244 agreement, have Nablus and Jericho. Nevertheless, it seems that in both cases al-Nāṣir’s rights in the Jordan valley were being safeguarded. That Jerusalem had been surrendered outright in the 1243 truce is clear from *MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum selectae*, ed. C. Rodenberg (Berlin, 1883–94), II, 6 (no. 6); *CM*, IV, 307–8 (‘circa principium aestatis proximo praeteritae’).

¹⁶⁹ Ibn Wāsil, v, 332–3; cf. also Ibn al-ʿAmīd, p. 155, ll. 5–6, regarding the plan to conquer Egypt. Prawer, II, 310, is incorrect in stating that Ismāʿīl in person advanced to Gaza.

¹⁷⁰ *HPEC*, IV/2, text 88, tr. 181.

¹⁷¹ Ibn Wāsil, v, 249. Humphreys, 262.

¹⁷² For a survey of Khwarizmian activity from 1240 to 1243, see Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 646–9; ‘La “Djazîra” au milieu du treizième siècle’, 119.

¹⁷³ Ibn Wāsil, v, 323–4, 325 (hence Ibn al-Furāt, Vatican MS, fo. 31r): between Muḥarram and Jumādā I 641 A.H./late June and early November 1243.

¹⁷⁴ Al-Khazrajī, fos. 152r–v. For the Qaymariyya, see also Qirtāy, *Taʾrīkh majmūʿ al-nawādir*, Forschungsbibliothek Gotha MS Or. 1655, fo. 28r; Ibn Wāsil, v, 336.

¹⁷⁵ Al-Khazrajī, fo. 152v: *fa-wāfaqa dhālika taḥrīk al-Tatar wa-qazdhum al-Khawārizmiyya*. Ibn Shaddād, ed. ʿAbbāra, 137. Qirtāy, fo. 27r. Ibn Wāsil, v, 336, gives the date of their crossing of the Euphrates as the beginning of 642 A.H. For the Mongol campaign against Aleppo, *vide infra*.

¹⁷⁶ The fullest account is in al-Khazrajī, fo. 152v. For ʿAyn al-Jarr, see R. Dussaud, *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* (Paris,

1927), 400–2. The attack on the Tripoli region is mentioned only in ‘Eracles’, 428.

177 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 337. Qirtāy, fo. 27v.

178 Gibb, ‘The Aiyūbids’, 709; also *supra*, p. 54. It should be noted, however, that al-Mansūr, who had promised to aid the Seljūk sultan against the Mongols in June 1243, failed to do so: Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286), tr. E.A.Wallis Budge, *The chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj* (Oxford and London, 1932), I, 406–7.

179 *HPEC*, IV/2, text 111, tr. 230 (for 1241). Ibn Wāṣil, v, 332, 338, and Ibn al-‘Amīd, 155 (for 1244).

180 John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. N.de Wailly (Paris, 1868), 189.

181 Al-Nuwayrī, 341, tells how, when the allies occupied Jerusalem in the summer of 1241, the jurist al-Sulamī was imprisoned not far from Ismā‘īl’s quarters. During a visit to the prince, the Frankish leaders heard al-Sulamī reciting the Qur’ān in a loud voice, and asked who he was. Ismā‘īl explained that this was a member of the clergy who was undergoing a second spell of incarceration for his opposition to the surrender of Muslim-held fortresses to the infidel. ‘Were he a priest of ours,’ the Franks replied, ‘we should have washed his feet and drunk his broth [with him].’ There is a similar version in al-Subkī, v, 101.

182 Ibn Wāṣil, v, 338–9. See also Qirtāy, fo. 28v.

183 ‘Memoriale potestatum Regiensium’, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, ed. L.A.Muratori (Milan, 1723–51), VIII, col. 1113, contains what purports to be a summary of a letter from the patriarch of Jerusalem, condemning the treachery of the Muslim forces at La Forbie. But such sentiments are lacking in the full texts of his letters given in ‘Annales monasterii de Burton’, *A M*, I, 257–63, and *CM*, IV, 337–44.

184 Robert, patriarch of Jerusalem, *et al.* to Innocent IV, in *Chronica de Mailros*, ed. J.Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1835), 158 (‘quorum...adventus fuit ultra omnium opinionem protelatus’). ‘Annales monasterii de Burton’, 258. *CM*, IV, 339.

185 Ibn Shaddād, Bodleian Library MS Marsh 333, fo. 110v (brief summary in Cahen, ‘La “Djazîra” au milieu du treizième siècle’, 119, without the month): latter part of Ṣafar 642 A.H. For the raid, see also Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, I, 409; in the Arabic version of this chronicle, *Ta’rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, ed. A. Sālihī (Beirut, 1890), 446, it is dated 641 A.H., i.e.

before mid-June 1244; cf. also Ibn Abī’l-Ḥadīd (d. 1258), *Sharḥ Nahj al-balā’ gha*, ed. M.A.Ibrāhīm (Cairo, 1959-67), VIII 238 (erroneously Placed Prior to Kösedgh). These authors mention only the money paid to the mongols by Aleppo. For that sent by Damascus and Ḥims, see *chronica de mailros*, 158 (‘non sin multa effusione pecunie’) *CM*, IV, 390, speak merely of Mongol

ultimatums issued 'quibusdam potentibus Sarracenorum soldanis'. On Yasa'ur, see J.A.Boyle, 'Kirakos of Ganjak on the Mongols', *Central Asiatic Journal*, VIII, 1963, p. 211, n. 95.

¹⁸⁶ *Chronica de Mailros*, 158. for the ultimatum to Bohemond, see also *CM*, IV, 389–90: 'aestate declinante', however, seems a trifle late.

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¹⁸⁷ They appear to have arrived shortly before 4 October, when the allies moved out of Acre towards Jaffa: 'Annales monasterii de Burton', 260; *CM*, IV, 341.

¹⁸⁸ *HDFS*, VI/1, 237, 239, 256 (= *CM*, IV, 302): 'Soldanum...ad evocandum auxilium Choerminorum...coegerunt.'

¹⁸⁹ Bulst-Thiele, 'Ritterorden', 219, and *Magistri*, 207 and n. 78.

¹⁹⁰ *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels*, ed. K.Ernst Lupprian (Vatican City, 1981), no. 27 (p. 174).

¹⁹¹ Ibn al-'Amīd, p. 155, 1. 3. 'Rothelin', 562. 'Eracles', 430 (though suggesting at p. 427 that Ayyūb had lured them south with the promise of land in Egypt). 'Annales monasterii de Burton', 258; *CM*, IV, 338. *Chronica de Mailros*, 157.

¹⁹² *CM*, IV, 289–90.

¹⁹³ On their relations with the emperor, see Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John*. 173–4.

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 137–9.

¹⁹⁵ 'Gestes', 729. This expedition coincided with Filangieri's attempt on Acre, on which *vide supra*, p. 50–1; for the date, see further Jackson, 'The end of Hohenstaufen rule in Syria', 34.

¹⁹⁶ Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 650–1. Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic Knights in Cilician Armenia', in *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, ed. T.S.R.Boase (Edinburgh, 1978), 110. Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, III, 232 (tr. Blochet, in *ROL*, v, 96), suggests that the order never recovered from this reverse. For a brief discussion of the local interests of the military orders, see Prawer, II, 280–1, and 'Military orders and crusader politics', 222.

¹⁹⁷ Ibn Wāṣil, v, 332; he alleges that the Hospitallers now began to refortify Kawkab. But Ibn Shaddād, *LJP*, 161, says nothing of Kawkab's fate after its destruction by al-Nāṣir's father al-Mu'azzam in 1220, merely that it was never restored. Had Kawkab been included in Theobald's truce of 1240 with

al-Nāṣir? The preceptor of the Hospital was killed in the Khwarizmian attack on Jerusalem in August 1244: *Chronica de Mailros*, 159.

198 *CM*, IV, 289: ‘quem non cessavimus pro liberatione Terrae Sanctae pro viribus expugnare.’

199 Al-Nuwayrī, 363: see the printed text in ‘Le testament d’al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’, ed. Cl. Cahen and I. Chabbouh, *BEOIFD*, xxix, 1977, text 101, tr. 108.

200 Frederick II’s claim that **al-Nāṣir** (who was not present in person, however, at La Forbie) went over to the Egyptians during the engagement (*CM*, IV, 303= *HDFS*, VI/1, 256–7) is without foundation. Al-Nāṣir’s general **Ẓahīr** al-Dīn Sunqur was among the prisoners taken to Cairo: **Sibt**, 494/746.

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS: SOME FRESH REVELATIONS

As is well known, the Secret History is the only surviving source on the rise of the Mongol empire produced by the Mongols themselves, yet controversy continues to surround its value, its purpose, even its date. The fullest and earliest attested version of the text does not even survive in the Uyghur script employed by the Mongols, but only in a transcription into Chinese characters, accompanied by Chinese translation; a transposition carried out at an unknown date under circumstances which are not entirely clear. Chinese sources, it is true, have been used to throw a certain amount of light on the transmission of the Secret History, notably in a lengthy and detailed article published forty years ago by William Hung,¹ but as the summary by F.W. Cleaves of the problems surrounding this evidence in the introduction to his translation of the Secret History makes abundantly clear,² much has remained a matter for conjecture.

It is worth recalling, however, that Hung did not regard his study as definitive,³ and that this line of research cannot be said to have reached a dead end. We shall be considering here some hitherto unused evidence which points forward to possible more precise conclusions concerning the production and transmission of the Chinese version of the Secret History. First, however, it is necessary to recapitulate the main conclusions of earlier work. This has located the earliest reference to the use of the Secret History by Chinese in a passage in the *Veritable Records* (*Shih-lu* 實錄) of the Ming apparently suggesting that it was drawn upon in the preparation of an interpreter's manual, the *Hua-i i-yü* 華夷譯語, in 1382.⁴ Unfortunately, this precise date marks only the point at which the Hung-wu Emperor ordered the compilation of the handbook: all that can be affirmed for certain is that this mention of a *Yüan pi-shih* 元秘史 must date to before the completion of the emperor's *Veritable Records* in 1418.⁵

A further piece of evidence, however, places the summarized (i.e. recapitulatory, non-interlineated) Chinese translation of the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* 元朝秘史, as the Secret History is known in Chinese, well before that point, since a manuscript of this material originally in the Great Vault of the Grand Secretariat (*Nei-ko ta-k'u* 內閣大庫) bears

upon it the copyist's date 1404.⁶ It has been surmised that this manuscript copy was prepared in connexion with the compilation of the massive *Yung-lo ta-tien* 永樂大典 encyclopedia carried out between 1403 and 1408. This incorporated the transcribed text with interlinear translation, and the summarized translation: it seems to have been the ultimate source of most versions of the Secret History later produced in China, with the exception of a printed edition, now surviving only in part, which appears to have been associated with the printing (perhaps, it has been suggested, very early in the Ming) of the *Hua-i i-yü*: the *Yung-lo ta-tien* itself, though frequently drawn upon by later (especially eighteenth-century) scholars, was never printed.⁷

Later references to the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* might, therefore, be seen as reflecting knowledge of the work disseminated from those two points. The next earliest reference known to date has been that in the *Comprehensive gazetteer of the Ming* (*Ta-Ming i-t'ung-chih* 大明一統志) of 1461,⁸ though this is not a verbatim quotation but an allusion to the mythical origins of the Mongol people given at the start of the work. It should be noted that the wolf-ancestor is described not as 'blue-coloured', *ts'ang-se-ti* 蒼色的, as in the current text of the Secret History, but as 'blue-white', *ts'ang-pai* 蒼白:⁹ I adopt, here and below, the translations used by Cleaves, though there would seem to be room for debate over them; 'whiteness', perhaps, could be taken to hint at spectral pallor. At all events, the increasing amount of Chinese evidence from 1461 onwards leaves only the very earliest stages of the Secret History unattested, specifically the original version, probably but not necessarily in Uyghur script; the version in which this was provided with interlinear transcription and glosses; the first summarized version whence the manuscript of 1404 was copied; and the first version to bring together interlinear transcription and glosses (without the Uyghur script) and the summarized translation before the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* was incorporated in this form in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* and the Ming printed edition.¹⁰

In all this a hitherto unused source compiled (to judge from its author's preface) in 1481 gives some very important information. This is the *History through the ages rightly outlined*, *Shih-shih cheng-kang* 世史正綱, of Ch'iu Chiün 丘濬 (1420–95). Ch'iu was a prominent scholar-official and writer who joined the Han-lin Academy in 1454 and worked for a while with Shang Lu 商輅 (1414–86), compiler of a chronicle style history of the Yüan period.¹¹ Ch'iu's own work is chiefly famous for its extremely negative attitude towards Mongol rule;¹² both men worked in the highly-charged atmosphere following the T'u-mu incident, in which the capture of China's emperor raised once more the spectre of Mongol conquest and provoked an outburst

of ethnocentric writing.¹³ Ch'iu apparently believed that the Mongol rulers had so terrorized the Chinese historians among their subjects that the existing record of the Yüan dynasty was not as black as it should rightly have been painted; he raised this point in particular over the monk Hsiang-mai 祥邁 and his account of Qubilai's destruction of the *Taoist Canon*.¹⁴ Here we read a comment on the *General essay on the Comprehensive Mirror*, *T'ung-chien po-lun* 通鑑博論, by the Ming prince Chu Ch'üan 朱權 (1378–1448):¹⁵

When I first got hold of the *Po-lun* and read it, and saw that it quoted the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* as saying that the first ancestor of the Yüan was the product of a union between a blue-white wolf and a dull-white doe, I doubted it. After I entered the Grand Secretariat I saw the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* written using Mongol letters annotated at the side with Chinese words, and sure enough it had this very story in it. Looking at things in the light of this, Hsiang-mai's confusion and fear must have been real enough—how much the more so when the preface clearly states that the work (*lun* 論) was composed on imperial command; it must have had some basis.

The last sentence here is ambiguous: the modern editors of the *Shih-shih cheng-kang*, presumably reflecting the 1563 edition on which they based their work, leave a blank space before the word 'command', indicating that their original took this to refer to a command from the Hung-wu Emperor to his son Chu Ch'üan to write the *T'ung-chien po-lun*.¹⁶ My own feeling is that this simply refers to Qubilai's command to Hsiang-mai noted in the preface to his work, the *Pien-wei lu* 辨僞錄;¹⁷ 'it' would then refer to Hsiang-mai's feelings when at the mercy of these monsters, not to the story of the Mongol ancestors itself. Any listing of an edition of the *Shih-shih cheng-kang* earlier than 1563 is very hard to find,¹⁸ and even were the first of these editions to exhibit on inspection the same blank space, one would not be sure that this reflected authorial intention. It should be noted, however, that one citation of this entire passage, in a source describing itself as a reprint, dated to 1569, from an editor who died in 1560 (and hence, one presumes, dependent on an edition of the *Shih-shih cheng-kang* earlier than that used by its modern editors) certainly does not exhibit this feature.

This citation occurs in the supplementary portion of a work whose short title has been catalogued as *Digest of the Comprehensive Mirror*, *T'ung-chien chieh-yao* 通鑑節要 in Cambridge University Library.¹⁹ The full title is given as *Hsin-k'an hsien-t'ai k'ao-cheng kang-mu tien-yin t'ung-chien chieh-yao hui-ch'eng*

新刊憲臺考正綱目點音通鑑節要會成; its editorship is ascribed to the well-known writer T'ang Shun-chih 唐順之 (1507–60). A work with a similar title is attested elsewhere as incorporating Ch'iu's comments; a work of a similar type (but describing itself as a ta-ch'üan 大全, a term which in the Cambridge text does replace *chieh-yao* in some chapter headings), is ascribed elsewhere to T'ang;²⁰ but this product of the Ching-hsien t'ang 敬賢堂 in the publishing centre of Chien-yang is not listed in any other bibliography I have consulted so far.

Textually, at any rate, this alternative source is completely identical with the modern edition of the *Shih-shih cheng-kang*, except for an interrogative particle at the end of the last clause, turning it into a rhetorical question. Earlier in the text, too, the character for annotated, chu, is here written 注 rather than 註, but otherwise the orthography is also identical. Both these characters would seem only to refer to the interlineated glosses beside the original script rather than the transcription into Chinese, but one cannot infer from this an absence of transcription in the manuscript seen by Ch'iu: in his short note any particular mention of the transcription would have been an irrelevance. The term 'Mongol characters', for that matter, is also tantalizing: the likelihood is that the Uyghur script is meant, but this, too, cannot be absolutely certain.²¹

What is of great importance is the confirmation this passage provides of the existence of a manuscript hitherto only put forward as a hypothetical source for surviving versions of the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih*; the location it gives for that manuscript precisely in the archives of the Grand Secretariat; and (less precisely) a date which may be inferred of somewhere circa 1465 for its presence there. For though in theory Ch'iu may have had access to the manuscript for some reason early in his career in the Han-lin Academy, or later when he came to compile his own *Shih-shih cheng-kang* (though his mode of expression implies some lapse of time since his discovery), the presumption must be that he came across it at a time when officially engaged in historiographic duties in connexion with the *Veritable Records* of the emperor Ying-tsung, a task to which he was assigned in 1464.²²

That he saw fit to publicize his discovery in such precise terms, however, raises another problem: why make such a point of his privileged access to this document if the substance of what he had to say was already more widely available in a printed version of the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih*? Though the continued preservation of this manuscript consulted by Ch'iu may reassure us that the printed edition could, after all, have been taken directly from this early and reliable source, the date at which this was done may well have been rather late, and not (as William Hung was inclined to believe) in the early Ming at all. It may be objected that the reference to the origin of the Mongols

in the *Ta-Ming i-t'ung chih* does provide evidence of some wider diffusion of the Secret History in the late fifteenth century. But it should be noted that the description of the wolf-ancestor in this text as 'blue-white' is a peculiarity shared with the *T'ung-chien po-lun* as quoted in the *Shih-shih cheng-kang* (though the orthographic variant for the colour of the doe found in this quotation is absent),²³ suggesting that the gazetteer may be drawing either on the *T'ung-chien po-lun* or some other intermediate source rather than betraying any direct knowledge of the Secret History itself.

These minor linguistic variations do not, as far as it is possible to judge from the quotation given, warrant any suspicion that Chu Ch'üan was himself drawing upon a translation of the Secret History other than that known today: much more probable is that the prince introduced his own stylistic improvements into the unpolished Chinese of the original translators. Given, however, that the date of the prince's work is as early as 1396,²⁴ it provides very valuable confirmation that the translation had indeed been effected by that time; William Hung's own supposition (which, as we have seen, was subject to uncertainties over the compilation of the *Veritable Records*) was that 1398 was the best *terminus ad quem* which could be deduced from the evidence he had before him.

Why, then, not verify this quotation from the *T'ung-chien po-lun* against one of the exemplars of this text which survive in East Asian libraries?²⁵ Matters are perhaps not quite so simple. For what this initial small piece of fresh evidence suggests is that a much larger task is actually required: Ming historiography on the Mongol period may in general be of greater interest to the student of Chinese intellectual history than to the Mongolist, but it would seem that it does preserve occasional scraps of useful information, and it would also seem that the task of hunting down this information has not so far been carried out in any systematic way. But for this to be done effectively will surely demand the skills of a specialist in the Ming period. All that a student of an entirely different era of Chinese history can do is raise one corner of this problem and invite the attention of those better qualified to solve it.

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Footnotes

¹ William Hung, 'The transmission of the book known as *The Secret History of the Mongols*', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 14, 1951, 433–92. On the author of this piece, see Susan Chan Egan, *A latterday Confucian: reminiscences of William Hung (1893–1980)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1987).

² Francis Woodman Cleaves, *The Secret History of the Mongols*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. xvii–lxv. This summary stands out for its clarity, concision and caution; I have preferred to follow it below, rather than try to relate my own account to Hung's more extended discussion.

³ Note Hung's remarks at the end of his n. 16 on p. 441 of his study.

⁴ Cleaves, *Secret History*, p. xxiii, provides the passage in Chinese.

⁵ Cleaves, p. liv.

⁶ Cleaves, pp. lviii–lxix.

⁷ Cleaves, pp. xxiv, lv–lxiii.

⁸ Cleaves, p. xxv, again provides the Chinese text.

⁹ As pointed out by Cleaves, *Secret History*, p. xxvi.

¹⁰ Following the listing in Cleaves, *Secret History*, p. lx.

¹¹ For Ch'iu, see L.Carrington Goodrich and Fang Chao-ying, *Dictionary of Ming biography*, 1368–1644 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 249–52, and for Shang Lu, pp. 1161–3.

¹² His views are touched upon in Jao Tsung-i's survey *Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shang chih chengt'ung lun* (Hong Kong: Lung-men shu-tien, 1977), 43, 154–6.

¹³ On this incident, which took place in 1449, and on its severe political repercussions, see Ph. de Heer, *The care-taker emperor* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1986). Two studies of the historiographic consequences are mentioned in the Introduction to John D.Langlois (ed.), *China under Mongol rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 19.

¹⁴ For a brief survey of this episode and its background, see K.Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 421–5, and note the literature listed on pp. 541–2: this has been expanded over recent years, most notably by P.van der Loon, *Taoist books in the libraries of the Sung period* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), 55–6.

¹⁵ On this prince, see the *Dictionary of Ming biography*, 305–7.

¹⁶ Ch'iu Chün, (ed.) Kuo Hsin 郭新 and Lu Ta-chieh 陸達節. *Shih-shih cheng-kang* (Ching-ch'üan: Kuo-shih chia-shu, 1936), 31.19a.

¹⁷ Hsiang-mai, *Pien-wei lu*, p. 751c, in ed. of *Taishō Canon*, vol. 52.

¹⁸ The only such listing I have encountered so far is the *Sonkeikaku bunko kanseki bunrui mokuroku* (Tokyo: Sonkeikaku bunko, 1934), 151, which only gives the date as 'Hung-chih 弘治 period'. This may show that the library held the first edition, since a postface to the *Shih-shih cheng-*

kang which has been transmitted with it (reprinted also in Jao, Cheng-t'ung lun, p. 157) dating to 1488, the first year of that period, indicates that the work had not been printed up to that point. It is, of course, also possible that the work was printed more than once in the Hung-chih period.

¹⁹ *T'ung-chien chieh-yao*, hsü-pien, 18.32b. This work entered the library from Japan in the early 1960s (it bears a certain amount of manuscript annotation by a Japanese); it is not the different work under the same short title preserved in the library of Sir Thomas Wade, which is a Korean print.

²⁰ See, respectively, pp. 101 and 100 of Wang Chung-min, *Chung-kuo shan-pen-shu t' i-yao* (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi ch'u-pan-she, 1983). As Tang's entry in the *Dictionary of Ming biography*, 1252–6, makes clear, his reputation did attract a certain number of false attributions. Though in this case it would seem hard to judge whether or not T'ang was involved in the work's compilation in any meaningful sense, the original editing must have taken place during his lifetime for the attribution to be plausible.

²¹ Note that the preface of the *Hua-i i-yü* distinguishes the Uyghur writing used by the Mongols as 'Kao-ch'ang chih shu' 高昌之書, and reserves the term used here for the 'Phags-pa script: *Hua-i i-yü* (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an*, series 3 reprint of 1918 Shanghai Han-fen-lou edition), preface, 1b.

²² See de Heer, *Care-taker emperor*, 139, for this, and note also the mention of Ch'iu on pp. 144, 146. Though earlier scholarship linking the *Hua-i i-yü* with the Secret History has surmised that the existing Chinese version was produced as a translation exercise or exemplar, the hypothesis that Ch'iu found it in the Grand Secretariats's historical archive entails the corollary that the specific document he saw had been preserved for its historical rather than its linguistic value.

²³ In both versions of Ch'iu's remarks that I have consulted, he uses Mathews's no. 6688, rather than no. 6686, which is in all the texts of the

Secret History as well as in the *Ta-Ming i-t'ung chih*. It is at least conceivable that this substitution may simply mark a pedantic correction by Ch'iu himself.

²⁴ This date is given e.g. by Fu Tseng-hsiang. *Ts'ang-yüan ch'ün-shu ching-yen lu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1983), 516.

²⁵ See the preceding note, and also *Sonkeikaku bunko kanseki bunrui mokuroku*, p. 150, for some prewar listings, and *Pei-ching t'u-shu-kuan ku-chi shan-pen shu-mu* (Peking: Shu-mu wen-hsien ch'u-pan-she, n.d.; preface 1987), 1151, and *Kuo-li chung-yang t'u-shu-kuan shan-pen shu-mu* (revised ed., Taipei: National Central Library, 1967), 403, for current holdings.

GHAZAN, ISLAM AND MONGOL TRADITION: A VIEW FROM THE MAMLŪK SULTANATE¹

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The conversion of Ghazan Khan to Islam in A.H. 694/A.D. 1295 was an event of great importance for both the Mongol ruling class and the Muslim subjects of his kingdom. The story of this conversion, based primarily on semi-official Persian works emanating from the *Ilkhānīd* state itself, has been retold and analysed in varying detail by several modern scholars.² Recently, Dr. Charles Melville,³ using contemporary Arabic sources from the Mamlūk Sultanate, has enriched our knowledge of this event; in addition, he has suggested that the Islamization of the Mongols may have been well advanced even before Ghazan's conversion. Melville deals mainly with Ghazan's conversion *per se*, as well as the events that led up to it. As for the nature of Ghazan's Islam, he writes: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on the sincerity of Ghazan's conversion, which we can never know, or on what he actually understood of Islam...'.⁴ He does show, however, that Ghazan's conversion to Islam was more than just a personal decision based on religious conviction: one motive behind this move was a desire to attract those Mongols who had already become Muslims, and thus to win their support in his struggle against Baidu.

An additional Mamlūk source sheds some light on the workings of Ghazan's mind, and the nature of his belief in Islam. We also learn that Ghazan did not see any inherent contradiction between his new religion and the traditions and laws of the Mongols. This source is *Ṣalāh* al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybeg al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363), who provides entries on Ghazan in his two major biographical dictionaries: the more comprehensive *al-Wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*,⁵ and *A'yān al-'aṣr wa-a'wān al-naṣr*,⁶ a shorter work on his contemporaries. Although most of the evidence on Ghazan is common to both entries, the latter is somewhat briefer, presents the material in a different order, and at times differs in detail from the parallel passages in the former work.⁷

In this paper, based on the evidence from al-Ṣafadī, as well as information from other sources, both Mamlūk and Persian, I will first

attempt to examine Ghazan's commitment to Islam. I will then analyse in some detail his continued adhesion to two areas of the Mongol imperial legacy: first, the Yasa, or body of law attributed to Chinggis Khan; and second, allegiance to the Qa'an or Great Khan. Subsequently, I will briefly touch upon two additional areas of Mongol tradition: the Chinggisid imperial ideology and the shamanistic religion. Finally, I shall attempt to draw together this information in order to paint a portrait of the syncretic nature of Ghazan's Islam, as well as to discuss briefly the possible implications for the history of the Islamization of the Mongols in Iran.

Al-Ṣafadī initially deals with Ghazan's conversion to Islam in a perfunctory way: his *nā'ib* (viceroy) Nawrūz was responsible for presenting this faith to him in an attractive manner, and he converted in 694/1294–5; 'and with this, Islam spread among the Mongols' (*wafashā bi-dhālika al-islām bi'l-tatār*).⁸ A more detailed—and unique—report about a subsequent crisis in Ghazan's new faith is provided by al-Ṣafadī further along in the biography. Citing as his source al-'Izz Ḥasan al-Irbilī al-Mutaṭabbib,⁹ an immigrant to the Mamlūk Sultanate from the Ḳhānīd realm, al-Ṣafadī tells the story of Ghazan's marriage to Bulughan Khatun,¹⁰ the widow of his father Arghun. Following Rashīd al-Dīn's laconic account, the outline of this story is already known: after Ghazan's accession to the throne, he married Bulughan Khatun according to the Muslim *Sharī'a*, even though she had been the wife of his father.¹¹ Rashīd al-Dīn only hints at the legalistic difficulties of such a match, but they would have appeared to have been insurmountable, since Islamic law expressly forbids the practice of marrying one's deceased father's wives.¹² Al-Ṣafadī gives a fuller account of this episode: having become ruler, Ghazan married his father's wives 'in accordance to the *Yāsā* (law) of the Mongols in this [matter]' (*'alā yāsā al-mughul fī dhālika*).¹³ He was particularly enamoured with Bulughan Khatun, who had been Arghun's senior wife. When Ghazan became a Muslim, he was told that Islam forbade marriage to one's deceased father's wives. Finding himself in a legally impossible situation, Ghazan was intent on abandoning Islam if this religion did not permit his marriage to Bulughan Khatun. However, one of the '*ulamā*' offered a legal opinion which provided a solution to this impasse: since Arghun had been a pagan, his marriage to Bulughan Khatun was not legal, and therefore Ghazan could now wed her with impunity. The *Khān* was happy with this suggestion, married Bulughan Khatun (in a Muslim manner), and 'he adhered to Islam. Without this [solution], he would have apostatized.'¹⁴ If this evidence is to be believed, it would indicate that Ghazan's initial commitment to his new religion was perhaps not very deep. I will return to the implication of this evidence at the end of the paper.

Mention has been made of the Mongol Yasa or law,¹⁵ a subject to which further reference is made in the biography. Al-Ṣafadī writes, evidently citing his contemporary, the secretary and encyclopedist Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī:¹⁶

[Ghazan] spoke Mongolian and Turkish (*al-mughūliyya wa-turkiyya*), and he knew Persian,¹⁷ but he did not speak it except with Khwāja Rashīd [al-Dīn] and his like from among the close associates of his court (*akhṣāʾ ḥaḍratihī*). He understood most of what was said before him in Arabic, but he did not let it be known that he understood it, out of pride in the deeply-rooted Chinggis Khani and pure Mongol Yasa (*taʿāzuman ʿalā yāsāq*¹⁸ *al-jinkiz khāniyya al-muʿriqa wa-mughūliyya al-khālisa*). When he became king, he took up leadership [in] the way of Chinggis Khan¹⁹ and established the Mongol Yasa [*al-yāsā al-mughūliyya*]. He appointed judges (*al-arḡūjiyya*) to carry out the tribunals (*al-arḡū*).²⁰ He obligated all to keep their rank and not to exceed it. The *aghā* (older brother, i.e. senior prince) was to be an *aghā*, and the *īmī* (younger, i.e. junior prince) was [to stay] an *īmī*.²¹

Besides the interesting information on the languages which Ghazan spoke,²² as well as an indication of his relationship to Rashīd al-Dīn, the passage contains significant evidence on Ghazan's commitment to the Yasa. Corroborating evidence of this devotion is found in his imperial command (*yarlıgh* [*<Tur. yarliy=Mon. Jarliy*]), recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn, ordering the distribution of *iqṭāʿāt* (assignments of land) to the Mongol soldiery. Ghazan begins the *yarlıgh* by praising Chinggis Khan's Yasa, to which he attributes his forefather's success in conquering the world.²³ Ghazan's commitment to the Yāsā evidently preceded his ascension to the throne. Elsewhere, Rashīd al-Dīn states that Ghazan was already a firm supporter of the Yasa in his younger days: as a little boy, he would gather his companions, and teach them the Yasa (text: *yāsāq*) as well as *yūsūn* (*<Mon. yosun* 'custom').²⁴ Furthermore, 'among them he would appoint the *aghā* and *īmī*, [as well as] the *andā* (*<Mon. anda* "sworn brother")²⁵ and *qūdāy* (*<Mon. quda* "in-law; family member by marriage").²⁶ If anyone had committed a transgression, then he would be eager to punish him, and would chastise him according to the way of the Yasa (in different MSS: *yāsā/yāsāq*)...'.²⁷ Whatever the historicity of this passage, it is significant that Rashīd al-Dīn decided to include it in his work and present it in a positive light. It must have been clear to him that in the mind of his patron, devotion to the Yasa, even after his conversion to Islam, was considered a laudatory thing.

It should be noted that there were fundamental contradictions between the *Yāsā* and the Muslim *Sharī'a*, certainly in such areas as ritual purity and the slaughter of animals.²⁸ The disparity between the two codes is further highlighted by al-Ṣafadī's statement on the precept authorizing (or necessitating) marriage with the widows of one's father. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that al-Ṣafadī does not provide detailed information on the *Yasa* as a whole (as understood by Ghazan or himself), beyond this statement, along with the additional remark that Ghazan, out of pride in the *Yasa*, refrained from letting it be known that he understood Arabic and Persian,²⁹ preferring to communicate in public only in the languages of the steppe nomads, Mongolian and Turkish (N.B. this is not a precept *per se*). In spite of the vagueness as to the contents of the *Yāsā*, it is clear, however, that the intention here is to refer to some kind of corpus of law, i.e. the so-called Great *Yāsā* of Chinggis Khān, to which great respect is accorded.³⁰

Al-Ṣafadī also gives us some evidence regarding the long-term fate of the *Yasa* in the *Ilkhānid* state. He quotes al-'Umarī, who in turn cites the Mamlūk amīr Sayf al-Dīn Aytamish al-Nāṣirī, noted as 'the most knowledgeable person of his time regarding the affairs of the Mongols.'³¹ Aytamish states that after Ghazan's death the 'Yasa of the Mongols (*yāsā al-mughul*) passed away.'³² Aytamish's comment on the fate of the *Yasa* brings to mind the remark of the Mongol general Qutluḡ-shāh, upon witnessing a debate of Muslim scholars, c. winter 707/1307–8:

What is this that we have done, abandoning the new *Yasa* (text: *yasaq*) and *yosun* of Chinggis Khan, and taking up the ancient religion of the Arabs, which is divided into seventy-odd parts? The choice of either of these two rites would be a disgrace and a dishonourable act, since in the one, marriage with a daughter is permitted and in the other, relations with one's mother or sister. We seek refuge in God from both of them! Let us return to the *Yasa* and *yosun* of Chinggis Khan.³³

Further evidence on the long-term fate of the *Yasa* in the *Ilkhānid* state is given by al-'Umarī, who states that the *Yasa* was maintained in the Chaghatayid Khanate as well as the realm of the Qa'an, as opposed to the *Ilkhānid* kingdom and the Golden Horde.³⁴

It would seem that in spite of Ghazan's attempts to enforce the *Yāsā* as he understood it, a lapse was perceived not long after his death by at least one senior Mongol officer. It appears that within several years the al-'Umarī, had gained the upper hand over the *Yasa*. This does not mean that there was a deliberate wholesale jettisoning of the *Yasa* by

the Khan or the Mongol leadership, but rather a process, perhaps subconscious in part, during which the precepts of Islam became more firmly rooted—at least in theory—among the Mongol leading class. On the other hand, citing Dr. Morgan, if Qutluğshāh's monologue 'was at all typical, the Mongols had not as yet acquired a very profound knowledge or understanding of the tenets of Islam.'³⁵

Another area of Mongol imperial culture which might have been influenced by Ghazan's conversion to Islam was his relationship to the Qa'an/Great Khan,³⁶ to whom Hülegü and his successors had preserved a formal allegiance. It should be remembered that just prior to Ghazan's conversion and his accession to the throne, Qubilai Qa'an had died. Ghazan perhaps, then, had a convenient opportunity to change the nature of his relations with the theoretical leader of the Mongol world. In fact, al-Ṣafadī and al-ʿUmarī unequivocally state in parallel passages that such a transformation indeed took place. The longer passage in al-Ṣafadī's *Wāṭi* will be cited:

After this [time], Ghazan started called himself Khan (*tasammā bi'lqāniyya*), and³⁷ had himself mentioned in the *khutba* (Friday sermon) and on coins³⁸ without the name of the Great Khan (*al-qān al-akbar*).³⁹ He drove [the Great Khan's] representative (*nā'ib*) from his country. None of his forefathers and princes of his family had done this before Ghazan. Rather Hülegü and all those who came after him had lowered themselves to the position of viceroy (*nā'ib*) of the Great Khan. None of them were called Khan, but rather they were called Sultan so-and-so (*fulān*). The striking of coins (*sikka*) and the *khutba* was in the name of the Great Khan, not them. If one of them (i.e. Hülegü, etc.) was mentioned by name, it was in a subservient fashion. Yet they were the kings of the country; they had the right to collect taxes, and to appoint and dismiss people.

The Great Khan had among them a representative; [in theory] they would enact orders after consulting with him. In fact, they did not consult him. When Ghazan drove out [the representative of the Great Khan] and became absolute ruler, he was censured for his. He said: 'I did not take the kingship [with the help] of Chinggis Khan, or anyone else. I took it only with my sword.' No one dared answer him. He gained absolute control of the Khanate (*al-qāniyya*). Those who came after him followed him [in this manner] until the end of time (i.e., the end of the *Ilkhānid* state). The Great Khan could do nothing to dispute this except by words.⁴⁰

I said: For this reason, there is no mention of ‘Hūlākūhī (sic),’ ‘Abaghāwī,’ ‘Arghūnī’ gold [coins], but only ‘Ghāzānī,’ ‘Khurbandī’⁴¹ and ‘Bū Sa’idī’ gold [coins], since Ghazan is the first in this country who had the striking of coins [in his] name; those who [came] after him followed him [in this manner].⁴²

Al-Ṣafadī misleads us when he states that Ghazan’s adoption of the title *khān* was without precedent, since Hülegü had used this title on his coins until the appearance of *īlkhān* (usually translated as ‘subject *khān*’) c. 658/1260.⁴³ What al-Ṣafadī perhaps meant to say is that in general Ghazan had dropped from his coins (and elsewhere perhaps) the title *ilkhān*, which may well have signified his subservient role *vis-à-vis* the Qa’an, and had returned to the perhaps more ambiguous *khān*. (Interestingly enough, in these entries, al-Ṣafadī only applies *īlkhān* to Ghazan once, when listing his titles and appellations at the beginning of the accounts.) In any case, al-Ṣafadī is generally correct in his description of Ghazan’s changing protocol. Unlike Hülegü, Abagha and Arghun, Ghazan had dropped the mention of the unnamed Qa’an (*qā’ān* al-Ṣafadī from the Arabic legends of the coins minted in his realm.⁴⁴ This would explain the remark at the end of the third paragraph, that before Ghazan, none of the *īlkhāns* had gold coins (i.e. *dīnārs*) named after them, since their coins were minted under the auspices of the (unnamed) Qa’an.

How much this represented a radical change in Ghazan’s relationship towards the Qa’an is unclear. Certainly, al-a’zam claim that Ghazan drove out the representative of the Qa’an is untrue. This representative was Bolad Aqa, who had arrived in the *īlkhānate* in 1285, during Arghun’s reign (1284–91) and remained in his position until his death in 1313.⁴⁵ There is evidence that some relations were maintained between the Qa’an and Ghazan. The Qa’an Temür Öljeitü (1294–1307) named Ghazan as ‘the prince who establishes peace in the Western Lands’.⁴⁶ There is also evidence of Ghazan sending an embassy to Temür Öljeitü in 1298, in part to collect dues owed to Ghazan from the manufacture of certain goods in China.⁴⁷ It would seem then that Ghazan, in spite of the change in his protocol and his conversion to Islam, maintained at least a formal allegiance to the Qa’an. The information related by al-Ṣafadī and al-‘Umari regarding the totality of Ghazan ‘declaration of independence’ is thus somewhat misleading.

Two additional points related to this passage need clarification. First, al-Ṣafadī writes that previous to Ghazan, the Hülegüid rulers had used the title *sulṭān*. Actually, this title is only occasionally found in *īlkhān*id

protocol before Ghazan's reign. It is not even found in the beginning of Aḥmad Tegüder's letter to Qalawun, although the Mongol ruler had become a Muslim.⁴⁸

The second point refers to the second paragraph. Ghazan is reported to have said: 'I did not take the kingship [with the help] of Chinggis Khan, or anyone else. I took it only with my sword.' Although it may appear otherwise at first glance, this claim is not denigrating Chinggis Khan. Rather, Ghazan appears to be saying that Chinggis Khan is irrelevant to his own claim to the kingship *vis-à-vis* other Mongol princes: in a sense, their descent from Chinggis Khan gave them all an equal claim to kingship. What bestowed upon Ghazan the right to rule was that he had defeated his rival 'with [his] sword'.⁴⁹ In passing it might be mentioned that this particular passage is reminiscent of a passage from al-ʿUmari: Ghazan, when countering Jochid claims to Azerbaijan presented to him by a embassy from the Golden Horde, is reported to have said: 'I only took the kingship by the sword, and not by inheritance. Among what I took and gained by the sword were Tabriz and Marāgha. Between you and me only the sword will decide regarding them.'⁵⁰ This specific version is similar to the one found in Ibn Ḥajar. Although it is possible that Ghazan used the same expression on two different occasions, it is perhaps more likely that one of the authors took a catchy phrase and applied it at an appropriate time.

It would seem, then, that although Ghazan's relationship towards the Qa'an had undergone some changes, formally he still recognized the latter's suzerainty. Whether the change was occasioned by his conversion to Islam, reflected Ghazan's view of the reality of the Mongol world-system, or was merely exploiting the death of Qubilai Khan to improve his own status, remains an open question. What can be said is that in spite of his conversion, here Ghazan remained basically loyal to another tenet of the Mongol imperial legacy.

I will briefly touch upon two other areas which are relevant to the present discussion. The first is Ghazan's continued commitment to the Mongol imperial ideology. Briefly, this is the belief that Chinggis Khan had received a mandate from heaven to conquer the world and place it under his control; this mandate was to be continued and completed by his successors.⁵¹ Elsewhere I have attempted to demonstrate that Ghazan, in spite of his conversion to Islam, did not in fact eschew a belief in this ideology.⁵² Here I shall mention just two points: first, there is the Ghazan's lauding of Chinggis Khan's conquest of the world, which was cited earlier in this paper. Secondly, there are Ghazan's extremely belligerent letters to the Mamlūk Sultan, in which he is called upon to surrender or face war and destruction. In spite of the Islamic terms in which these letters are

couched, and even the Islamic rationalizations contained therein, what we have here is the traditional Mongol demand to surrender unconditionally or face the consequences.⁵³

The final area of Mongol tradition to which Ghazan's commitment will be examined is that of the Mongol folk religion, what is usually called shamanism. It should be noted that this is the only realm of Mongol tradition discussed in this paper whose existence clearly precedes the establishment of the Mongol Empire. Frankly, it should be admitted that the evidence for Ghazan's continued practice of pagan and shamanistic rituals is very sparse. Essentially there is only one piece of evidence, provided by Rashīd al-Dīn: in 1302, Ghazan participated in a traditional Mongol ritual of hanging cloth streamers to a tree and dancing around it, interestingly enough after having prayed in a Muslim manner and delivered a speech in a decidedly Islamic tenor to the assembled officers and ladies. This tree had been picked out because Ghazan had spent a night by it during a earlier, and difficult, stage of his career. Any doubts regarding the traditional Mongol nature of this ritual should be allayed by information provided in this same passage: such a ritual had been performed in Mongolia by Qutula Khan, an ancestor of Chinggis Khan, in order to fulfil an oath to his 'ancient god' (*khudāy-i qaḍīm*) i.e. Tengri of the traditional Turco-Mongolian religion.⁵⁴ It may be noted that Rashīd al-Dīn thought it politic to relate this story without comment. There is also evidence that even in the post-Ghazan period, when obedience to and concern with the Yāsā was apparently in decline, shamanistic rituals were still maintained among the Mongol élite of the Ilkhānid state.⁵⁵

One conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that Ghazan's Islam was a syncretist faith: having converted, he maintained a belief in various aspects of Mongol custom and tradition, much of which explicitly contradicted the precepts of his new religion. I would suggest that this syncretism also characterized the Islam of the Mongols as a whole, certainly of their élite. This is indicated by the above-mentioned participation of the Mongol officers and ladies in a pagan ritual. Only afterwards—gradually and perhaps never fully—were the elements of Mongolian tradition weeded out. We learn, then, that the conversion of the Mongols, with Ghazan at their head, fits into the pattern of 'communal conversion', where—in the words of Professor Nehemia Levtzion—'Islam was adopted by ethnic groups in their own milieu, while maintaining their own cultural identity. There was hardly a break with past traditions, and pre-Islamic customs and beliefs survived.'⁵⁶

The syncretic nature of the Islam of the newly converted Mongols was also perceived by a contemporary observer in Mamlūk Syria, the theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who condemned them

accordingly. In a *fatwa* (formal legal opinion), issued probably just before Ghazan's third offensive against Syria in 702/1303, Ibn Taymiyya cast aspersions on the sincerity and quality of the Islam of the Mongols. Among the reasons adduced were that many of the Mongols do not follow the commands of the Muslim **Shari'a** (such as pilgrimage, prayer and fasting), but rather the Law of Chinggis Khan, referred to not as *Yasa*, but with the Islamic terms *sunna* and *al-Ṣafadi's*. In addition, they put Chinggis Khan on a par with **Muhammad**, and pay obeisance to him. They maintain their belief in conquering the world: submission to them is more important than Islam.⁵⁷ While it is true that Ibn Taymiyya was writing anti-Mongol propaganda, he cannot be accused of inventing slanders against Ghazan to satisfy his Mamlūk masters; Ibn Taymiyya consistently took an independent line and often went to prison rather than recant.⁵⁸

It is noteworthy that Ibn Taymiyya's opinion was shared by none other than Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü, who said of his brother in a letter to the Mamlūk Sultan: 'He was a Muslim on the outside, but an infidel on the inside.'⁵⁹ It is admittedly difficult, however, to decide how much of this statement was a result of Öljeitü's desire to put some distance between him and his brother, in the interest of diplomacy, and how much was brought about by a deeply held conviction regarding the quality of the latter's Islam.

Not only was Ghazan's Islam syncretic but following *al-Ṣafadi*, it appears that this Islam was (initially at least) not very deeply held. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the story of Bulughan Khatun. In the light of this evidence, Rashīd al-Dīn's account of the affair would seem to be a cover-up. There is no reason to reject *al-Ṣafadi's* story. Certainly the latter was writing long after the end of the Mamluk-**Ilkhānīd** war and the demise of the **Ilkhānate**. The Islamization of the Mongols (or their Turkified descendants) was a fact. Thus there was no compelling political reason for him to cast aspersions upon the Islam of the Mongol rulers. The result of this story—especially when taken together with additional evidence presented above—is that Ghazan's reputation as a devout, orthodox Muslim is somewhat tarnished. We are left, then, with an inconsistent, even confused, but certainly more historically convincing convert to Islam.

Footnotes

¹ This is an expanded version of a paper read at the 204th Annual Meeting of the American Oriental Society at Madison, WI, on 23 March 1994. I would like to thank Dr. David Morgan and Dr. Igor de Rachewiltz for reading drafts of this paper and their many useful comments.

² H.H.Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, III (1888), 383–4; A.C.M.D’Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, IV (repr., Tientsin, 1940, of La Haye and Amsterdam, 1835), 132–3; J.A.Boyle, ‘Dynastic and political history of the Ī-Khāns’, in *The Cambridge history of Iran*, v, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge, 1968), 378–80; A.Bausani, ‘Religion under the Mongols’, *Cambridge history of Iran*, v, 541–3.

³ ‘*Pādshāh-i Islām*: The conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān’, *Pembroke Papers*, 1, 1990, 159–77.

⁴ *ibid.*, 171.

⁵ MS Topkapi Sarayl, Ahmet III 2920/25, fols. 60b–Z65b. This entry is found under the entry: ‘Maḥmūd b.Arghūn al-Mughulī al-Jinkiz Khānī’ with ‘Ghāzān al-Mughulī’ in the margin; Maḥmūd was the Muslim name which Ghazan adopted upon his conversion. In another unpublished volume of *al-Wāḥid bi’l-wafayāt* (MS Bodleian Arch. Seld. A.28, fol. 75b), there is a very short entry for ‘Ghāzān’, but this is a cross-reference, sending the reader to the article Maḥmūd b.Arghun...’ upon which the present article is based.

⁶ Two Istanbul manuscripts of *A’yân al-ʿaqr* were consulted: MS Süleymaniye, Aya Sofya 2968, fol. 3b–7b [henceforth: MS AS]; MS Topkapi Sarayl, Emanet Hazine 1216, fol. 128b–130b [henceforth: MS EH]. A facsimile edition of *A’yân al-ʿaqr*, based on MS Süleymaniye, Atif Ef. 1809, has recently been published by F.Sezgin (Frankfurt a.M., 1990). This last mentioned manuscript, however, does not contain the biography of Ghazan. Sezgin, in the introduction to his edition (p. vii), writes: ‘We had to substitute five missing pages (vol. 2, pp. 326–330), which we took from the eighth part of the autograph in the Aya Sofya collection (no. 2968), fols. 1b–3b.’ Actually these folios are taken from MS Aya Sofya 2967, which also lacks the entry for Ghazan, as found in MS Aya Sofya 2968.

⁷ On the relationship between *al-Wāḥid bi’l-wafayāt* and *A’yân al-ʿaqr*, see D.P.Little, *Al-Ṣafadī* as biographer of his contemporaries’, in D.P.Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic civilization presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden, 1976), 190–210 (repr. in D.P.Little, *History and historiography of the*

Mamluks [London, 1986], art. I). Al-Ṣafadī is clearly the source for the entry on Ghazan in the fifteenth-century *al-Durar al-kāmina fi a'yān al-mi'a al-thāmina* by Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449). In this paper I have used the five-volume Cairo edition (1966) of the work; Ghazan's biography appears in vol. m, 292–4 (no. 3313). This corresponds with the Hyderabad edition (1348–50/1929–32, four volumes), III, 212–14.

⁸ Wāḥidī, fol. 60b; *A'yān*, MS EH, fol. 128b; Ibn Hajar, III, 212.

⁹ Thus in Wāḥidī, fol. 62b; the appellation *al-mutatabbib* can be translated as 'the practitioner of medicine'. In *A'yān*, MS EH, fol. 128a, he is called instead *al-ṭabīb*. On this personality, who died in Damascus in 726/1326, see the introduction to K. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich: al-Umarī's*

Darstellung der mongolische Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-ahyār fi 'l-mamālik al-amṣār (Wiesbaden, 1968), 29 (there called al-Arbīlī). Al-Umarī cites him several times for information on the Chaghatayid Khānate (ibid., 75–7).

¹⁰ On her, see Ch. Melville, 'Bologhān Kāūn', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IV, 339. F.D. Lessing (ed.), *Mongolian-English dictionary* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), gives the spelling of this word (meaning 'sable') as *bulayan*, but cf. G. Doerfer, *Mongolische und türkische Elemente in Neupersischen* [henceforward: TMEN] (Wiesbaden, 1962–75), I, 215.

¹¹ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, III, ed. 'A. 'Alizādah (Baku, 1957), 301; = K. Jahn (ed.), *Geschichte Güzün-Hün's aus dem Ta'riḥ-i-Mubārak-i-güzāni des Rashīd al-Dīn*... (London, 1940), 80 (left column). As far as I can tell, this story is not mentioned in Wāṣṣāf's history (*Ta'rīkh-i waṣṣāf al-haḍra = waTajziyat al-amṣār wa-tajziyat al-a'sār* [repr. Tehran, 1338S./1959, of Bombay 1269H/1852–3]).

¹² Boyle, 'Il-Khāns', 380, cites the Qur'ān, IV, 26: 'And marry not women whom your fathers have married: for this is a shame, and hateful, and an evil way; though what is past may be allowed to happen.' Boyle wonders how any self-respecting Muslim dignitary could have officiated at such a ceremony, which blatantly contradicted the *Sharī'a*. See also J. Schacht, 'Nihkāh, I in the classical Islamic law', *ErI*, VIII, 27.

¹³ The matter of the Yasa will be discussed below; in passing it might be mentioned that the term 'yasa' could also refer to a particular precept and not just the entire legal corpus. This particular rule is mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn (ed. 'Alizādah, 6), who writes that Hülegü thus married his father's widows 'in accordance with the Yasa (*ba-rāh-i yāsāq*)'. On this practice, see William of Rubruck, in A. van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, I (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 184–5; translation in P. Jackson (tr.), and P. Jackson and D. Morgan (introduction, notes and appendices), *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (London, 1990), 91–2, and n. 1 on p. 92. Boyle, 'Il-Khāns', 380, shows that this custom was well established among the Mongol royal family in Iran, as well as being an ancient practice among the tribes of the Eurasian steppe.

¹⁴ Wāḥidī, fols. 62b–63a; *A'yān*, MS EH, fol. 128a; MS AS, fol. 3b; cf. the

summary in Ibn Hajar, III, 292–3, which differs in details from that presented by al-Ṣafadī. It is interesting to note that the unnamed scholar mentioned in this passage was subject to some criticism for his permissive interpretation of the law, but he replied that adopting an indulgent position and thus preventing Ghazan's apostasy and his subsequent antipathy to Islam was the best solution. This cogent explanation was accepted.

¹⁵ On the *Yasa*, see P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khān: his life and legacy*, ed. and tr. T. N. Haining (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 187–96;

D. Ayalon, 'The Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān: a reexamination', *Studia Islamica*, pt. A, vol. 33 (1971), 97–140; pt. B, vol. 34 (1971), 151–80 (the four parts of this article—of which parts C1 and C2 deal with the position of the *yasa* in the Mamluk Sultanate—have been republished in D. Ayalon, *Outsiders in the lands of Islam* [London, 1988]); D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (London, 1986), 96–9; idem, 'The "Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān" and Mongol law in the Ilkhānate', *BSOAS*, XLIX, 1, 1986, 163–76; I. de Rachewiltz, 'Some reflections on Cinggis Qan's *Jasay*', *East Asian History*, 6, 1993, 91–104. The transliteration of *Yasa* presents some problems. I have eschewed the original Mongolian form *Jasay*, in favour of that based on the Turkic derivative *yasa* which is used in the Muslim sources. This is usually rendered *yāsā* or *yāsa* in the Arabic and Persian texts, although *yāsāq* is also found.

¹⁶ On the previous folio of *Wāḥī* al-Ṣafadī cites al-'Umari on Ghazan's name and genealogy, as well as his physical characteristics and personality. The mention of the languages which Ghazan knew, etc., would seem to be a continuation of this description. According to Little, 'Ṣafadī', 203–4, virtually all of the information which al-Ṣafadī derived from al-'Umari was transferred orally and not through the latter's written works.

¹⁷ Thus in *Wāḥī A'yān*, MS AS, has 'he spoke Turkish, Mongolian and Persian'; MS EH, omits Turkish from the list.

¹⁸ This form is closer to the Mongol *Jasay*. *ta'āzuman li-ajal yāsā jinkaz khān al-khālīqā*.

¹⁹ *Wāḥī*: *ahadha nafsahu fī al-siyāsa ma 'khadh jinkiz khān*. The parallel passage in *A'yān*, is slightly different, but more clear: *ahadha nafsahu bi-ṭarīq jinkiz khān*. At the beginning of the entry, however, the latter work does have the following sentence: *lamma malaka, akhadha nafsahu fī l-mulk ma 'khadh jinkaz khān*.

²⁰ On the argh *ū* (generally *yarghū* < Mongolian *Jaryu*), the Mongol combination of committee of inquiry and court-martial, and *Jaryuči* see D. Morgan, 'The "Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān"', 173–6.

²¹ *Wāḥī* fol. 61a; some minor differences are found in *A'yān*, MS EH. 128a-b; MS AS, fols. 3b-4a, which are noted above; there is a short

summary in Ibn Hajar, III, 212. For *aghā* (< Mo. *aga*; Turkish *ary*) and *īnī* (< Tu. *ini*), see Doerfer, *TMEN*, I, 133–40, II, 226. The sentence would seem

to mean that cadet member of the Mongol royal family in the **Ilkhānate** were to defer to the senior members, with the added implication that the present hierarchy, with Ghazan at the summit, was to be maintained.

²² According to Rashīd al-Dīn (ed. 'Alizādah, 379;=ed. Jahn, 171), Ghazan knew besides Mongolian some Arabic, persian, 'Hindī', 'Kashmīrī', Tibetan, 'Khittā'ī', Frankish and other languages. B.Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 4th ed. (Leiden, 1985), 380, n. 59, notes that Turkish should have been mentioned in this passage. Whether Ghazan actually spoke all of these languages remains a moot point. It is possible that **al-Ṣafadī** (and al-'Umari) may have known of Ghazan's linguistic skills and just did not bother to list the non-Islamic languages. Spuler, it should be added, doubts Ghazan's knowledge of Arabic.

²³ Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 511 [=ed. Jahn, 303], cited in Morgan, "The "Great **Yāsā** of Chingiz Khān",', 172, but compare his comment.

²⁴ J.A.Boyle (in the glossary of *The successors of Genghis Khan* [New York and London, 1971], 341), writes of the *yosun*: 'Mongol customary law, as distinct from the *yasa* of Genghis Khan.'

²⁵ See *The Secret History of the Mongols*, tr. F.W.Cleaves (Cambridge, MA, 1982), I, 271; Doerfer, *TMEN*, I, 149–52.

²⁶ See *Secret History*, tr. Cleaves, I, 276; Doerfer, *TMEN*, I, 424.

²⁷ Rashid al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 251;=ed. Jahn, 8. This passage is mentioned briefly in Morgan, "The "Great **Yāsā** of Chingiz Khān",', 172.

²⁸ See the comment of P.Jackson, 'Chaghatayid Dynasty', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, v, 344.

²⁹ I understand that the expression '*tu'āpuman*' refers to both Persian and Arabic. Thus he did not reveal that he understood Arabic and spoke Persian only with a few close associates 'out of pride in the *yasa*'.

³⁰ The term *yasa* is subsequently used in the biography in a meaning different from a corpus of laws, but rather as an individual command; **Wāḡī**, fols. 61b-62b; *A'yān*, MS. EH, fol. 129a; MS. AS, fol. 4a. For the application of the term **Yāsā** to the individual commands of a particular Qa'an, and in one case to the orders of Chaghatai, see Morgan, "The "Great **Yāsā** of Chingiz Khān",', 166–73.

³¹ *Wafi*, fol. 62b; *A'yān*, MS EH, fol. 129b; MS AS, fol. 5a. Aytamish (or Etmish), a trusted *mamlūk* of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b.Qalawun (709–741/1310–1341), was an adviser on Mongol affairs and served as an envoy several times to Abū ^{Abū Sa'id} **Yāsā** of Chingiz Khān', pt. C2, 131–40; D.P.Little, 'Notes on Aitamiš, a Mongol Mamluk', in U.Haarmann and P.Bachmann (ed.), *Die Islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter and Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag* (Beirut, 1979),

³² Wāfī, fol. 62b; *A'yān*, MS EH, fol. 129b; MS AS, fol. 5a-b. The expression *yās al-mughul* is found only in *A'yān*; in Wāfī the word *yās* is missing. Only *A'yān*, mentions that al-'Umarī is the ultimate source of this information.

³³ Qashani, 98, cited in Morgan, 'The "Great Yās of Chingiz Khān"', 172, on which this translation is based.

³⁴ Al-'Umarī, ed. Lech, p. 41 of Arabic text.

³⁵ Morgan, 'The "Great Yās of Chingiz Khān"', 172. Qutluğ-shāh also had a confused idea of some aspects of Mongol history: in a conversation with the Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiyya, he stated that Chinggis Khan (who he claimed was his ancestor) was a Muslim; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *al-Kanz al-durār wa-jāmi' al-ghurar*, ix, ed. H.R. Roemer (Cairo, 1971), 32, citing the historian al-Birzālī, who in turn recorded this from Ibn Taymiyya's testimony.

³⁶ The Qa'an, sometimes called the Great Khan, was the supreme ruler of the Mongol empire, while 'khān' was applied to lesser Mongol princes who ruled the *uluses* (royal appanages which eventually became independent states). For these two titles, see I. de Rachewiltz, 'Qan, Qa'an and the seal of Güyüg', in K. Sagaster and M. Weiers (ed.), *Documenta Barbarorum: Festschrift für Walther Heissig zum 70. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden, 1983), 281–98.

³⁷ MS Wāfī: *aw*, which is a mistake for *wa-*; the latter particle is found in *A'yān*.

³⁸ The mentioning of a name in the sermon and on the coinage are the two major symbols of sovereignty in traditional Islamic political life.

³⁹ cf. al-'Umarī 78, where the title 'Great Khan' is rendered *al-qān al-kabīr*. In general, both al-Ṣafādī and al-'Umarī use *qān* instead of the more usual *khān* found in the Mamlūk sources. *Qān* is closer to the Middle Mongolian *qan*, while *khān* resembles the Turkic form of this title. Both authors write *jinkiz khān* for Chinggis Khan, as this must have been a fixed expression. Besides the usage of *khān* in this case, al-'Umarī uses *khān* only twice in the part of al-'Umarī's work edited by Lech (see index, s.v. *khān*).

⁴⁰ Much of this information in these two paragraphs is found, albeit in a more condensed form (but with some additions) in al-'Umarī, who cites Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī; Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, 19 of Arabic text; 32–4 of introduction (for information on al-Isfahānī). Al-'Umarī wrongly ascribes to Arghun the addition of his name to that of the Qa'an on coins. In reality, Hülegü had already begun doing this.

⁴¹ Kharbanda (Per. 'Ass-Herd') was the original name of **Öljeita** (Mon. 'Lucky One'), Ghazan's brother and successor who ruled 1304–16. He was also known by the name Khudābanda (Per. 'Servant of God'), as well as **Muḥammad**. See Boyle, 'I-Ikhāns', 398.

⁴² Wāḡī, fol. 62a-b; cf. **A'yān**, MS EH, 129a–b (missing a line of text on fol. 129b); MS AS, fols. 4b–5a, for some minor differences. Cf. also the shorter version in al-'Umari, ed. Lech, Arabic text. 19.

⁴³ See N. and R. Amitai-Preiss, 'Two notes on the protocol on Hülegü's coinage', *Israel Numismatic Journal*, 10, 1988–89 [1991], 117–21;

R. Amitai-Preiss, 'Evidence for the early use of the title **īkhān** among the Mongols', *JRAS*, NS, 1, 1991, 353; in idem, 'An exchange of letters in

Arabic between Abaya **īkhān** and Sultan Baybars (A.H. 667/A.D. 1268–9)', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 38, 1994, 11–33, there is a discussion of other possible translations of this term: I am now less certain that 'subject *khan*' is the correct translation.

⁴⁴ See the discussion in T. Allsen, 'Changing forms of legitimization in Mongol Iran', in G. Seaman and D. Marks, *Rulers from the steppe: state formation on the Eurasian periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 230–1, who also mentions a Mongolian legend on Ghazan's coins minted in Georgia which mention the Qa'an.

⁴⁵ Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 221–4; E. Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols de Fadl Allāh Rashid-ed-Din* (Leiden and London, 1910), 231–2; T. Allsen, 'Two cultural brokers of medieval Eurasia: Bolad Aqa and Marco Polo', in M. Gervers and W. Schleppe (ed.), *Nomad diplomacy, destruction and religion from the Pacific to the Adriatic* (Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia, no. 1, Toronto, 1994), 63–78.

⁴⁶ Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 222; Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols*, 230.

⁴⁷ P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I (Paris, 1959), 120–1; for the return of this embassy, see *ibid*, I, 393. See Allsen, 'Legitimization', 241, n. 67 for evidence of other missions.

⁴⁸ Appendix to al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk fi ma'rifat al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, I, ed. M. M. Ziyāda (Cairo, 1934–9), 978.

⁴⁹ This brings to mind the tanistry thesis suggested by J. F. Fletcher, 'Turco-Mongolian monarchic tradition in the Ottoman Empire', *Harvard Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 3–4, 1979–80, 236–51; see also Morgan, *The Mongols*, 38–9.

⁵⁰ III, 293. Ibn **Hajar**, however, says that Ghazan said this when he drove out the Jochid representatives from Rūm (Anatolia; according to the editor, one MS reads Iraq). Al-'Umari, ed. Lech, 79.

51 On this ideology, see the discussion and bibliography in R.Amitai-Preiss,

Mamluks and Mongols: the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war, 1260–1281 (Cambridge, 1995), 10–11.

52 See R.Amitai-Preiss, ‘Aims and motivations of Ilkhanid strategy towards Syria and the Mamluks’, in D.Morgan (ed.), *The Mongol Empire and its legacy*, forthcoming.

53 Besides the discussion in the article mentioned in the previous note, see T.Raff, *An anti-Mongol fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya* (privately printed, Leiden, 1973), 33–5. On p. 30, Raff discusses the use of both Islamic and Chinggisid motifs in Ghazan’s proclamations to the population of Damascus in 699/1300.

54 Rashid al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alīzadah, 350–1;=ed. Jahn, 141–2; cited in Boyle, ‘Il-Khāns’, 392–3. For *khudā-y-i qadīm* (and *khudā-y-i dā’im*) as Tengri, see S.Heidemann, *Der Aleppiner Kalifat (AD 1261): vom Ende des Kalifates in Bagdad über Aleppo zu den Restauration in Kairo* (Leiden, 1994), 332–3, 336, 338.

55 See Boyle, ‘Il-Khāns’, 402.

56 N.Levtzion, ‘Towards a comparative study of Islamization’, in N.Levtzion, *Conversion to Islam* (New York and London, 1979), 19.

57 Ibn Taymiyya, *shar‘ fatāwā ibn taymiyya* (Beirut, n.d.), IV, 280–98, esp. 286–8. This passage is analysed in detail by Raff, *An anti-Mongol fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya*, 44–59; see *ibid.*, 5–7, for a discussion of the dating of this *fatwa*. A summary of Ibn Taymiyya’s approach is found in Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr* (Cairo, 1342/1923), n, 67, who uses the word *yāsāq* (sic) for the Mongol *Majmū’a*; see the discussion in E.Sivan, *Radical Islam: medieval theology and modern politics* (New Haven, 1985), 96–7.

58 See D.P.Little, ‘The historical and historiographical significance of the detention of Ibn Taymiyya’, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 4, 1973, 311–27 (repr. in Little, *History and historiography*, art. VII). Cf. Sivan, *Radical Islam*, 96–7, who suggests that Ibn Taymiyya’s hostility to the Mongols was due to the fact that he had fled as a child from Mongol-controlled territory, and was thus suffering from a ‘refugee syndrome’.

59 Ibn al-Dawādārī, IX, 127.

Marco Polo and his ‘Travels’¹

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The year 1998 marks the seven-hundredth anniversary of the initial composition of the book associated with Marco Polo, *Le devisement dou monde*. As the first European to claim that he had been to China and back (not to mention that he had travelled extensively elsewhere in Asia), Polo has become a household name. He has been credited with the introduction of noodles into Italy and of spaghetti into China. With perhaps greater warrant, he has been cited as an authority on—*inter alia*—the capital of the Mongol Great Khan Qubilai, on the Mongol postal relay system, on the trade in horses across the Arabian Sea, and on political conditions on the north-west frontier of India in the mid thirteenth century. The *Marco Polo bibliography* published in 1986 contained over 2,300 items in European languages alone.²

But Marco Polo’s reliability has been a matter of dispute from the beginning. It has recently been proposed that the incredulity he met with on his return to Venice sprang from an unwillingness to accept his depiction of a highly organized and hospitable Mongol empire that ran counter to the traditional Western Christian view of the ‘barbarian’ and especially the view of the barbarian Mongols that had obtained since the 1240s.³ Polo has also met with scepticism from modern commentators. A few years ago, the approach of the rather fine book by Dr John Critchley was that the Polo account is a more valuable source for the minds of late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Western Europeans than for contemporary conditions in Asia. For Critchley, therefore, the question of the authenticity of the Polo material is very much a secondary consideration.⁴ More recently, Dr Frances Wood has queried whether Polo was ever in China. She concludes that the famous Venetian probably never got much further than Constantinople or the Black Sea.⁵ The argument tends to be based (1) on omissions which would supposedly not have been made by anyone who had genuinely visited the country: Polo’s failure to mention foot-binding, tea-drinking, or the Great Wall, for instance; (2) on the fact that Polo’s name has so far not come to light in any Chinese source; and (3) on what can only be regarded as deliberate falsehood, such as the alleged participation of the Polos in the siege and capture of a Chinese city which is known to have been over one year prior to their arrival. Of these objections,

the failure to mention the Great Wall carries little weight, given that we can be fairly certain it had not yet been built: walls there certainly were, but not the continuous and impressive structure we see today, which apparently dates from the sixteenth century, the era of the Ming dynasty.⁶

In fact, the authenticity of Polo's stay in 'Cathay' was first challenged years ago, partly for such reasons as these but also on the grounds that the Chinese section contains remarkably little in the way of personal reminiscence and that the accounts of Chinese cities are frequently vague (not to say bland) and hardly compare with the vivid descriptions of life in the Mongolian steppe.⁷ Indeed, one could find further grounds for challenging Polo's firsthand familiarity with the Middle Kingdom: that the book neglects, for instance, to mention finger-printing, a technique with a long history in China.⁸ It seems to me, however, that to consider the visit to China in isolation is to set about it the wrong way: we need, rather, to take the work as a whole. In this paper I want to address the following questions. What is the book we associate with Polo's name? With what purpose was it written? What claims does it make for itself? To what extent does it purport to represent Polo's own experiences? Just where did Polo go? This last question is particularly central to my paper.

Asia in the era of Marco Polo

First, it is necessary to put the travels in context.⁹ The voyages of the three Venetians, Marco Polo, his father Niccolò and his uncle Maffeo, date from an era when much of Asia lay under the rule of the Mongols; although even as the elder Polos set off on their first journey in the early 1260s the unitary Mongol empire was dissolving into a number of rival khanates, of which those of the Golden Horde (in the steppes of southern Russia) and of Persia were closest to the territories of the Catholic West. Only the Mongol rulers of Persia, the so-called *Īl-khāns*, acknowledged the Great Khan (*qaghan*) Qubilai, whose dominions lay in the east and who was able to compensate himself for the hostility of many of his relatives by completing the conquest of southern China in 1279. For all the book's protestations, the mighty ruler of Cathay immortalized by Polo (and later by Coleridge) was in fact the first *qaghan* not recognized throughout the Mongol empire.¹⁰

The subjection of much of Asia under a single government had greatly facilitated the opportunities for both merchants and missionaries to travel from western Europe across the continent, opportunities which were not appreciably reduced by the empire's disintegration into a number of constituent states.¹¹ In the eastern Mediterranean, Italian and other Latin merchants were active in ports like Ayas (Ajaccio) in the kingdom of Lesser Armenia, lying at the terminus of one of the overland trade routes through the Mongol empire.

From the mid thirteenth century merchants from the great Italian commercial cities, Venice, Genoa and Pisa, were beginning to travel at least in Persia and the lands of the Golden Horde.¹² The appearance of rival Mongol khanates further gave rise to promising diplomatic contacts. After the Muslim khan of the Golden Horde reached an understanding with the Mamluk government at Cairo in 1262, negotiations (ultimately fruitless) began between the Pope and various Western monarchs on the one hand and the *Īl-khāns* on the other regarding the possibility of military collaboration against Egypt, as the principal bastion of Muslim power.¹³ But the shadows were already closing in on the Latin states in Syria and Palestine. When Marco Polo accompanied his father and uncle on their second journey in 1271 the great port of Acre was still in Christian hands; but by the time the Polos came back, the fragile Western settlements had been

overwhelmed by the Egyptians (1291).

Authors and copyists

Who wrote the book? There has been widespread agreement that the original language was a form of Old French strongly influenced by Italian. The style is consonant with the story given in the Prologue to what is possibly the earliest surviving MS (the Paris MS fr. 1116, known as F), that Polo dictated his experiences in a Genoese prison in 1298 to a fellow-captive, the Pisan romance-writer Rusticello.¹⁴ But other versions, in other Western languages, were already being made in the early years of the fourteenth century. It has been proposed that Rusticello had a hand only in the production of one version and that subsequently Polo had other co-authors.¹⁵ One hundred and twenty MSS survive in total. Many contain material not found in others. It seems that F itself is the result of abridgement, and hence that some of these other versions represent MS traditions which are in fact older than F; in other words, that F is not the closest in content to the original.¹⁶ The most important traditions, apart from F, are: T, MSS of a Tuscan version, known as *l'Ottimo*, 'the Best', made by Niccolò degli Ormanni, who died as early as 1309;¹⁷ P, a Latin translation made by the Dominican Friar Francesco Pipino of Bologna from a text in the Venetian dialect, at some time between 1310 and 1314 (and now represented by the largest single group of MSS); Z, another Latin version (but quite independent of P), represented primarily by a Toledo MS of the fifteenth century; and R, the MS used by Ramusio in the mid sixteenth century as the basis for his printed edition and now lost (the edition contains a great many, though not all, of the passages otherwise found only in Z, as well as passages not found in any other extant version).

Many phrases in different MSS may reflect embellishments and accretions due to particular copyists, working in some cases very soon afterwards but in others, perhaps, up to a century and a half later. But the discovery of the fifteenth-century MS Z in Toledo in 1932 revolutionized scholarly thinking on the subject: the fact that so many passages hitherto found only in Ramusio's edition were encountered also in Z obviously tended to make the Ramusio text appear far more dependable.¹⁸ And since much of the material found in Z, but not present in F, would have been too interesting simply to have been omitted, it is conceivable that these earlier accretions represent supplementary oral information from Marco Polo himself.¹⁹ This had

happened with two previous visitors to the Mongols, both Franciscan friars, the papal ambassador John of Plano Carpini and the missionary William of Rubruck. Carpini, returning to the West in 1247, had been in great demand as a dinner guest, and we know at least that the Italian Salimbene de Adam obtained further information from him which is not found in his report.²⁰ Rubruck, an unofficial visitor to the Mongol empire, was nevertheless contacted in Paris a few years after his return by the English Franciscan Roger Bacon, who exploited the opportunity to check particular details in the Flemish friar's *Itinerarium* before incorporating them in his own work.²¹

If I have spent so long on the issue of Polo MS traditions, it is in order to make two important and related points at the outset. First, the book—in any of the forms that have come down to us—is not by Marco Polo. We simply cannot be certain what was in the work originally drafted by Rusticello on the basis of Polo's reminiscences in a Genoese prison. Even if we possessed that original, Polo's own perspective on late thirteenth-century Asia would be refracted for us through the prism of Rusticello's prose. And secondly, this means that we cannot afford to lay too much stress on matters that the book does not mention. Given the kind of material found only in Z, for instance, but omitted in other texts because some copyist did not find it sufficiently interesting, we are hardly in a position to claim that Polo was never in China because he failed to refer to foot-binding or tea-drinking. They might have been mentioned in some MS (or group of MSS) now lost. (In fact, it has been overlooked that Z does mention the fact that Chinese women take very small steps, but gives a somewhat arcane explanation for it (I, 305), on which I do not propose to expatiate.)

Corroborative material

What other information is available to supplement the details furnished by the book about the Polos? How do we know that they actually travelled anywhere at all? Apart from the information supplied in the MSS themselves, sources for Polo's experiences are few. There are some that are near-contemporary, such as the *Imago Mundi* of Jacopo d'Acqui, which dates from the fourteenth century. It is d'Acqui who tells us that after his return Polo was captured in a sea battle with the Genoese in 1296 off Ayas in Lesser Armenia, and that in his final illness he was urged to excise passages that were exaggerated and incredible; Polo allegedly replied that he had not told half of what he had seen.²² The physician and philosopher Pietro di Abano (d. 1316) claims to have met Polo, 'the most extensive traveller and the most diligent inquirer that I have ever known'.²³ Pipino claims in his preface that he spoke to those who had known Marco and also that the latter's father and uncle had vouched for his veracity.²⁴ It is also worth noticing that according to one fourteenth-century French MS a version from which it was copied had been presented by Polo himself to Thibaut de Cepoy, visiting Venice as the agent of the Capetian prince Charles of Valois in 1307.²⁵ Lastly, documents from the Polo family have survived. Marco's own will (dated 1324) is less informative than that of his uncle Maffeo (1310), which refers to 'the three tablets of gold which were from the magnificent Chan of the Tartars' (a term that could apply either to the *qaghan*, to the *Īl-khān* or to the *khān* of the Golden Horde); it is presumably one of these which is listed in an inventory of Marco's property drawn up in 1366, during one of the numerous disputes among his extremely litigious kinsfolk.²⁶ What became of the tablets thereafter is, regrettably, unknown.

The fullest source outside the book itself is Ramusio's introduction to his sixteenth-century edition; but the details found here have to be treated with caution, since we do not know their provenance (possibly in some cases genuine traditions preserved at Venice over the previous 250 years) and in a number of instances Ramusio is demonstrably wrong. On the other hand, much of the additional material in his text has an authentic ring and is difficult to account for if it did not in fact emanate from someone who had visited the Far East (the edition, it should be noted, dates from 1553, some years before Europeans again

began to establish themselves in China). But what we are to make of the claim, found only in Ramusio's introduction, that Polo sent home to Venice from his Genoese prison and asked his father to forward his notes,²⁷ and that he profited from the assistance of a noble Genoese in writing the book,²⁸ is anybody's guess.

The aim of the book

With what purpose was the book written? The result, we must presume, of its having been written by a professional romance-writer is that the style of the work is heavily formulaic. Of several Chinese cities we learn little more than that the people are idolators, subject to the Great Khan, use paper money and live by trade and industry. Particularly towards the end there are set battle-scenes, in which identical phrases occur with remorseless regularity: men and horses are slain in profusion, severed arms and legs lie strewn about, and the din is so great that 'you could not hear God thundering' (a phrase encountered half a dozen times in F). All the stock-in-trade of medieval French writers is naturally imported: 'And what shall I say?... 'Why make a long story of it?' (this sometimes a few pages too late.) The book is also rambling and discursive, at times irritatingly so: 'But I will go on to tell you also a marvel which I had forgotten to tell' (I, 188; cf. also 216); 'again I will tell you a thing which I had forgotten...' (I, 244; cf. also 277, 407). Even more evocative of a thoroughly disordered mind are the abrupt and maddening changes of direction:

Now since we have told you of these Tartars of the Levant then we will leave them for you and will turn again to tell about the Great Turquie [i.e. Turkestan] so as you will be able to hear clearly. But it is truth that we have told you above all the facts of the Great Turquie...and so we have nothing more to tell of it. So we will leave it and will tell you... (I, 469).

Or still worse:

Now we will leave this and will tell you of the Greater Sea [i.e. the Black Sea]. Yet it is true that there are many merchants and many people who know it; but there are also plenty more of such as do not know it and for such as these one does well to put it in writing. And we will do so... [There follow three lines of text about the mouth of the Black Sea; following which] And after we had begun about the Greater Sea then we repented of it, of putting it in writing, because many people know it clearly. And therefore we will leave it then, and will

begin about other things... (I, 477).

There can be no unanimity regarding the purpose for which the book was produced. It may be that Marco Polo conceived of writing a merchant's handbook in the strict sense—a by no means improbable aim for a member of an Italian merchant family. The various texts do contain references to products and their prices, sometimes in Venetian values,²⁹ and the spices that are not imported into Europe are plainly of no interest.³⁰ But Marco does not emerge from the book in the guise of a merchant.³¹ If a merchant's handbook was ever the aim, it was submerged beneath the priorities of Rusticello and other copyists. The Z text is content to say that Polo whiled away his enforced leisure hours in prison by compiling the work 'for the enjoyment of readers' (*ad consolationem legentium*). There is a fuller statement in F:

He says to himself that it would be too great evil if he did not cause all the great wonders which he saw and which he heard for truth to be put in writing so that the other people who did not see them nor know may know them by this book (I, 73).

The same theme recurs later, at the beginning of the section on India:

which are indeed things to make known to those who do not know them, for there are many wonderful things which are not in all the rest of the world, and for this reason it does well and is very good and profitable to put in writing in our book (I, 353).

So far, then, a concern for the transmission of *mirabilia*. But Jacques Heers has drawn attention to the emphasis on the excellence of the Christian faith and on its triumph.³²

It is clear that even in Polo's lifetime the value of the book varied with the translator or copyist and the era. The fact that a French ambassador, then in Venice to organize a crusade against Byzantium,³³ asked for and received a copy from Polo himself suggests that it might, even at this early date, have acquired an interest for would-be crusaders contemplating the Mongol alliance. And it is worth noticing that some MS copies are found bound up with crusade treatises or related matter.³⁴

Similarly, for some copyists the information it included that was especially relevant pertained to the religious beliefs of the various peoples it surveyed. For that reason the Z scribe frequently noted in the margin *adorant ydola*, and the Dominican Pipino, who had composed his Latin translation for the 'reverend fathers' of his Order and replaced the F prologue with one of his own, lays great stress on

the salvation of souls: whether it is the case that those reading of the marvels of creation in Polo's book will be led to wonder all the more at the power and wisdom of God, or that the hearts of 'some devoted to religion' will be stimulated to carry the Gospel to 'the blinded nations of the infidels, where the harvest truly is great but the labourers are few'.³⁵ The difference of approach is sometimes starkly in evidence, as when Polo is speaking of marriage customs in Tibet. The basic text is found in F: 'And there is such a custom of marrying women as I shall tell you: it is true that no man would take a maiden for wife for anything in the world...' [unless she has first lain with many men]. In a mid fifteenth-century Venetian MS, this sentence begins: 'And there is such a pleasing custom of marrying women'; for Pipino, some generations earlier, it had to be 'such a custom of marrying women as I shall tell you, an absurd and most detestable abuse coming from the blindness of idolatry...' (I, 269–70). Such preoccupations rendered it by no means incongruous for all three Polos to appear in friars' garb in the illustrations to certain MSS.³⁶ In one case, indeed, material from the itinerary of the fourteenth-century Franciscan traveller Odoric of Pordenone is inserted at intervals in an abridged Polo text.³⁷

The Prologue purports to furnish a framework for the second and main part of the book, 'a description of the diverse parts of the world'.³⁸ The phrase is revealing, and has been too often overlooked. Although material is often introduced by the first person ('I Marco'), the tone is more frequently impersonal: 'When one leaves this city, one travels...' 'One finds...' In fact, it is generally unclear whether the Polos' own travels are the sole source for the information given; the origin of the information is usually left unspecified. The book is therefore emphatically not a narrative of the Polos' travels, of the sort that we find, for instance, in the reports of Carpini and Rubruck.³⁹ If it were an itinerary, the order of places followed in southern Persia would be bizarre in the extreme. And it is important to note that the treatment is, if anything, *more* impersonal in the sections on Persia and Central Asia than in those on China. In western Asia, Polo virtually parachutes into a few localities—Sāwa and a neighbouring village (I, 113–16), where he picked up stories about the Magi; Hurmuz (I, 123–6); a plain in Kirmān where he narrowly escaped capture by the Qara'una Mongols (I, 122); and Badakhshān, where he fell ill (I, 138, R only):⁴⁰ there is little sense of an itinerary. By contrast, the points at which the reader is most strongly under the impression of following in the footsteps of an individual traveller occur in various journeys within 'Cathay': there is no comparison here with the highly improbable description given of China in the 1340s by the Moroccan pilgrim Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (demonstrably an authentic traveller as far as India).⁴¹

As a whole, however, the Polo book represents an attempt to set out an encyclopedic survey of the different parts of the world ‘in order’. The phrase ‘in order’ recurs extremely frequently, but the order is manifestly not that of any particular journey made in the past: the writer and reader, in Critchley’s winsome phrase, ‘travel through the book together’⁴²—and it might be added that they frequently turn aside to places that lie off this imaginary route. The only chronological framework is to be found in the prologue, which tells of the departure of Maffeo and Niccolò Polo from Constantinople in 1260 (1250 in all the manuscripts), recounts their return to Venice and their second departure, this time with Niccolò’s 15-year-old son Marco, and ends with the three travellers’ homeward journey by way of Persia, as ambassadors from Qubilai escorting the imperial princess Kökechin to the **Il-khān** Arghun, in the early 1290s. And even here there is no intimation of route other than a brief allusion to Java.

Personal observation or hearsay?

What claims does the book make for itself and for the Polos? The reader is at intervals assured that the contents are authentic. 'I shall bind myself for certain not to say more of it than is according to the truth' (I, 177, from VB). This statement is found in one of the Venetian MSS, which perhaps understandably take some interest in trophies that they claim Marco brought back to Venice, like a specimen of the hair of the wild ox from Ergiuul (Erji'ül, i.e. Liangchou)⁴³ and the dried head and hooves of a musk-deer (I, 179, from VB). When on the island of 'Lesser Java' (Sumatra), he obtained some brazil seeds which the travellers took back and planted at Venice, though 'it did not grow there at all' (I, 376), and when in Maabar (Ma'bar; the Coromandel coast of southern India) he took some earth from the place where St Thomas had been martyred and was able to heal many with it back home in Venice (I, 398). In other contexts it is merely claimed that Marco witnessed something, as for example that he saw the head of a gigantic fish in an idol-temple at Quinsai and heard several times the count of the annual revenues of that city (I, 341, Z only; I, 342); and Ramusio's text adds that he saw an estimate of the customs dues there (I, 340). According to one Venetian MS, he had the opportunity to measure a wing-feather of the *ruc* which was brought to Qubilai's court (I, 431, from VB).

Marvels, perhaps; but there is remarkably little of the fabulous. Admittedly, we are treated to an account of men with tails inhabiting the kingdom of Lambri (I, 376). But even Carpini, a sober diplomat with a brief to inform the pope of all he had seen in the Mongol world, had mixed in with it well-worn *topoi* with a pedigree that went back to the Alexander Romance: tales about dog-headed people, a race with no heads at all, those with only one leg who propelled themselves along by cartwheeling, and so on. By comparison the Polo account is remarkably restrained, at times even rigorous.⁴⁴ Great care is taken *not* to claim that Polo saw the *ruc* (I, 430–1). The book seeks to put the record straight regarding the salamander (asbestos) which is not consumed by fire: not an animal, as hitherto believed, but a cloth manufactured out of a vein in the earth (I, 156).⁴⁵ It is also concerned to explain tales about the unicorn (in this case, evidently a rhinoceros) and the trade in what purported to be pygmy corpses (actually the dried and decorated carcasses of monkeys) on Sumatra (I, 372). There

is the attempt—by this time obligatory for all European travellers in Asia—to locate Prester John, and the Polo account is an interesting and not unintelligent variation on previous themes (I, 181–3).⁴⁶ There are improbable stories, certainly: a long tale about the Christian inhabitants of a village near Baghdad, oppressed by an evil Caliph, who were able by dint of prayer to induce a mountain to move as promised in the Gospel (I, 105–12); or the shoemaker of Baghdad who, after lusting after a beautiful woman who entered his shop, put out his own eye because it was better to enter Heaven with one eye than to go to Hell with two (I, 108–9); or the relation of the death of the last caliph of Baghdad, whom the Mongols allegedly left to starve amidst the treasure he had accumulated instead of spending it on his army (I, 102–3). Such tales are met with in other sources, and Polo (and indeed anyone else) could have picked them up in eastern Christian circles when passing through Persia or Iraq on the way home.⁴⁷ And it has been suggested that he could have heard a tale about a miracle involving a church at Samarqand that was threatened by the venom of local Muslims (I, 144–6) from a Nestorian prelate domiciled at Chên-chiang-fu, Mar Sargis, whom he mentions elsewhere (I, 323) and who is known to have originated in Samarqand.⁴⁸ Generally speaking, the accent, in other words, is on the edifying and the moralistic, rather than on the zoologically preposterous.

The book is concerned to detach hearsay from personal experience. At the outset we find an assurance to this effect:

But there are some things which he did not see, but he heard them from men fit to be cited and of truth. And therefore we shall put the things seen for seen, and the heard for heard, so that our book may be right and truthful, with no falsehood... (I, 73).

Although it cannot be said that this laudable aim is adhered to consistently, it nevertheless does resurface at intervals:

But do not believe that we have treated of the whole province of Catai [north China] in order, nor indeed of a twentieth part; but only as I Marco used to cross through the province, so the cities which are on the way across are described (I, 309, Z only).

Regarding Mangi (Man-tze, i.e. south China) we read in F: ‘We have not told you of the nine provinces [“kingdoms”] of Mangi but of three: these are Yangiu, Quinsai and Fugiu...’. The Z text adds: ‘Of these three, however, we have told you this in order because Master Marco

made his passage through them, for his way was directed thither. But of the other six also he heard and learned many things...; but because he was not in any of them as he was in Quinsai...and because he did not travel over them he would not have been able to tell so fully as about the others, so we will leave them aside' (I, 353). Similarly, when we reach the island of 'Lesser Java', to F's statement that it contains eight kingdoms a fourteenth-century Latin MS adds: 'of which I Marco was in six, namely in the kingdoms of Ferlec, Basman, Sumatra, Dagroian, Lambri and Fansur, but I was not in the other two' (I, 371); and subsequently we find: 'And we will tell you nothing of the other kingdoms on the other side [i.e. on the southern coasts of Sumatra] because we were not there at all' (I, 377). The lengthy section on the 'Old Man of the Mountain' (the head of the sect of the Assassins) is prefaced with the words: 'I Master Marco Polo heard it told by several men...' (I, 129). The account of the salamander/asbestos in 'Ghinghin Talas' is credited to a 'companion, named Çulficar, a Turk..., who stayed three years in that province for the Great Khan to have that salamander brought out'; but, the author adds, 'I saw them myself' (I, 156–7). At one point, in the account of the city of Quenlinfu (Chien-ning fu),⁴⁹ Ramusio's text inserts the words, 'and I was told, though I did not see...' (I, 346).

In the vast majority of cases where there is a personal note, incidentally, it is Marco's experiences that are transmitted, and not those of his father and uncle. Exceptions are the reference to all three Polos staying for a year in the city of Campçio (Kan-chou) 'for their business which is not worth mention' (I, 160),⁵⁰ and the discovery, during a visit by Marco and his uncle to the city of Fugiu, of a strange sect whom they identified as Christians (I, 349, Z only), although modern commentators have seen here an isolated pocket of Manichaeans.⁵¹ But generally speaking the elder Polos are eclipsed: what they saw on their first journey across Asia to Qubilai's court, the Prologue tells us, Marco also saw (later), 'and so he will tell you clearly in the book below' (I, 77).⁵²

So where precisely are we told that Marco Polo went? If we take the book at face value, Marco himself was employed on numerous missions by the *qaghan*, on which he was under orders to write interesting reports, and these were the means whereby he was so well informed about the world (I, 87). The suggestion has been made that this helps to explain the tone of much of the information, given the formulaic character of Chinese reports of this kind—and, incidentally, of those of Venetian ambassadors.⁵³ Some of this imperial business seems to have involved land journeys through China. Thus Marco was sent as messenger to Qarajang, i.e. Yün-nan (I, 86); and he also travelled westwards for four months' journey from Qubilai's capital,

Khanbaligh, and Pul-i Sangin ('the bridge over the Sang-kan')⁵⁴ lay en route (I, 255). Elsewhere we are told that 'from Sindufu [Sheng-tu] one sets out and rides quite seventy days' journey through provinces and through lands [in] which we have been and have written them in our book above' (I, 300).

But there are other references to sea voyages on Qubilai's behalf, entailing visits to the great Chinese ports to which the book devotes so much attention. Considerable stress is laid upon Marco's experience of India (i.e. south and south-east Asia in general):

Moreover, I tell you quite truly that Master Marco Polo stays there in India so long and knows so much of them, of their affairs and of their customs and of their trade, that there was scarcely a man who would know better how to tell the truth about them... (I, 354).⁵⁵

In fact a careful reading reveals that an account of India is practically as vital to the book's purposes as is the account of China: 'our book was not yet filled with that which we wish to write there,' the reader is assured, 'for there were wanting all the doings of the Indians' (I, 353). Marco had allegedly just returned from India when the *qaghan's* envoys to the *Il-khān* Arghun ascertained that the land route across Asia was unsafe, i.e. in about 1290 (I, 89; embellished in some other MSS); which was why he and his father and uncle were able to latch onto the embassy when it was decided to go by sea to Persia instead.

The book claims that Polo was in six out of the eight kingdoms on 'Lesser Java', as we have seen, and was marooned in one of these, 'Sumatra', by adverse weather for five months (I, 373). It was presumably by sea also that he visited Āiampa (i.e. part of present-day Vietnam: I, 368), whose king, he learned, had fathered 326 children. We cannot always be sure whether a particular visit—that to the island of Lesser Java, for instance—occurred in the course of the long return journey or formed part of some earlier official mission; and the various MS traditions render it difficult for us to know, in some cases, because they contradict one another. Thus a Venetian MS adds that Polo was part of an embassy which Qubilai sent to Ceylon to ask its king for an enormous ruby and that he saw the ruby with his own eyes, though the mission was a failure (I, 380); whereas Ramusio's text specifies that Polo stopped off in Ceylon on the way home (I, 407). The two statements are not mutually exclusive, of course. Similarly, the visit to Maabar, on which Polo says he witnessed its king being pursued for debt and which is mentioned without embellishment by Z, is alleged in Ramusio's text to have fallen during the return voyage (I, 389). The halt at the great port of Tana in Gujarat (I, 421), on the other hand, is

most likely to have occurred just prior to the Polos' arrival in Persia.

Europeans in Mongol Asia

How plausible, then, is the book as a whole? The notion that Italian merchants might travel from Europe across the breadth of Asia, and come back to tell the tale, is not as far-fetched to us, of course, as it would perhaps have appeared to the citizens of Venice around 1300. It seems that the arrival of Europeans of some sort (*Fu-lang*, i.e. 'Franks') at Qubilai's court is recorded in the Chinese annals as early as 1261, though the obscure details associated with them, which include a reference to the Land of the Midnight Sun, make it unlikely that they were Italians: more probably they hailed from Scandinavia or from some northern Russian city like Novgorod.⁵⁶ The Italian presence in the Far East (as opposed to Persia) was more a feature of the fourteenth century, and even then the Venetians appear to have been outnumbered by their rivals the Genoese, who already by c. 1320 had a reputation for unrivalled daring and curiosity: Polo learned that they had recently ventured onto the Caspian Sea (I, 99).⁵⁷ But we do have evidence that Venetians had got as far as China at least by the time the Polos embarked on their return voyage. The Franciscan missionary John of Montecorvino—later, in 1307, to become the first Latin archbishop of Khanbaligh—speaks in his third letter of a Venetian merchant, Pietro da Lucalongo, who had travelled out with him to China from Tabriz in 1291 and purchased for him the land on which he had built his church.⁵⁸ The remarkable thing about the Polos' two journeys to the *qaghan's* court is that they occurred some years before an Italian presence in the Far East is documented.

What we know of Yüan China from other sources—notably the *Yüan Shih*, the dynastic history compiled after the fall of the Mongol regime in 1368, but from contemporary records—serves to make much of the detail of the account of Polo's activities there rather convincing. Even the mention of asbestos deposits appears apt, since Qubilai's finance minister Ahmad had in 1267 submitted a memorial to the throne in which he advocated their proper exploitation.⁵⁹ Nor were far-flung missions on the *qaghan's* behalf uncommon either by land or by sea. Qubilai is known to have despatched a party to explore the sources of the Yellow River in 1281,⁶⁰ and the Mongol government's concern to revive trade with the Indian subcontinent and the islands of the eastern archipelago is apparent from 1278 onwards. Yüan embassies visited **Ma'bar** in 1280, Ceylon, Ma'bar and Kawlam

(Quilon) in 1281, Ceylon again in 1282, Kawlam in 1283, and Ma'bar in 1285, 1287 (with Ceylon) and 1290. The purpose was not always simply an exchange of goods. The 1282 mission appears to be that mentioned in the Polo texts (though with the year 1281 or, in one MS tradition, 1284), since one of its goals was to inspect or secure the alms bowl and mortal remains of the Buddha (identified by Polo as 'Adam': I, 411); and the envoys in 1290 were under orders to bring back men of learning and interpreters.⁶¹

The Polo texts do not claim that the Venetians participated in all of the embassies mentioned. Thus in the account of the mission sent to Ceylon in 1281 to ask its king for relics of Adam the book makes no mention of Marco or his father and uncle. Admittedly Qubilai is not known, from Chinese sources or indeed any others apart from the Polo book, to have employed expatriate Europeans (and Chinese sources are remarkably unhelpful in this regard, given their tendency to lump together everyone from the West, whether Muslims or Central Asian Buddhists, as *Hsi-yü*, 'Westerners', or *Se-mu*, 'people of diverse nations').⁶² On the other hand, Qubilai's relatives the *Īl-khāns* certainly employed Europeans. Such men are found as early as the 1260s acting as interpreters and envoys on behalf of Hülegü and Abaqa.⁶³ Ghazan, who eventually married the princess Kökechin and himself became *Īl-khān* in 1295, had in his service around 1300 a Pisan called Isolo; and he and his father Arghun were represented on diplomatic missions to Western Europe in 1289–91 and in 1302 by a Genoese named Buscarello di Ghisolfi.⁶⁴

It may be that we can begin to explain the frustrating nature of much of the detail on China. In the first place, Marco spent a significant proportion of his 17 years in the *qaghan's* service travelling abroad, possibly in the main to the ports of southern India. And secondly, both then and during his stay in China itself, he would have associated largely with non-Chinese: this would account for the absence of references to tea-drinking. As a foreigner in the imperial service, he would have been employed as part of a deliberate policy of reducing dependence on the native Chinese.⁶⁵ Nor would he have been required to learn the Chinese language. That he did not seems clear from his error in interpreting the Chinese title of the Mongol general Bayan ('Cingsang' = *ch'eng-hsiang*, 'minister') to mean 'a hundred eyes' (I, 310, 311);⁶⁶ although this does, incidentally, look like just the kind of mistake that could only have been made by someone who had visited China. Competence in other languages was at a premium in the Yüan dominions, as it had been throughout the Mongol world since the beginning.⁶⁷ The book does not specify which were the 'languages and four letters and writings' that Marco Polo learned (I, 86). Two of them were almost certainly Persian and Turkish (the languages of most of

the non-Mongol foreigners employed in the administration), and it has been suggested that the other two were both Mongolian, but written in two distinct alphabets, the older Uighur script and the new *phagspa* script introduced by Qubilai's regime in 1269 and borrowed from Tibet.⁶⁸ There is nothing surprising about the fact that the information in the book has in large measure a Persian slant: similarly, merchants who told the Master of the Temple in Cyprus some time before 1308 about the great Chinese port of Hsin-Ts'ai (Hang-chou) employed an Arabic-Persian form ('Hansa') not too remote from the 'Quinsai' of the Polo account.⁶⁹ Persian was by now a *lingua franca* throughout much of the Mongol empire,⁷⁰ and was doubtless the language Marco knew best. He was an alien who was surely thrown together with other aliens, and it is through the eyes of aliens that we see late thirteenth-century China in the book.

The status of the Polos

It is not so much the main portion of the book that fails to withstand scrutiny as certain of the details supplied in the Prologue, specifically regarding the status enjoyed by the Polos. Let us examine the story, which begins with a commercial expedition by Maffeo and Niccolò from Constantinople to the lands of the Golden Horde. Here they allegedly found themselves unable to retrace their steps owing to the war that had broken out between the khān, Berke, and his southern neighbour, the ḡl-khān Hülegü (a war known to have begun in 1261–62), and so travelled east into Central Asia, where they met an envoy from Hülegü to Qubilai's court and were persuaded to accompany him to the *qaghan* (I, 74–7). As Pelliot pointed out some decades ago, the war between Berke and Hülegü in the Caucasus region hardly prevented the Venetians from returning via the Pontic steppes, and the real reason must have been the problems that developed between Berke and the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus and which led to a Mongol invasion of Thrace at some point in the early 1260s.⁷¹

Qubilai sent back the Polo brothers with a gift of some asbestos cloth (I, 157–8) and with the Mongol noble 'Cogatai', as his ambassadors to the Pope, who was asked to send 100 Christian missionaries; and he instructed the Venetians in addition to obtain for him oil from the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem (I, 78–9; cf. also I, 201–2). What became of the asbestos cloth, we are not told; but both the other details of their commission are strikingly reminiscent of episodes documented elsewhere. When the Nestorian prelate Mar Yaballaha and his companion Rabban Sauma travelled from China to Persia in c. 1275, we are told that they went on Qubilai's behalf and that the *qaghan* had given them garments with which they were to touch the Sepulchre after dipping them in the Jordan.⁷² And again, a few years later, in 1278, we learn from a letter of Pope Nicholas III to Qubilai that the *qaghan* had asked his short-lived predecessor, John XXI, for the despatch of missionaries.⁷³ So there is nothing particularly odd about Qubilai's commission to the Polo brothers; although equally, it raises the possibility that Rusticello inserted the details about Jerusalem in the light of Rabban Sauma's own relatively recent visit to western Europe as the ambassador of the ḡl-khān Arghun: it is worth noting that the Nestorian had spent the winter of 1287–88 in Genoa,

where his arrival had created a great stir.⁷⁴

‘Cogatai’ having fallen ill en route and been left behind, the Polo brothers continued on to Acre, but were unable to prosecute their business because their arrival there (probably in April 1269) fell during a three-year vacancy in the Holy See: this fits well, since no pope was elected for three years following the death of Clement IV in 1268. On the advice of the papal legate at Acre, they waited until the election of a successor and occupied themselves with a visit to their home in Venice. After two years, with the conclave still undecided, they determined to return to Qubilai before it was ‘too late’. Leaving Venice once more, this time with Niccolò’s young son Marco, they stopped off at Acre, where they consulted the legate, Tedaldo Visconti, archdeacon of Liège. He furnished them with a letter to Qubilai certifying that they had been prevented from fulfilling their mission by the vacancy in the Holy See. But they had got no further than Ayas when they learned that the legate had himself been elected Pope as Gregory X; and soon afterwards the new Pope himself ordered them to return. The Polos thus became part of a diplomatic mission from Gregory to Qubilai. Initially they were accompanied by two Dominican Friars, named as Niccolò da Vicenza and William of Tripoli. The friars took fright, however, at the news of a devastating invasion of Armenia by the Egyptian Sultan Baybars, handed over their letters to the Polos, and returned with the Master of the Templars. The Polos pressed on, and after a three and a half year journey reached the *qaghan’s* court (I, 80–4).

M.H.Laurent, who examined the account of the early journeys in the Prologue in some depth, concluded that the details can all be harmonized with known conditions, except that the book makes two different clerics into one: the legate on the first occasion was William of Agen, who died in April 1270, and not Tedaldo Visconti, who was in Palestine only for something like 12 months, from the autumn of 1270 until he left Acre for Italy in November 1271.⁷⁵ Contrary to the Polo prologue, it does not seem that Tedaldo was ever papal legate. He is described merely as a pilgrim in the *Estoire de Eracles*, which mentions his arrival in Palestine, and in the dedication of William of Tripoli’s *De Statu Sarracenorum*;⁷⁶ and it is difficult in any case to see how he could have been appointed on the death of William of Agen in 1270, given that there had been no pope for two years.

Laurent’s otherwise admirably meticulous study left two details unexplored. One relates to the Egyptian invasion. Only a single Armenian source mentions this campaign, for the good reason that it never materialized. News reached the capital, Sis, that Baybars was on his way north, and this caused some alarm; King Leo III was able to

deflect him with a placatory embassy.⁷⁷ As we learn from Arabic chroniclers, which completely neglect to mention Armenia in this context, the whole affair had been a false alarm. At Damascus Baybars received word of advance of a Mongol army from Ilkhanid Persia in October 1271. From ^Ḥamā he sent ahead two expeditionary forces which penetrated as far as Mar'ash and Edessa (al-Ruḥā) respectively, but he himself advanced no further than Aleppo before withdrawing southwards in response to an attack on Caco (Qāqūn) by the Lord Edward, then on crusade in Palestine. The sultan was back in Cairo by December.⁷⁸ We could surmise that the two friars deserted the mission on hearing the news of the Mongol attack, which at this early stage might have seemed at least as threatening. But the Mongol advance was in response to an appeal from the Lord Edward, and one early recension of the Polo book has Pope Gregory sending the Venetians and the two friars specifically to secure aid from the Ḥl-khān Abaqa for a future crusade (I, 83).⁷⁹ On these grounds Soranzo as long ago as 1930 suggested that Gregory's embassy was in fact directed to Abaqa. This would rather undermine the need for any pusillanimous reaction on the part of the Dominicans.⁸⁰

The second detail relates to the letters which the pope entrusted to the friars. To write to the *qaghan* when merely archdeacon of Liège on pilgrimage in the Holy Land is one thing; it is quite another to do so immediately after being elected pontiff. We might have hoped that Gregory, mindful of the importance his correspondence had now acquired, kept a copy to be inserted in the registers after his arrival in Italy. No such copy has survived.⁸¹ Arguments from silence are always hazardous. But it is odd that Gregory seemingly failed to recall his letter to Qubilai at the time of the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, and that, when Pope Nicholas III came to write to the *qaghan* on 4 April 1278 (the letter we noticed above), he made no reference to a correspondence with Gregory: he mentioned only the fact that Qubilai had sent word to Pope John XXI, via the Ḥl-khān Abaqa, asking for baptism and for the despatch of missionaries (i.e. in 1276–77).⁸²

It will be observed that on two occasions the Polos are said to have been part of an embassy but deprived of the company of the official envoys en route. The Mongol noble 'Cogatai' abandoned the elder Polos on their way back from Qubilai in the 1260s (we are not told whether or not they still had a Mongol escort), and the Dominicans selected to head the mission from Gregory X in 1271 deserted the three Venetians at Ayas on learning of the northward advance of an Egyptian army. 'Cogatai' is so far unidentified.⁸³ But William of Tripoli appears to be identical with the homonymous Dominican author of the *De Statu Sarracenorum*, written at Acre and dedicated to none other than the future Gregory X: there is no corroboration of his

appointment as an ambassador to the Mongols. To be asked to believe that two members of a Mendicant Order—men who usually emerge from the sources as intrepid and conscientious observers of their Rule—panicked and aborted their mission on the rumours of the Egyptian advance places the reader's credulity under something of a strain. And taken together with the disappearance of 'Cogatai' a few years earlier, it leaves the nagging impression that the Polos had a habit of losing their fellow travellers en route. It begins to look as if Rusticello (with or without Polo) cobbled together an apparently plausible background for the outward journey. Perhaps it was not the first occasion that the Pisan writer had invented prestigious connections of this kind: the claim in one of his other works to have been lent an Arthurian romance by the Lord Edward is decidedly suspect.⁸⁴ Traders described as *mercatores et homines Abagacham* were among those who at Ayas at this very time, in October 1271, received satisfaction for losses suffered at the hands of the Genoese;⁸⁵ and it is possible that the Polos met this party in Armenia and travelled back with them to Persia. But in any case, it was not unknown for merchants to travel with friars, though in no sense forming part of their mission: the Venetian Pietro da Lucalongo, as we have seen, accompanied Montecorvino from Tabriz to China in 1291.⁸⁶

Regarding the return voyage in the early 1290s, we seem to be on firmer ground. The Polos were selected to accompany a mission taking an imperial princess, Kökechin, from China to Persia as a bride for the *Īl-khān* Arghun: she was to replace the queen Bulughan, who had recently died. The authenticity of the mission from the *qaghan* which brought the princess Kökechin is confirmed by both Chinese and Persian sources. We know that the three ambassadors named in the Polo account—the Mongol nobles Uladai, Abushqa and Qocha—received orders from Qubilai in April–May 1290 to prepare for their departure. The Ilkhanid historian Rashīd al-Dīn describes the arrival of the embassy, headed apparently by Qocha, in Persia in *c.* 1292–93: Arghun having himself died in the interim, they were received by his son Ghazan, who took delivery of the princess and sent a share of the *qaghan's* gifts to his uncle, the *Īl-khān* Gaykhatu.⁸⁷ The mention of Qocha in particular appears to corroborate the statement in the Polo account that he alone of the ambassadors survived the long sea voyage. Although the Europeans are not mentioned in either of these eastern accounts, the Polo prologue here seems to do a more convincing job of linking their return from China with an episode that actually occurred. Even the detail supplied at one point elsewhere in Ramusio's text that Marco was in the plain of Hurmuz when the king of Kirmān headed an unsuccessful campaign to capture the city slots conveniently into the chronology of the return journey, since the

expedition in question can safely be dated to the winter of the Hijrī year 691/early 1292.⁸⁸

But were the Polos part of this embassy to Persia, or did they merely sail in the same fleet? And what became of the mission with which Qubilai is now said to have charged them—to the pope and the kings of France and Spain, among others (I, 90)—but of which we hear nothing further? One problem here is the insistence of Chinese imperial etiquette that foreign merchants be treated as tribute missions from subject peoples;⁸⁹ while merchants were employed as official agents representing the commercial interests of the Mongol *qaghans*.⁹⁰ The distinction between commercial and diplomatic missions had long been difficult to make in the world of the steppe,⁹¹ and visiting traders themselves could accordingly be forgiven for concluding, in error, that their functions had been extended to embrace diplomacy. As we have seen, there is no evidence for the employment of Europeans on official diplomatic missions by the *qaghan*, although such evidence does exist for Mongol Persia.

The inclusion of the Polos in official embassies, however, looks suspiciously like part of a wider tendency to magnify their role in the east. Great stress is laid upon the affection in which the Polos were held. Qubilai is said to have loved them so much that he repeatedly withheld permission for their departure; and when he finally gave them leave, it was with great reluctance (I, 88, 89). So, too, Princess Kökechin regarded each of the Polos as a father, and ‘there was nothing she would not do for them’; she is supposed to have wept when they left Persia for Europe (I, 92–3). Stuff of this sort is of a piece with the emphasis on the high esteem which Marco especially, according to the Prologue, enjoyed at the *qaghan*’s court and with his alleged capacity to draft more beguiling reports than anyone else (I, 85–7).⁹² But it should be noted that the more specific manifestations of the Polos’ indispensability are less problematic: their participation, for instance, in the siege of Saianfu (Hsiang-yang; I, 317–20), which is impossible, given the date (1273), when they could not have yet reached the Far East, and where Chinese sources ascribe their role instead to Muslim mangonel experts;⁹³ and Marco’s appointment for three years as governor of Yangiu (Yang-chou; I, 316), which Pelliot sought to explain away with the proposal that the Venetian simply had charge of the government salt monopoly in the city.⁹⁴ That these—the two most implausible claims the book makes for the Polos—are not found in certain important groups of MSS, namely Z, those based on a fourteenth-century Latin text, and some of those in Venetian dialect, is often forgotten; they may well represent interpolations of a later date.⁹⁵ It is a curious coincidence that a Venetian merchant family is known to have been domiciled in Yang-chou by 1342, when one of

them was commemorated with an impressive Latin tombstone.⁹⁶

It is not implausible that the Polos, like other Westerners (this time, Muslims and Central Asian Turks) we read of in the Chinese and Persian sources for Qubilai's reign,⁹⁷ were genuinely employed by the *qaghan* on commercial business and accompanied diplomatic missions. Rather, it is, at the very least, their role as ambassadors which is a fabrication. Despite Olschki's determination to accept that they served Qubilai in this capacity,⁹⁸ they may well have belonged to a species with which the Mongol empire had for some decades been familiar. A generation or so earlier, the Franciscan William of Rubruck had assured Louis IX of France that bogus envoys 'scurry about all over the world'. Rubruck told the story of one such impostor called Theodolus who obtained permission to travel to the Papal Curia (at some point prior to 1254). He was initially accompanied by a Mongol envoy, who fell ill, however, and died at Nicaea when the party was detained by the emperor John Vatatzes; Theodolus was thrown into prison.⁹⁹ That there were still attractions in Polo's era in passing oneself off as an official envoy emerges from a letter written to Edward I of England by two ambassadors from Mongol Persia in 1276. The ambassadors warn the king against a couple of Catalans (probably merchants) who, in company with a Nestorian Christian, had been sent by the *Īl-khān* Abaqa to purchase gerfalcons in Norway; instead they were travelling further south and pretending to be Abaqa's envoys to the various courts of Catholic Europe (the purpose, of course, would have been to obtain free gerfalcons as gifts and to pocket the *Īl-khān*'s money).¹⁰⁰ It was only natural, moreover, for expatriate Westerners to inflate their own consequence when they could safely do so hundreds of miles away. The Pisan Isolo carries off the prize in this context, because he seemingly managed to exaggerate his standing at two completely different courts. He convinced the Ilkhanid statesman and chronicler, Rashīd al-Dīn, that he was one of the rulers of Pisa, so that he was described in just those terms when Rashīd al-Dīn came to write the section of his great historical encyclopedia entitled 'History of the Franks';¹⁰¹ and when at the Papal Curia in 1301 Isolo claimed to be Ghazan's 'vicar' for Syria and the Holy Land, which the *Īl-khān* had recently (and briefly) conquered, although it is more likely that he was merely deputed to superintend the resettlement of Western colonists in the region.¹⁰² We cannot discount the probability that the Polos had embarked on a similar—but, in literary terms, a more successful—imposture.

Conclusion

The book associated with Marco Polo's name is a description of the known world rather than the memoirs or itinerary of the traveller himself; and this, together with an extremely complex and obscure MS tradition, means that we need not attach too much significance to matters that are omitted. As regards the areas the Venetians visited, the book itself makes claims that are not particularly extraordinary, and demonstrates, moreover, a readiness to distance itself from the outrageous. On several matters, such as the diplomatic and commercial contacts between Yüan China and southern Asia, the Polo texts are so well informed that it is difficult to see how Rusticello might have come by the information without an Italian who had spent time in the Far East. Marco Polo may not have travelled extensively in China, and seems to have been employed at least as much on commissions that entailed lengthy journeys by sea between China and peninsular India. In any case, apart from the two itineraries within China which bear the stamp of personal experience, the book is in large measure only loosely arranged around places which it assures us Marco or all three Polos visited; and that the Venetians were not in all the places mentioned is made quite explicit. We have, lastly, to distinguish where the book says the Polos went from the claims it makes (or some MS traditions make) for their credentials, and to confine our scepticism to the latter. The fact that Marco Polo or his co-author or later copyists exaggerated his importance while in China or on the voyage from China to Persia has long been suspected and can hardly be in doubt. But it does not in itself demonstrate that he was never in China or, worse still, never east of the Crimea.

Footnotes

¹ Earlier versions of this study were read to my colleagues in the History Department at Keele University, and to the Seminar on the History of the Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, in April 1996. I am grateful for the stimulating questions and discussions that followed.

² Hiroshi Watanabe (comp.), *Marco Polo bibliography 1477–1983* (Tokyo, 1986).

³ Martin Gosman, 'Marco Polo's voyages: the conflict between confirmation and observation', in Zweder von Martels (ed.), *Travel fact and travel fiction: studies on fiction, literary tradition, scholarly discovery and observation in travel writing* (Leiden, 1994), 72–84 (see especially pp. 76–7, 83–4). For earlier views of the Mongols, see Gian Andri Bezzola, *Die Mongolen in abendländischer Sicht: ein Beitrag zur Frage der Völkerbegegnungen (1220–1270)* (Berne and Munich, 1974); Felicitas Schmieder, *Europa und die Fremden: die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert* (Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters, 16, Sigmaringen, 1994). Similarly, the delay in the West's absorption of the new information from the 'sophisticated' East is compared with the easy assimilation of the material on the relatively 'uncivilized' Canary islanders: J.K. Hyde, 'Real and imaginary journeys in the later Middle Ages', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, LXV, 1982, 138–40.

⁴ John Critchley, *Marco Polo's book* (Aldershot, 1992), xiv; also the 'Epilogue' (pp. 178–9). My debt to Critchley's book will be apparent to anyone who has read it.

⁵ Frances Wood, *Did Marco Polo go to China?* (London, 1995): see especially her 'Conclusions' (pp. 140–51).

⁶ Arthur Waldron, 'The problem of the Great Wall of China', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XLII, 1983, 643–63; idem, *The Great Wall of China: from history to myth* (Cambridge, 1990). For a brief defence of Polo in respect of the other omissions, see J.R.S. Phillips, *The medieval expansion of Europe* (Oxford, 1988), 118–19.

⁷ For example, by John W. Haeger, 'Marco Polo in China? Problems with internal evidence', *Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies*, xiv, 1978, 22–30.

⁸ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jamī' al-Tawārīkh*, II, ed. E. Blochet (Leiden and London, 1911), 481–3, and transl. J.A. Boyle, *The successors of Genghis Khan* (New York, 1971), 280–1; see further E. Chavannes, review of Berthold Laufer, *History*

of the finger-print system (Washington, 1913), in *Young Pao*, xiv, 1913, 490–1.

⁹ Leonardo Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, (tr.) J.A.Scott (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), does a good job of placing the Polos' journeys in historical context, though the book is marred by a tendency to be too uncritical and at times excessively eulogistic.

¹⁰ David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), 118–19, 156–8.

¹¹ For what follows, see generally Phillips, chs. 5–7.

¹² Luciano Petech, 'Les marchands italiens dans l'empire mongol', *Journal Asiatique*, CCL, 1962 549–74.

¹³ J.A.Boyle, 'The Il-khans of Persia and the princes of Europe', *Central Asiatic Journal*, xx, 1976, 25–40. Denis Sinor, 'The Mongols and western Europe', in K.M.Setton (general ed.), *A history of the crusades*, III (ed. H.W.Hazard). *The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1975), 530–9. For Egypt and the Golden Horde, see S.Zakirov, *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniya Zolotoi Ordys s Egiptom* (Moscow, 1966).

¹⁴ Carl Theodor Gossen, 'Marco Polo und Rustichello da Pisa', in Manfred Bambeck and Hans Helmut Christmann (ed.), *Philologica Romanica Erhard Lommatzsch gewidmet* (Munich, 1975), 133–43.

¹⁵ Critchley, 18–19, 52.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 9, 139. For an example of a seemingly abridged passage, on 'Caragian', see the composite translation by [A. C.] M[oule and Paul] P[elliot], *The description of the world*, I, [(London, 1938, 2 vols; II is an edition of the Z version)], 278, n. 3: all future references are to this translation.

¹⁷ The most recent edition of this text is by Ruggiero M.Ruggieri (ed.), *Il Milione* (Florence, 1986).

¹⁸ See, for instance, the plea of Valeria Bertolucci Pizzorusso, 'A propos de Marco Polo et de son livre: quelques suggestions de travail', in *Essor et fortune de la Chanson de geste dans l'Europe et l'Orient latin: Actes du ix^e Congrès international de la Société Rencesvals pour l'étude des épopées romanes. Padoue-Venise, 29 août-4 septembre 1982*, II, (Modena, 1984), 797.

¹⁹ Hyde, 'Real and imaginary journeys', 130–1.

²⁰ Salimbene de Adam, 'Cronica', ed. O.Holder-Egger, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores* (Hanover etc., 1826–1913), XXXII, 210, 213.

²¹ Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, ed. J.Bridges (Oxford, 1897–1900, 3 vols.), I,

305. See generally Jarl Charpentier, 'William of Rubruck and Roger Bacon', in *Hyllningsskrift tillägnad Sven Hedin på hans 70-årsdag den 19 Febr. 1935* (Stockholm, 1935), 255–67.

²² MP, I, 31–2, 34–5. It is improbable, incidentally, that Polo was captured in the battle off Ayas in 1296; a minor sea engagement, at a slightly later date, has been proposed.

²³ Sir Henry Yule, *Cathay and the way thither*, new edn. by Henri Cordier (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, XXXIII, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XLI, London, 1913–16, 4 vols.), III, 195; a fuller quotation in Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959–73, 3 vols with continuous pagination), I, 601–2.

²⁴ Translated in MP, I, 60; also reproduced in Sir E. Denison Ross, 'Marco Polo and his book', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, xx (1934), 201 (text), 202–3 (transl.).

²⁵ This MS was used by M.G. Pauthier as the base for his edition, *Le Livre de Marco Polo* (Paris, 1865): its preface appears *ibid.*, 1–2, and is translated in MP, I, 61–2. Ross, 'Marco Polo', 192, was too dismissive of the 'De Cepoy legend', but it should be pointed out that the date of the gift, August 1307, is impossible, since De Cepoy had left Venice for Brindisi by May: Joseph Petit, 'Un capitaine du règne de Philippe le Bel: Thibaut de Chepoy', *Le Moyen Âge*, x=2e série, I (1897), 231–4.

²⁶ MP, I, 28, 556 (and cf. 555, n.l.).

²⁷ Critchley, 21. This detail is not found in Jacopo d'Acqui, as Wood claims (pp. 42, 142).

²⁸ Jacques Heers, *Marco Polo* (Paris, 1983), 290–2.

²⁹ Examples in Critchley, 34.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 49, citing MP, I, 276.

³¹ A point well made by Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, 97–9, 111; see also Heers, *Marco Polo*, 165–85, 258. But for a more positive assessment of the mercantile point of view as found in the Polo book, see Antonio Carile, 'Territorio e ambiente nel "Divisament dou monde" di Marco Polo', *Studi Veneziani*, n.s., I, 1977, 13–36; Ugo Tucci, 'Marco Polo, mercante', in Lionello Lanciotti (ed.), *Venezia e l'Oriente* (Florence, 1987), 323–37.

³² Heers, *Marco Polo*, 112–17.

³³ Critchley, 38. Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: the foreign policy of Andronicus II 1282–1328* (Harvard Historical Studies, LXXXVIII, Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 206–9.

³⁴ See Critchley, 71, 136; though he also points out (pp. 72–5) that the book's attitude towards the Mongol alliance is less than enthusiastic.

³⁵ MP, I, 59–60; and see Ross, ‘Marco Polo’, 200–1 (text), 202 (transl.).

³⁶ Olschki, *Marco Polo’s Asia*, 111, 115 (and see his fig. 3, facing p. 117).

³⁷ John J. Nitti (ed.), *Juan Fernàndez de Heredia’s Aragonese version of the Libro de Marco Polo* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1980).

³⁸ For what follows, see Jacques Heers, ‘De Marco Polo à Christophe Colomb: comment lire le *Devisement du monde*?’ , *Journal of Medieval History*, x, 1984, 125–43.

³⁹ For an attempt to outline an itinerary for the Polos, see Olschki, *Marco Polo’s Asia*, 12–38.

⁴⁰ Wolfgang Lentz, ‘War Marco Polo auf dem Pamir?’, *ZDMG*, n.F. XI, 1933, 1–32, concluded that the visit to Badakhshān was authentic.

⁴¹ See the remarks of Yule, *Cathay*, ed. Cordier, IV, 48–9, 130 n. 1, 140 n. 1; Cordier’s note on the great mosque at Canton, *ibid.*, 122, n. 1; Ross Dunn, *The adventures of Ibn Batuta, a Muslim traveler of the fourteenth century* (London, 1986), 252–3, reviews the problems, but gives Ibn **Baṭṭūṭa** the benefit of the doubt. See my review of vol. IV of the translation by H.A.R. Gibb and C.F. Beckingham, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd series, vi, 1996, 262–6.

⁴² Critchley, 81.

⁴³ Pelliot, *Notes*, II, 646–7.

⁴⁴ This did not prevent fabulous creatures finding their way into the illustrations in some of the Polo MSS: see R. Wittkower, ‘Marco Polo and the pictorial tradition of the marvels of the east’, in *Oriente Poliano. Studi e conferenze tenute all’IsMEO in occasione del VII centenario della nascita di Marco Polo (1254–1954)* (Rome, 1957), 155–72; John Block Friedman, *The monstrous races in medieval art and thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 154–8.

⁴⁵ For the old misconception, see Berthold Laufer, ‘Asbestos and salamander: an essay in Chinese and Hellenistic folk-lore’, *T’oung Pao*, XVI, 1915, 299–373.

⁴⁶ Louis Hambis, ‘Le voyage de Marco Polo en Haute Asie’, in *Oriente Poliano*, 183–4. David Morgan, ‘Prester John and the Mongols’, in Charles F. Beckingham and Bernard Hamilton (ed.), *Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost Tribes* (Aldershot, 1996), 165–6.

⁴⁷ Critchley, 83–4.

⁴⁸ Pelliot, *Notes*, II, 774–5.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, II, 814–15.

⁵⁰ For Kan-chou, see *ibid.*, I, 150–3. It is noteworthy that the Tuscan version (Ruggieri, 150) omits Marco's name here, which might suggest that the visit fell during the first journey.

⁵¹ Paul Pelliot, 'Les traditions manichéennes au Fou-kien', *T'oung Pao*, XXII, 1923, 193–208; and in his *Notes*, II, 726–8.

⁵² This reference to Marco is omitted in the Tuscan version (Ruggieri, 106).

⁵³ Critchley, 78–9, and cf. also 82–3 for pilgrims' guides; for Chinese geographical writing, see *ibid.*, xii. Heers, *Marco Polo*, 241–2, draws analogies between the tone of Polo's book and the spiced-up account of Hülegü's invasion of Persia, based on the report of **Ch'ang** Te and presented to Qubilai by Liu Yu in 1263: for the text, see Emil Bretschneider, *Mediaeval researches from eastern Asiatic sources* (London, 1888, 2 vols.), I, 122–56.

⁵⁴ Pelliot, *Notes*, II, 812.

⁵⁵ For a *resumé* of the material on India, see K.A.Nilakanta Sastri, 'Marco Polo on India', in *Oriente Poliano*, 111–20.

⁵⁶ Herbert Franke, review of Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, in *ZDMG*, CXII, 1962, 229–31; and his 'Sino-Western contacts under the Mongol empire', *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, VI, 1966, 54–5.

⁵⁷ Guillaume Adam, 'De modo Sarracenos extirpandi', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades* [hereafter *RHC*]. *Documents Arméniens*, II (Paris, 1906), 553. See also the comments in B.Z. Kedar, *Merchants in crisis* (New Haven and London, 1976), 10–11; Michel Balard, 'Les Génois en Asie centrale et en extrême-orient au XIV^e siècle: un cas exceptionnel?', in *Économies et sociétés au moyen âge: Mélanges offerts à Édouard Perroy* (Paris, 1973), 681–9.

⁵⁸ 'Epistolae Fr. Iohannis de Monte Corvino', in Anastasius Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana, I. Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 352–3; tr. in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol mission* (London, 1955), 229. For the date of Montecorvino's departure from Tabriz, see his second letter, in Van den Wyngaert, 345 (tr. Dawson, 224).

⁵⁹ Laufer, 'Asbestos and salamander', 365.

⁶⁰ Emilio Bottazzi, 'Un'esplorazione alle sorgenti del Fiume Giallo durante la dinastia Yüan', *Annali: Istituto Orientale di Napoli*, n.s. XIX, 1969, 529–46, with the year 1280 in error. Herbert Franke, 'The exploration of the Yellow River sources under emperor Qubilai in 1281', in G.Gnoli and

L.Lanciotti (ed.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata* (Rome, 1985), 401–16; repr. in Franke, *China under Mongol rule* (Aldershot, 1994).

⁶¹ W.W.Rockhill, 'Notes on the relations and trade of China with the eastern archipelago and the coast of the Indian Ocean during the fourteenth century: part I', *T'oung Pao*, xv, 1914, 429–42.

⁶² Ch'ên Yüan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols*, tr. Ch'ien Hsing-hai and L.Carrington Goodrich (Monumenta Serica Monographs, xv, Los Angeles, 1966), 1–2. Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks on the language problem in Yüan China', *Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia*, v, 1967, 65.

⁶³ Denis Sinor, 'Interpreters in medieval Inner Asia', in Marcel Erdal (ed.), *Studies in the history and culture of Central Eurasia* (Jerusalem, 1982=Asian and African Studies, XVI), 307–16.

⁶⁴ Jean Richard, 'Isol le Pisan: un aventurier franc gouverneur d'une province mongole?', *Central Asiatic Journal*, xiv, 1970, 186–94; repr. in his *Orient et Occident au Moyen Âge: contacts et relations (XIIe-XVes.)* (London, 1976). Jacques Paviot, 'Buscarello de' Ghisolfi, marchand génois intermédiaire entre la Perse mongole et la Chrétienté latine (fin du XIII^{me}-début du XIV^{me} siècles)', in *Storia dei Genovesi*, XI (Genoa, 1991), 107–17. Sinor, 'The Mongols and Western Europe', 534–7.

⁶⁵ Morris Rossabi, 'The Muslims in the early Yüan dynasty', in John D.Langlois (ed.), *China under Mongol rule* (Princeton, 1981), especially 257–60, 270–95; idem, *Khubilai Khan: his life and times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), 70–5. For a revisionist view of the effectiveness of this policy, especially in the later decades of Mongol rule, cf. Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian rule in China: local administration in the Yuan dynasty* (Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph series, 29, Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 78–88; see *ibid.*, 122, for the social isolation of the Mongols (and presumably, therefore, of other foreign officials) in Yüan China.

⁶⁶ Pelliot, *Notes*, I, 68. Francis Woodman Cleaves, 'The biography of Bayan of the Bārin in the Yüan Shih', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XIX, 1956, 186–8. Polo (or perhaps Rusticello) transferred to Bayan's Chinese rank an incorrect explanation of the Mongol name *bayan* ('rich') as deriving from Chinese *po-yen*, 'hundred eyes'.

⁶⁷ Sinor, 'Interpreters', 307–16.

⁶⁸ On this script, see N.N.Poppe (ed.) and John R.Krueger (tr.), *The Mongolian monuments in ^{hp} ags-pa script* (Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, VIII, Wiesbaden, 1957); De Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks', 71–3; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, 155–60. Heers, *Marco Polo*, 234, suggests that Arabic was one of Polo's four languages.

⁶⁹ 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC Documents Arméniens*, II (Paris, 1906), 842.

⁷⁰ Huang Shijian, 'The Persian language in China during the Yuan dynasty', *Papers on Far Eastern History*, XXXIV (September 1986), 83–95.

⁷¹ Pelliot, *Notes*, I, 94–5. For the outbreak of hostilities between Berke and the Emperor Michael, see Marius Canard, 'Un traité entre Byzance et l'Égypte au XIII^e siècle', in *Mélanges offerts à Gaudefroy-Demombynes* (Cairo, 1939–45), 213–19.

⁷² M.M.Siouffi, 'Notice sur un patriarche nestorien', *Journal Asiatique*, 7^e série, XVII, 1881, 90. The evidence is discussed by Pelliot, *Recherches sur les chrétiens d'Asie centrale et d'extrême-orient* (Paris, 1973), 257–9, and by Morris Rossabi, *Voyager from Xanadu: Rabban Sauma and the first journey from China to the West* (Tokyo and New York, 1992), 43–6.

⁷³ Karl-Ernst Lupprian (ed.), *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels* (Vatican City, 1981), 237–41 (no. 47); cf. also Nicholas's letter to the Il-khān, 1 April 1278, *ibid.*, 233–6 (no. 46). For Rabban Sauma, see Jean Richard, 'La mission en Europe de Rabban Çauṃa et l'union des églises', in *XII Convegno Volta (Rome, 1957)*, 162–7; repr. in his *Orient et Occident*.

⁷⁴ E.A.Wallis Budge (tr.), *The monks of Kūblāi Khān Emperor of China* (London, 1928), 181. Rossabi, *Voyager from Xanadu*, 134–8.

⁷⁵ M.H.Laurent, 'Grégoire X et Marco Polo (1269–1271)', *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome*, LVIII (1941–6), 132–44. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', B, ed. R.Röhricht and G.Raynaud, *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, II (1884), documents, 455, has 10 November; 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur', *RHC Historiens Occidentaux*, II (Paris, 1859), 471, gives the date of Gregory's embarkation as the octave of St. Martin, i.e. 18 November. For William of Agen, see Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader states: the secular church* (London, 1980), 270–5.

⁷⁶ 'L'estoire de Eracles', 471. Hans Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1883), 575.

⁷⁷ *La chronique attribuée au Connétable Smbat*, (tr.) Gerard Dédéyan (Paris, 1980), 134; also transl. in A.G.Galstian, *Armianskie istochniki o Mongolakh izvlecheniya iz rukopisei XIII-XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1962), 64.

⁷⁸ Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the thirteenth century*, (tr.) P.M.Holt (London, 1992), 208–9. Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: the Mamluk-Ilkhānid war, 1260–1281* (Cambridge, 1995), 125.

⁷⁹ Critchley, 66–8. For the Lord Edward's appeal, see 'L'estoire de Eracles', 461; R.Röhricht, 'Études sur les derniers temps du royaume de Jérusalem, A. La croisade du prince Édouard d'Angleterre (1270–1274)',

⁸⁰ Giovanni Soranzo, *Il papato, l'Europa cristiana e i Tartari* (Milan, 1930), 217 and n. 2.

⁸¹ Burkhard Roberg, 'Die Tartaren auf dem 2. Konzil von Lyon (1274)', *Annuario Historiae Conciliorum*, v (1973), 288, n. 268, suggests that Gregory wrote to the ʾI-khān Abaqa, at least, from the Holy Land prior to his departure for Italy, in order to notify him of his plans to convene the council.

⁸² See Jean Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen-Âge (XIIIe-XVe siècles)* (Rome, 1977), 85–6. Salimbene, 'Cronica', 210, who names the papal envoys, says in error that they were sent by John XXI.

⁸³ Louis Hambis, 'Le prétendu "Cogatal" de Marco Polo', in *Nel VII. centenario della nascita di Marco Polo* (Venice, 1955), 235–40.

⁸⁴ Critchley, 4, 6–7.

⁸⁵ Cte. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61, 3 vols.) II, 78–9; Cornelio Desimoni (ed.), 'Actes passés en 1271, 1274 et 1279 à l'Aïas (Petite Arménie) et à Beyrouth par devant des notaires génois', *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (1881), documents, 441. Catherine Otten-Froux, 'L'Aïas dans le dernier tiers du XIIIe siècle d'après les notaires génois', in B.Z.Kedar and A.L.Udovitch (ed.), *The medieval Levant: studies in memory of Eliyahu Ashtor (1914–1984)* (Jerusalem, 1988=Asian and African Studies, XXII), 154–5.

⁸⁶ 'Epistolae Fr. Iohannis de Monte Corvino', in Van den Wyngaert, 352–3 (tr. Dawson, *The Mongol mission*, 229); and see n. 58 above.

⁸⁷ Francis Woodman Cleaves, 'A Chinese source bearing on Marco Polo's departure from China and a Persian source on his arrival in Persia', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XXXVI, 1976, 181–203. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, ed. A.A.Alizade and tr. A.K.Arends, m (Baku, 1957), text 280 (and see 281), gives no date for the arrival of the embassy from China, though clearly placing it prior to the winter of 1293–4.

⁸⁸ Jean Aubin, 'Les princes d'Ormuz du XIII^e au xv^e siècle', *Journal Asiatique*, CCXLI, 1953, 88.

⁸⁹ See generally John K.Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese world order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). On the attitudes of the Mongols' predecessors, the Sung emperors, see Herbert Franke, 'Sung embassies: some general observations', in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbours, 10th–14th centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 117; for the post-Yüan era, Henry Serruys, C.I.C.M., *Sino-Mongol relations during the Ming, II: The tribute system and diplomatic missions (1400–1600)* (Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, xiv, Brussels,

1967), 19–21.

⁹⁰ For Qubilai's reign, see Elizabeth Endicott-West, 'Merchant associations in Yüan China: the *Ortoy*', *Asia Major*, 3rd series, II (1989), part 2, 127–54; for the pre-Qubilai era, Thomas T. Allsen, 'Mongolian princes and their merchant partners 1200–1260', *ibid.*, 83–126.

⁹¹ Denis Sinor, 'Diplomatic practices in medieval Inner Asia', in C.E.Bosworth *et al.* (ed.), *The Islamic world from Classical to modern times: Essays in honor of Bernard Lewis* (Princeton, 1989), 342–3.

⁹² Critchley, 38–41, suggests that Marco Polo was inflating his own capacities in a bid to secure a job with the French.

⁹³ Texts conveniently assembled in A.C.Moule, *Quinsai and other notes on Marco Polo* (Cambridge, 1957), 75–6.

⁹⁴ Pelliot, *Notes*, II, 876.

⁹⁵ A point made by Ronald Latham in his introduction to the Penguin translation (1958), 14, n. These passages, however, do appear in abbreviated form in the Tuscan version (Ruggieri, 230–1).

⁹⁶ Francis A.Rouleau, S.J., 'The Yangchow Latin tombstone as a landmark of medieval Christianity in China', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XVII, 1954, 346–65.

⁹⁷ Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Turks in China under the Mongols: a preliminary investigation of Turco-Mongol relations in the 13th and 14th centuries', in Rossabi (ed.), *China among equals*, 281–310. Rossabi, 'The Muslims in the early Yüan dynasty'.

⁹⁸ Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, 121–4.

⁹⁹ Rubruck, 'Itinerarium', xxix, 7–13, in Van den Wyngaert, 253–6; (tr.) Peter Jackson and David Morgan, *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173, London, 1990), 184–7.

¹⁰⁰ Ch.Kohler and C.V.Langlois (ed.), 'Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275–1307)', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, LII (1891), 57.

¹⁰¹ Karl Jahn (ed.), *Die Frankengeschichte des Rašīd ad-Dīn* (2nd ed., Vienna, 1977), Persian text. Tafel 45, German transl., 53.

¹⁰² Richard, 'Isol le Pisan', 188–90. For Ghazan's brief reoccupation of Syria and Palestine, see Sylvia Schein, 'Gesta Dei per Mongolos 1300: the genesis of a non-event', *English Historical Review*, XCIV, 1979, 805–19 (especially 815 ff.).

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